

Knowledge Hegemonies
in the Early Modern World 2

Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms

Ottoman Philosophical
Culture and the Court
Debate Between
Zeyrek and Hocazāde

Efe Murat Balıkcıoğlu



Edizioni
Ca' Foscari

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Series edited by
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I have accrued many debts to those who offered their help, time, and guidance during this long and arduous journey of research and writing. I am most indebted to Pietro Daniel Omodeo and Harun K    k for providing timely encouragement and assistance during the entire process that resulted in this book. I am also immensely grateful to Cemal Kafadar, Hacı Osman G  nd  z, Abdurrahman Mihirig, and Ahmed Tahir Nur for their generous comments, revision suggestions, and diligent readings. The feedback of the two anonymous readers was thoughtful and welcome. I had the chance to present an earlier draft of the Arabic texts along with my English translations at Harvard University's Classical Arabic Reading Group in Spring 2018. I would like to thank Shady H. Nasser, Giovanni Carrera, and Hacı Osman G  nd  z for inviting me to present my research. I began to work on this manuscript during the early months of the unfortunate COVID-19 pandemic. Walden Pond in Concord, MA has been such a peaceful and devotional place for me to draw inspiration for this manuscript during this solitary time. I was also delighted to see that the Turkish manuscript libraries had the most efficient and accommodating system for acquiring copies of manuscripts relevant to one's research. I would like to thank the personnel at S  leymaniye (especially Hasan Tetik), Millet, and Beyazıt Devlet Libraries in Istanbul, Turkey.

This book has been also made possible by the support of several departments and programs. I would like to acknowledge the generosity of Ca' Foscari University of Venice's Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Wellesley College's Departments of Religion (Barbara Geller) and Italian Studies (Sergio Parussa/David Ward), the University of Bologna Faculty Research Exchange Program, and Harvard University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) for their institutional support. Furthermore, I wish to thank Fedor Benevich, Oscar Aguirre-Mandujano, Hasan Umut, and Akif Ercihan Yerliođlu for their invaluable comments on the earlier draft of this book, as well as Aslıhan Akışık,   mer Ayg  n, Joanna Burdzel, Giancarlo Casale, Sharon Elkins, Khaled El-Rouayheb, Simon Grote, Hasan Hacak, James Hankins, Didem Havliođlu, Nil  fer İsvan, Lidwien Kapteijns, Bruce Lawrence, Roy Mottahedeh, G  lru Necipođlu, Adnan Onart, Stefano Pell  , İrvin Cemil Schick, Benny Shaffer, Sunil Sharma, Engin E. Sezer, Jacob Stump, Himmet Taşk  m  r, Cem Tecimer, Wheeler Thackston, Emilio Vavarella, Dilan Yıldırım, Sina Zeytinođlu, and the students who took my REL/PHI 366 Islamic philosophy seminar at Wellesley, for their friendship, collegiality, and thoughtful conversations on the topics covered in this book.

Last but not least, I am eternally thankful to my beloved Seval Haraç and my parents Tevfik and Yasemin Balıkçiođlu. Without their love, devotion, and moral support indeed, I would not be able to complete this study. All remaining errors are entirely of my own.

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Notes on Transliteration and Dates

For the Romanization of texts written in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish, this book uses a slightly modified version of the conventional transliteration system by the *IJMES* (*International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*). The modification that I applied is as follows: For [خ] in Ottoman Turkish I used [h] instead of [kh]; and for [ق], [ص], and [ط] in Ottoman Turkish words, I used [k], [s] and [t] to distinguish them from [ك], [س] and [ت] respectively.

For reference, I have included the transliterations of all passages that I included in the footnotes. Some of my translations and readings are tentative, and I am open to various other alternative readings and suggestions by the wider scholarly community.

I follow the respective rules of Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, and Persian depending on the language of the text, even if some terms may be common in all three languages. I kept common Arabic terms such as *medrese* (Muslim college) and *ulema* (the learned class) as they are pronounced in modern Turkish leaving out the letter *ayn* for reading purposes.

If an Ottoman Turkish expression has an Arabic or Persian origin, then I transliterated the word according to the modified *IJMES* transliteration conventions. If the word is originally Ottoman Turkish, then I did not put any transliteration including Ottoman titles, as in the cases of Kātib Çelebi, Sinān Paşa or Nev'ī Efendi (not Çelebī, Pāshā or Efendī). There were a great number of fifteenth-century Ottoman scholars coming from diverse backgrounds. If the scholar was born and studied in the lands of Rūm, then I treated that scholar as having Ottoman Turkish origins and I used Ottoman Turkish transliteration conventions with an Ottoman Turkish *izāfet* in the title. If the scholar was from Arab or Persian lands, then I transliterated his name by using Arabic conventions (such as 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī) unless

indicated otherwise in some Persian names. For instance, Sinān-ı ‘Acem, a Persian émigré-scholar is generally addressed with a Persian *idāfa*, not as Sinān el-‘Acemī. Some Ottoman Turkish sources also referred to al-Ṭūsī as ‘Alī-yi Ṭūsī or Mevlānā Ṭūsī. For full titles, the Ottomans tended to give the full name in Arabic *idāfa*. For instance, in the case of the Ottoman scholar Ḥayālī’s full title (i.e. Şemseddin Ahmed bin Mūsā el-Ḥayālī), I transliterated his name according to Arabic conventions, but with a Turkish pronunciation.

Last but not least, many works in Ottoman Turkish may have Arabic titles, but the content could still be in Ottoman Turkish. In that regard, if the work is in Ottoman Turkish with an Arabic title, then I transliterated the title and the quotations from that work according to the above-mentioned Ottoman Turkish transliteration conventions (i.e. *Mevzū‘atü’l-‘ulūm or Tācū’t-tevārīh*). If both the title and main text of the work are in Arabic, then I used the *IJMES’* Arabic conventions, even if the work was compiled by an Ottoman scholar (i.e. *Kashf al-zunūn*).

Dates are given according to the Common Era and the Islamic Hijra calendar together.

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Schild der Nothwendigkeit.
Höchstes Gestirn des Seins!
— das kein Wunsch erreicht,
das kein Nein befleckt,
ewiges Ja des Sein's,
ewig bin ich dein Ja:
denn ich liebe dich, o Ewigkeit! — —

Friedrich Nietzsche, "Ruhm und Ewigkeit"*

See the fourth part of the poem "Ruhm und Ewigkeit" in Friedrich Nietzsche's "Dionysos-Dithyramben". *Dionysos-Dithyramben*, 150-1; and *Sämtliche Werke*, 404. The expression "Schild der Nothwendigkeit" is a metaphor by analogy denoting the Aristotelian paradigm set in opposition to "Schild des Dionysos" (Groddeck, *Dionysos-Dithyramben*, 243). For the English version: "Shield of Necessity. | Highest of constellation of Being! | Which no desire can attain, | Which no negation can taint, | Eternal Yes of Being, | I am your lasting Affirmation: | For I love you, oh Eternity!" (Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 140).

1 Introduction

The Agonistic Spirit at the Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Court

Summary 1.1 A Literature Review. The Nature of Early Muslim Debates and Disputations (From *Jadal* and *Munāẓara* to *Ādāb al-baḥth wa-l-munāẓara*). – 1.2 The Transformation of Disputations. The Rise of Collaborative Research and Practice. – 1.3 The Ottoman Case. An Attempt at Reconciling Past Schools by Verification (*Taḥqīq*). – 1.4 An Archaeology of a Court Debate. Hıcazâde versus Zeyrek on God’s Unicity.

The fifteenth-century Ottoman philosophical corpus is a neglected area of research in early modern intellectual history, which has been overshadowed by innumerable studies on philosophical production in other contemporaneous contexts, such as the Italian Renaissance or early modern European thought. These philosophical debates and disputations that took place in Ottoman public and private settings were highly rich in terms of intellectual extent, covering subjects at the intersection of philosophy, theology and, in certain cases, Sufism. These scholarly events mined for potential parallels to specific developments in the history of philosophy. And a good number of them were based on certain Graeco-Arabic doctrines originally purported by the Muslim Peripatetic philosopher and physician Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), also known as Avicenna in the West.

For the early twentieth-century scholarship, the genres of commentary (*sharḥ*) and gloss (*ḥāshiya*), which were popular registers for knowledge production in the post-classical Islamic world, were previously regarded as stale, static, and unoriginal, only restricting themselves to redundant expositions. New studies on the commentary and gloss tradition, however, reveal that the production of knowledge in the early modern Islamic world was a dynamic seedbed of intellectual change and scientific investigation. The analyses of lemmata in the plethora of post-classical commentaries and

glosses reveal that scholars could posit numerous and disparate doctrinal positions, each referencing particular texts, through which the scholars gave their own syntheses based on their own unique perspectives.¹ In order to delve into the philosophical traditions of the late fifteenth-century Ottoman medrese, contemporary scholars of post-classical Islamic intellectual history have to consider the recontextualized philosophical discussions emphasized in the multilayered texts of glosses, by bearing in mind the time span between the *Urtext* and the later textual amendments. The textual tradition in each book could span over hundreds of years.

Competition was a law of the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarship. The scholarly communities and medrese networks were dominated by countless formal debates, royal commissions, written encounters, and snap challenges in which the scholars engaged to prove their superiority in scholarly merit, argumentation, referencing, and religious piety over one another.² The content of these debates covered a wide range of scientific disciplines from religious sciences, such as jurisprudence,³ inheritance law and manumission,⁴ and theology,⁵ to philosophical matters, including logic,⁶ metaphysics and

1 See *Oriens's* special issue on “The *Hāshiyā* and Islamic Intellectual History” introduced and edited by Asad Q. Ahmed and Margaret Larkin, *Oriens*, 41(3-4), 2013. For glosses in *hikma* and *kalām*, see Ahmed, “Post-Classical Philosophical Commentaries/Glosses”, and Wisnovsky, “Avicennism and Exegetical Practice”. The rich nature of commentary and gloss in the post-classical context was previously studied by Wisnovsky in his “The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary”.

2 For an index of academic debates, intellectual rivalries, and scholarly collaborations, see Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 478-82.

3 See the set of exchanges written concerning the question of four principles (*muḳaddimāt-ı erbaʿa*), a topic in the principles of jurisprudence. The discussion was initiated by the Ottoman scholar Mollā ʿAlāeddīn-i ʿArabī (d. 901/1496), and there were responses prepared by his other fifteenth-century contemporaries, including Kaṣṭalānī, Ḥasan-ı Şamsunī, Ḥatībzāde, and Ḥacı Ḥasanzāde, preserved in a single manuscript (Süleymaniye Library, MS Bağdatlı Vehbi 2027). See Ḥoca Saʿdeddīn, *Tācūʿt-tevārīḥ*, 2: 487; Atçıl, *The Formation of the Ottoman Learned Class*, 279-83; Köksal, “Osmanlılarda Mukaddimāt-ı Erbaa Literatürü”.

4 Korkmaz, *Molla Hüsrev'in 'Velâ' Hakkındaki Görüşleri*; Özer, “Molla Hüsrev'in *er-Risâle fî'l-Velâ'sı*”; “Molla Hüsrev'in *Velâ* Meselesi”.

5 The famed fifteenth-century theologian Kaṣṭalānī (d. 901/1496) wrote a treatise of polemics concerning the Timurid verifier al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī's (d. 816/1413) alleged mistakes in six theological issues under the title *I'tirādāt al-Kaṣṭalānī ʿalâ al-Sayyid al-Sharīf*. Sinân Paşa (d. 891/1496) responded to these objections on behalf of Jurjānī, and the exchange was also referred to as “[Kaṣṭalānī's] boasts” (i.e. the *tafākhur* debate). See Ünver, “Molla Kestelli'nin Seyyid Şerif'e”, 111-13.

6 Mollā Luṭfī (d. 900/1495) wrote a treatise titled *al-Sabʿa al-shidād*, a critique of Jurjānī's views on the term of logic ‘subject’ (*mawḏūʿ*) in response to the verifier Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī's (d. 766/1363) points in his commentary on Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī's (d. 682/1283) *Maṭālīʿ al-anwār* in logic (Gökyay, Özen, “Molla Luṭfī”, 258). Mollā ʿİzârī (d. 901/1496), who was in charge of Luṭfī's execution, also penned a refutation of this treatise. See Ḥocazāde's defense of Jurjānī in a discussion with two prominent scholars, the Shaykh al-Islām Efḏālzāde (d. 908/1503) and the Sultan's tutor Ḥoca Ḥayrūddīn (d. ?). The debate concerns Taftāzānī's statement regarding *kalām* being in need of logic (Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 90-1). Besides Mollā Luṭfī's work, also see Mollā Hüsrev's (d. 885/1480) *taḥqīq* on the question of logical definitions with regard to the unity of genus and species, see Üçer, “Müteahhir Dönem Mantık Düşüncesinde”.

natural philosophy,⁷ as well as others, such as rhetoric,⁸ dialectical inquiry,⁹ and mathematics.¹⁰ In fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarship, verifying the truth in the face of different domains of knowledge took many forms, including Sufi epistemology,¹¹ as well as a dialogue with certain other non-Muslim traditions (see chapter 2).

The scholarly exchanges were opportunities for scholars to display their knowledge, make names for themselves and, most importantly, establish their mastery in synthesizing knowledge coming from diverse schools of thought by way of verification (*taḥqīq*), a method of arbitration, closely associated with Avicennism and the post-classical commentary and gloss practice.¹² *Taḥqīq* is a form of constatation to ascertain already established truths through the process of acquiring a thing's true existence, an essential way of knowing based on skepticism towards the past and openness to independent reasoning and syncretism. According to Khaled El-Rouayheb, the culture of arbitration during the seventeenth century, which could be regarded as the "age of *taḥqīq*" in the Arabic-speaking regions of the Ottoman Empire, insisted on the insufficiency of 'imitation' (*taqlīd*), that is, acceptance of the creed based on uncritical affirmation of what one has been

7 See the fifteenth-century Ottoman adjudications (*muḥākamāt*) on Ghazālī's critique of the philosophers in his *Tahfūt al-falāsifa* (Özervarlı, "Arbitrating Between al-Ghazālī and the Philosophers", 375-97 and van Lit, "An Ottoman Commentary Tradition", 368-413).

8 The celebrated jurist Mollā Hüsrev penned an unedited gloss on Taftāzānī's *Mutawwal*, objecting to the criticisms by 'Abdullāh-ı Kırımı (d. 879/1474) (Millet Library, MS Feyzullah Efendi 1791). See Alak, "Molla Hüsrev'in Belâgat İlimlerine" and "Şeyhülislâm Molla Hüsrev'in Belâgatle".

9 For an adjudication in dialectical inquiry (*ādāb al-baḥth*), see Belhaj, "Mullā Khusraw as a Dialectician".

10 Fazlıoğlu, "Ali Kuşçu'nun Bir Hendese Problemi".

11 See the forthcoming article by Balıkcıoğlu, "In the Crucible of Ottoman *Taḥqīq*" to be published in the special *taḥqīq* issue of *The Journal of Early Modern History*, 27, 2023 edited by Giancarlo Casale. The term *ahl-e kashf wa-taḥqīq* (often contrasted with *ahl-e zāhir* or *taqlīd*) was initially used for a select number of distinct Timurid scholars who synthesized Ibn 'Arabī's doctrines with Sunni theology, occultism, and Avicennan philosophy. For the use of *taḥqīq* in the context of the Timurid scholar Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī (d. 858/1454) and his milieu, see Binbaş, *Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran*, 98-9. The earlier sense of *taḥqīq* implied the concordance of natural, philosophical, scriptural, and mystical knowledge with specific references to Akbarī theosophy, the Neoplatonist vocabulary of the syncretic *Ikhwān al-ṣafā'*, esoteric sciences, as well as various key doctrines, such as the unity of opposites, the causal connectivity among lower and celestial bodies (astral determinism), *waḥdat al-wujūd*, and the belief that Arabic letters inscribed in the Qur'ān hid divine secrets. Associating a distinct intellectual network of scholars who sought ways to prove the unity of *madhabs* and differing schools of thought including the fifteenth-century Timurid syncretic universalist-occultists Yazdī and Ibn Turka, *ahl-e taḥqīq* was a term further employed for a distinct network of Islamicate jurists like Husayn al-Akhlāṭī (d. 799/1397) and Akmal al-Dīn al-Bābertī (d. 786/1384), as well as the Hanafī lettrist-mystic al-Biṣṭāmī (d. 858/1454). All those figures were linked to Ottoman verifiers, such as Mollā Fenārī and Qāḍizāde-i, as well as the jurist-mystic rebel Şeyḫ Bedreddīn (d. 819/1416) in various capacities (Binbaş, *Intellectual Networks*, 100-6). Having spent most of his later life in the Ottoman Brusa, Biṣṭāmī was known for his preoccupation with natural sciences, prognostication and astronomical/astrological compendia based on Timurid models. His extant compendia with apocalyptic/messianic themes date back to the first two years of Mehmed II's reign, which suggests that the millennial-universalist tendencies in political vision was a common trend in the post-Mongol Islamicate world (Fleischer, "Ancient Wisdom and New Sciences", 232-6). As a category different from *faḥḥāṣif* or *mutakallim*, *muḥaqqiq* (one who realizes) referred more specifically to high caliber Sufis associated with the school of Ibn 'Arabī (Chittick, *Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul*, 45-57; "The School of Ibn 'Arabī", 510-16; Dagli, *Ibn al-'Arabī and Islamic Intellectual Culture*, 100).

12 Wisnowsky, "Avicennism and Exegetical Practice", as well as Brentjes, *Teaching and Learning the Sciences*, 175-7; and, for the context of verification in the Ottoman North Africa, see El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*.

told by elders, peers, teachers, and books¹³ – as opposed to the rational demonstration of the truth of the Islamic creed through demonstrative arguments and critical assessments.¹⁴

Within the very limited literature available on early modern Islamic intellectual history, the contemporaneous achievements of Muslim scholars during the Renaissance are vastly overlooked. Current research reveals that like their contemporaries in the Italian world, there was a similar vibrant community of Muslim scholars who mediated between different schools of thought through synthesis and verification, even those deemed to be against the central orthodoxy of Islam.¹⁵ A competent verifier (*muḥaqqiq*) in the Ottoman context was expected to arbitrate among diverse doctrines with rigor and finesse in argumentation, not with blind imitation. In that sense, a master verifier was not only asked to give exact references to past debates, but also should be able to restate them in the new context. *Tahqīq* required that the verifier adhered most closely to demonstrative (*burhānī*) arguments as opposed to rhetorically persuasive arguments, often having followed Avicenna's own critical method or defended his positions.¹⁶ *Tahqīq* did not necessarily aim at breaking away from the tradition but tackled new formulations based on the internal assessment of traditional sources present by moving away from the standard interpretation.

The fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarly culture denoted the efficacious resort to skill, power, calculation, and self-control, which could be argued to have corresponded to the Ancient Greek principle of *agôn* (ἀγών).¹⁷ With regard to the formal qualities of various types of games, Roger Caillois singles out agonistics as the backbone of competitive games, including sports, as well as scholarly debates and disputations, in which adversaries confront each other under ideal conditions, susceptible to assigning precise and incontestable value to the winner's triumph based on ambition, valor and, in the early Ottoman context, erudition and scholarly merit. The Ottoman agonistics were total actions, reflecting authority, codification, and competitive merit. The evaluations were based on the arbitration of a capable referee who acted as the guardian of truth and veracity.¹⁸

Besides scholarly debates and disputations, snap challenges were also a form of popular exchanges among Ottoman scholars with past rivalry and personal animosity. These phenomena aimed at proving one's superiority in knowledge and argumentation skills in often off-the-cuff settings, and had

13 In the religio-legal context, *taqlīd* is understood to be a scaffolded doctrine within the system of school conformism as opposed to *ijtihād*, yet this did not mean that many possible changes and amendments could be introduced within each doctrine. In the scholarly context, *taqlīd*, in turn, is understood in juxtaposition to *tahqīq*. For the religio-legal context, see Ibrahim, "Rethinking the *Taqlīd* Hegemony" and Jackson, "*Taqlīd*, Legal Scaffolding".

14 In their dictionaries of technical terms, 'Abd al-Ra'ūf al-Munāwī (d. 1622) and Ebū'l-Bekā Kefevī (d. 1684) both defined that *tahqīq* is "to establish the proof of a scholarly question" (*ithbāt dalīl al-mas'ala*) (El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 4, 27-8, 357-60).

15 Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 1-23.

16 For the case of verification in the Islamic context of philosophical sciences, see Wisnovsky, "On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism", 273. Technically speaking, verification is a method of acquiring a real definition of a concept by achieving a complete and essential conception (Ibrahim, "Fahṛ al-Dīn al-Rāzī", 396; Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 276-9).

17 Caillois, *Man, Play and Games*, 72; Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 30-1, 48-50.

18 For the status of referees in the Italian debate culture, Quint, "Dueling and Civility", 231-4.

close connotations in the Greek concept of ‘dare to contest’ as in *agôn* and, arguably, Immanuel Kant’s later *sapere aude* (dare to know) borrowed from the Latin poet Horace. There are numerous extant accounts of such exchanges in which the fellow scholar tried to challenge the other party in the presence of other scholars before even greeting his adversary.¹⁹

The practice of *agôn* is a vindication of personal responsibility, and assumes sustained attention, determined application, and the desire to win.²⁰ Its corruption only begins when no referee or decision is recognized. Depending on the context of the scientific method and value system of the society, an agonistic debate has to be based on meritocracy and high achievement.²¹

The culture of scholarly debates (*mubâḥaşât-ı ‘ilmiyye* in Ottoman Turkish)²² was a prominent feature of court life in the post-classical Islamic world. Particularly through its formal structure, ambitious display of scholarly pride, and close links to patronage activities, this culture shared an affinity with the intellectual life of other contemporary Islamicate courts, including Timurid/post-Timurid Persia and Mamlūk Egypt,²³ and found new venues in knowledge transfer, especially in the cases of Baghdad and Isfahan, two cities that were in continued intercity dialogue despite their competing distinctions in language (Arabic/Persian), religious affiliation (Sunnī/Shī‘ī) and cultures of early sciences and their developments.²⁴ The Ottoman Sultan, his viziers, or the scholars themselves could initiate the scholarly debates. If a discussion was commissioned or ordered (*amara*) by the Sultan, an official debate could be held in front of the members of the ruling class along with various reputable scholars of the day, and the debate could result in the promotion of the victorious party to a higher post or the loser’s removal from a seat, should the end result prove especially humiliating. These exchanges were not limited to sciences but also extended to the arts, and the case of the Ottoman panegyrics even saved the lives of scholar-poets who managed to combine political confessionism with advanced rhetorical skills.²⁵

The egalitarian spirit of *agôn*, a term that dates back to Ancient Greece, was at the heart of the Ottoman scholarly practice. The debates were regulated and subject to arbitration and evaluation by a qualified referee or a

19 As for exemplary snap exchanges, see Hocaazâde and ‘Alî Kūşçu on the tidal waves in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bosphorus: Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqâ’iq al-nu‘mâniyya*, 161; Hoca Sa‘deddîn, *Tâcüt-tevârîh*, 2: 490-1; al-Laknawî, *al-Fawâ'id al-bahiyya*, 352; Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 94-5. The epistolary exchange between the late fifteenth-century scholars Aḥî Çelebi and Gulâm Sinân regarding the critique of their respective glosses on Şadr al-Sharî‘a’s commentary on *al-Wiqāya* in jurisprudence: Özen, “Sahn-ı Semân’da Bir Atışma”.

20 Caillois, *Man, Play and Games*, 14-18; Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought*, 46-7.

21 Caillois, *Man, Play and Games*, 46.

22 In Ottoman biobibliographical sources, the term was employed as *mübâḥiş-i ‘ilmiyye*. See, for instance, Muhtesibzâde, *Hadâ’ik al-reyhân [Terceme-i şakâ’ik]*, MS TSMK 1263, f. 98a.

23 See Brentjes, “Patronage, Networks and Migration”; Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion*, 63-4; Broadbridge, “Academic Rivalry and the Patronage System”.

24 See Kheirandish, *Baghdad and Isfahan*. For ‘one-volume libraries’ (as in Franz Rosenthal’s coinage) from Işfahân, which included a *thematically-curated* select number of canonical works in philosophy, see Endress, “Philosophische ein-Band-Bibliotheken aus Isfahan”.

25 The competitive spirit, as well as the rewarding mechanism, extended to skillfully composed panegyrics addressed to the ruling class, which were often honored with salaries, prizes, and ceremonial robes. The Ottoman panegyrics were always politically motivated. In some cases, they also saved one’s life, as in Veliyüddîn Aḥmed Paşa’s (d. 902/1496-97) panegyric to Mehmed II (Aguirre-Mandujano, “The Social and Intellectual World”).

notary before the announcement of the victorious.²⁶ Though the agonistic spirit had often been associated with sports in Ancient Greece, the Socratic tradition did encourage philosophy as *agôn* as an indispensable feature of the philosophical method *elenchos/elenchus* (ἐλεγχος, cross-examination) to get at truth, which was in direct opposition to the rhetorical character of philosophical sophistry. In this case, the combativeness of the Homeric hero in warfare was directed at philosophical truth and certainty, and Socrates' agonistic *elenchos* also transformed the interlocutors in their commitment to inquiry, the outcome of which could be evaluated based on the criteria of the day.²⁷

All knowledge including philosophy is polemical by nature, and polemics cannot be divorced from agonistics.²⁸ An agonistic impulse in philosophical debates gravitates towards the rigor and ambition to reach truth through a cooperative search between the interlocutors. In the case of *elenchus*, the questioner takes upon himself the task of refuting the other party's arguments or bringing out counter-explanations.²⁹ 'Winning' means showing oneself superior in the outcome of a game since the object for which scholars compete is victory that may be based on merit, erudition, etiquette or, simply, a semblance of superiority in expected criteria.³⁰

The relationship between erudition and credibility informs the dynamics of early modern Ottoman disputes, which, in fact, resembled highly codified (verbal) duels exercised in the Italian Renaissance.³¹ Nonetheless "there were no medals to be won", as Monica Azzolini suggests, in scientific duels in the Italian context, so the discussions were more directed at one's public reputation rather than institutional standing. One could race with another for a prospect, yet, for the Italian context, there were no apparent losers or those who were removed from their positions indefinitely.³² A great variety of semi-

26 See the exchange between the mathematician Niccolò Tartaglia (1499/1500-57) and the polymath Girolamo Cardano (1501-76) for the case of notary, Azzolini, "There Were no Medals", 275-6.

27 Metcalf, *Philosophy as Agôn*, 22, 106 and for its crossovers in classical Chinese thought, Wong, "Agon and Hé". In turn, for sophistry as play, see Huizinga, "Play-Forms in Philosophy", in *Homo Ludens*, 146-57. With regard to the Socratic *elenchus*, the method of refuting the empty belief in one's own wisdom, Gregory Vlastos has singled out two types, i.e. standard versus indirect *elenchus*, such that the former corresponds to Socrates' main instrument of philosophical investigation, for the latter is uncommitted to the truth of the premise-set from which he deduces the refutation of the refutant in a way that the original claim does not play a role in the process (Vlastos, "The Socratic *Elenchus*", 711-14). Recent studies have shown that there was no such distinction in Socrates' method; and both aspects rather consider *elenchus* as "an argument in which an interlocutor's original claim is rejected when it is seen to be inconsistent with other things that the interlocutor believes" (Young, "The Socratic *Elenchus*", 56-8). Recent discussions concerning the nature of *elenchus* focus on whether this method is a systematic and uniform method of refutation with set premises or it simply exposes certain inconsistencies without being able to refute a given moral thesis or *endoxon* (Wolsdorf, "Socratic Philosophizing", 34-40).

28 Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 156.

29 Metcalf, *Philosophy as Agôn*, 6-8.

30 Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 50.

31 There were various types of duels, including verbal and hot-blooded vendetta, yet violence still had its codified etiquette of politeness, even if it ended in a gory fashion. Duellos could be verbal, physical or written (e.g. in lieu of *cartelli*) (see Quint, "Duelling and Civility", 264-5; Weinstein, "Fighting or Flying?"). In the early Islamic world, the debates against the dialectics of the philosophizing theologians were "fierce" (Belhaj, "Disputation is a Fighting Sport"). In the fifteenth-century Ottoman context, could the execution of Mollâ Luṭfi, which have been recently viewed to be political rather than theological in nature, be considered as a revenge act in lieu of dueling?

32 Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 264-5.

public exchanges were simply based on honor, reputation, and personal animosity with the aim of “gaining profit in the form of status and patronage”.³³ Scholars were making careers out of polemics and controversy, as honor and reward were complementary aspects of court visibility and state support.

Similar to the fifteenth-century Ottoman world, the scholarly exchanges at the Italian Renaissance universities were verbal arenas in which the scholars demonstrated their ability to argue strongly in Latin, by reflecting on a question, making inferences and conclusions through their strict argumentation and, in the case of the medical professor Girolamo Cardano (1501-76) who was never bested by anyone in his lifetime, even by discomfiting opponents with quoted passages from memory.³⁴

Some of these exchanges were simply motivated by claims of supremacy, original authorship, historical meanings or priority³⁵ in a given subject, instead of focusing on content and output. Historically speaking, a good number of disputes in the context of the Italian Renaissance, such as the exchanges between the mathematicians Niccolò Tartaglia (1499/1500-57) and Ludovico Ferrari (1522-65) or the astronomers Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and Baldassarre Capra (1580-1626), were related to honor, priority, and the claims of plagiarism, rather than scientific credibility and content.

Both in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean, disputations were not also limited to the junior and senior members of the academy. Novice students were able to only find lectureship positions in the coming academic years or even future preferment in ecclesiastical and political enterprises based on their performance (see the case of scholarly disputations at the University of Bologna at the turn of the sixteenth-century).³⁶ A novice student, as in the case of one of the primary scholars of this study, Hocaşade Muşlıhuddîn Muştafâ (d. 893/1488), was eager to seek an agonistic activity with his peers or seniors in order to demonstrate his prowess and aptitude in knowledge. Likewise, disputations had a lasting impact in one's career, and universities often competed one another in order to gain the upper hand to make a name for their institutions and designate academic adversaries, often motivated by ensuing political conflicts and tug-of-wars for territorial hegemony.³⁷

Across cultures and traditions, the functions of debates and disputations as global social constructs may vary from legitimizing, defending, and acknowledging certain rights and doctrines,³⁸ to creating a propaganda for

33 Azzolini, “There Were No Medals”, 269. For a case study of Italian artistic games of honor and profit, see Hoklman, “For Honor and Profit”, and for the case of the professional disputes and feuds among English medical practitioners, Harley, “Honor and Property”.

34 Grendler, *The Universities of the Italian Renaissance*, 152-4. Also see the case of Hocaşade in chapter 3.

35 For the priority dispute between the mathematicians Tartaglia and Cardano concerning a general rule for the solution of algebraic equations to the third degree or cubic equations, see Long, *Openness, Secrecy, Authorship*, 198-201. The debates could be even extended to the historical meanings of certain words against various forms of politico-legal codifications and censorship, see McCuaig, *Carlo Sigonio*, 174-250. For Carlo Sigonio's (1524-1584) famous disputation with the humanist Francesco Robortello (1516-1567) on the Roman questions and the republic with references to various volumes of commentary, see McCuaig, *Carlo Sigonio*, 41-50.

36 Matsen, “Students' ‘Arts’ Disputations”.

37 Denley, “Academic Rivalry and Interchange”.

38 Graf, “Christliche Polemik”, 832-4.

promotion, reinforcing communal identity, and having an instructive nature.³⁹ Besides the institutional and careeristic aspects of disputations, the defense of certain doctrines did lead to a conflict with the religious authority. One of the most famed disputations of the Renaissance, which never took place, was the anticipated defense of Pico della Mirandola's (1463-94) thirteen theses included in his *Conclusiones nongentae*. Out of nine hundred, the papacy condemned thirteen theses offering Pico to participate in a disputation in Rome sometime after 6 January 1487.⁴⁰

1.1 A Literature Review. The Nature of Early Muslim Debates and Disputations (From *Jadal* and *Munāzara* to *Ādāb al-baḥṭh wa-l-munāzara*)

Dialectic was an indispensable tool for scientific inquiry and knowledge transfer in the Islamic world, promulgating rational methods and procedures for scholarly disputation under the rubric of *jadal* (dialectical disputation) and *munāzara* (dialectical investigation) or, in later centuries, *ādāb al-baḥṭh wa-l-munāzara* (protocols of dialectical inquiry and investigation).⁴¹ *Jadal*, an early adopted method of argumentation in religious sciences, was a pedagogical instrument that sought the opponent's assent, whereas the *munāzara* was perceived as a more truth-oriented investigation, since it sought veracity through proof - not the rhetorical superiority over one view over another.⁴²

Munāzara gained technical precision by the thirteenth century, and began to be often associated with rational sciences as a method of inquiry formulized under *ādāb al-baḥṭh wa-l-munāzara*, a style aimed at bungling inquiries, reducing your opponent to concession, or silencing based on proof-seeking indicants and logical implications.⁴³ As a form of formal investigation, *baḥṭh* was directed at veracity and brought a new parameter that was picked up by philosophers who eschewed from *jadal* due to its rhetorical and logical fallacies.⁴⁴ It was not a coincidence that the court debates and disputations - whether oral or written - in the Ottoman context, were re-

39 Holmberg, "The Public Debate".

40 Grendler, *The Universities of the Italian Renaissance*, 156.

41 Young, "Dialectic in the Religious Sciences".

42 Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 9-11. Compared to the Aristotelian dialectic, the Arabic *jadal* (especially in the case of Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, d. 478/1085) was closer to the peirastic form than to eristic since *jadal* was believed to lead to truth in theology and jurisprudence (Widigdo, "Aristotelian Dialectic, Medieval *Jadal*", 19). For an overview of disputation culture in early Islamic history, Abū Zahra, *Tārīkh al-jadal*. For a full bibliography of primary and secondary resources in Islamic culture of disputation, see the website of Society for the Study of Islamicate Dialectical Disputation (SSIDD): <https://ssidd.org>.

43 Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 9-11.

44 Fārābī regards philosophy among the certain sciences that asserted themselves as the intended end of investigative activity with principles that are universal, true, and certain; whereas the dialectic, that is, the tool or servant of scientific art, is equally concerned with where something is said as well as what is said, aiming for universal and generally accepted premises (Di Pasquale, *Al-Fārābī's Book of Dialectic*, 149-51). As for Fārābī's criticism of *ādāb al-jadal* that this method failed to establish truth with thorough examination, close study, and precision (*istiḡṣā*), see Gyekye, "Al-Fārābī on the Logic" and Miller, "Al-Fārābī's Dispute". With regard to theological discussions in the method and criteria for logical reasoning, see Frank, "The *Kalām*" and van Ess, "The Logical Structure".

ferred to as *baḥth* from the root *b-ḥ-th* or, as a verbal noun in its increased third form, *mubāḥatha/mübāḥase*, which also described a mutual exercise directed at acquiring knowledge through investigation.

Dialectic as the art of argumentation first diffused into the Abbasid sources through the first translation of Aristotle's *Topics* by the Nestorian Patriarch Timothy I (d. 208/823) under the title *Kitāb al-jadal*, a work which was commissioned by the third caliph al-Mahdī (d. 169/785). Timothy I was also known for his apology (including a discussion on the singular versus triune nature of God) written as a result of a two-day's debate between him as the Catholicos of the East Syrian Church and the Caliph himself. Both sides debated the tenets of each other's religion in sympathy and piety – the former especially praising the Caliph's theology.⁴⁵

The introduction of *jadal* as a general method for knowledge inquiry had close connections to the claims of universalism, political leadership, and proselytizing religion.⁴⁶ The early collections of scholarly exchanges in the Islamic world go back the ninth- and tenth-century Abbasid Baghdad, at a time when Christian and Muslim scholars penned disputations in a great variety of subjects, and most of these debates consisted of either interfaith dialogues between Christian and Muslim theologians or discussions related to the transmission of knowledge from different religious sources and intellectual communities.

Before the advent of Islam, the disputation was already a form of formal exchange between religious scholars, and there were even earlier debates recorded, such as the case of the debate between the Sasanian viceroy of northern Iraq, Mar Qardagh, and his Christian mentor, the hermit Abdišo, on the question on the nature of eternal and created realities, an event indicated the transfer of knowledge and cultural exchange at the Byzantine-Sasanid border.⁴⁷ As early as the fifth century, there were East-Syrian Christian disputations (*drāṣā*) directed at controversial aspects of prevalent religions of the day, including apologetics, propaganda pamphlets in support of a candidate for the elections of a new catholicos,⁴⁸ as well as defenses of certain Christian tenets against various monotheistic denominations and their non-monotheistic opponents, such as Jews, various Christian sects, Samaritans, Zoroastrians, Manicheans, and other pagan religions.⁴⁹

The rigor of religious disputations of the Syriac Christian scholars carried over to the early centuries of the Islamic period. Scholars like Josef van Ess, Michael Cook, and Gerhard Endress studied the narrative structure of early Syriac and Arabic polemics, showing the abundance of dialectic disputations as the foremost method of intellectual inquiry in the context of Mus-

⁴⁵ Mingana, *The Apology of Timothy the Patriarch*, 1-10 and, for the definitions of God in both traditions, 17-23. Also see Beaumont, "Speaking of the Triune God".

⁴⁶ Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, 62-7; Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic*, 46-8.

⁴⁷ Walker, "Refuting the Eternity of the Stars".

⁴⁸ Holmberg, "The Public Debate", 51.

⁴⁹ For a list of such religious polemics and disputations, see the titles preserved by the East-Syrian bibliographer 'Abdišo' of Nisibis (d. 1318) in *Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers*. Walker mentions that some of the titles were framed as prose dialogues in the Byzantine style (Walker, "Refuting the Eternity of the Stars", 169-70). For an overview of Byzantine polemical disputations, Cameron, "Disputations, Polemical Literature" and a study of polemics with regard to the Byzantine anti-Judaism, Külzer, *Disputationes Graecae*.

lim-Christian dialogue.⁵⁰ These debates and disputations covered a number of interreligious subjects concerning the transmission and modification of Greek and Syriac works into Arabic, the relationship between reason and revelation and/or logic and grammar, along with topics in Syriac and Arabic philosophy and theology, including but not limited to, hypostases, unity, trinity,⁵¹ the nature of created beings, and the question of God's divine attributes and causal power.⁵²

With the advent of the translation movement in Baghdad, the general concerns of the debate shifted from Christian-Muslim disputes related to catechism and creed, to the question of reconciliation of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonist traditions with the monotheistic strands of religious thought.⁵³ This trend also continued in the post-classical Islamic world, where the system of Avicenna was discussed, amended, and criticized by a plethora of scholars who produced work in post-classical Avicennism (*ḥikma*) and philosophical theology (*kalām*) that developed twelfth century onwards and, as in the Ottoman case, a great number of debates attempted at reconciling these traditions in the face of emerging scholarship.

Dialectical disputation was indeed an esteemed literary genre in early Arabic literary tradition, a source of amusement, competition, and struggle that lent other Islamicate contexts certain traits in etiquette and composition. Having analyzed the common narrative structures of extant public disputations during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, Bo Holmberg has presented various distinctive traits of the genre that also existed in the Ottoman world, such as motivation, description, the presence of an official person, the rewarding mechanism, as well as the winner ('hero') versus the loser ('anti-hero').⁵⁴ The narratives regarding competing parties were common literary topoi in Arabic biobibliographical sources, often taking a position on the personage in question through praise or polemic.⁵⁵

50 There are various case studies of early Muslim disputations and dogma published by Josef van Ess and Michael Cook, such as van Ess, *Traditionistische Polemik* and Cook, *Early Muslim Dogma* respectively. Cook has accentuated the importance of Syriac intermediaries in the role of the Muslim theologians' acquiring this method for the development of *kalām* (Cook, "The Origins of *Kalām*"). For a recently edited volume, which covers the philosophical exchanges and case studies among the rival Muslim and Christian scholars, see Janos, *Ideas in Motion*; especially the chapters by Gerhard Endress and Olga Lizzini. Also see the article on the logical roots of Arabic theology by van Ess, "The Logical Structure". For the uses of disputation in theology, see van Ess, "Disputationspraxis in der Islamischen Theologie", 932-8 and, for the genres of refutations (*mu'āraḍa*) and public disputation (*munāẓara*), and the structure and milieu of the *munāẓara* practice, van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, 4: 725-37. For the sociopolitical contexts of interfaith dialogues on dialectics, Aristotelian physics, and theology, see Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, 61-74; and also with regard to the context of early heresies (*zanādiq*), *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, 1: 423-56.

51 For a treatise on a similar topic with the Zeyrek-Ḥocazāde debate, see Holmberg, *A Treatise*. Also Hundhammer, "Die Trinitätsdiskussion".

52 As for the early Christian apologetics in defense of Christianity against the doctrinal criticism of Islam, see Griffith, *The Beginnings of Christian Theology*, as well as his "Disputing with Islam in Syriac". For the sources of early Syriac Christian-Arab Muslim disputations, Pietruschka, "Streitgespräche", 152-8. For Arab Christian apologetics, see Sbath, *Mubāḥath falsafiyya*.

53 See Watt, "The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition". In the works of the sixth-century Syriac scholar and priest Sergius of Rēsh'aynā, Watt has argued that Syriac Aristotelianism was a compromise between Christianity and the pagan philosophy taught in the School of Alexandria.

54 Watt, "The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition", 48-50.

55 For a study of the general characteristics of polemical exchanges in Islamic biobibliographical sources, see Douglas, "Controversy and Its Effects".

In this sense, dialectical disputations merged arrogance and quarrelsomeness with competitiveness based on the scholars' skill in syllogistic logic.⁵⁶ A paragon of the early debate genre was the seminal exchange between and the Arab grammarian Abū Sa'īd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) and the tenth century Christian philosopher Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus (d. 328/940), one of the pioneers of the Baghdad School of Aristotelianism. The court debate was held upon the request of the Abbasid vizier Abu'l-Faṭḥ Ibn Furāt in the year 320/932, who asked Sīrāfī to take up the refutation of Bishr Mattā's claim that logic was the only way to distinguish truth from falsity. The debate itself carried the tension raging between the representatives of conventional Arabic scholarship versus the proponents of the Greek sciences (especially logic). The accounts showed that Mattā was not able to keep up with Sīrāfī's questions, coming to terms with the fact that, as in the words of Gerhard Endress, he failed to prove that Greek logic transcended the limitations of language, and contained universal laws of reason inherent in the structure of language.⁵⁷

The early sources on Arabic disputation etiquette outlined various reasons for defeat. Refraining from answering the question, lacking a guiding principle, or having an inadequate reply to the arguments presented were explicit reasons but, additionally, there were also some other individual signs of defeat, such as silence, peevishness, incapacity, digression, contradiction, incommensurability, reduction *ad absurdum*, and appeal to the crowd.⁵⁸

In that context, one of the highlights of the debate was the Abbasid vizier Ibn Furāt's intervention in the discussion obliging Mattā to reply Sīrāfī's tangential questions with substantial counter-arguments. Mattā himself regarded the vizier's points as digressions and could not fully develop and reiterate his point in a deft manner, thereby accepting the opponent's superiority.⁵⁹ Ibn Furāt's intercession indicates the presence of an external arbiter who directed the conversation if the answers were not satisfactorily outlined, which was a sign of defeat.

Beyond the formal setting of reading groups at various mosques (*ḥalaqāt*), which were mostly reserved for religious sciences, the *majālis* (sing. *majlis*), i.e. séances of learned literary exchange grouped around influential scholars, were the main social settings for learning, deliberation, and discussion.⁶⁰ The model of Mattā-Sīrāfī debate had a lasting impact on future generations because, despite the fact that he was the loser of the debate, his students were armed with a better understanding of the grammarian's technique in the decades to come. Mattā's successor to the chair of logic, the

56 van Ess, *The Flowering of Muslim Theology*, 185-8.

57 For the historical account of the debate, see the eleventh-century philosopher al-Tawḥīdī, *Kitāb al-imtā' wa'l-mu'ānasa*, 107-33 and Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-udabā'*, 894-908. There is a manuscript recorded in Sultan Aḥmed III's (d. 1149/1976) Topkapı Palace Library inventory of Tawḥīdī's work from the year 815-16/1413, see MS 2389 Topkapı, 429 folios. *Kitāb al-imtā'* covers Tawḥīdī's philosophical and literary conversations with his friend Abū al-Wafā al-Buzjānī and the Buwayhī vizier Ibn Sa'dān, including forty topics and spanning a period of thirty-nine nights (Tawḥīdī also included the episode between Sīrāfī and Mattā). See Margoliouth, "The Discussion", and Abderrahmane "Discussion". For the précis of the debate, Endress, "The Debate"; Versteegh, "The Debate Between Logic and Grammar" and Günaydın, *Al-Sīrāfī's Theory*, 47-77.

58 For a list of signs of defeat based on early works on *jadāl*, such as by the Karaite Jew Jacob al-Qirḡisānī (d. after 937) and his Shī'ite contemporary Abū al-Ḥusayn Iṣḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Kātib, see Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 39-46.

59 Margoliouth, "The Discussion", 123.

60 Osti, "The Practical Matters of Culture"; Endress, "Theology as a Rational Science", 225.

Jacobite scholar Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī (d. 363/974), and his Muslim disciple Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (d. after 391/1001) continued in the path of their master by preparing treatises on the meaning and topic of logic and grammar as fundamental disciplines.⁶¹ Along with those on other subjects,⁶² they argued for the independence of logic and its centrality in scientific inquiry. It was another student of Mattā, the great Muslim philosopher Abū Nasr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) who would later place logic to the highest position in his enumeration of the sciences.⁶³

Thanks to the Islamic practice of dialectical investigation, the Abbasid debate culture fostered a group of scholars who would continue to develop their research practice in generations to come. The legacy of early debates characterized by a strict code of disputation etiquette, thus, paved the way for future systematic investigations led by the scholars of classical Arabic philosophy and theology.

1.2 The Transformation of Disputations. The Rise of Collaborative Research and Practice

The medieval Latin *quaestiones* had a different trajectory from post-classical Islamic disputations. It was the chief method of instruction at schools and universities until its demise in the seventeenth century, especially when a new form of criticism challenged the status of the Aristotelian *sophismata* as a verified way of scientific inquiry.⁶⁴ Starting with its eleventh century application in Roman law, theology, and exegesis, and finally to logic in the Mertonian tradition of the fourteenth-century Oxford, the disputations as methods of scientific inquiry gained prominence and began to be employed for discussions in medicine and natural philosophy afterwards.⁶⁵ It was only from the sixteenth century onwards, the reaction against the fallacious nature of scholastic disputations took many forms, by garnering first the attention of the Italian humanists and, then, the emerging class of medical doctors and scientist-engineers who especially favored a new empirical methodology based on anatomical and surgical procedures.

61 Çıkar, “Nahiv ve Mantık”.

62 The relationship between logic and grammar was not the only subject-matter to be covered, and even questions on the definition of the Aristotelian concept of nature was also debated in a series of lemmata by Christian Arab philosophers of the eleventh-century Baghdad against Avicenna’s disposition: Brown, “Avicenna and the Christian Philosophers”.

63 Endress, “The Debate”, 320.

64 See the chapter “The *disputatio de sophismatibus*”, in Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 39-44. For the reception of dialectic in Christian Latin tradition, Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation* and Donavin, Poster, Utz, *Medieval Forms of Argument*, especially Bose, “The Issue of Theological Style”, 4-8.

65 As for the development of new syllogistic methodology to be applied to scientific discussions and later its application to medicine and natural philosophy, see chapters “The Mertonian Tradition”, “Medial *quaestiones disputatae* c. 1250-1450”, and “*Quaestiones disputatae in physica* During the Late 15th and 16th Centuries”, in Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 45-52, 66-84, and 85-100 respectively.

Having been adopted as an essential method of theological inquiry in the late medieval world, disputations expelled any qualms about the applicability of logical techniques to religious dogmas early on.⁶⁶ The academic counterparts to the Timurid and Ottoman public debates were also present at medieval universities of Europe, including Oxford, Paris, and Padua: the *quaestiones ordinariae* were disputations on a fixed subject with the participation of questioners, professors, and students, whereas the *quaestiones de quodlibet* could cover any subject proposed by any participant. The debates could concern any range of topics from the merits of particular sciences to cross-religious theological and eschatological matters, such as the Trinity and the unicity of the monotheistic God, similar to the Islamic world.

The earlier application of disputations in law and theology at medieval universities yielded to often controversial, innovative, and productive results in combatting heresies, as well as resolving or harmonizing conflicting references, which constituted alternative solutions to perennial debates in theology. They applied induction, experiential method, and verification to philosophical subject (including more practical Aristotelian topics), paving the way for an attempt at verifying complex universal truths in medieval quodlibetal disputations.⁶⁷

By the fourteenth century, the quodlibetal disputations took another form culminating in types of disputations called the *sophismata* that dwelled on ambiguous, puzzling or simply difficult sentences that had to be resolved, or the ambiguous propositions that could be both true and wrong (see the case of the Liar Paradox in Islamic philosophy).⁶⁸

The *sophisma* was a technical term with no pejorative connotations, which referred to a puzzling or an ambiguous sentence presenting logical hardships. Despite being distinguished from sophism, these types of disputes still presented certain difficulties by virtue of faulty formulations. A new approach was developed to dismantle possible fallacies based on the meaning of words, the analysis of the terminology involved and, finally, the supposition of terms employed in proposed statements.⁶⁹

As quodlibetal disputations started to lose prestige from the fourteenth century onwards, the masters became extremely reluctant to preside over such exchanges due to the improper use of dialectic in scholastic disputations.⁷⁰ In addition to the critics in theology who claimed this method of inquiry was against the will of God, the later generations of Italian humanists also had a critical attitude towards the use of the *sophismata* as a method of inquiry. The rhetorical character of these exchanges began to be utilized

⁶⁶ The systematic use of logic in religious inquiry was already embraced by the eleventh-century theologian St. Anselm (Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 9).

⁶⁷ Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 26 and 36-8. Also see the views of the thirteenth-century theologians William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste on this new method of verification employed by the *quaestio disputata* especially when applied to the teaching of physics: see Dales, "Robert Grosseteste's Scientific Works", 381-4 and also the study the scientific methods of aforementioned scholars: Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Grosseteste*, 272-8.

⁶⁸ Alwishah, Sanson, "The Early Arabic Liar", 106. Having begun as a bitter argument in a scholarly gathering and then led to written exchanges, the debate between Şadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 903/1498) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1503) was the most detailed scrutiny of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. For the topic of discussion and Dashtakī's alternative solution, see El-Rouayheb, "The Liar Paradox".

⁶⁹ Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 41-2.

⁷⁰ Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 101-28.

for departmental rivalry, personal feuds, and rhetorical exercises based on the *sophismata* rather than a clash of opposite philosophies.⁷¹

The pervasiveness of the scholastic *quaestio disputata* as a general method of instruction and scientific inquiry led its utilization in subjects not limited to law, theology, and logic, and this was one of the main reasons behind the unitary character of late medieval learning both in medieval Latin and post-classical Islamicate traditions. With the increased knowledge in Greek texts and its commentaries, as well as the humanist tendency of using the dialogue and the treatise to expound ideas and challenging positions, the method of disputation caused a new trend of questions dwelling on particular issues in natural philosophy. For instance, the *sophismata*-based reasoning in fourteenth-century physics highlighted common analytical languages applied to theology and philosophy, by enabling Aristotelian conceptions, definitions, and principles to prevail in theological subjects.⁷² These disputations were often written in the form of *cartelli di sfide* and directed at certain contemporary adversaries (*concurrentes*).⁷³ In the late medieval world, both traditions kept on producing knowledge based on the modified version of Aristotelian dialectic and ended up accumulating a vast corpus over centuries.

As the fifteenth-century Ottomans were interested in rectifying certain standards to dialectical investigation as a primary method of scientific inquiry, the Latin West saw it as an obstacle to practical naturalism and astronomy. Even though the Italian humanists directed eloquent criticisms to the Aristotelian logic and rhetoric, the later generations to come, in an ironic way, still continued to use this method in their disputations. As Paul Oskar Kristeller suggests, the humanism and scholasticism of the Italian Renaissance arose in medieval Italy at about the same time, having coexisted while also developing different branches of medieval learning. Contrary to the commonly held view, Aristotelianism was not overridden by the humanist perspective. This did not, however, mean that Aristotelianism did not remain entirely untouched. It was further modified and enriched with the revival of Neoplatonism and Stoicism in the Humanist movement. With the sixteenth century, mathematics and astronomy, along with mechanics, would assume flourishing importance in their practical application through the advent of new empirical methodologies and revised curricula for universities.⁷⁴ In the Ottoman context though, the scholastic efforts of the *quaestio disputata* continued in theology and philosophy (i.e. logic, metaphysics, and, even to an extent, physics) as a generic exercise, and used as a viable tool to rule out unfounded assertions and derive religious and rational information.

⁷¹ In the words of the Italian nobleman and philosopher Pico della Mirandola, “only useful for causing disgrace an associate and for upsetting the memory by repetition but they [disputations] were of little or no use for finding out the truth” (Lawn, *The Rise and Decline*, 111-12). Also see Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources*, 99-100.

⁷² Murdoch, “From Social into Intellectual Factors”, 303-8.

⁷³ The early exponents of disputations on Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics were comprised of figures like Nicoletto Vernia (1426-1499) and Agostino Nifo (c. 1473-1545), who often listed and qualified three resources (the late Greek, Latin, and Arab) for their inquiry into the Aristotelian principles (Mahoney, “Philosophy and Science”, in *Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance*). Similarly, the bitter animosity that arose between the Ockhamist theologian Alessandro Achillini (1463-1512) and the humanist-philosopher Pietro Pamponazzi (1462-1525) led to the production of a set of exchanges on the Averroestic doctrines of the unity of the intellect, the immortality of the soul, and the Aristotelian theory of passive and active intellects.

⁷⁴ Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources*, 101-4.

The late sixteenth century in Northern Europe was a period when a new sociotype of scientist-engineers emerged whose knowledge was based on high artisanship. During this period, the sociotype of *ingeneri* was still regarded as a denigration of the ‘court philosopher’ status,⁷⁵ and philosophy in the hierarchy of knowledge was still placed high. This was the case until when a new vision of mathematical philosophy of nature derived from the discipline of mechanics that attacked the prevailing Aristotelianism, thereby drafting a new natural philosophy with the elevated status of practical investigation.⁷⁶

With the decline of disputations and the further development of scientific-technological in the Latin West that made the European globalization possible, the reconfiguration of geopolitics by excursions and explorations became the new norm and the agonistic spirit was carried into the voyages in the race of discovering the New World.⁷⁷ The technical edge and the rise of practical branches of sciences that would ultimately led to an empiricist method and a new scholarly etiquette, which brought openness and collaboration. This new sense of scientific collaboration was based on the model of peer review, collegiality, as well as a new type of precision and certainty in proof and persuasion,⁷⁸ rather than secrecy, dramatic gestures, and argumentative disputations.⁷⁹

1.3 The Ottoman Case. An Attempt at Reconciling Past Schools by Verification (*Tahqîq*)

The post-classical scholarly disputations in theology came with the rise of a new scientific paradigm based on Aristotelian logic, physics, and metaphysics in the later medieval world, and was a result of the clash between different currents of scholarly traditions that often contradicted one another over centuries. For the case of the fifteenth-century Ottomans, debates and disputations reflected attempts at reconciling and reconstructing certain aspects of past scholarships in post-Avicennan philosophy (*hikma*) and Muslim philosophical theology (*kalâm*) within the context of the post-classical Islamic thought. With a few exceptions, there were no radical attempts at leaving the disputation framework in favor of collaboration, nor challenging Aristotelian metaphysical and physical dogmas through the introduction of, more desirably, mathematical or mechanical proofs.

⁷⁵ See the example of the Italian philosopher Giovanni Battista Benedetti (1530-90), who was the contemporary of the Dutch scientist-engineer Simon Stevin (1548-1620), as well as Mario Biagioli’s setting ‘Galilei the courtier’ as opposed to the image of ‘Galilei the engineer’ (Omodeo, “The Engineer and the Philosopher”, 25-6). And for the short-lived fever of Ottoman explorations, Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*.

⁷⁶ Omodeo, “The Engineer and the Philosopher”, 35-6.

⁷⁷ Renaissance philosopher, physician, and mathematician Girolamo Cardano observed in his autobiography *De vita propria liber* that three canonical technologies of the modernity, i.e. gunpowder, the compass, and the printing press, were overshadowed by the geographical discoveries of his time (Omodeo, *Amerigo Vespucci*, 18; and for a list of expeditions reflecting the competitive spirit of geographical discovery, 27-9). For a case of *tahqîq* in geography from the Islamic world, see Casale’s “On Tahqîq, Space Travel, and the Discovery of Jetlag” to be published in *The Journal of Early Modern History*, 27, 2023.

⁷⁸ Serjeantson, “Proof and Persuasion”.

⁷⁹ Azzolini, “There Were No Medals”, 282-3.

For the Ottoman case, it had been already more than four centuries since Avicenna produced works and, in the centuries that followed him, there was already a full-fledged corpus that had developed through critiquing his central doctrines both within (post-Avicennans, i.e. *hikma*) and outside (theologians, i.e. *kalām*). The post-classical Islamicate world, therefore, was dealing with a long set of objections, refutations, and amendments and, for a fifteenth-century Ottoman scholar, the central question focused on how to reconcile these clashing views in the face of scholarly veracity.

The discipline *hikma* as the new technical term for philosophy as a naturalized form of *falsafa* and, in the sixth/twelfth century, it replaced *falsafa* as a self-description of the practice of philosophy, just as *hukamā'* replaced *falāsifa*, the latter of which was often taken in negative connotation, especially from Suhrawardī onwards.⁸⁰ It was after the critical works of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) that *falsafa* started to be applied to Avicenna, yet it generally referred to the 'sages' in the past.⁸¹

Recent studies on Ottoman philosophical production from the period reveal that contrary to the view about the decline of Islamic philosophy after Ghazālī, the Ottomans employed, if not, studied and acknowledged certain aspects of Avicennan-Aristotelian philosophy (*falsafa*) that had been incorporated into the post-classical corpus through certain modifications. These reworkings of classical *falsafa* doctrines were often classified under *hikma*, a discipline officially taught and studied at early modern Ottoman medreses that was often taken in juxtaposition to post-classical philosophical theology, that is, *kalām*.

After the second half of the fifteenth-century, the core doctrines and positions studied at Ottoman medreses were products of this tension between *hikma* and *kalām*, mostly based on the works and commentaries of previous Persian verifiers, such as philosophers 'Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1265) and Naşīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), as well as Il-Khanid and Timurid theologians 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), Şa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413). The works of these Perso-Islamic scholars were used as standard medrese handbooks, and an accomplished Ottoman student or tutor was expected to know their contents lemma-by-lemma and evaluate them in a critical manner.⁸² The Ottoman imperial consciousness based itself on the Timurid models of disputation, in which the famous set of exchanges between the rival theologians Taftāzānī and Jurjānī were often taken as paragons of scholarly rigor and exactitude.

The theoretical antinomies of the Aristotelian worldview were only to be challenged with some efforts in the pre-Ottoman world but, for the case of the fifteenth-century Ottomans, the Aristotelian-Avicennan assertions and doctrines still prevailed in a modified form. Many of the famed medrese scholars of the time continued to study, teach, and comment on Aristotelian-Avicennan principles, for instance, in theoretical physics, without resorting to independent mathematical models in astronomical calculations.

⁸⁰ Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 200.

⁸¹ Griffel, "Ismā'īlite Critique of Ibn Sīnā", 211.

⁸² For a survey of Jurjānī's scholarly investigations and debates with other competing scholars: Gümüş, *Seyyid Şerīf Cürçānī*, 99-106. As for his exchanges with the Sufi shaykh Shāh Ni'matullāh Walī, Binbaş, "Timurid Experimentation", 277-303; and for the account of this debate, Aubin, *Matériaux pour la biographie*, 86-7.

As an émigré scholar who received patronage outside the medrese network, the Timurid-Ottoman astronomer and mathematician ‘Alī Kūşcu (d. 879/1474) had a flexible position at the Ayaşofya mosque/medrese complex, which may be equivalent of today’s high-paying research posts at institutes for advanced study. For the fifteenth-century context, it was mostly with his qualified criticism that the astronomy was to be freed from the *idée fixes* of the Aristotelian conceptualizations of theoretical physics.⁸³

During his tenure, not only did Kūşcu conduct informal reading groups in physics, astronomy and mathematics at Ayaşofya (the persecuted Ottoman polymath Mollā Luṭfī (d. 900/1495) was a prominent pupil) but also continued his separate research that would establish mathematics as a foundational discipline for astronomy. His paradigmatic shift and critique, as displayed by George Saliba, bore new evidences for the transmission of Arabic science to Europe, being traced particularly in the writings of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543).⁸⁴ Yet it should be noted that Kūşcu’s post was outside medrese networks. He was often engulfed in his own research without much communal appreciation and embrace, and the upholders of the Perso-Islamic medrese curriculum turned a blind eye on his output in theoretical physics, which only became widely available at medreses in the centuries to come.⁸⁵

With a few exceptions, Aristotelian-Avicennism was still a dominant and popular current in fifteenth-century Ottoman metaphysics and physics that employed classical Islamic dialectic disputation and investigation techniques in argumentation. The main figures of this study, Ottoman scholars Mollā Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98) and Ḥocazāde Muşliḥuddīn Muştafā (d. 893/1488), represented this *ancien régime* of theoretical medrese framework, emulating a broadly Perso-Islamic culture of learning, which saw scientific inquiry as a product of the tension between *ḥikma* and *kalām*, and often had the intention of applying theory to practice.⁸⁶ As a Sufi-scholar who neither studied nor produced works in *falsafa* or *ḥikma*, Zeyrek was a representative of the *kalām* tradition from the perspective of Sunni orthodoxy. In contrast, Ḥocazāde, a famed figure in the study of *ḥikma* and *kalām*, was a representative of a tradition who were conversant in both schools well and had the merit to evaluate their points as a verifier (*muḥaqqiq*).

The fifteenth-century was a period before practical sciences branched out into a wide range of subcategories, which were often practiced by scholars outside medrese networks and career paths.⁸⁷ Aristotelian-Avicennan terminology constituted the core of metaphysics and physics and, as the influence of scholastic theology waned, the practicalization of natural knowledge

⁸³ Ragep, “Freeing Astronomy from Philosophy”; “Copernicus and His Islamic Predecessors”; “‘Alī Qūshjī and Regiomontanus” and “Ṭūsī and Copernicus”.

⁸⁴ Saliba, *Islamic Science*, ch. 6: “Islamic Science and Renaissance Europe. The Copernican Connection”.

⁸⁵ Given the paucity of early copies, ‘Alī Kūşcu’s primarily theological work, that is, his ‘new’ commentary on the thirteenth-century polymath and philosopher Ṭūsī’s *Tajrīd al-i’tiqād*, was started to be studied only after the sixteenth-century onwards, replacing the scholar Işfahānī’s popular ‘older’ commentary.

⁸⁶ Küçük, *Science Without Leisure*, 56-8. Also see the recent exchange on the arguments of the manuscript: For Nir Shafir’s review article of Küçük’s monograph *Science Without Leisure*, see Shafir, “The Almighty Akçe”.

⁸⁷ As for the practicalization of the sciences, see the high number of branches among practical sciences in Kātīb Çelebi’s the seventeenth-century encyclopedia *Kashf al-zunūn* when compared with Ṭaşkōprizāde’s earlier compendium.

gained momentum. It was with the Ottoman seventeenth-century that practical naturalism gained an unprecedented epistemological value and interest.⁸⁸

As the fifteenth-century progressed, the Ottoman verifiers like Hocaşāde continued to refine and amend previous frameworks, building their own syntheses through arbitration and verification, without resorting to either discipline – whether *hikma* or *kalām*. For the contemporaneous European context though, a new form of persuasion and proof in physics, mathematics, and practical sciences was on the rise, and the dialectic started to be perceived as either insufficient or fallacious. As the Latin West was moving away from the *sophismata* by finding new empirical methods to replace the classical disputation techniques inherited from the medieval Latin tradition, the Ottoman educators not only seemed to concentrate on the reconciliation of past debates through synthetic arguments based on careful arbitration and verification, but also reconstructed them in the new scholarly context.

1.4 An Archaeology of a Court Debate. Hocaşāde versus Zeyrek on God’s Unicity

The debate between Zeyrek and Hocaşāde on God’s unicity (*tawhīd*), a private court event that was held in the presence of Sultan Meḥmed II, his grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa, and an arbiter-scholar Mollā Hüsrev, occupies a significant place in post-classical dialectical disputation and investigation. For scholars the extant texts of the event provide invaluable insights about early modern conventions of scientific study, knowledge acquisition, source critique, and scholarly patronage, by laying out the Ottoman rules of conduct in religious and rational inquiry, exemplifying preference in scholarship, and giving a bird’s-eye view of what was accepted as scientifically true and rigorous during the day.

As the story goes, the famed Sultan Meḥmed II (second reign 855/1451-886/1481) orders the young verifier Hocaşāde to pen an inquiry upon Zeyrek’s unfounded criticism of the master verifier Jurjānī’s piety. According to the extant texts, Zeyrek criticizes the verifier based on his leniency towards the philosophers’ premise that states that necessity is identical to God’s quiddity/essence with regard God’s unicity. For Zeyrek though, who follows the theologians’ view, necessity (like existence) is an accident superadded to God’s quiddity/essence externally and, contrary to the philosophers’ thesis, cannot be identical with Him since it goes against God’s singularity. In response to his opponent’s counter-arguments in support of the philosophers’ formulation, Zeyrek further remarks that none of the stated meanings of necessity corresponds to ‘necessity’ in the philosophers’ sense, which is a proof that necessity should be taken as an *accidental* quality.

In later lemmata, Hocaşāde, on the other hand, for the sake of verification, shows that what the philosophers have claimed concerning necessity, like the case of existence, is valid in their own paradigm and, that is why, Jurjānī did not rule out this premise as impossible. This, however, does not mean that the Timurid master followed the proof, he simply quoted it to exemplify the philosophers’ formulation and line of thought. It is important to note that Hocaşāde does not necessarily follow the philosophers’ view (as

⁸⁸ See Küçük’s *Science Without Leisure*, Introduction, chs 2-3.

evidenced by certain other passages in another work, especially his adjudication - *muḥākama* - on the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*). His aim was not only to demonstrate Zeyrek that the philosophers' premise regarding necessity is true in and of itself (with respect to the accepted meanings of necessity in Avicennan philosophy), but also how Avicenna's proof can still be reconciled with the new post-classical framework of mental considerations (*i'tibārāt*) in philosophy (see Conclusion).

As our sources indicate, the debate continued unusually for a week - a story often depicted ostentatiously in Ottoman biobibliographical sources. The duration of the debate indicated that there were a number of attempts by each scholar to object, refute, counter-object, or amend the other's arguments. This also meant that the exchange was a deliberative event in which the Sultan and the other scholars present could involve in evaluating both sides remarks, coming to a conclusion about what was discussed.

The present study aims to contextualize a famed fifteenth-century philosophical debate that occurred between two celebrated scholars of the late fifteenth-century, by tracing their sources and arguments in past scholarship. The debate covers a wide range of subjects in the context of God's unicity, by often employing arguments ranging from classical Arabic philosophy to post-classical philosophical theology through philological rigor and close reading.

The book attempts at reconstructing the sociocultural context of the debate through the information found in biobibliographical sources, and it comments on the intellectual reasoning behind its commission, by evaluating the positions of each scholar with the aim of mapping early Ottoman scholarly conventions. Chapter two gives a general survey of the early Ottoman attitudes towards knowledge production, by tracing different aspects of the Ottoman intellectual community, such as imperial patronage, scholarly etiquette, culture of meritocracy, institutionalization, and the role of palatine libraries. In light of the Sultan's urban development projects in Constantinople, the chapter will first cover the ways in which fifteenth-century endowment deeds, the Sultan's Code of Law, and contemporary Ottoman historical chronicles portray the institutional novelties introduced by the centralized imperial policies; subsequently it will provide anecdotal instances regarding academic rivalry, cases of jealousy, and the Ottoman scholarly sentiment for academic autonomy.

Chapter three covers background information about the debate available through biobibliographical sources, as well as the context of a wide range of subjects regarding the scholarship of the day, such as the categorization of philosophical and theological texts, the clash of conflicting doctrines at post-classical medreses, Ottoman debate/disputation etiquette, and Zeyrek's alleged declaration of Ḥocazāde's unbelief. The chapter aims to provide the sociocultural background of the debate through various primary source materials dating back to the early Ottoman biobibliographical dictionaries.

Chapter four provides an intellectual background of the main subject-matter by referencing previous scholarship on the proof of God's singularity contrary to the claims of non-monotheists. The main context of the debate concerns the validity of a thesis included in the philosophers' proof of God's *tawḥīd*, which is the central doctrine of Muslim creed and theology. The proof originally goes back to the works of philosopher Avicenna, whose definitions and formulations were reinterpreted and modified by later commentators. The chapter also traces how Avicenna's proof was outlined and later criticized or modified by post-classical theologians, such as Jurjānī.

After outlining the debate's philosophical background in classical and post-classical scholarship, chapter five will resume with the outline and analysis of the debate lemma-by-lemma to show the breadth of its referencing and arbitration, with references to past and contemporaneous philosophical scholarship in the footnotes. By way of conclusion, it should be noted that even though Hıcazade did not believe in the philosophers' thesis precisely, he defended it for the sake of the debate, by proving that it was true in and of itself on their own terms.

The analysis at hand does not extend to other contemporaneous fifteenth-century discussions and debates held in the presence of the Sultan. Given the number of debates in various genres including jurisprudence, catechism, logic, etc., this will be beyond the scope of this book which, rather, aims to exhume an oft-mentioned but previously unanalyzed debate in Ottoman philosophy and theology, by laying out all its socio-political and intellectual context - especially in light of new studies as in the case of the Sultan's newly studied library and study room, as well as the pieces of information included in biobibliographical dictionaries. The extent of the philosophical debate culture and the influence of Avicennism in early Ottoman scholarship will be a topic of another book. The extent of the philosophical debate culture will be a topic of another book. The translations of Zeyrek's and Hıcazade's texts, along with their *editiones principes* and the facsimiles of their original manuscripts, could be found in the Appendix. I believe that analyzing such a complex debate argument-by-argument not only shows the diversity of references to past passages and positions but also exemplify the breadth and depth of early modern disputation culture and scholarly methodology utilized during the Ottoman 'age of scholarly debates'.

2 The Ottoman Age of Scholarly Debates Cultures of Patronage, Pride, and Merit in Fifteenth-Century Scholarship

Summary 2.1 Sultan's Great Jihad. Constantinople and Mehmed II's Education Policy. – 2.2 Setting the Standard for Learning. The Sultan's Code of Law, the Construction of the *Şahn-i semān*, and Other Endowments by His Bureaucrats. – 2.3 Critiquing the Sultan. Scholarly Autonomy, Pride, and Academic Rivalry. – 2.4 Court Debate Culture and Palatine Libraries. – 2.5 The Social Functions of Scholarly Patronage. Legitimacy, Honor, and Prestige.

Sultan Mehmed II's second reign (855/1451-886/1481) signaled the beginning of a new phase in Ottoman scholarship. With an imperial program that developed a highly structured bureaucratic system, Mehmed II's new establishment set rigid rules that regulated the scholarly path by establishing prestigious institutions based on merit, codifying a hierarchical order, and creating opportunities for a lifetime career in academia that crossed paths with politics.¹ The Ottoman formation of a new learned class in the fifteenth-century also coincided with (albeit not entirely shaped by) a turning point with the conquest of Constantinople/Ķostantīniyye in 857/1453, namely the creation of a new capital distinctly imperial and universalist Muslim in character.

In the second half of the fifteenth-century, the fledgling Ottoman principality was transformed into an empire due to Sultan Mehmed II's efforts, vision and oft-criticized centralization policies. On the one hand, the cen-

1 For the formation and transformation of the ulema in the early Ottoman Empire, Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 59-74. Atçıl traces the formation of the ulema class to the centralization policies of Mehmed II, referring to the period spanning from the reign of Mehmed II to the first decades of Süleymān I (857/1453-937/1530) as "the formation of the Ottoman learned class vis-à-vis its inclusion as a state apparatus" (Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 70-4).

tralization helped the Sultan to instigate his image as an all-powerful absolute monarch and, on the other, Mehmed II sustained this image via cosmopolitan and universalistic claims, which set him as a patron of science and arts in a dazzling variety of disciplines. For a monarch who had the claims of a world emperor, the Sultan had to make his new empire a hub for learning. It was a common route for many Ottoman scholars before his reign to leave Anatolia for advance learning in other Islamicate centers, such as Tabriz, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, and Samarkand. The brain drain was an imminent problem and, thus, having claims of universal patronage meant reverting this tendency to study abroad and to find ways to attract the luminaries from East and West. Through the establishment of well-funded medrese circuits in different regions of Rüm and Thrace during Mehmed II's reign, the Ottomans were able to create a self-sustaining system of educational mobility, in which the scholars did not feel the need to relocate for other centers of culture and learning. And this institutional novice also contributed to the rise of locally-educated scholars which brought stability and uniformity of education in the lands of Rüm.²

The key term that described the Sultan's and his grand viziers' attitude towards the learned class and interest in sciences was *rağbet* (continual interest, favor), an expression often repeated to describe their policies on learning as well.³ The Sultan commissioned works to the luminaries of his time and did not hesitate to arrange extremely generous rewards and favors for those who accepted the Sultan's offer and further pursued their careers in the new capital (as in the case of the aforementioned 'Alī Kuşçu).⁴

Inherent among the foregoing historical and historiographical debates Mehmed II was a great patron for sciences and the arts. His understanding of patronage was not only limited to works within the Islamicate context but also encompassed geography and maps,⁵ Christian art,⁶ and relics,⁷ as well as philosophy, with commissions by a good number of late Byzantine and Quattrocento artists, scholars, and luminaries, some of which took active part in the Ottoman imperial court.⁸ Given Mehmed II's universalistic vision and interreligious discourse in his political mission of empire building, the patronage in Graeco-Roman art, philosophy, and religious scholarship served as a political and aesthetic medium for the Ottoman new

2 Atçıl, "Mobility of Scholars".

3 See the phrases '*ulemā*'ya *rağbet* or '*ilme rağbet-i tamm* (Gelibolulu, *Kühül-ahbār*, 2: 70-1). Also "Sultān Mehmedmed'iñ '*ulemā*'ya *rağbeti ziyāde olmağın*" (Neşri, *Ğihānnümā*, 325).

4 "Bir ehl-i kemāl olsa ey İstanbul'a götürürdi. Hattā Semerkand'dan fağrū'l-'ulemā' Mevlānā 'Alī Kuşçu cemī-i te'allukātıyla getürdüb bī-kiyās meblāğ a'tā idüb emvāle garķ itmişdi" (Neşri, *Ğihānnümā*, 308).

5 For Mehmed II's map atelier and the works produced there, see Pinto, "The Maps Are the Message".

6 Raby, *El Gran Turco* and Necipoğlu, "Visual Cosmopolitanism and Creative Translation". Also for various other maps, woodblocks, and drawings presented, Redford, "Byzantium and the Islamic World, 1261-1557".

7 The Sultan's treasury had twenty-one relics along with historically and religiously significant miscellaneous objects, including the bodies of the Prophet Isaiah, one of the innocents massacred by Herod, Saint Euphemia, and Saints John of Damascus and Chrysostom, as well as the Gospel of Saint John the Evangelist and Jesus' cradle (Raby, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", esp. 298-300).

8 See Adivar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, 31-57 and Bádenas, "The Byzantine Intellectual Elite".

order.⁹ Unlike his father Murād II's emphasis on the use of Turkish especially in manuscript production, Arabic continued its past status as an international *lingua franca* of the polyglot interconfessional scholars during Mehmed II's reign. It was utilized for writing on theology, law, philosophy, and science, as well as oral communication among scholars and palace visitors. A handful of Greek texts translated into Arabic (not into the Sultan's native Turkish) in the imperial setting,¹⁰ notably including fragments from the Neoplatonist Greek philosopher Georgios Gemistos Pletho's controversial *Book of Laws* accompanied by his edition of a pagan revelation in dactylic hexameter, *The Chaldean Oracles*, which argued for religio-political reform in Christian monotheism through Pagan and Neoplatonist sources,¹¹ and the Aristotelian philosopher George Amiroutzes' translation of Ptolemy's *Geographia* with his son Basil/Mehmed Bey¹² along with a cartographic study that used the book's mathematical system to create a large-scale world map in a united whole.¹³

The Sultan's library and Greek Scriptorium¹⁴ were comprised of manuscripts like Arrian's *Anabasis* (a biography of Alexander the Great), Homer's *Iliad*, the fifteenth-century Italian humanist Leonardo Bruni's arrangement of the first book of Polybius on the Punic Wars, as well as a Greek translation of St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, which all reflected the Sultan's political vision, interests, and models. The imperial acquisitions were included under three categories: gifts, commissions, and requisitions through conquests.¹⁵ Mehmed II's imperial library, which held non-Islamic manuscripts, objects, and relics, also saw a marked development in illumination, calligraphy, and bookbinding (an Ottoman variation on the inter-

9 Casale, "Mehmed the Conqueror". For the ways in which the Sultan modified and adapted other forms of knowledge in his cultural politics, see Akasoy, "Die Adaptation byzantinischen Wissens".

10 Mavroudi, "Translations from Greek".

11 Hankins considers Pletho as the fountainhead for the Neoplatonic revival during the later Quattrocento (Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, 194). Christian and Islamic interpretations of Platonic philosophy were often associated with calls for religious and social reform (in juxtaposition with Aristotelianism in philosophical theology and Orthodoxy in creed), as well as a "universalization of religion" which sought an inner harmony between different religious systems (Mavroudi, "Pletho as Subversive". With regard to Pletho and his relationship to the Ottomans, see Akasoy, "George Gemistos Pletho and Islam", esp. 351-2 and her "Plethons *Nomoi*". Pletho often appropriated Pagan, Neoplatonist, and non-Christian (Islamic) sources in order to demonstrate that they could be compatible with the teachings of Greek Orthodoxy (DeBolt, "George Gemistos Plethon on God").

12 George of Trebizond developed a friendship with the Sultan's close associate the Greek scholar Amiroutzes and helped the scholar to compose an introduction to Ptolemy's *Almagest* in Greek along with a dedication of the book to the Sultan before having executed its Arabic translation, together with the latter's son Basil/Mehmed Bey (Raby, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 302).

13 Casale, "Mehmed the Conqueror", 860.

14 Raby, "Mehmed the Conqueror's Greek Scriptorium". It has been argued that there is substantial evidence from reliable sources that allows scholars to eliminate certainly Greek and mostly Latin from the list of languages that Mehmed II might have been competent (Patrinelis, "Mehmed II the Conqueror"). One reference that refutes this position is included in a panegyric composed by Amiroutzes, stating the line "many thought that you did not know this language [Greek] at all" (Mirmiroğlu, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet", 100-1).

15 For the Greek manuscripts attributed to the Ottoman court, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 304-11.

national Timurid style).¹⁶ Despite Mehmed II's efforts in collecting a vast number of manuscripts for his imperial library, as well as procuring Greek books, there had been a wave of propaganda in the West against his religious-cultural policies, which misinformed that there were 120,000 destroyed volumes by the Barbarian Turks (an allusion to the burning of the Library of Alexandria) in the fifteenth-century Venetian humanist Lauro Quirini's note written on 15 July 1453 in Crete.¹⁷

The barbaric image of the Turks that lacked reason and rational assessment was a common topos in political discourse during the Quattrocento¹⁸ as exemplified by the well-known humanist writer Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (1405-64), who later assumed the papal title Pius II in 1458. In a letter written to Mehmed II with the 'intention' of converting him into Christianity, Pius II vilified the Turks as not having possessed a naturally rational disposition, and demonstrated the philosophical contradictions of their religion.¹⁹ The pervasiveness of the Crusade literature and rhetoric in Renaissance Humanism may tell us a lot about the so-called 'humanistic attitude' towards the Muslim advancement,²⁰ yet there were other attempts at presenting an interreligious dialogue or disputation without disparaging the Sultan's philosophical inclinations.

Prior to discussing the Sultan's patronage activities, a celebrated Ottoman bureaucrat ʿTursun Beg (d. 896/1491 [?]), also known as being highly critical of some of Mehmed II's policies in his book of history *Tārīh-i Ebū'l-feth*,²¹ regarded him as a learned (*'ālim*), judicious (*'ādil*), and intelligent (*'ākil*) ruler whose words and decisions embodied divine wisdom or philosophy (*ḥikmet*).²² The historian Neşrî (d. 926/1520 [?]) added to this, noting that he was a friend of scholars and virtuous ones,²³ whereas the Ottoman historian-dervish Aşıkpaşazâde (d. after 889/1484) similarly stressed his benevolence and generosity towards the learned class, as well as poor mystics.²⁴

Written upon Bâyezid II's request, his *Tārīh-i Ebū'l-Feth* was a book of history, which chronicled the events and deeds during and after the conquest of Constantinople with certain elements from the advice literature (*nasīḥa*). Though Mehmed II was portrayed as a great conqueror, and an in-

16 See the essays in Raby, Tanındı, *Turkish Bookbinding in the 15th Century*.

17 Pertusi, "Le Epistole storiche di Lauro Quirini", esp. 227. According to Akasoy, the Byzantine Greek Metropolitan Isidore of Kiev did not mention any concrete figures, and the fifteenth-century Byzantine historian Doukas spoke only of the "throwaway prices" for books (Akasoy, "A Baghdad Court in Constantinople/Istanbul", 140-1).

18 As a response to the Ottoman advancement, a great number of Crusade orations and histories, as well as tracts on converting the Turks to Christianity were produced. For the assessment of such works in the context of Renaissance political discourse and propaganda, see Bisaha, *Creating East and West* and Meserve, *Empires of Islam*.

19 Akasoy, "Mehmed II as a Patron of Greek Philosophy", 249-50.

20 Hankins, "Renaissance Crusaders".

21 Specifically speaking, ʿTursun Beg criticized Sultan's policies on taxation, emergency contributions as well as the confiscation of certain endowment properties. See İnalçık, Murphey, "Editors' Introduction", 23.

22 "Sultân Ebū'l-feth 'ālim ü 'ākil ve taşarrufât-ı cüz'ıyyâtda mâhir ü kâmil, aqvâli zînet-i ḥikmet ile ḥâlî" (ʿTursun Beg, *Tārīh-i Ebū'l-Feth*, 65).

23 "Muḥıbb-i 'ulemâ' u fuḍalâ' melikdi" (Neşrî, *Ğihânnümâ*, 308).

24 "'Ulemâ'ya ve fuḳarâya ve eyâma ve tül 'avretlere şadaḳa virürdi" (Aşıkpaşazâde, *Die Altosmanische Chronik*, 195).

telligent ruler, ʒursun Beg also underlined the Sultan's hubris as one of his main vices. According to this work, the Sultan had arrogance (*azamet ü ki-br*) and bad temper (*gađab*), and never practiced forbearance (*hilm*) and gratitude (*şükr*), the latter of which was rather the quality of the much-revered Byzantino-Serbian-born scholar and grand vizier Maĥmüd Angelović Paşa (d. 878/1474) who was put to death by the Sultan tragically due to a complicated series of events. Upon this unfortunate event, Maĥmüd Paşa, a much revered figure by the common people, was elevated to a position of a Sufi saint and his highly appreciated personality was praised in many posthumous hagiographies written on his behalf.²⁵ It is, therefore, understandable why ʒursun Beg, who received the patronage of Maĥmüd Paşa during much of his career, put the Sultan on the spot as a powerful monarch who, at the same time, succumbed to his ego and presumptuous choices.

Sultan Meĥmed II was not the sole instigator of scholarly patronage in the fifteenth-century Ottoman world and, the scholars themselves, as well as his viziers should be also given credit in the Ottoman upsurge of scholarly activities and institution building. There were eighty-four medreses founded in Rümili and Anatolia during the time of the first six Ottoman rulers – thirty-seven of them belonging to the reign of his father Murād II (d. 855/1451).²⁶ There were, in contrast, tens of mosques, medreses, and soup kitchens that were built during the time Meĥmed II,²⁷ both endowed by him and his viziers such as Maĥmüd Paşa, Murād Paşa,²⁸ and Rüm Meĥmed Paşa²⁹ in Constantinople along with many others.³⁰ Apart from these educational endowments, the Sultan's new Code of Law had the simultaneous effect of drawing clear distinctions among the members of the learned class in terms of bureaucratic hierarchy, which was both praised and presented as a model in subsequent centuries (see § 1.2 below).

2.1 Sultan's Great Jihad. Constantinople and Meĥmed II's Education Policy

The conquest of Constantinople in 857/1453 inaugurated the vision of a new imperial city as the seat of a multi-confessional world empire.³¹ In order to ensure the provisioning of the city, Meĥmed II had to restore the prosperity of neighboring villages and move people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, later by way of forced resettlement, in order to repopulate and revitalize the city.³²

²⁵ İnalçık, Murphey, "Editors' Introduction", 22-3. Uçman, "Menâkıb-ı Mahmud Paşa-yı" and Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Toplumunda".

²⁶ İhsanoğlu, "Osmanlı Medrese", 897 and Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 32.

²⁷ See for a list of all structures built in Istanbul during the time of Meĥmed II, Ayverdi, *İstanbul Osmanlı Mi'mârîsinin*, and his earlier *Fâtih Devri Mimarîsi*.

²⁸ Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul*, 123-5.

²⁹ "Rüm Meĥmed Paşa Üsküdar'da bir 'imâret ve bir medrese yaptı" (Neşri, *Ġihânnümâ*, 323).

³⁰ For the full list of fifteenth-century Ottoman viziers who established endowments in various parts of the empire, see Neşri, *Ġihânnümâ*, 320-4.

³¹ Necipoğlu, "From Byzantine Constantinople to Ottoman Kostantiniyye".

³² İnalçık, "The Policy of Mehmed II", 235 and Lowry, "From Lesser Wars to the Mightiest War".

The resettlement policy did not work well initially,³³ and the Sultan further decided to revitalize the city by introducing other means, such as constructing prestigious educational institutions and religious spaces to attract the luminaries of his time.³⁴ The books of history written by Ottoman statesman ʿursun Bey and Byzantine historian Kritovoulos (d. 1470) gave a detailed account of the vigor and effort involved in the repopulation³⁵ and the urban development (*isti'mār*)³⁶ of Constantinople, along with the Sultan's great investment in higher education institutions that attracted the attention of many scholars to the capital of the lands of Rūm.

The new imperial scheme was generous to the learned class, partly due to the grand revitalization projects that were undertaken by Mehmed II to renovate the city as an emerging center for learning. These projects not only shaped the political institutions but also defined the ways in which the members of the learned class could cooperate with the other agents of bureaucracy and navigate upwards in the social hierarchy. An Ottoman historian Gelibolulu Ālī (d. 1008/1600) observed how the realization of the Sultan's grand construction project, the prestigious *Şahın-ı şemān* complex, contributed to the organization and formation of the learned class, thereby preventing the outliers (*ecnebīler*) who did not have the right merit and credentials to instruct, that is, those who belonged to a non-academic lineage, from merging freely with the learned class. In other words, according to Ālī, the building of such a prestigious institution, the *Şahın-ı şemān*, set the standard for the profession.³⁷

Urban development in Constantinople was a serious undertaking, so much that the Ottoman Turkish endowment charter (*vaqfiye*) that was published by the Directorate General of Foundations in 1938 referred the conquest of Constantinople as “the smaller jihad” (*cihād-ı aşgar*), whereas the revitalization of the city was addressed as “the greater” (*cihād-ı ekber*).³⁸ These deeds of endowment provide important clues about the ways in which teaching and learning were perceived by the State, and how salaries and promotions were implemented during the early decades after the conquest of the city. These charters not only documented the changing features of the city but also pinpointed extant buildings from the Byzantines, which turned into Islamic educational spaces.

Besides historical chronicles, extant endowment deeds from the period constituted vital firsthand sources for the Sultan's education policy, shed-

33 “Sultān Meḥammed Hān Gāzi kim İstanbul'ı feth itdi [...] ve cemi' vilāyetlerine kuşlar gönderdi kim hātrı olan gelsün İstanbul'da olur bağlar bağçeler mülklüğe gelüb ʿutsun dedi ve her kim ki geldiye vardılar bu şehir bununla ma'mūr olmadı” (Aşıkpaşazāde, *Die Altosmanische Chronik*, 133). The Sultan afterwards resorted to the policy of forced resettlement.

34 For an extensive account of construction projects realized in Mehmed II's new capital in the making, see Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul*, as well as her earlier *The Ottoman Capital in the Making*.

35 Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed*, 93-4.

36 See the section on the Sultan's urban development projects in Constantinople: ʿursun Beg, *Tārīh-i Ebū'l-Feth*, 65-76. In addition to the term *isti'mār*, the Sultan used the phrase “şehir 'imāret etmek” (Neşri, *Kitāb-ı Cihan-nümā*, 709).

37 “Çünkü bünyān-ı medāris-i şemāniyye ki görildi, ba'dehu 'ulemā' tarīkīniñ nizāmına cell-i himmet buyurıldı. [...] ve içlerine, ecānibden kimse karışmasun deyü silsile-i tarīkleri kemāl-i intizāmıla istiḥkām bula” (Gelibolulu, *Kühü'l-ahbār*, 2: 68).

38 See *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 32, f. 37; and also Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, “Fâtiḥ Sultan Mehmed'in Ayasofya Vakfiyesi”, 259, f. 11.

ding light on the construction of higher education institutions in the new capital. As in other Islamicate contexts, these deeds offer an insight into the arrangement of educational institutions³⁹ such that they outlined the nature and duties of the endowment by giving a detailed account of the buildings employed, as well as the personnel who got involved. Nonetheless, one problem with relying heavily on endowment deeds is that they only give a formal view about educational activities in the empire. There were, however, other informal means of scholarly interaction, such as special instructional circles on various topics in which novice students could also acquire knowledge outside the formal classroom context through the *halaqāt* and *majālis*.⁴⁰

2.2 Setting the Standard for Learning. The Sultan's Code of Law, the Construction of the *Şahin-i şemân*, and Other Endowments by His Bureaucrats

Right after the conquest of Constantinople, Meḥmed II undertook a great number of projects in the new capital, by turning eight decrepit churches into Muslim higher education institutions⁴¹ and by establishing new ones. Our sources indicate less than eight such structures, yet there are additional other churches recorded as being converted into mosques apart from this list, such as Fethiyye and Kenise Ḥura (Kariye or Chora). Extant Arabic and Ottoman Turkish endowment charters count Ayaşofya (Hagia Sophia), Zeyrek, Eski 'İmāret, Kalendarhāne, Silivri, and Mesadomenko in Galata (with a lecture space - *dershāne* - among the converted churches along with other newly built mosques in Constantinople's *Yeñi Cāmi'* and *Ḳulle-i cedīde* districts.⁴²

Certain rules of conduct, job specifications, as well as salary amounts in these newly established institutions were listed in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish endowment deeds in detail. To this date, there are eleven extant endowment deeds from the period.⁴³ Some of these deeds were copied and edited in later centuries, and we have several of these extant documents highlighting the key aspects of fifteenth-century educational institutions.⁴⁴

³⁹ For a study for the Mamlūk educational context: Haarmann, "Mamluk Endowment Deeds".

⁴⁰ Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge*, 88-91 and Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice*, 74-9. *Majālis* referred to informal gatherings, that is *salons*, not *séances* - with conversational debates overheard, not practiced (Goodman, "Rāzī vs. Rāzī", 101). With the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the Arab lands, a new culture of salons arose which was vital in the transmission of knowledge, as well as the prevalence of Arabic literary culture among scholars, poets, and bureaucrats from the lands of Rūm, who received posts in North Africa and the Levant. The rise of salons among Ottoman scholarly and literary elite not only enabled advanced linguistic training, but also were centers where the scholars shared their recent works, seeking for instruction, debate, and feedback on works in progress (Pfeifer, *Empire of Salons*, 166-99, esp. 166-76). Medreses were highly regulated institutions, and salons started as spaces for intellectual production that refrained from the meddling of the political class as well as the detailed stipulations of medrese endowment charters (Pfeifer, *Empire of Salons*, 198).

⁴¹ "Eyyām-ı sālīfādanberi me'abād-ı küffār ḥāksār olan kenā'is-i nā-üstevārdan sekiz 'aded kenīseleri medrese idüb" (Mecdī, *Ḥadā'ikü's-şakā'ik*, 1: 117).

⁴² For the list, see Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, "Fâtih Sultan Mehmed'in Ayasofya Vakfiyesi", 259-61, ff. 12-16; *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 33-7, ff. 40-8.

⁴³ For the full list, see "Giriş", in *Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in 877/1472 Tarihli Vakfiyesi*, VII-XI.

⁴⁴ Most of these documents have been recently studied and grouped by Hayashi in his "Fatih Vakfiyeleri'nin Tanzim", 94.

Three of these eleven documents are based on the original text initially drafted by Mehmed II – though they had been also reorganized during the reign of his son Bâyezîd II (r. 886/1481-918/1512). The precise dates of these deeds cannot be determined, so it is difficult to pinpoint exactly which political decisions were pivotal in their drafting. Endowment deeds list all given landholdings of a particular institution that ensured revenue and the perpetuity of the endowment. There are strict rules for each endowment to observe, and the positions for hire and salary rates are fixed and included within each deed. Apart from the section regarding “salaries” (*veżâ’if*), each endowment includes a section of “general terms and conditions” (*şarḥ-ı vakfiye*), which outline the rules and regulations under which each endowment had to operate.⁴⁵

In addition to the endowment deeds, the Sultan’s new Code of Law also regulated a tenure system based on rank and merit, and certain schools, such as the *Şahn-ı şemân*, were considered the epitome of Ottoman learning and teaching, a case that could be evidenced by its staffing of famed scholars and high salary levels. Nonetheless, there were also other cases in which the hierarchy of learning was not strictly maintained, and the decision-making prerogative of the Sultan still had a tremendous influence on promotions and appointments.

Due to his centralizing tendencies, Mehmed II could intervene in the process whenever he wished since the Sultan was a law unto himself.⁴⁶ Furthermore, changing places or posts in every couple of years was common during this period. It was not necessarily the case that whenever a scholar received a prestigious position, he would continue in that post until his retirement. This suggests that the late fifteenth-century appointments were already temporary and always shifting. Many of the scholars from the period occupied numerous posts located in various towns and cities during their career spans, even relocating to less paid jobs due to losing the Sultan’s favor or clashing with bureaucrats and other scholars.

The Sultan’s premier educational complex was called the *Şahn-ı şemân* (The Eight Courtyards) due to the eight colleges that it housed, and the number eight also had an allusion to the Eight Heavens (*heşt bihişt*)⁴⁷ in Islamic eschatology, the alleged eight gates of the paradise.⁴⁸ The complex was built on the ruins of the Church of the Holy Apostles in Constantinople, a church founded by Constantine the Great in the 330s, which was used as a burial site for the Byzantine emperors from Constantine onwards.⁴⁹ The church had been a nodal point for Byzantine ceremony, where the relics of Eastern Orthodox saints (including Timothy’s relics) were housed and conferred a spiritual and political legitimacy on the dynastic claims of the em-

⁴⁵ See the Turkish translation of Ayaşofya’s endowment charter (*vakfiye*) along with the original Arabic document in Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, “Fâtih Sultan Mehmed’in Ayasofya Vakfiyesi”, 296, f. 132.

⁴⁶ Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 69.

⁴⁷ “Şahn medreseleri dimekle ma’rûf ve heşt-bihişt evşâfiyle” (Gelibolulu, *Künhü’l-ahbâr*, 2: 69). Also “Ol şehriyâr-ı kâmkârün dârü’l-çarârda heşt-bihişte vüşûlune vesile olmuşdur” (İbn Kemâl, *Tevârih-i Âli Osman*, 547).

⁴⁸ Also see Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 95-7.

⁴⁹ See Dark, Özgümüş, “Chapter 6. The Church of the Holy Apostles”; Downey, “The Tombs of the Byzantine Emperors” and, for a homily that included a description of the church, see James, Gavril, “A Homily with a Description”.

perors newly rooted in Constantinople.⁵⁰ As recent studies suggest, the edifice was essentially square in plan, with a porticoed courtyard to its west and two broad lateral stairways giving entrance both to the main prayer hall and the courtyard, as well as a walled compound to the east, which included the mausoleums of Mehmed II and one of his wives, Gülbahâr Hatun.⁵¹

As Çiğdem Kafescioğlu has observed, the mosque at the new educational complex lacked the convent for Sufi dervishes that all prior mosques in sultans' complexes, and the iconic presence of the mosque at the summit of a hill highlighted the highest-ranking medrese within the Ottoman realm with its eight medreses placed in rows of four on opposite ends of the Renaissance-style plaza, thereby having represented the Sultan's new hierarchy of the religious establishment.⁵² Endowment charters concerning the education at the *Şahın* offer no information about whether each college was devoted to a particular discipline. However, it is clear that each college at the *Şahın* was assigned and entrusted to the tutelage of a particular scholar and was consequently addressed by their name. In certain documents, some of these colleges were simply referred to as *Şeyhiyye*, *Sinobiyye*, *Şalibuddîn*, and *Muşlihuddîn* after the name of the scholar who was in charge of the college.⁵³ This naming practice is not uncommon since education in Islam was structured around personal ties; and the letters of recommendation (i.e. licenses, sing. *icâzetnâme*) only bore the names of tutors and the books studied, not the institutions themselves.⁵⁴ Whether Muslim colleges could be seen as independent institutions with a unique program of education or only be taken within the context of personal connections has been debated in contemporary historiography.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the case for Mehmed II's endowments combines both aspects of these readings, as the hierarchy that the Sultan envisioned among educational institutions, the education policy stressed in endowment deeds, not to mention his Code of Law, all regarded the *Şahın* as an independent institution with a unique system of education.

During the reign of Mehmed II, obtaining an appointment at the *Şahın-ı şemân* also entailed the favor of the Sultan. Appointments and teaching at the *Şahın* depended on the Sultan's permission, favor, and approval in addition to individual merit. Mehmed II's Code of Law included a separate sec-

⁵⁰ The Holy Apostles also served as the primary religiopolitical prototype for the basilica of San Marco in Venice (Israel, "A History Built on Ruins", esp. 107-10).

⁵¹ Dark, Özgümüş, "Chapter 6. The Church of the Holy Apostles", 84. According to the Ottoman inscription on the main door, Mehmed II's original *külliyeye* was constructed from February 1461 to January 1471. The large cupola was severely destroyed later by an earthquake in 1179/1766 and rebuilt under Muştafa III (r. 1171-87/1757-74). Also see Aga-Oğlu, "The Fatih Mosque", esp. 179-83.

⁵² Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul*, 76-7.

⁵³ Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 23-7, esp. figs 2-5.

⁵⁴ Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges*, 270.

⁵⁵ In contemporary historiography, this debate comprised several distinct elements, including construction, administrative organization, and potential library endowments. For instance, George Makdisi saw colleges as having an organized student body with a specified curriculum, whereas A.L. Tibawi stressed the fact that despite the foundation of rigid endowed institutions of learning, Islamic education had always remained flexible, informal, and tied to persons rather than institutions. It is right that learning could not be reduced to endowed institutions during this period since the informal ways of acquiring knowledge were also common as in the cases of certain private reading circles. For the discussion, see Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges*, 281 and Tibawi, "Origin and Character of *al-Madrasah*".

tion about those who could teach at this institution. Due to the privileged status of the school, the Sultan did not simply see this school as a conglomerate of best scholars but a creation transcending that: a prestigious, independent institution with its own preparatory schools, in which qualified scholars were appointed upon fair judgment.⁵⁶

With regard to the career paths of famed fifteenth-century scholars, a position at the *Şahın* was not often their last appointment. When a scholar established a reputation – whether, during early or mid-career – he would also secure a position in one of the eight medreses at the *Şahın*. In most documented cases, an appointment at the *Şahın* was temporary, since a scholar at the *Şahın*, according to the Sultan's Code of Law, could further be qualified to become a chief military-judge (*kāḍī'asker*). Consequently, appointments in the fifteenth-century context were usually transitory, and a certain scholar was even expected to take up posts, ranging from İznik to the Balkan settlements of Dimetoka and Filibe depending on the vacancy.⁵⁷

Meḥmed II's deeds suggest that the institution had to be endowed for the benefit of those competent students and tutors who were eager to learn or acquire knowledge.⁵⁸ Moreover, each college should be organized by the directives of a scholar, who could easily deal with hard problems (*ḥall al-mushkilāt*) and dispel doubts (*daf' al-shubhāt*) about certain issues,⁵⁹ that is, someone who could have the sufficient intelligence and capacity to grasp the classification and contents of various sciences.⁶⁰ The appointed scholar should be able to teach both rational and traditional sciences (*'akliyāt ü nakliyāt*), which proved a scholar's prowess in different aspects of Islamic sciences.⁶¹ As for the desired qualifications of scholars to be appointed at these colleges, the Ottoman Turkish deed further notes that the scholar (*müderri*) had to be competent in various sciences, knowledgeable in certain levels of wisdom (*hikem*), as well as elaborating on longer and more detailed textual accounts (*muṭavvelāt*).⁶²

As for drafting, the Sultan personally supervised the preparation of each endowment deed, but also received some help from reputable scholars and bureaucrats. For instance, during the time of Bāyezīd II, Mollā 'Alāeddīn 'Ālī, a member of the prominent bureaucrat-scholar family of the Fenārīs, was

⁵⁶ İdrīs-i Bitlisī here equates scholars with prophets (*anbiyā'*) and mentions how the Sultan made fair appointments based on intellectual capacity and virtue (İdrīs-i Bitlisī, *Heşt Behişt VII. Ketibe*, 36).

⁵⁷ For a list of the medreses and the scholars from Filibe and Dimetoka, see Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 167-9.

⁵⁸ The student or assistant to be assigned has to be someone who has the ability to address others (*muḥāṭabeye kābil*) and demands knowledge (*ṭālīb-i 'ilmler*) (*Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 146, f. 265; and also *Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in 877/1472*, 105).

⁵⁹ *Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in 877/1472*, 155.

⁶⁰ Tursun Beg narrated that Meḥmed II built the new complex so that virtuous scholars could devote themselves to teaching (*tedrīs*), articulation (*ifāde*), as well as disciplining (*terşih*) their students in religious and scientific issues: "Ve efrād-ı efāzıl-ı 'ulemā'dan - ki her biri Şüreyḥ-i 'ahd ü 'allāme-i devrdür, tedrīs ü ifādet ve terşih ü ifāzat için müte'ayyin oldular" (*Tursun Beg, Târih-i Ebû'l-Feth*, 71).

⁶¹ Akgündüz, Öztürk, Baş, "Fâtih Sultan Mehmed'in Ayasofya Vakfiyesi", 296, f. 133; and *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 246 or, for the Ottoman Turkish, see 144, f. 262. Also see İdrīs-i Bitlisī, *Heşt Behişt VII. Ketibe*, 75.

⁶² *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 145, f. 263.

consulted with the preparation of certain endowment deeds,⁶³ being particularly in charge of the Ayaşofya document.⁶⁴ Similarly, there were other cases in which certain Ottoman scholars (including the main figures of this study, Hocaşade and Mollâ Hüsrev) got involved in the drafting of deeds and signed them for approval.⁶⁵

Apart from the Şahn, Mehmed II also ordered the establishment of other medreses in the new capital, including those of Ayaşofya (Hagia Sophia) and Eyüb, and many skillful Ottoman and Persian architects worked in their construction, as well as in Ayaşofya's renovation.⁶⁶ Similar to the case of Zeyrek,⁶⁷ probably the books at the Eyüb medrese were later transferred to the great library within the Şahn upon its completion.⁶⁸ An inscription in the marginalia of the Eyüb deed does not mention the status of rational sciences but has a specific emphasis on the study of religious sciences including its main and secondary branches.⁶⁹

As mentioned earlier, Ayaşofya equaled and even surpassed the Sultan's premier institute Şahn-ı semân in rank and distinction (*pāye*),⁷⁰ a fact reflected in recorded salary rates.⁷¹ Mehmed II initially built the medrese, but Bāyezid II extended the premises after his commissioning a second floor.⁷² It is mentioned in our sources that Mollâ Hüsrev (d. 885/1480), the arbiter of the debate at hand, was the first scholar to be appointed there, and Kuşçu worked and taught there from two hundred aspers a day, a position that he held until his death.

The Sultan was not alone in his endeavors of patronage. Among all the viziers of Mehmed II's reign, Maḥmūd Paşa held a special place, since not only

63 Erünsal, "Fâtih Devri Kütüphaneleri", 70.

64 See Ayaşofya endowment periodic registers in Tekindağ, "Ayaşofya tahrir defterlerine", 305 and Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 10-11.

65 See the endowment deed of İşâ Bey dated 839/1435-36 on page 58 in the appendix of Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*. Also Mollâ Hüsrev authenticated the deed of the medrese of İznik (Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 297).

66 "Arab u 'Acem ü Rüm'dan mâhir mi'mârlar ve mühendisler getirüb", as well as "Ve Ayaşofya'yı ve sür-ı Koşantiniye'yi meremmet idüb binâsın tecdîd etti" (Tursun Beg, *Târîh-i Ebû'l-Feth*, 71 and 74-5 respectively). For the section on job specifications and salary amounts (*vezâ'if*) for the case of Ayaşofya mosque, see *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 166-70, ff. 305-13.

67 For job specifications and salary amounts at the Zeyrek mosque, see *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 170-1, ff. 314-16. There is no position for a bookkeeper or a librarian included in the deed.

68 This fact is evidenced by the colophons of certain books originally belonged to the Zeyrek medrese (Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 15-16; Cunbur, "Fatih Devri Kütüphaneleri", 6 and Şehsuvaroğlu, *İstanbul'da 500 Yıllık*, 16). A copy of *Kîmyâ-ye sa'âda* included in SK, MS Hz. Halid 178 has a note stating that it was endowed to the library of the Eyüb medrese by Mehmed II's grand vizier Karamanî Mehmed in 884/1480 (see Ünver, "Sadrazam Karamanlı").

69 "Eyyüb Vakfiyesinin Tercümesi", in *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 317.

70 "The Ayaşofya medrese is at the same level as the Şahn medreses [...] if a professor in a medrese position of twenty-five aspers in the içil [Istanbul, Edirne, Bursa, and their environs] wants to become a judge, he is appointed to a judgeship with a salary of forty five aspers" (Mehmed II's *Kânunnâme* was translated and quoted in Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 70-3; for the original text, see *Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman*, 11-12).

71 The Sultan's Code of Law assigned the salary of fifty aspers per day to a teacher at the Şahn, whereas İdris-i Bitlisi assigned hundred aspers per day (İdris-i Bitlisi, *Heşt Behişt VII. Ketibe*, 75). Compared to the salaries at the Şahn - fifty or hundred aspers a day - a two hundred-asper daily salary was twice the distinction (*pāye*), showing the prestige of the position (see Erünsal, "Fâtih Devri Kütüphaneleri", 60-1).

72 "Ba'de medrese hücerâtının üzerine bir tabaka daḥı binâ olunub hücerât tarḥ olunmak Sultân Bāyezid Hân'dır" (Ayvansarayî, *Hadikatü'l-Cevâmi'*, 42).

was he the longest standing grand vizier, but also was known for his patronage activities and close ties to the learned class. His tenure did not last long and, as noted earlier, Maḥmūd Paşa lost the Sultan's favor and was eventually killed due to his alleged poisoning of the prince Muştafâ who supposedly had an affair with his second wife.⁷³ During his tenure, Maḥmūd Paşa was the second most influential man in the empire as a patron of arts and sciences. He was the only grand vizier of the time to build more than one mosque under his name and was even regarded as a popular figure among common men with a hagiography assigned to his name and legacy.⁷⁴ Before falling from favor, Maḥmūd Paşa was regardless a loyal supporter of the Sultan's policies and the key figure in introducing the most accomplished scholars from the learned class to him and his entourage.⁷⁵ He showed favor and benevolence to the members of the academic community (*ṭarîḳ-ı 'ulemâ*),⁷⁶ and was remembered for his regular scholarly gatherings (sing. *meclis*) and his personal support for scholars like Mollâ İyâs and Mollâ 'Abdülkerîm, the latter of whom allegedly helped him quit drinking wine.⁷⁷

Maḥmūd Paşa provided further financial support for the ulema, and he was one of the engineers of the incorporation of the Ottoman learned class into the court and religious bureaucracy. He subsequently built two medreses, one in Istanbul and another in the village of Hasköy near Edirne.⁷⁸ The latter was a granted library endowment by the grand vizier, and the books were recently transferred to the mosque of Sultan Selim I upon the demolition of the medrese in 1914.⁷⁹ Apart from his endowments, Maḥmūd Paşa, who was also present at the Zeyrek-Ḥocazâde debate along with the Sultan, was an acclaimed patron of poets and historians. Two significant histories, the poet-historian Enverî's *Düsturnâme*, in Ottoman Turkish, and historian Şükrullâh's (d. after 868/1464) *Behcet al-tawâriḳh*, in Persian, were also dedicated to him.⁸⁰

Whether Maḥmūd Paşa belonged to the learned class remains debatable but *Ṭaşköprizâde*, who generously included many scholars of the day in his *al-Shaqâ'iḳ*, did not have such an entry for him. In some anecdotal instances, Maḥmūd Paşa, yet, had been considered as an ideal vizier with a scholarly background who was mostly remembered for his support for the learned class.⁸¹ His portrayal had also changed over the course of the next century. Later historians like Gelibolulu Âlî in particular instrumentalized his case to criticize one of the later grand viziers such as Rüstem Paşa (d.

⁷³ Uzunçarşılı, "Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Vezir-i".

⁷⁴ Uçman, "Menâkıb-ı Mahmud Paşa-ı"; Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Toplumunda".

⁷⁵ Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs*, 388, 368-9.

⁷⁶ Ünver, "Mahmud Paşa Vakıfları", 69.

⁷⁷ Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs*, 302-3.

⁷⁸ "Maḥmūd Paşa İstanbul'da bir 'imâret bünyâd idüb yanında bir medrese yaptı ve Edirne civârında Ḥaş Köy'de bir medrese ve Sofya'da bir câmi' yapub" (Neşri, *Gihannümâ*, 141).

⁷⁹ Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs*, 307-9; and for the number of books in philosophy and logic, Ünver, "Mahmud Paşa Vakıfları", 69.

⁸⁰ As for the Ottoman historical writing in Persian as well as Şükrullâh's contributions to the genre, see Yıldız, "Ottoman Historical Writing in Persian", 443-50.

⁸¹ "Lâ-siyemâ ṭarîḳ-ı 'ulemâ'dan zuhür ve şadâret rütbesine bir şadr-ı meşhûr olan Maḥmūd Paşa nevverallâhu merḳadahu ta'yîn olunub merâtib-i 'ulemâ'ya, ol şehryâr-ı şâhib-i sa'adet-i ma'nâ-marîfeti râḡıb bulması i'tilâ'i fezâ'ili istid'â eyledi" (Gelibolulu, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 2: 69).

968/1561), a figure accused of being one of the chief instigators of bureaucratic corruption.⁸²

2.3 Critiquing the Sultan. Scholarly Autonomy, Pride, and Academic Rivalry

On the one hand, Sultan Mehmed II's Code of Law and his endowments might have established certain fifteenth-century standards in terms of teaching, appointment, and career track; and, on the other, there were many other cases in which the critics of Mehmed II's authoritarian tendencies raised their voices against the breach of his own conduct by direct intervention in bureaucratic and scholarly functioning.

The sixteenth-century historian Gelibolulu Ālī offered an alternative narrative in which he argued that there were certain rules observed in scholarly promotion coming from the centralizing reign of Bāyezīd I (r. 1389/791-1403/805). Having set strict rules, Mehmed II, ironically, breached them by intervening in ulema career paths. Gelibolulu credited him with the early Ottoman structural reforms, the intellectual vision, and the scientific patronage but he also backdated the charges of bureaucratic degeneration to Mehmed II's reign, having set him as the main instigator of decline in scholarship since he incessantly intervened in certain ulema career paths by removing them from their merited posts often on a whim.

In the cases of Hocasāde and the Sufi-scholar Sinān Paşa (d. 891/1486), the Sultan, for instance, violated legal conventions, as his bad temper resulted in rash decisions that contravened the rules outlined in his Code of Law concerning academic appointment and merit.⁸³ Again in the cases of Hocasāde and his junior rival Hātībzāde (see chapter 3), the Sultan violated the legal conventions by appointing scholars to inferior teaching posts for punishment.⁸⁴

Fifteenth-century scholars had their code of honor, and there were many proud ones who turned down bureaucratic opportunities offered by the Sultan since, for them, this meant succumbing to the political authority and leaving the path of knowledge. Scholarly pride did not, however, deter scholars from challenging others in scholarly debates to receive favors from certain patrons including the Sultan himself. The late sixteenth-century scholar and Shaykh al-Islām Hoca Sa'deddin's biobibliographical dictionary *Tācū't-tevārīh* offered numerous references to intellectual rivalry among certain Ottoman scholars, and stressed scholarly pride and respect as common

⁸² Gelibolulu Ālī, *Kühū'l-ahbār*, 69, 76.

⁸³ Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 199.

⁸⁴ "Eger çi ki ecdād-ı 'izāmından Yıldırım Bāyezīd Hān merhūmdan kendülerün zamān-ı sa'ādetlerine gelince vākı' olan āhā'-ı kirām, bu kavāninün bir miqdārını icrā buyurmuşlar; lākin bi't-tamām tertib ü ihtimām u ihtitām niyyetini güyā ki Ebū'l-Fetḥ Sultān Meḥemmed Hān merhūmūn meşūbatı defterine ta'līk kılmuşlar. Ammā bu nehc-i laṭīf, meşlūk-i vāz'-ı şerīf olduğdan soñra ba'zı fevzāl-ı meşāhir ve mü'ellifin-i şāhib-i taḥrīr olan neḥāir zümre'-i cellilesinden merhūm Hātībzāde ve Hocasāde ve anlarun emşāli fuzalā'-ı pāk-nihāda ṭayy-i merātible ri'āyet olunub otuzar akça medreseden ḥāce'-i şehyārī ve kādrī askerlik gibi pāye-i kām-kārī rütbe-i sāmīye ile iltifāt ü rağbet buyurmaları vuḳū' buldı. Ya'nī ki, fuzalā'-ı nādiredān ve feylesūfān-ı mevşūfān-ı zīşān, ḥuşuş aşḥāb-ı te'līf nāmındaki rūşen-i rū-şināsān ḥāḳkında ki, her birinün kādrī 'wa'l-qad iştāfaynāhu fī al-dunyā' ḥil'atiyle ma'ni müzeyyendür. Anlarun ri'āyetinde metā'-ı himmete endāze lāzım olmadıḡı remz-i vāzıḡları ile şüyū' buldı" (Gelibolulu, *Kühū'l-ahbār*, 73-4).

themes. The work interjected the lines below introducing a section exemplifying how another contemporary scholar, the competitive Ḥatībzāde (d. 901/1495), took pride in his profession as a scholar and never paid lip service to the ruling authority in order to receive high-paid judgements.

the perpetuity of the state of the Ottomans is due to
[the autonomy of scholars]
her glory comes from such respect for scholars⁸⁵

An utmost devotion to the academia by upholding the autonomy of scholars was a must but this code did not deter scholars to initiate personal attacks. A contemporary theologian, Ḥatībzāde was famous for being supremely ambitious in proving his superiority in knowledge. Similar to the case of Renaissance verbal fights over academic priority, it was common in the Ottoman context to challenge a fellow scholar to prove one's superiority in terms of scholarly rectitude. In cases such as that of Ḥatībzāde, this could go so far as challenging a senior scholar (whether Ḥocazāde or the celebrated sheikh al-Islām Efdālzāde [d. 908/1503]) and making rash claims in such debates which were often negatively received by his opponents and other arbiters.

According to our sources, Ḥatībzāde's bold remarks during exchanges were sometimes interpreted as insulting and condescending by senior scholars, and he was often criticized for his insolence and combative behavior. During a discussion with the religious scholar Mollā 'Alā'eddīn-i 'Arabī concerning God's speech (*kalām*) and vision (*ru'ya*) in the presence of Bāyezid II, Ḥatībzāde's words offended both the scholar and the Sultan. In order to appease the Sultan, Ḥatībzāde later prepared a treatise that arbitrated various positions dedicating the work to His Excellency.⁸⁶ However the Sultan rejected it and, subsequently, Ḥatībzāde complained about receiving no money from the Sultan despite his dedication, threatening to move to Mecca for the rest of his life. Knowing that the Sultan would be angered by Ḥatībzāde's abandonment of his teaching post in the lands of Rūm, the grand vizier Çandarlı İbrahim Paşa (d. 905/1499) sent ten thousand aspers from his own pocket; yet this time Ḥatībzāde, who was full of himself, got angry for receiving such a trivial amount.⁸⁷ This anecdote suggests that the fifteenth-century scholars were not easily intimidated by the ruling authority and were instead able to exercise their autonomy, professional pride, in spite of the Sultans' prerogative.

Despite Mehmed II's determined interference with scholars' decisions and lives, scholarly pride was tolerated to a certain degree, and scholars

⁸⁵ "Devām-ı devlet-i 'Osmāniyān bu vaz'ladır | ri'āyet-i 'ulemā'dır medār-ı cāhları" (Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tacūt-tevārīh*, 2: 484).

⁸⁶ Two copies of this work, *Risāla fī baḥth al-ru'ya wa'l-kalām*, are recorded at the Topkapı Palace, MS TSMK 4947 and 4948 (see Karatay, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi*, 90). Also there is a copy recorded in SK, MS Ayasofya 2276.

⁸⁷ "Bir gün Sultān Bāyezid Ḥān Ḥazretleri 'aḳd-ı meclis-i 'ulemā' idüb Ḥatībzāde ile Mevlānā 'Alā'eddīn-i 'Arabī meyānında baḥş-i 'ilmī cereyān idicek Ḥatībzāde'niñ ba'zı kelimātu bā'iş-i inḥirāf ḥātır-ı ḥatır pādişāhı olıcaḳ keyfiyet-i ḥāle mütefaṭtan olub mebḥaş-ı rü'yet ve kelām taḳḳiḳine müte'allıḳ bir risāle yazub ism-i sāmī-i Sultān-ı zemān ile taşdır idüb vezir İbrahim Paşa eliyle meclis-i hümāyūna isāl itdükde maḥz-ı ḳabüle vusül olmayub renceş-i ḥātırlarını izḥār buyurdılar. Ḥatībzāde recā-ı cā'ize ideriken ḥilāf-ı melḥūzı zuhūr idecek vezir-i mezbūre varub Mekke mücāveretine icāzet istedi vezir gördi ki 'arz iderse vaḥşet-ziyād olmaḳ muḳarrerdir. Birḳaç gündən soñra kendi mālından on biñ aḳçe cā'ize-i Sultāniye şüretinde irsāl eyledi. Lākin Ḥatībzāde cā'izeniñ te'ḥir ve taḳlīli vezirden ḳann idüb izḥār-ı renceş eyledi" (Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tacūt-tevārīh*, 2: 484).

were afforded respect and immunity as the members of the learning class. In contrast to the sixteenth-century ulema, the scholars of this age were not fully incorporated into the bureaucratic apparatus. In other words, their actions were not fully controlled by the ruling class, and it was common for a scholar to take easily pride in refusing high-paid judgeships. For instance, prior to a royal meeting, the future Shaykh al-Islām Efdālzāde would greet any high-ranking bureaucrat entering the room. Having hit his chest hard with the back of his hand, the proud Ḥatībzāde again told Efdālzāde that he ruined the reputation of the ulema by submitting to the ruling authority.⁸⁸

In this sense, there was a code among fifteenth-century scholars that receiving a non-academic job was something to be looked down upon, and a great number of scholars actively took pride in their decision to reject various bureaucratic posts. In this vein, the famed fifteenth-century theologians Ḥayālī and Ḥatībzāde bragged about their decisions to never stray from the path of knowledge (*‘ilm*) by assuming judgeships.⁸⁹ Similarly, Mollā ‘İzārī claimed that the only mistake that the master Ḥocazāde committed in life was his choosing to take up non-academic posts as in the cases of the judgeships of Edirne, Constantinople, and İznik - though it was known that he was in some way forced to make these decisions, having ended up regretting them.⁹⁰

Similar to the early Abbasid context, there were also theological debates with certain Christian scholars or monks in an attempt to proselytize.⁹¹ These religiously motivated debates were common features of the fourteenth-century Ottoman world, especially when Thrace and western parts of Anatolia belonged to the Byzantine realm. As the Ottomans established strong educational institutions in now fully integrated territories of Thrace and Anatolia, the attention shifting from proselytization to the reconciliation of Avicennan thought with philosophical theology. One example of such proselytizing debates was the case of a certain Zeynī shaykh known as ‘Alī, one of the successors of ‘Abdurrahīm-i Merzifonī. Likewise, it was reported that before the conquest, Mollā Ḥayrūddīn debated forty Christian monks at Ayaşofya and, due to his finesse in theological assessment, all the monks allegedly converted to Islam, yet keeping this fact a secret.⁹²

Many scholars of the early Ottoman world were members of religious groups, and the Zeyniyye order, which was known for its strict work ethics, was among the most popular. An often-recorded maxim in biographical sources is that a good scholar should not pursue worldly gain. This code of conduct possessed affinities with the Sufi concept of renunciation of worldly affairs. It was due to this maxim that many of the fifteenth-century figures had humble outfits and, aside from their achievements in religious and ra-

88 “Efdālzāde erkân-ı sa’âdet tarafına meyl idüb selâm vericek el arkası ile göşüne urub ‘arż-ı ‘ilmi hettiñ eylediñ didi” (Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tâcü’t-tevârîh*, 2: 483).

89 Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tâcü’t-tevârîh*, 2: 483.

90 Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tâcü’t-tevârîh*, 2: 472.

91 For an overview of the early Ottoman polemical literature, see Krstić, *Contested Conversations*, 6-12, 51-74. And for a fifteenth-century case of an autobiographical narrative of conversion (Abdallāh al-Tarjumān’s *Tuhfa*) influenced by the genre of Muslim disputation/polemic, see Szpiech, *Conversation and Narrative*, 200-13; Krstić, “Reading Abdallāh”.

92 “Şeyh ile İstanbul’a fetih olunmamış iken varub Ayaşofya’ya girdiñ anda sâkin olan râhibler ile Şeyh Ḥazretleri mübâhâşe idüb ilzâm idecek kırk râhib İslâm’a gelüb İslâmlarını ketm itdiler” (Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tâcü’t-tevârîh*, 2: 466).

tional sciences, they never boasted about their riches, worldly gains or bureaucratic jobs that they accepted.⁹³

Religious etiquette did not mean that there was no open rivalry among religious scholars. Jealousy (*hased*) among scholars was a serious challenge, and many anecdotes in biographical dictionaries concern bold exchanges between scholars, as well as the machinations initiated by various state dignitaries. For example, Persian émigré scholar 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's student Mollā 'Abdülkâdir⁹⁴ was also a tutor and an advisor to the Sultan. Prior to an appointment with the Sultan, Mollā 'Abdülkâdir was feeling weak, being excused from meeting him. It is recorded that Maḥmūd Paşa, who will be later replaced by another of Ṭūsī's students through palace intrigue, convinced the young scholar for a walk on that same day through the intermediary of certain hypocrites at the palace, and having heard that the scholar accompanied Maḥmūd Paşa in the palace garden, the Sultan believed that Mollā 'Abdülkâdir lied to him about his sickness. Meḥmed II, later on, dismissed him from his post.⁹⁵

As a common deal-breaker among scholars, jealousy generally manifested in fights over the protocol. When a senior scholar or a high-ranking official entered the room, the other parties were expected to rise out of respect. If a scholar sat on the left of the Sultan instead of the right, this could signify that the former held an inferior position. All these particularities of saluting and demonstrating respect were figured in the motivations behind verbal exchanges among scholars. For instance, Mollā Hüsrev and Mollā Gürānī (d. 893/1488) were the most reputable jurist-scholars of the time, and there was a known scholarly rivalry between them. In court meetings, controversy often emerged over who would sit on the Sultan's right. Knowing that Meḥmed II thought highly of Mollā Hüsrev, Mollā Gürānī sent a humble message to the Sultan explaining that he would rather prefer to stand during the meetings to come. In response to this act of humility, Meḥmed II decided that Gürānī should sit on his right during meetings. Upon hearing this, Mollā Hüsrev was reported to have said that teaching and learning (*'ilm*) superseded political affairs. Thereupon he excused himself from official meetings and moved to Brusa to establish his own medrese.⁹⁶

93 Wealth and affluence might have played a role in the production and transmission of knowledge especially in educational novelty, but it should also be noted that there was already an early generation of Ottoman scholars who relied on the (*Zeynī*) principle of poverty, who rejected any career opportunities outside academia that would instigate their incorporation into the bureaucratic apparatus. While the economic means do have an impact on scholarly novelties, one could imagine other context where money was not the only determiner (see the discussion in Shafir's review article of Küçük's monograph *Science Without Leisure*, "The Almighty Akçe", 269).

94 "Ṭūsī'niñ tilmizi" (Hoca Sa'deddīn, *Tacū't-tevārīh*, 2: 501).

95 "Sultān Meḥmed Hān Ḥazretlerine mu'allim olub takarrubı bir tabakaya irişdi ki Maḥmūd Paşa ḥased idüb bir güne engiz ile ḥayzū'l-iltifâtdan dūr itdi". The marginalia of the text further comments on the incident as follows: "Şüret-i engiz bu idi ki bir gün Pâdişâh esneyüb mizâcında nev'-i fütür olmağın i'tizâr itmişidi. Ba'zı muşâhibleri ki şöbetinde münâfık ve nihānī Paşa ile muvâfık idiler. Tenezzüh için bir bağçe seyrine tahrik idüb Paşa'ya haber vermişler. Paşa daḥı Pâdişâh'a 'arz idüb isti'alâm buyurılıkdâ seyre gitdüğü şâbit olcâk rençes-i ḥâtrıların zâhir idüb 'izz-i ḥuzûrlarından dūr itdiler" (Hoca Sa'deddīn, *Tacū't-tevārīh*, 2: 501).

96 "Ḥattâ Sultān-ı 'aşr ittiḥâz-ı velîme idüb üstâdı olan Mevlânâ Gürānī ḥâtrını taṭbîb için ne maḥalde cülûs iderler deyü istihbâr itdiler Mevlânâ Gürānī daḥı böyle ḥayr gönderdi ki bize lâyıf olan oldur ki ol meclisde cülûs itmeyüb ikâmet-i ḥıdmet-i mevkıfında kıyâm ide ve bu ḥaber-dilâvîz ve zâmir-menîr-i pâdişâhiye te'sîr idüb cânib-i yeminlerini Mevlânâ'ya ta'ayyun itdiler. Mevlânâ Hüsrev ve cânib-i yesârda cülûsa râzî olmayub gayret-i 'ilmiyye böyle iktizâ ider ki ben ol meclisde ḥâzır olmayım mezmûni müstemil bir mektûb bedi'ü'l-üşlûb inşâ idüb

2.4 Court Debate Culture and Palatine Libraries

The debate examined here likely took place at the Topkapı Palace's ashlar masonry building called the 'Inner Treasury' in its L-shaped suite of four halls, whose architectural features and multifunctional design have been recently studied by Gülru Necipoğlu.⁹⁷ The Treasury-cum-Bath, also known as the Meḥmed the Conqueror's Pavilion (*Fātiḥ Köşkü*) in the later centuries, was the first royal edifice built by Meḥmed II around the year 866/1462-63. This complex was also a preferred site for philosophical and theological discussions, including those about the principles of the Peripatetics.⁹⁸ As detailed by Greek chronicler Kritovoulos (d. 1470), Meḥmed II preoccupied himself with philosophical debates in the summer of 869/1465, in the company of the grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa, as well as other scholars, including George Amiroutzes and his two sons.⁹⁹ The Zeyrek-Ḥocazāde debate dated as 871/1466 may very well have unfolded in Meḥmed II's palatine library, which housed the most quintessential book collection of its time with more than 5,700 volumes in the inventory. Its library holdings surpassed those of premier libraries in Europe, such as the semi-public library at the Vatican, the library of Palazzo Medici, as well as those by Matthias Corvinus, the King of Hungary (r. 1458-90), and Federico da Montefeltro (1422-82), the Duke of Urbino.¹⁰⁰ Some of the theological, philosophical, and scientific debates might have taken place in the Sultan's throne room with a niche on the upper right corner for the throne seating, which most probably also housed the Sultan's library (see Room no. 2 below located in [fig. 1a] Ground plan and its recent photos in [figs 2a-b]).¹⁰¹

Meḥmed II had a keen interest in Arabic Peripatetic (Avicennan) philosophy, as well as those of other schools, such as Suhrawardī's Illuminism, an aspect of his patronage in rational sciences also praised in certain panegyrics. This is evidenced in the poems of Persian Sufi-poet 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī (d. 898/1492) and Amiroutzes, which praised his thoroughgoing support for Aristotelian and Platonic strands of thought.¹⁰² It is no coincidence that the philosophy corpus, numerically dominated by Avicenna's works and their commentaries, was the second largest set of manuscripts in librarian 'Aṭūfī's famed palace inventory prepared for Bāyezīd II in the year 908/1502-03.¹⁰³ The inventory, which also includes the book acquisitions bequeathed by Meḥmed II, has been recently studied and analyzed in

dīvān-ı 'ālīye gönderüb hemāndem keştiye girüb Brusa'ya vardı. Bu belde-i mezbūrede bir medrese binā' idüb tadrise şurū' eyledi" (Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tācū't-tevārīḥ*, 2: 464).

⁹⁷ Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 3.

⁹⁸ Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed*, 14.


⁹⁹ Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed*, 177, 209-10 and Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 10. Amiroutzes had two sons, Basil and Alexander, who might have converted into Islam after Meḥmed II's death in 1481 in order to save their position under his son (Argyriou, Lagarrigue, "Georges Amiroutzes et son Dialogue", 41-4; Monfasani, *George Amiroutzes*, 10).

¹⁰⁰ Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 16-17. Also see Csapodi, *The Corvinian Library*; Tanner, *The Raven King*, 8-12 and Arbizzoni, Bianca, Peruzzi, *Principi e signori*.

¹⁰¹ Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 10.

¹⁰² "Rāh-e Mashsha'iyān ze tu wāqīḥ | nūr-e Ishrāqiyān be tu lāyih || ṭab'-e pāk-e tu rā ki vaqqādast | fahm-e ḥikmat-e ṭabi'ī uftādast || bar dilat ḥikmat-e ilāhī tāft | ke ruh az ḡulmat-e malāhī tāft" (al-Jāmī, *Dīwān*, 174). For Amiroutzes' panegyric, see § 2.6.

¹⁰³ Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 44.



Figures 1a-c Inner Treasury (Treasury-Bath complex). [1a] Ground plan. [1b] Elevation from the third courtyard. [1c] Cross-section from the third courtyard (Reproduced from Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 4. Drawings: Eldem, Akozan, *Topkapı Sarayı*, pls 71-4)



Figures 2a-b Inner Treasury. [Left] Second hall (throne room) interior with throne alcove and fireplace. [Right] First hall interior with multi-tiered niches and fireplace. (Reproduced from Necipoğlu, "The Spatial Organization of Knowledge", 6; Photos: Devrim, "Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi", 90-1)

two volumes by a number of leading contemporary academics with invaluable contextualizations, who commented on each genre based on the scholarship of the day. Observing that the collection encompassed non-Islamic philosophical and scientific works alongside others reminiscent of pre-Islamic universalism, Cemal Kafadar has underscored Mehmed II's universalist and cosmopolitan ambitions in the same line with the competitive post-Timurid scholarly traditions.¹⁰⁴

With regard to God's unicity and his lack in participation in other beings, Amiroutzes defined God, in an attempt at assimilating Aristotelian metaphysics with late Greek Neoplatonism and Christianity,¹⁰⁵ as "incommunicability in itself, which, whatever it is, subsists from itself, sufficient in itself and unchangeable, existing in radical unity and oneness, transcending all communion, sharing no relation and being unparticipated in".¹⁰⁶ With certain affinities with the Avicennan paradigm, Amiroutzes further defined God

104 Kafadar, "Between Amasya and Istanbul", 1: 99-100. Contrary to the commonly held misperception that medrese libraries represented a strict Sunnī Orthodoxy in terms of inventory holdings, Konrad Hirschler has argued that the books held at the Ashrafiyya library in medieval Damascus were equipped with the rationalist way of approaching theological questions (Hirschler, *Medieval Damascus*, 102-32, esp. 122). On the other hand, an opposite trend can be observed in Persia especially during and after the Mongol invasion: the Mongol rulers preferred not to subsidize religious or theological titles over science and literature, a fact that might reflect the Mongol's reversal of Seljūq Sunnism and scholarly standardization (Biran, "Libraries, Books, and the Transmission of Knowledge", 489 and al-Ṭiqṭaqā, *Al-Fakhri on the Systems of Government*, 16). Also see for the underrepresentation of theological and philosophical sciences in the library of a thirteenth-century Shī'ite scholar, Kohlberg, *A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work*.

105 Monfasani, *George Amiroutzes*, 41. Almost no philosophical writings of his were known, yet Monfasani has recently come across a group of fifteen tractates of Amiroutzes in a manuscript in Toledo, which were later edited and published by the author. In a work written against the Platonic *metempsychosis*, Amiroutzes brought a Christian-Aristotelian bent when demolishing the position (Monfasani, "A Note on George Amiroutzes", 125-6).

106 Monfasani, *George Amiroutzes*, 38.

as the One, the Indefinite Dyad, i.e. God, “that cannot be predicated other than oneness itself”.¹⁰⁷ Conceptually speaking, oneness can be “combined with being Being”; however, it is not necessarily combined with oneness since oneness is prior to being. In the words of Amiroutzes, “if a particular thing were self-existing, it would not be said that something is added to it, making what exists by virtue of itself and by its own existence prior to what participates in it”.¹⁰⁸ This, in turn, sets the One’s precedence over the many.

Philosophical discussions commissioned at palace libraries were common features of the ‘connected histories’ of early modern intellectual history.¹⁰⁹ For instance, Pico della Mirandola (1463-94) completed his treatise *De Ente et Uno* (On Being and Unity) during his residency at the Badia Fiesolana near Florence in 1490-91.¹¹⁰ Pico’s work, similar to the content of the debate at hand, covers the question of God’s oneness, singularity, and simplicity with regard to the contingent multitude in the world, yet different from the Aristotelian-Avicennan scope of the Ottoman context,¹¹¹ his treatise does not hold the validity of the Peripatetics but tries to reconcile Aristotle and Plato in light of other traditions of the past, including schools as wide as Christian Neoplatonism (Dionysius the Areopagite), Christian Latin tradition (St. Anselm, Duns Scotus, St. Thomas etc.), Arabic Aristotelianism (Avicenna, Averroes), as well as Kabbalah.¹¹² Despite his use of a greater range of sources, Mirandola, in line with Ḥocazâde’s mission of verification, aims to “vindicate truth”¹¹³ with an attempt at synthesizing different schools of thought.

The Badia Fiesolana was one of the most spectacular libraries of its time, with a richness comparable to the size of Bâyezîd II’s library, where, in a similar fashion, Aristotelian works were given much more weight in the li-

¹⁰⁷ Quoted from Monfasani, “Tractate I. The Philosopher What the Ancients Taught Concerning Being”, *George Amiroutzes*, 71.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted from Monfasani, “Tractate XIV. The Same Author Concerning the First Principle”, *George Amiroutzes*, 187.

¹⁰⁹ With regard to the notions of universalism and humanism under the broad head of ‘historical anthropology’ in the connected early modern world, see Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories”, 739-40.

¹¹⁰ Dressen, “Peripatetici pariter et platonici”, 376.

¹¹¹ Maybe with the exception of the term *al-i’tibârât*’s connotation in Suhrawardî’s Illuminationism, the terms (and scholars) cited and commented in the Zeyrek-Ḥocazâde debate tend to be rather related to the Arabic Peripatetic tradition or its post-classical critique by certain theologians. There does not seem to be any direct Platonist figures cited in response to the Aristotelian-Avicennan worldview. Due to the dominance of the latter school during this period, there does not seem to be any medrese handbooks positing Illuminationist doctrines. On the contrary, there tend to be parts in certain treatises, in which Suhrawardî’s doctrines were criticized (İbn Kemâl, “Risâla fî ziyâda al-wujûd”, 9-49). With regard to the question whether there was an Ottoman Illuminationist school, see Arıcı, “Osmanlı İlim Dünyasında İsrâkî Bir Zümreden Söz Etmek Mümkün mü?”.

¹¹² Hamm, *Pico della Mirandola of Being and Unity*. Mirandola’s discourse on unicity covers the similar ground with the Zeyrek-Ḥocazâde debate, especially when questioning how God’s four attributes did not go against His unicity. Here Avicenna’s view is given in light of Averroes’ criticism, and by using Platonic vocabulary, Mirandola defined unicity as the most expense *genera*, a view that the Arabic Avicenna would go against since God, for him, cannot be defined by logical categories, such as genus and species (Hamm, *Pico della Mirandola of Being and Unity*, ch. 8, 28).

¹¹³ See Pico’s letter to his friend Ermolao Barbaro, where he refers to his project as “vindicating truth” translated by Hamm in *Pico della Mirandola of Being and Unity*, 6.

library holding over Platonic texts.¹¹⁴ To evaluate the quality of the Badia library stock requires some thoughtful attention to the conventions of reading and study and, having studied the inventory, Angela Dressen notes that the size of patristic and theological works at the Badia have often been downplayed to the extent that the biggest collection at the library constitutes theological scholastic works. The fifteenth-century study practices suggest that the influence of theology, especially in the philosophical discourses produced at the Badia, was far more reaching than previously assumed.¹¹⁵ An avid collector of books and a denizen of the ancient Near East, Pico was even accounted as having penned a treatise “defending the scholastic philosophers against the charge that their barbarous style disqualified them as thinkers”.¹¹⁶ Hıcazâde’s synthetic method reconciling different aspects of knowledge, including Avicennan philosophy and post-classical theology, had an affinity with Pico’s syncretic approach due to his constant dialogue with different schools of thought and attempts at scholarly arbitration.¹¹⁷

2.5 The Social Functions of Scholarly Patronage. Legitimacy, Honor, and Prestige

To conclude, patronage was a productive and dynamic system that propelled clientele-fostering networks and thought processes, rewarded ingenuity, crafted scientific approaches, and legitimized knowledge based on the trends of the day. The context of Ottoman courtly life and scientific patronage indeed shaped the practice and presentation of the sciences in the eyes of the learned class, but given the fact that getting bureaucratic favors or posts at the Ottoman court was looked down upon by many fifteenth-century reputable scholars, it would be an oversimplification to limit the scientific culture only to distinction and social taste,¹¹⁸ i.e. not amounting to content and scientific criteria. The fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarship did not establish a fitting discourse based on court satisfaction but, rather, fostered objectivity within the confines of the present scholarship. The rule of scholarly aptness was based on arbitration and verification, both of which depended on the correct use of syllogisms, rigorous argumentation, and the knowledge of past scholarship.

Court culture was a recognized tool to legitimize the sciences and, in turn, the study of sciences also sought legitimization through patronage. Recent scholarship with a sociological bent tended to overpower the role of courtly life, by reducing the cultivation of science and the arts to courtly manners,

¹¹⁴ Dressen, *The Library of the Badia Fiesolana*, 48. I would like to thank the author for sharing a copy of her monograph with me.

¹¹⁵ Dressen, “Peripatetici pariter et platonici”, 371-3. Also see other secondary literature regarding the weight of theology in Pico’s philosophy: Monnerjahn, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola* and Dulles, *Princeps Concordiae*, 144-64.

¹¹⁶ See Pico’s another letter to Ermolao Barbaro mentioned in Grafton, *Commerce with the Classics*, 109.

¹¹⁷ Behind the synthetic formulations of both Italian and Ottoman contexts, there also lied developments in library classification and cataloguing systems which were becoming more diversified and, in some ways, universalistic based on the idea of the unity of science (see Besson, *Medieval Classification and Cataloguing*).

¹¹⁸ Bourdieu, *Distinction*.

social propriety, and decency. In his tendentious study Mario Biagioli has pushed on the image of the Italian polymath Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) as a courtier, arguing that his courtly role was integral to his scientific achievement and artisanship to a degree that Galileo had to refashion himself as a successful philosopher – thereby downplaying his interest in mechanics to receive sustained favor and patronage.¹¹⁹ It is true that scholars did not live in a vacuum and their concern for patronage and social climbing, thus, were not external to Galileo’s scientific pursuits. On the one hand, Galileo’s increasing commitment to Copernicanism and his self-fashioning as a successful court client fed off each other, constructing a socio-professional identity that led him to put forth a new natural philosophy within the confines of his tenure and professional choices;¹²⁰ on the other, it would be simplistic to treat the patronage networks as no more than labels and resources to be tapped into by clever opportunists playing language games.

The modes of behavior and etiquette in court debates indeed had close ties to the sociogenesis of the ruling class and its actions. As in Norbert Elias’ coinage “civilizing process” regulated the self-image of the Sultan and his domain, which were shaped by a wide variety of facts determining his political absolutism based on the level of technology, the type of manners, the development of scientific knowledge, religious ideas, and customs.¹²¹ Yet, for the sympathizers of the ‘patronage-first’ approach, it is a problem that the imperial patronage directed at scientific objectivity and scholarly argumentation may not still garner the sincere attention of patrons and influence their worldviews. In other words, the court debate might simply be a showcase of power, as well as a legitimizing tool for political absolutism to a degree that the patrons might simply lack commitment to the issues addressed.

It could be argued that court debates had an inner fallacy of associating the power’s acknowledgment with objectivity and verity. On the one hand, the discourse of power may simply dismiss certain options and alternative explanations but, on the other, utilize them in its favor – whether through the utilization of physical objects (e.g. maps, commemorative coins, and medals), works of art imbued with a religious/cosmic undertone (e.g. Lorenzo de’ Medici’s commissioning of votive images at churches,¹²² Louis XIV’s ostentatious display of his sun image in plays), or theological and philosophical justifications (e.g. the Catholic theology of the *Corpus Mysticum* or the polymath Blaise Pascal’s political commentary). In this regard, the Ottoman context was not significantly different from its other European and Islamicate counterparts.

119 See Biagioli, *Galileo, Courtier*. In his first review, Michael Shank has argued that Biagioli downplays the scientific achievements of Galileo in order to assign a crucial role to the prevalent aristocratic culture, thereby playing by the evidence to bolster his point concerning his “social context-first approach”. The trap of microhistory, for Shank, has the perils of disregarding the trajectory of intellectual continuity and scientific eruditions of a particular scholar. For Shank’s review, Biagioli’s reply, and the former’s rejoinder: Shank, “Galileo’s Day in Court”; Biagioli, “Playing with the Evidence” and Shank, “How Shall We Practice History?”.

120 Biagioli, *Galileo, Courtier*, 1-8.

121 Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 1: 3. As in the words of Huizinga, culture arises in the form of contest, proceeding in the shape or the mood of the game, and contest, in this regard, contributes to civilizing functions (Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 50).

122 Lowe, “Patronage and Territoriality”, esp. 262. For a survey, Gombrich, “The Early Medici as Patrons of Art” and, for the role of Cosimo de’ Medici (1389-1464) in artistic and religious propaganda for the new republic, see Hollingsworth, *Patronage in Renaissance Italy*, 48-94 and Kent, “The Dynamic of Power”.

The court society is undoubtedly connected to the advancing centralization of state power and might, and the image of the king, as in the classical case of Louis XIV, the *Roi Soleil*, has been often taken as an utmost model of the omnipotent absolute monarch.¹²³ In a similar fashion, Sultan Mehmed II, who was known for his centralization policies in administration and had turned the fledgling principality into a world empire, attracted many scholars, artists, and literati from East to West.¹²⁴ He was never portrayed as an ignorant monarch. He was rather portrayed as meticulous in his decisions and determined to give the utmost chance to deserving philosophical and artistic traditions, at all costs.

Mehmed II was an absolutist monarch, who was said to have gleamed like the Sun possessing divine wisdom – even by the Byzantine scholars and Italian humanists of the period.¹²⁵ The late Byzantine philosopher Georgios Amiroutzes (1400-70), whose acquaintance with the Sultan went back to the conquest of Trebizond in 866/1461, also praised the Sultan's patronage of Graeco-Arabic philosophy in a panegyric with allusions to both Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, and paralleled his virtuous character to the glimmering quality of the encompassing sun:

O the Greatest Autocrat of Autocrats
 O the Khan above, the Highest of the Highest Ones,
 O the Most Brilliant Sun, the One, with your golden gleaming
 Rays, illuminating everything that yields
 O the One that shines, delighting most abundantly,
 O the One that holds the scepter over the universe, may You rejoice.¹²⁶

In his panegyrics, Amiroutzes refers to Plato and Aristotle along with the latter's father-in-law Hermias (d. 341 BC) as the Sultan's ultimate virtuous models. Amiroutzes' second fragment above was adapted from Aristotle's "Hymn to Virtue" written in commemoration of Hermias, a funerary hymn that was recited by the initiates of Aristotle's school and philosophy.¹²⁷ Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus and a companion of Platonists, was a great patron of philosophy who sponsored Aristotle during his exile in Assos, and the philosopher ultimately married to her daughter Pythias. Aristotle and the Peripatetics were indebted to him to such an extent that they had a reason to portray him as a devout student and patron of philosophy.¹²⁸

123 See Marin, *Portrait of the King*; Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, vol. 2 and Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*. Also a ruler of the Anatolian Seljuqs 'Alā al-Dīn Kayqubād I (d. 1220/616-1237/634) and the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen (r. 1220-50) refashioned themselves in their coins and seals after the models of pagan solar cult, such as that of Apollo and Sol Invictus and the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 963/1556-1014/1605), who was also the instigator of eclectic belief systems like 'Divine Faith' (*dīn-e ilāhī*) and 'Universal Peace' (*ṣulḥ-e kull*), was also preoccupied with the divine light imagery (see the articles by Suzan Yalman on Suhrawardī's use of light imagery in assigning a cosmic rulership to the Seljuq Sultan: "'Ala al-Din Kayqubad Illuminated", her research précis "Light of the Heavens and Earth" and "Repairing the Antique", 226-31).

124 Akasoy, "A Baghdad Court in Constantinople/Istanbul", 136-47.

125 Babinger, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet ve İtalya" and "Mehmed der Eroberer".

126 Janssens, van Deun, "George Amiroutzes". I want to thank Aslıhan Akışık for sharing this source and translating Amiroutzes' panegyric verse on the Sultan for this study. Also see Mirmiroğlu, "Fatih Sultan Mehmet", 98-9.

127 Renahan, "Aristotle as Lyric Poet" and LeVen, "Aristotle's Hymn to Virtue".

128 Ford, *Aristotle as Poet*, 18.

The cases of scientific universalism, syncretism, and encyclopedism were common grounds for early modern Islamicate ideologies, which were often shaped by the prevailing religio-political imperial vision of a 'cosmic sovereign', and the doctrinal accumulation of Islamicate domains of knowledge coming from different sources. It is in this context that the image of Sun as 'the Absolute' emphasized Mehmed II's illuminating quality of patronage in philosophy, a motif tied to the Neoplatonist cosmology inherited by certain strands of Graeco-Arabic thought - whether the Muslim Peripatetics or Illuminationists. The Sultan here is portrayed as the 'Necessitating One', an 'Unmoved Mover', emanating beams of existence and truth. In certain other Ottoman works, the Sultan was also depicted as a fountainhead that beget the divine light of philosophy when radiating wisdom and knowledge. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that in his Persian book of history *Hasht bihisht*, the Kurdo-Ottoman historian İdris-i Bitlisî counted *hikma*, a term that may refer to a wide range of meanings, including Avicennan philosophy, Suhrawardî's thought, or 'divine wisdom' in its most general sense,¹²⁹ among the Sultan's natural faculties (*malaka*). Bitlisî's account may resonate strongly with Jāmī's and Amiroutzes' panegyrics due to its utilization of Neoplatonist vocabulary. For this reason, the Kurdo-Ottoman historian here links the Sultan's 'overflowing wisdom' to the 'Active Intellect' ('*aql-e fa'āl*') in Aristotelian-Avicennan cosmogony.¹³⁰ The Sultan as the 'Active Intellect' or the 'ever-present Sun' here governs both the celestial and the sublunary, so that he can enable the actualization of potential intelligibles within the material intellect, giving a push to the sublime and, at the same time, initiating the patronage of Muslim Peripatetic and Platonist schools of philosophy in the Ottoman world.¹³¹

It has been recently argued that Mehmed II's cultural politics was deeply inflected by a particular thread of Renaissance philosophy called the *Prisca Theologia*, the Renaissance dialectic between humanism and scholasticism. This strand of thought, in many ways, could be associated with the sixteenth-century Mughal emperor Akbar's *Sulḥ-e kull* that motivated the revival of more eclectic and mysterious forms of ancient learning (including Neoplatonism) along with a political narrative of reasserting himself as a 'renewer' (*renovatio/mujaddid*) and restoring the world to its pristine order under a universal ecclesiastical authority.¹³² Matthew Melvin-Koush-

129 For an analysis of different sections in philosophical genres (*hikma falsafiyya* and *hikma islāmiyya*) in the Török manuscript prepared by the fifteenth-century palace cataloguer 'Aṭūfī, which includes the full list of books belonged to Bāyezid II's palace library, see Gutas, "Philosophical Manuscripts". Also see ch. 4 in Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 206-13. For the fifteenth-century Ottoman nuances among *falsafa*, *hikma* and *kalām*, see Taşköprizâde, *Miftāḥ al-sa'āda wa-miṣbāḥ*, 1: 311-12, 2: 150, as well as the Ottoman Turkish version translated by his son Taşköprizâde Mehmed, see Taşköprizâde, *Mevzū'ātü'l-'ulūm*, 1: 331-5, 2: 256. Taşköprizâde's definition of *hikma* also follows Jurjānī's dictionary of terminology (al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-ta'rīfāt*, 97).

130 For the uses of Neoplatonic vocabulary in the fifteenth-century Ottoman poetry, see the cases of Tācizāde Ca'fer Çelebi (d. 921/1515) and Mihrī Ḥatun (d. after 917/1512), in Andrews, "Ottoman Poetry" and Havlioğlu, "Mihrī Hatun and Neoplatonic Discourse", 169-87 and 188-202 respectively. Especially in Ca'fer Çelebi's case, love always had its grounding in a cosmic connection through the use of Neoplatonist imagery in a series of emanations descending from a primal unity loosely signified by notion of "God as the [ultimate] Truth [*el-Ḥaqq*]" (see Andrews, "Ottoman Poetry", 171-4). For Mihrī Ḥatun, also see Havlioğlu, *Mihrī Hatun*, 18-19, 104-6.

131 İdris-i Bitlisî, *Heşt Behişt VII. Ketibe*, 36.

132 Casale, "Mehmed the Conqueror", 846-50; "From Parallels to Intersections", 23-5. With regard to the Mughal cases of religious conciliation, universalism, and mixing of cultures

ki has recently observed that early modern Islamicate empires in the post-Mongol world include certain common forms of religiopolitical legitimacy, such as messianism, apocalypticism, ecumenism, occultism, and the principle of saint-philosopher-kingship. The latter aspect is a common feature that implies cosmic universalism at the nexus of mysticism, political legitimacy, and philosophical studies.¹³³

It is no coincidence that Mehmed II was regarded as the ‘Second Renewer’ (*müceddid-i şânî*) of the Hagia Sophia, who appropriated and embodied its sacred power for a firm religio-political mission by way of a discourse steeped in the Neoplatonic *renovatio/tajdid*. In İdris-i Bitlisi’s history, the Sultan was depicted as having seen himself as a ‘cosmic sovereign’, a conduit between the world of men and the divine, which was a quality comparable to the Byzantine emperor Justinian I (r. 527-65), who was the edifice’s first founder.¹³⁴

It should be noted that despite that many descriptions of Mehmed II accentuated the Platonic aspects of his patronage in philosophy, there could be found other representations of him as a supporter and resuscitator of studies in Arabic Aristotelianism.¹³⁵ In most descriptions included in history books, I argue that there is a fine balance between Aristotelian and Platonic features of Mehmed II’s scholarly interests, the latter being more highlighted in contemporary scholarship due to its terminological resting on the image of sun rays. On the other hand, there is a plenty of evidence that Mehmed II was an instigator of Aristotelian sciences and, in the case of the Ottoman medrese, this would amount to the study of Avicenna and Avicennism that diffused into the disciplines of *hikma* and *kalâm*.

George Amiroutzes, who was allegedly related to the grand vizier Mahmud Paşa,¹³⁶ gave an alternative account of Mehmed II’s philosophical interests in his “Dialogue with the Sultan on Christ’s Faith”,¹³⁷ in which the philosopher rather emphasized the Sultan’s familiarity with Aristotelian doctrines based on the model of Alexander the Great.¹³⁸ In this work, Amiroutzes saw Mehmed II as the harmonizer of Christianity and Islam *par*

(*âmizish-e farhang*) including Akbar’s *Şulh-e kull*, see *Modern Asian Studies*’ May 2022 special issue on Mughal political theology (volume 56): Moin, “*Sulh-i kull* as an oath of peace”; Gommans, Huseini, “Neoplatonism and the Pax Mongolica”; Sheffield, “Exercises in peace”; Pye, “The Sufi method behind the Mughal ‘Peace with All’ religions”. Also see Kinra, “Revisiting the History and Historiography of Mughal Pluralism” and Amanat “Nuqtawî Messianic Agnostics of Iran”.

133 Melvin-Koushki, “Early Modern Islamicate Empire”, 356-62.

134 Casale, “Mehmed the Conqueror”, 853-5.

135 As in the case of Mehmed II exemplified previously, the term *faylasūf* generally refers to an Avicennan philosopher who acknowledges the cosmological and ontological assumptions of Arabic Aristotelianism. See astronomer-mathematician Faḥḥullāh al-Shirwānī’s (d. 891/1486) designation of Ulugh Bey as “al-sultān al-faylasūf” in a text included in his *Sharḥ al-tadhkira fi ‘ilm al-hay’a* (Fazlıoğlu, “The Samarqand Mathematical-Astronomical School”, 41).

136 Monfasani has written that there are two sources regarding the connection between the two men: the first source suggests that their mothers were daughters of İagari, a Greek nobleman Marko Yagari; and, according to Laonicus Chalcocondyles’ account, Amiroutzes might be Mahmud Paşa’s cousin, *exadelphos*. See Monfasani, *George Amiroutzes*, 8.

137 For the edition of the text, Argyriou, Lagarrigue, “Georges Amiroutzes et son Dialogue”.

138 According to Kritvoulos, Amirutzes was a late Byzantine philosopher who was learned in physics, dogmatics, mathematics, geometry, as well as Peripatetic and Stoic philosophy. For Kritvoulos on Mehmed II’s generosity towards Amiroutzes, see Kritvoulos, *History of Mehmed*, 117 and Mirmiroğlu, “Fatih Sultan Mehmet”, 94-100. For a full survey of the Sultan’s patronage activities, see Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, 462-93. For Amiroutzes’ praise

excellence under a unified rubric from the Aristotelian religio-philosophical point of view.¹³⁹

Another such text is the late Byzantine philosopher and Aristotelian polemist George of Trebizond's (1395-1484) "Preface to Mehmed II for the *Isagoge* to Ptolemy's *Almagest*". As John Monfasani has suggested, this work was written while George was in Constantinople, where he had gone in the spring of 1465 and remained until early 1466. The scholar was not able to present this dedication during his visit; he, instead, proposed to send it to the Sultan along with his dedication of the Latin *Comparatio* and other writings from Rome, including *The Difference between Plato and Aristotle*, a work in comparative philosophy that the Sultan would highly appreciate.¹⁴⁰ A Byzantine theologian, humanist, and convert to Catholicism, Cardinal Bessarion (1403-72), who was a pupil of Pletho and a supporter of Platonism, got hold of George's Latin letters, found out about George's flattering words for Mehmed II and, along with the Spanish theologian and diplomat Rodrigo Sánchez Arévalo (1404-1470), led the scholar to be imprisoned for a period of four months due to his 'heretical' assertions that Mehmed II "succeeded by divine right to the universal monarchy of the Roman emperors and popes over the whole world".¹⁴¹ Having described His Excellency as *peritia philosophiae peripateticae, doctrina in multis disciplinis* (being learned in terms of peripatetic philosophy and various other sciences) in these letters,¹⁴² George also extolled the Sultan's interest, familiarity, and patronage in Aristotelian philosophy as follows:

I have the praise of your power, thinking that there is nothing better in the present life than to serve a wise king and one who philosophizes about the greatest matters. For in addition to your other manly virtues which befits a king, Your Mightiness is also said to study Aristotle even more than those who have a professional responsibility to study Aristotle.¹⁴³

In the rest of the preface, George counted the Sultan's stated interest in Ptolemy's *Great Synthesis* (i.e. his *Almagest*) among his virtues, a work that synthesized cartography, topography, and astronomy with mathematical precision, so that it was highly practical for military strategy, territorial mapping, as well as apocalypticism and political prognostication.¹⁴⁴ An-

of the Sultan's knowledge in Aristotelian[-Avicennan] philosophy, see Akasoy, "Mehmed II as a Patron of Greek Philosophy", 253.

139 Bádenas, "The Byzantine Intellectual Elite", 28.

140 Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 281-2. George dedicated this work to the Ottoman sultan, whom he believed to be an "Aristotelian" (Shank, "The *Almagest*", 58).

141 Trame, *Rodrigo Sánchez Arévalo*, 185-6.

142 Akasoy, "Mehmed II as a Patron of Greek Philosophy", 255.

143 Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 281. Also see another treatise by George that depicted the Sultan's penchant for Aristotelian philosophy titled "On the Divinity of Manuel", a text that might have been written in 1467 for the Sultan's hypothetical conversion, stating that the Sultan "mastered the works of Aristotle" (Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 566-7).

144 Berggren and Jones have observed that the primary contributions of Ptolemy's *Geography* were supplying "a detailed and extensive topography of the entire known parts of the world (i.e. Europe, Africa, and Asia), a clear and succinct discussion of the roles of astronomy, and other forms of data-gathering in geographical investigations", in which the scholars would be able to write down "the coordinates of latitude and longitude for every feature drawn on a world map so that anyone possessing Ptolemy's work could reproduce a precise world map at any time, in

na Akasoy has recently suggested that the conviction that the Sultan was familiar with Aristotelian doctrines is highly striking in another treatise called “On the Eternal Glory of the Autocrat”.¹⁴⁵ After having mentioned that the Sultan’s qualities outshined those of the Byzantine emperor Constantine the Great (r. 306-37) – “just as the sun outshines the moon” – George, in this work, talked about the Sultan’s interest in Ptolemy’s *Great Synthesis* and introduced the theme of the Aristotelian canon in order to justify certain Christian doctrines in the eyes of Aristotelianism.¹⁴⁶ Chapter II of this treatise concerned the Holy Trinity with regard to God’s unicity, in which, by applying Aristotelian definitions (i.e. statements that designate the essence of something) to Christian theology, the Trinity concurred with Aristotelian propositions, such that the statement “God is one in Trinity” did not clash with “He is one but not in Trinity” per se.¹⁴⁷ With another work dated in July 1453 called “On the Truth of Christians’ Faith”, which was re-laborated into two treatises, George of Trebizond regarded the Sultan as the new Emmanuel, i.e. Jesus Christ in the flesh, unifying all the people of the world. This vision that he developed was an original vision of the providential role of Islam as a protector and renewer of the Church, as well as Mehmed II being the emperor of a universal kingdom.¹⁴⁸

whole or in part, and at any scale” (Berggren, Jones, *Ptolemy’s Geography*, 3). For the translation history of Ptolemy’s *Almagest*, see Dalché, “The Reception of Ptolemy’s Geography”.

145 Akasoy, “Mehmed II as a Patron of Greek Philosophy”, 254.

146 Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 493.

147 Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezunitiana*, 497.

148 Bádenas, “The Byzantine Intellectual Elite”, 29-30; Akasoy, “A Baghdad Court in Constantinople/Istanbul”, 144.

3 What the Sources Say The Sociocultural Context of the Zeyrek-Hocasāde Debate

Summary 3.1 Lives of Two Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Professors. – 3.1.1 A Pious Sufi-Scholar. Mollā Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]). – 3.1.2 Life of a Verifier. Hocasāde Muşliħuddīn Muştafā (d. 893/1488). – 3.1.2.1 Hocasāde’s Scholarly Breadth and Esteemed Argumentative Skills in Debate. – 3.1.2.2 Common Phrases Used for Hocasāde’s Vast Knowledge in Various Sciences. – 3.2 The Diversity of Genres in Philosophy and Theology. Two Types of Scholars at Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Medreses. – 3.3 Ottoman Culture of Court Debate and Disputation Etiquette. – 3.4 A Question of Unbelief. – 3.5 Extant Manuscripts.

The debate at hand between two prominent Ottoman scholars Zeyrek and Hocasāde, which was constructed through a limited number of primary source materials, concerned a hefty philosophical/theological topic regarding the validity of the philosophers’ proof of God’s unicity. In addition to the single extant copies of each scholar’s response, there are only a few extant descriptions of the actual event, compiled more than a century later. The oldest extant narrative is known to have recorded by the Ottoman *littérateur* Taşköprizāde Aħmed Efendi (d. 968/1561) in a popular imperial biobibliographical dictionary called *al-Shaqā’iq al-num’āniyya fī ‘ulamā’ al-dawla al-‘uthmāniyya*, an almanac of Ottoman scholars and Sufis until his time. Taşköprizāde’s narration was employed as a model for later texts, and the biographers to come embellished this narrative by adding more context and rhetorical remarks, which made the debate memorable for future generations. Nearly a hundred years after the initial debate, Taşköprizāde narrated the events as follows:

One day, the virtuous scholar [Mawlānā Zeyrek] made certain claims about al-Sayyid al-Jurjānī in the presence of Sultan Meħemmed Hān. These words bothered the Sultan and he summoned Hocasāde, who, at the time,

was an instructor in Brusa working at the Mehemmed Hân Medrese, and ordered him to hold a debate with Mawlânâ Zeyrek. There was an inquiry (*su'âl*) about the proof of God's unicity by Hocasâde, and he sent this inquiry to Mawlânâ Zeyrek so that the senior scholar would pen a response to him. Afterwards Zeyrek penned his response in the presence of the Sultan. The referees present at the debate were the scholar-jurist Mawlânâ Hüsrev and the grand vizier Maḥmûd Paşa, the latter kept standing on his feet. Hocasâde started with his statement first and he stated: "Let the Sultan know that it is not necessary to deny what it is claimed. [Otherwise] I am afraid that people will say that Hocasâde denies God's unicity". Then Zeyrek settled Hocasâde's initial inquiry and responded to him. There followed a great debate, and many words were exchanged between the two. The matter was not settled on this day and the debate continued for six days. The Sultan ordered on the sixth day that each one of the contestants should peruse what they have written. Mawlânâ Zeyrek said: "I do not have an extra copy other than my own". Then Hocasâde stated: "I have another copy. I will give this to Zeyrek and then I will write what he penned at the back of my copy". Then he started to jot down Zeyrek's response. [After a while] the Sultan replied to Hocasâde in a joking manner: "Don't write Master Zeyrek's points wrong". Then Hocasâde replied: "Even if I were to copy things down wrong, my mistakes would never exceed the mistakes of my opponent". [Upon hearing this] the Sultan laughed at Hocasâde's words. Then, on the seventh day Hocasâde gained the upper hand and this was also judged as such by Mawlânâ Hüsrev. Afterwards the Sultan added addressing Hocasâde: "O Master, it is said in *hadîth* literature that those who were killed were killed. You verily killed this man and we witnessed this. I give his medrese post to you". At the time Mawlânâ Zeyrek was an instructor at one of the churches among the Constantinople churches [i.e. the medrese of Zeyrek] that Mehemmed Hân [had] converted into medreses before the construction of the *Şahn-i şemân*.¹

As Taşköprizâde's account suggests, the debate on God's unicity notoriously continued for six days, and on the sixth, the Sultan asked both scholars to pen their points, rather than proceeding orally, so that on the next day it could be determined who made the most convincing argument. Finally on the seventh day, the debate came to an end upon the review of their responses, and Hocasâde was elected as the winner when the scholar-jurist Mollâ Hüsrev (d. 885/1480) announced his victory by quoting the well-known *hadîth* "Those who were killed were killed, and the winner [Hocasâde] had the booty".²

Disputations could be a vehicle for personal prestige and generous favors in patronage; yet, for the losing party, it could mean one's humiliation or dishonoring.³ Sometimes the expressions employed in such debates may include a metaphorical language of murder and revenge, as in the afore-

1 Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqâ'iq*, 124-5.

2 "Man qatala qatılan fa-lahu salbuhu" (Hoca Sa'deddin, *Tâcü't-tevârih*, 2: 467; Bosnalı Koca Hüseyin, *Bedâ'iyi'ül-vekâ'iyi'*, 2: 285b; Belîğ, *Güldeste-i riyâz*, 270).

3 Written or verbal, disputations could confer honors, as well as used to dishonor (*dedecora*). See the reference for Cardono's autobiography in Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 272. The dialogue between scholars involved numerous references to terms of dishonor, such as shame (*vergogna*), and honor, such as honesty (*onestà*), courtesy (*cortesia*), and loyalty (*lealtà*) (Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 276).

mentioned *ḥadīth* that mentioned ‘killing’. The arbitrators of the debate, more specifically Mollā Hüsrev, seemed to be disappointed with Zeyrek’s headstrong attitude in nuanced theological issues and his inability to verify the philosophers’ point, such that this may have been what subsequently led him to remove Zeyrek from his post at his new highly prestigious medrese *Şahn-ı şemân*, and conferred his post on the younger Hocasāde. At the end of the anecdote, biographical sources write that Zeyrek eventually quit teaching and moved to Brusa to lead a pious and reclusive life for the rest of his days. Though later Meḥmed II intended to win him back by offering another post, the heartbroken Zeyrek felt offended, and securing a humble amount of twenty aspers per day from a certain local merchant called Hoca Hasan, he never left Brusa again, spending his days in devotion and piety.⁴

There are some curious details about the debate in the later Turkish adaptation of *al-Shaqā’iq* by the *littérateur* Mecdī Meḥmed Efendi (d. 999/1591), who embellished his narrative by interjecting elaborate prose and poetry describing the mood and disposition of the parties involved. The Ottoman biobibliographical sources do not specify Zeyrek’s initial question of contestation against Jurjānī, but it was widely known that this was not the first time that the young Hocasāde had, in the presence of other prominent scholars, refuted the established Zeyrek in a formal debate (see below). This remarkable debate was a final glorious round in a highly anticipated series of Ottoman intellectual boxing matches.

It may be that, remembering this initial snap exchange over a decade ago (see the miniature [fig. 3]), Meḥmed II commissioned Hocasāde again, after many years, to tackle the senior scholar’s boasts of being a more virtuous Muslim than the Timurid verifier Jurjānī. After some words about how Zeyrek praised his own rational capacity and religious devotion, Mecdī included a curious couplet from the fourteenth-century Persian ghazal master Hāfez in order to mock Zeyrek’s vanity in the debate, “Be bitter the mouth of him, who the candy [of my sweet verse] aspersed! | Be dust on the head of him, who the denier of the limpid water [of my verse] became!”⁵ – the meaning of which was interpreted by the Ottoman Sufi commentator Sūdī of Bosnia (d. 1007/1599)⁶ as “lacking thankfulness and appreciation is like denying clear water”.⁷

To dramatize the scene, the biographer Mecdī further added that Zeyrek’s bitter words passed through Sultan Meḥmed II’s chest like a sharp arrow, greatly offending him and causing him to look for unsubstantiated faults in the Sufi-scholar’s rectitude in religion with his “piercing axe”.⁸ Zeyrek found it necessary to bring refutations to silence (*ilzām-ı iltizām idüb*) the master verifier’s arguments related to piety. Upon this, knowing his acumen and argumentative style in philosophical arguments, the Sultan ordered Hocasāde, who was residing in Brusa at the time, to prepare an initial inquiry on Jurjānī’s

4 Ünver, “Molla Zeyrek’in gücenmesi”, 70.

5 Clarke, *The Divân-ı Hâfiz*, 946. The original lines are as follows: *bādā dahānash talkh ke ‘ayb-e nabāt guft | khākash ba-sar ke munkar-e āb-e zulāl shud* (Mecdī, *Hadā’ikü’ş-şakā’ik*, 1: 142). “Be dust on the head of him” is an idiomatic term that expresses disrespect.

6 Aruçi, “Sūdī Bosnevî”. Also for an account of his life and works, Hoca, *Sūdī, Hayatı, Eserleri*.

7 Bosnawī, *Sharḥ-e Sūdī bar Hāfez*, 2741-2.

8 “Pādişāh-ı cemm-i ḥaşmet, fāzıl-ı mezbūruñ sihām-ı kelām sine-i gūzārından mecrūhu’l-ḥātır olub Seyyid Şerif Cürçānī’ye tibr-i ṭa’ana ile söz atduğundan rencide-i bāl oldı” (Mecdī, *Hadā’ikü’ş-şakā’ik*, 142).

section on God's unicity, in which Jurjānī evaluated positively the philosophers' version against the Dualists. Ḥocazāde, as Mecdī recounts, was known to have then prepared a written inquiry on God's unicity, which acted as an antithesis to Zeyrek's sophisticated claims about the weakness of Jurjānī's evaluation of the philosophers' unicity formulation.⁹ Ḥocazāde, in turn, argued for the premise's validity in the eyes of the philosophers.

According to Mecdī, Zeyrek – often portrayed as haughty and assuming in manners (i.e. *tekebbür*) – desisted Ḥocazāde's reply and claimed that he committed 'innovation' in religion, implying that his position suggested the denial of God's unicity. Brushing off the claim of unbelief (*kufır*) with his rigid verification and argumentation method, Ḥocazāde made the most sound judgments regarding the subject matter based on the arbitrator Ḥüsrev's decision.¹⁰ The persistent Zeyrek still resisted Ḥocazāde's rejoinders and brought more counter-arguments, which were all again refuted by the junior scholar – by way of verification.

The exchange between Ḥocazāde and Zeyrek followed the formal rules of scholarly debate and investigation. 'Verification' (*taḥkik* in Ottoman Turkish),¹¹ a term also employed as a method in private reading (*muṭāla'a*) in the centuries to come as well,¹² was a key term used here to describe the utmost rigor in scholarship and reading. Along with its meanings associated with objective reasoning in scholarly research and inquiry, *taḥqıq* may also denote originality, methodological and philological rigor, comparison of primary sources, and epistemological commitment to certain truth-claims.¹³ This method indicated that the scholar in question possessed the requisite intellectual tools and expertise to analyze the sources and cull a synthesis of his own via arbitration. From the Sultan's acerbic words and ironic jokes for Zeyrek in Mecdī's prose, it is apparent that the Sultan was impressed by Ḥocazāde's debating skills and it was, therefore, no coincidence that, on the seventh day Ḥocazāde's statements were deemed more certain and truthful, dispelling the doubts about the master verifier Jurjānī's exposition.

⁹ "Menküldür ki Ḥocazāde hazretleriniñ burhân-ı tevḥîde mukaddimât u mebâdisi ve ḥimâyet ü muğâlaṭatla muḥâlîteden ḥâlî bir su'âlî ve kıyâsât-ı mustakîmiyetü'l-şu'ev gibi 'aks-ı naḳîz ve 'adem-i intâç ihtimâlî meslûb bedî'ü'l-uslûb bir sözi var idi" (Mecdî, *Ḥadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 143).

¹⁰ "Esâs-ı kelâmî aşlından te'sîs u terşîs eyleyüb mevrid-i i'tirâzî taḥkîkât-i bâri'e ve tedkîkât-ı fâ'ike ile aḥkâm eyledükden soñra kendü su'âlîni taḥrîr ü taḥkîk idüb" (Mecdî, *Ḥadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 143).

¹¹ A verbal noun of increased verb form II from the root ḥ-q-q meaning 'to be true'.

¹² There are certain other uses of *taḥqıq* especially in the seventeenth-century *âdâb al-baḥth* literature on private reading (*muṭāla'a*) practices. For the rise of 'deep reading' see El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 97-128. The Ottoman scholar Müneccimbaşı Aḥmed's (d. 11/1702) refers to the practice of *al-'ilm al-taḥqıqî* as a way of inferencing (*istidlâl*) in private reading, Örs, "Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede'nin", 61; for the Arabic text, 91-3.

¹³ See the forthcoming special issue of *Journal of Early Modern History* on *taḥqıq*; especially editor Giancarlo Casale's "Introduction". The articles included in the volume by Giancarlo Casale, Rajeev Kinra, Stefano Pellò, Maria Vittoria Comacchi, Francesco Calzolaio, and Efe Murat Balıkcıoğlu analyze specific cases from the Indo-Persian to the Mediterranean worlds. For the case of *taḥqıq* as 'direct experience', see the articles by Casale and Calzolaio; *taḥqıq* as 'philological rigor' and 'literary research', see Pellò's article in the same volume, as well as Dudney, "A Desire for Meaning". With regard to this term's application to the study of classical Islamic sciences: El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century*. The closest cases for El-Rouayheb's sense of 'independent research' also exist in Kinra's article "The Truth is Out There (and Also in Here)". Stressing the philological and universalistic aspects of the term, Matthew Melvin-Koushki, however, extends its application to various other underrepresented disciplines including occult sciences (Melvin-Koushki, "*Taḥqıq* vs. *Taqīd* in the Renaissance of Western Early Modernity").



Figure 3 Hocaazāde (front right) and Mollā Zeyrek (far left) are portrayed seated for a debate in Muhtesibzāde Mehmed's (d. 968/1560) Turkish translation of *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya*, *Hadā'ikü'r-reyhān*, a work completed in 967/1560. The miniature above is from a later copy of this work and is attributed to the seventeenth-century artist Nakşî. The caption reads that Mollā Zeyrek was seated on one side of the Sultan and the Persian scholar Mevlānā Seyyid 'Alī on the other. After the Sultan welcomed Hocaazāde, who approached him to introduce himself and receive favors, the scholar placed his face in the dirt under the Sultan's feet and prayed for his longevity.⁴ The miniature seems to depict the young scholar's first encounter with Zeyrek at the foothills of Constantinople as the background suggests, yet the biographical sources mention that the scholars debated in the presence of the Sultan while being peripatetic, not seated.⁵ The depiction can be seen as a *mélange* that conflated both encounters, that is, Hocaazāde's novice appearance and the current debate, since it was only during the second encounter that the grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa (probably depicted smaller in size above) was present. During the debate, he was said to have remained standing due to his utmost respect for scholars – while others were seated. The figure seated next to the Sultan could be either Mevlānā Seyyid 'Alī or, the arbiter of the debate at hand, Mollā Hüsrev (probably the former). The miniaturist did not seem to have paid particular attention to the chronology and context of both events. As for the attire, the white headgear with a red top may signify one's links to the state and the bureaucratic path since the Sultan and Maḥmūd Paşa here seems to have matching tops, and likewise a green top may imply one's association with the *'ilmiyye* class (see the headgears of Hocaazāde and Seyyid 'Alī above). The Sufi-scholar Zeyrek's green robe depicted here with a green headgear may have connections to his Bayrāmī background. (Photo Courtesy: Serpil Bağcı and Ahmet Tunç Şen)

⁴ "Ol meclisde hazret-i Sultān'ın bir yanında Mollā Zeyrek bir yanında Mevlānā Seyyid 'Alī cāliser imiş pes pādīşāh hazretleri Hocaazāde'ye merhabā hoş geldin deyü hitāb idüb anlar dabı pādīşāh-ı ālem-penāh hazretleriniñ hāk-pāylarına yüz sürüb du'ā idüb oturmuşlar" (Muhtesibzāde, *Hadā'ikü'r-reyhān* [Terceme-i şakā'ik], MS TSMK 1263, f. 90a).

⁵ *Tacü't-tevārih*, 2: 469.

The Ottoman debates at the court of Meḥmed II had a ‘zero-sum’ logic, which was structured around the honor or recognition bestowed upon the contesters, since one’s being victorious also meant that the other side being on the losing end, whose prestige, reputation, and posts could be transferred to the other party. Meḥmed II punished Zeyrek by handing in his post at the prestigious *Şahn* to the victorious Ḥocazāde of Brusa. This rash move diverged sharply from the meritocratic bestowal of career lines specified in Sultan’s Code of Law and, as mentioned earlier, Gelibolulu Ālī took it as an example of Meḥmed II’s overly centralized and authoritarian rule – a transgression that violated even his own rule of law and set standards.¹⁴ In his arrogance, even after the debate Zeyrek continued to distort the truth about its outcome: whenever in the company of friends, he would claim that after Ḥocazāde denials of God’s unicity during the debate, he slapped him with his palms until the novice scholar accepted the truth – both of which were patently false.¹⁵

3.1 Lives of Two Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Professors

3.1.1 A Pious Sufi-Scholar. Mollā Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?])

Beginning his career at Brusa’s Murādiye medrese, Mollā Meḥmed, also known as Zeyrek, was a famed Sufi-scholar, who held a prestigious teaching post at the Zeyrek medrese for more than twenty years. This post was created after the Pantokrator Monastery was converted into a mosque and a medrese, immediately following the conquest of Constantinople in 857/1453.¹⁶ It seems that the rooms that once monks occupied were used for teaching during the first decade of the conquest temporarily. The eighteenth-century handbook of history of Istanbul mosques *Ḥadīkatü’l-cevāmi’* observes that the lodge (*zāviye*) next to the mosque building was given to Mollā Zeyrek directly by the endower (*vākıf*) Meḥmed II.¹⁷

The Zeyrek Medrese was one of most panoramically situated Byzantine monuments that stood on the fourth hill of the historic peninsula and overlooked the south-east across the valley to the third hill called *Oxeia* (‘steep’ in Greek), where the Süleymaniye complex is now crowned.¹⁸ Before the foundation of the

14 Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 199.

15 “Mevlânâ Zeyrek’ün aḥbâb u aḥzâbı yanına cem’ olub keyfiyet-i mübâḥaşeden istifsâr eyledüklerinde Mevlânâ Ḥocazāde meclis-i pâdişâhîde tevḥide inkâr idüb câdde-i ḥaḳḳdan ‘adül eyledi. Ben amı tevḥide kâ’ il idüb ḥaḳḳa ikrâr etdürinceye değün başına başına tabânça ile zârb eyledüm. Bu mâbeynde ne mezkûruñ kendübaşına dermânı tokunub kûrulmağa kâdir oldı ve ne Mevlânâ Ḥüsrev ol serfirâzi elimden almağa mâlik oldı deyü yordılar” (Mecdî, *Ḥadâ’ikü’ş-şakâ’ik*, 144).

16 Meḥmed II put *Zeyrek Medresesi Odaları*, the rooms previously occupied by Byzantine monks on the western part of the edifice, at the disposal of the scholar Zeyrek and his students (*Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 35, ff. 43-4). For the Arabic of the same passage, Akgündüz, *Öztürk, Baş*, “Fâtih Sultan Mehmed’in Ayasofya Vakfiyesi”, 259, f. 13.

17 “Câmi’-i mezkûr keniseden münkâlıbdır. Vâkıfı Ebû’l-fetḥ Sultân Meḥmed Ḥân’dır. Maḥfîl-i hümayünü vardır. Veziyesi Ayasofya’dandır. Muttaşılında olan zāviyeye ibtidâ’ Zeyrek Mollâ Meḥmed Efendi müderris olmağla, câmi’-i şerîfîn sebep-i şöhret olmuşdur” (Ayvasarâyî, *Ḥadīkatü’l-cevāmi’*, 172). Another source suggests that Zeyrek’s salary and daily expenditures were met by the Ayasofya mosque (Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqq’i*, 123).

18 Magdalino, “The Foundation of the Pantokrator Monastery”, 33-5; Stanković, Berger, “The Komnenoi and Constantinople”.

Pantokrator complex between 1118 and 1136, which served as the new imperial mausoleum (after the Holy Apostles Church) for the Komnenian dynasty,¹⁹ there was an aristocratic mansion that had first become a convent at the end of the eight century, which then turned into a hospital by the Emperor Theophilos (r. 829-42).²⁰ When John II and Eirene founded the structure, the Komnenian dynasty was in power for more than fifty years. The monastery was composed of three large interconnected churches constructed in three phases - the south church dedicated to the Christ Pantokrator having served as the *katholikon* of the monastery.²¹ The edifice was associated with the sacralization of the Komnenian imperial image²² with references to early Christian themes and depictions of cosmos that paralleled those at the Great Palace, as well as the Samson cycle (often being associated with the *ghāzī* father of Digenes Akrites, a twelfth-century romance produced at the Komnenian court),²³ and the zodiac signs.²⁴ With the conquest of Constantinople by the Latin Crusaders army in 1204, the structure was converted into administrative headquarters in the hands of the Venetians²⁵ and, besides the early renovation attempts of the structure by the architect F. Çuhadoroğlu between 1960 and 1970, a group of leading scholars of antiquities and architecture, including Robert Ousterhout, Zeynep Ahunbay, and Metin Ahunbay, have recently studied and started the restoration of the Zeyrek Camii after the structure gained a 'world heritage' status in 1985.²⁶

19 In the eighteenth century, Jean-Claude Flachet, the first merchant to the Sultan, recorded as having seen in the grounds of the Topkapı Palace, the marble tomb of Manuel I Comnenus, which was originally in the Pantokrator Monastery (Raby, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 298). As a victory monument representing the Komnenian dynastic might, power, religiosity, the Pantokrator reflects the two ways that its patronage would have been understood, as a celebration of piety (often female; here Piroška-Eirene) and military valor (usually male) (Ousterhout, "Piroška and the Pantokrator", 227). The Church's interior and exterior mosaics were so lavish that its mosaics shone like the sun as noted by Russian travellers - its interior ostentation having close connections with the Pala d'Oro at San Marco in Venice (Majeska, *Russian Travellers to Constantinople*, 43 and 289; and Ousterhout, "The Decoration of the Pantokrator (Zeyrek Camii)", 439). The Pantokrator held various relics including the headless body of St. Michael, the 'stone of anointing' where Jesus' body was allegedly laid form the cross, as well as stained glass windows which signalled the Komnenian fascination with the west (Majeska, *Russian Travellers to Constantinople*, 292-4; Ousterhout, "Piroška and the Pantokrator", 230). The edifice also held the tombs of the Komnenian emperors. In the eighteenth century, Jean-Claude Flachet, the first merchant to the Sultan, recorded as having seen in the grounds of the Topkapı Place, the marble tomb of Manuel I Comnenus, which was originally at the premises of the Pantokrator Monastery (Raby, "East & West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 298).

20 Magdalino, "Medieval Constantinople", 50-1; "The Foundation of the Pantokrator Monastery", 35.

21 Ousterhout, "Architecture, Art and Komnenian Ideology", 142-4.

22 The image of the Pantokrator represented Eirene's policy of religious piety and poverty. She became a protector of orphans and widows, and enriched monastic dwellings with money (see the commemorative text in the appendix concerning Eirene as the "founder of the venerable monastery of the Pantokrator Saviour Christ", in Magdalino, "The Foundation of the Pantokrator Monastery", 53-4).

23 Hull, *Digenis Akritas* and Magdalino, "Digenes Akrites and Byzantine Literature".

24 Ousterhout, "Architecture, Art and Komnenian Ideology", 145-7.

25 Kotzabassi, "The Monastery of Pantokrator".

26 Ousterhout, Ahunbay, Ahunbay, "Study and Restoration. First Report"; "Study and Restoration. Second Report", as well as Zeynep Ahunbay's summary "Zeynep Camii Restorasyonu" prepared for *Voyvoda Caddesi Toplantıları* (2006-2007), which can be found at <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/159589>.

al-Shaqā'iq refers to the medrese of Zeyrek as one of the first medreses in operation before the building of the *Şahın-ı şemân*.²⁷ This suggests that education in Constantinople continued in converted church buildings until the completion of the Sultan's education complex in 875/1470-71, and after this, education at Zeyrek halted completely since the medrese building of Zeyrek was utilized as a mosque.²⁸ Mecdî's entry suggests that Mehmed II only turned [eight] churches that had been in half ruins [with non-durable edifices] at the time of the conquest.²⁹ It is, however, also noted that turning these buildings into colleges was a righteous act since the Sultan justly initiated the study of the opening verse of the Qur'ân, *al-Fātiha*, upholding God's unicity (*tevḥīd*) and benediction (*takdīs*) in place of obsolete Christian texts or, metaphorically speaking, the bells of the infidel community.³⁰ Erasing the Christian past meant upholding God's unicity as the core beliefs of Islam but here the sixteenth-century biographer Mecdî might have been making a subtle reference to the celebrated debate between Ḥocazâde and Mollâ Zeyrek when mentioning God's unicity in the context of the Zeyrek mosque.

Mollâ Mehmed was known as *zeyrek* due to his acuteness of mind, an epithet given by the mystic Ḥacı Bayrâm-ı Velî (d. 833/1430), who, according to our sources, initiated him to his order with the same name.³¹ The green headgear with a red top worn by Zeyrek in the miniature above follows the early depiction of the Bayrâmî headgear. This illustration may not have paid attention to Ḥacı Bayrâm's changing of the official headgear color from red to white, upon Sultan Murâd II's (d. 855/1451) request, so that he would be able to distance his order from that of the Bayrâmî Sufis of Ardabil.³² Still, the Bayrâmî symbolism of unicity was a known phenomenon, also observed in the symbolism of three-folded headgears worn especially to follow the shaykh Bayrâm's example.³³ Naqşî's depiction above might have followed this detail, having missed the chronology of the change in the Bayrâmîs' headgear coloring.

The Ottoman sources regularly depicted Zeyrek as a pious scholar more preoccupied with worship (*ibâdet*) than with *scientia* (*'ilm*) – whether rational or religious.³⁴ Given that the unicity of God (i.e. *tawḥīd*) was the central

27 “Thumma naqalahu al-Sultân Muḥammad Khân 'ilâ ihdâ al-madâris [Zeyrek] allâti 'ayyanahu 'ind fath madîna Koştantîniyye qabl binâ' al-madâris al-thamân” (Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqâ'iq*, 124). And one of the first urban edifices to be appropriated for Islamic use as the new Ottoman capital's first medrese (Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul*, 22).

28 The Ottoman Turkish endowment charter from this period also gives the impression that the place was used as a temporary teaching spot until the completion of the *Şahın-ı şemân*. See “Kenise-i mezbûre câmi' olmağ bâbında fermân-ı kazâ-cereyân şudûr itmîşdir” (*Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 35, f. 44).

29 “Eyyâm-ı sâlifâdanberi me'abâd-ı küffâr ḥâksâr olan kenâ'is-i nâ-üstevârdan sekiz 'aded keniseleri medrese idüb” (Mecdî, *Ḥadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 117).

30 “Edyân-ı bâtıla üzere olan şuhuf-ı merfû-ı mensûbeyi okudub mebnî-i me'ânî-i seb'ül-meşânî olan fûnûn berâ'at-ı nişânî anîñ yerine oğutarağ emr eyledi. Zemzeme-i ruhâbîni âvâze-i lûtbe-i belâgat-nişâne tebdil idüb aşvât-ı nevâkis küffârî bî-nevâmîsi kelbânîñ tevḥîd ü takdîse taḥvîl eyledi” (Mecdî, *Ḥadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 117).

31 Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqâ'iq*, 123. Steingass defines the Persian word *zayrak* or *zîrak* as “ingenious, intelligent, prudent, penetrating, sagacious, smart, and quick in understanding or at manual labor” (Steingass, *A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary*, 634).

32 Bayramoğlu, Azamat, “Bayramiyye”, 270.

33 Bayramoğlu, Azamat, “Bayramiyye”, 270. Also for a general overview of Sufi symbolism in clothing, Muslu, “Türk Tasavvuf Kültüründe”.

34 Ḥoca Sa'deddin, *Tâcü't-tevâriḥ*, 2: 467.

doctrine in Bayrāmī rituals, it is understandable why Zeyrek might have felt compelled to criticize Jurjānī's piety, exposition, as well as affirmative take on the philosophers' positions with regard to the nature of God's necessity and existence.

3.1.2 Life of a Verifier. Ḥocazāde Muşliḥuddīn Muştafā (d. 893/1488)

Born around the year 838/1434 to a rich merchant family based in Brusa, Ḥocazāde was one of the most brilliant assistants of Ḥızır Bey (d. 863/1459), a famed Ottoman theologian teaching at Meḥmed I's (d. 824/1421) prestigious Sulṭāniye Medrese in Brusa.³⁵ It should be noted that similar to the case of the affluent medieval cities of Khorasan, such as Nishapur and Marw, Brusa was a center of trade, in which traders and scholars often linked to same families, a fact that led a dominating group of upper-class merchant families having invested on education to satisfy their desire for prestige and legacy.³⁶ According to the Ottoman sources, Murād II was said to have appointed Ḥocazāde at the town of Kaştel upon graduation (probably both as a novice instructor and a jurist) during his second short reign, just before the Second War of Kosovo in 852/1448.³⁷ On his way back from this victorious campaign, Murād II reappointed him at Eseyiye medrese by the Grand Mosque of Brusa with a low salary of ten aspers per day, where Ḥocazāde spent formative six years, committing *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* to memory and jotting down glosses in the marginalia of his copy. Taşköprizāde cited the sixteenth-century scholar 'Arabzāde, claiming that the contemporary Sufi-scholar Ḥasan Çelebi (d. 891/1486), who was also harshly criticized by Ḥocazāde in reply to Zeyrek below, obtained the manuscript and incorporated Ḥocazāde's memos into his own gloss.³⁸ This backstory must be the reason why Ḥocazāde lashed Ḥasan Çelebi's comments on Jurjānī's take on unicity during the debate.

It was during this time when Ḥocazāde first encountered Zeyrek during the young scholar's unsolicited visit to Sultan Meḥmed II to receive his favor. The story of the first encounter is as follows: Following the conquest of Constantinople in 857/1453, Ḥocazāde decided to show his reverence for the young Meḥmed II by congratulating him in person for his successful campaign. This encounter was perceived as a great opportunity for Ḥocazāde, who was a novice in teaching (*mülāzım*), to receive patronage from court members, or to seize a post in the Ottoman hierarchical service out of the Sultan's benevolence.³⁹ However, the junior scholar did not have enough

³⁵ Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 68.

³⁶ See Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur*, 20-7, 59 and Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 26; also see Rudolph, "Khōdjā-zāde".

³⁷ Biographical sources could be mistaken here since Ḥocazāde would be at the age of fourteen, but, on the other hand, he was often depicted as a child prodigy who was good at grasping complex problems and offering solutions to them. Historian Philippe Ariès has traced the age of schooling in the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France and England to the ages seven and eight; and a boy aged between thirteen and fifteen was already a full-grown man and shared in the life of his elders (Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood*, 151, 164).

³⁸ Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā'iq*, 137; Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tācū't-tevārīḥ*, 2:, 474.

³⁹ Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tācū't-tevārīḥ*, 2: 470. Meḥmed II was known for having shown (*ragbet itmek*) kindness (*lutf*) and favor (*iltifāt*) to the scholars, and Ḥocazāde thought that this was the

money to finance a trip to the new capital. He borrowed eight hundred aspers from one of his students to buy two horses, and left Brusa immediately with the student. By this way, he would be able to give his best offerings to the Sultan in time, who was at the foothills of Constantinople, waiting to leave for a new campaign towards Edirne.

According to Kâtib Çelebi (d. 1067/1657), Hoca-zâde presented a poem composed in praise of the scholar-grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa,⁴⁰ who introduced him to the Sultan. This was a common way to establish contact with the Sultan or, at least, establish a reputation for oneself as a noted scholar during the early years of the nascent empire. Unlike the set standards in Meḥmed II's Code of Law, which would be promulgated later during the last years of the Sultan, academic promotions were closely monitored by the Sultan and his viziers, and prominent scholars could have proposed candidates, although the Sultan always had the last word.⁴¹ In short, Ottoman debate culture was a byproduct of this early promotion scheme based on the duplex of meritocracy and patronage.

As the story goes, Meḥmed II was chatting with two celebrated scholars of the time, the Persian scholar Mollâ Seyyid 'Alî (d. 860/1456), a student of the famous theologian Jurjânî,⁴² along with the Bayramî scholar Mollâ Zeyrek. Hoca-zâde joined their conversation and argued successfully against the aged scholars - allegedly dumbfounding and silencing even the senior Zeyrek during this short exchange.⁴³

Hoca-zâde's encounter with these experienced scholars highlighted his acuity and foreshadowed his future scholarly debates (*mubâheşât-ı 'ilmiyye*) and successes. At the end of the day, the established scholars obtained gifts from the Sultan, while the poor Hoca-zâde dressed in shabby clothes received no favors. His student even became annoyed at Hoca-zâde's inability to demonstrate competence so much that he directly accused Hoca-zâde of not making a good impression. Quite the contrary was true, however. After his student fell asleep at night, two guards brought Hoca-zâde a great number of gifts, including horses and mules, precious clothes, and ten thousand aspers. Apparently the guards had not initially believed that the scholar whom the Sultan wanted most to honor was this mendicant-looking man.⁴⁴ Hoca-zâde woke his disgruntled student, informing him that he had attained status and fortune (*devlete irdi*), and officially became the Sultan's tutor,⁴⁵ a 'rags-to-riches' saga often recounted in Ottoman biobibliographical sources.⁴⁶

right moment to benefit (to take a share, *behremend*) from his benevolence (*lutf u ihsân*) (Hoca Sa'deddîn, *Tâcû't-tevârih*, 2: 470; Mecdî, *Hadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 148).

⁴⁰ Kâtib Çelebi, *Sullam al-wuşûl*, 3: 339.

⁴¹ Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, 74-5.

⁴² "Şerif Cürçânî hıdmetine vuşûl bulub meşkûh-ı fezâ'ilinden iktibâs itmiş" (Hoca Sa'deddîn, *Tâcû't-tevârih*, 2: 456).

⁴³ Hoca Sa'deddîn, *Tâcû't-tevârih*, 2: 469; Mecdî, *Hadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 148.

⁴⁴ Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqâ'iq*, 128; Hoca Sa'deddîn, *Tâcû't-tevârih*, 2: 471; Hüseyn, *Bedâ'iyü'l-vekâ'iyi*, 286b. Belîğ's *Güldeste-i riyâz* skips this piece of information after summarizing the whole anecdote only in two short sentences.

⁴⁵ Hoca Sa'deddîn, *Tâcû't-tevârih*, 2: 471.

⁴⁶ See Hoca-zâde's earlier encounter with Şeyḥ Velî Şemseddîn, a successor (*halîfe*) of the city saint of Brusa, i.e. Emîr Sultân, who advised him to continue his pursuit in knowledge instead of becoming a tradesman (Repp, *The Mufti of Istanbul*, 69).

The jealousy of grand viziers often invited state intervention in career paths. In the case of Hocaazâde, his career was interrupted at least twice when the grand viziers of the time decided to expel him off from Mehmed II's immediate circle. Whenever a scholar became closely associated (*takarrub*) with the Sultan, sources indicate that grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa had always found a way to dispel this person (*dür itmîş*) from the Sultan's immediate milieu, thanks to his finesse in palace politics. Our sources indicate that, as a palace tutor, Hocaazâde worked closely with the Sultan, teaching him 'Izz al-Dīn al-Zanjānī's book on Arabic morphology.⁴⁷ They spent so much time together that Maḥmūd Paşa, allegedly became jealous (*hasad*),⁴⁸ and tricked the Sultan by misinforming him that Hocaazâde was not satisfied with his post and desired a career in religious bureaucracy.⁴⁹ In fact, such a post, on the contrary, would be resisted by many independent-minded scholars like Hocaazâde, who saw this as a way to succumb to political authority.

The grand vizier convinced the Sultan to give Hocaazâde the chief military judgeship (*ḳādī'asker*) in Edirne in the year 862/1457-58,⁵⁰ so that the latter would be away from the Sultan's retinue. Hocaazâde rejected this offer initially, but could not resist Mehmed II's insistence and accepted the post. Later on he regretted this decision since, for the first time, he had digressed from the academic path (*'ilm-i ṭarîḳ*) for a post in the bureaucracy.⁵¹ Dissatisfied with the position, the young scholar longed to occupy himself with teaching (*tedrîs*)⁵² and, at the age of thirty-three, he was given a post at his *alma mater* Sultāniye with a salary of fifty aspers per day.⁵³ His new teaching post at Sultāniye, as Taşköprizâde's father narrates, was a position that was far more superior to his previous posts of chief judge of Edirne and tutor to the Sultan,⁵⁴ which could be interpreted as that a medrese job might have been perceived as more prestigious than a palace or bureaucratic post. As a result, Hocaazâde was removed from the judgeship upon his own request, since it was a job that he never desired to take in the first place, and had only assumed it due to the Sultan's persistence.⁵⁵

47 The name and the nature of the work that Hocaazâde studied with the Sultan is only given in Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqâ'iq*, 129. His notes from this time should be *Sharḥ al-'Izzî fî al-taṣrîf* (SK, MS Tekelioğlu 628). Hocaazâde's commentary is waiting to be studied.

48 Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqâ'iq*, 129. Ottoman chronicles and biographical dictionaries included instances in which palace bureaucrats often assigned pensions to scholars and constituted a channel between scholarship and power, which were also present in the early Abbasid court (Osti, "The Practical Matters of Culture", 157).

49 Osti, "The Practical Matters of Culture" and Hüseyn, *Bedâyi'ül-veḳâyi*, 2: 287a. Hoca Sa'deddīn, *Tâcüt-tevârîḥ* mentions that Maḥmūd Paşa also devised the same scheme to the Sultan's another tutor Mollâ 'Abdülḳâdir (Hoca Sa'deddīn, *Tâcüt-tevârîḥ*, 2: 501).

50 Belîğ, *Güldeste-i riyâz*, 268.

51 "Kabûlden imtinâ' itdi [...] ibrâmla râm itdi" (Hüseyn, *Bedâyi'ül-veḳâyi*, 2: 287a).

52 Hocaazâde's decision here echoes a past encounter. During his youth, he met the local Sufi Velî Şemsüddīn (d. 875/1470), one of the successors of the Sufi sheikh Emîr Sultân (d. 833/1429), who advised him never to leave the path of knowledge (Mecdî, *Ḥadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 142).

53 Mecdî, *Ḥadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 142. *Sicill-i 'Oşmânî* writes that Hocaazâde quit his military-judgeship in Edirne on his own, yet he should have been rather dismissed (*'azl*) from the office upon his request (Şüreyyâ, *Sicill-i 'Oşmânî*, 4: 490).

54 Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqâ'iq*, 130.

55 *Güldeste's* inclusion of Hocaazâde's post at Sultāniye just after his first job at Esediyye is probably a misattribution. After mentioning that Hocaazâde left his post in Edirne, İsmâ'il Belîğ directly skipped to his second encounter with Zeyrek (Belîğ, *Güldeste-i riyâz*, 269). However,

There were two parallel career tracks that a scholar could pursue in the late fifteenth-century: academic or religio-legal (excluding other jobs that were open to medrese graduates, such as librarians, preachers, imams, schoolteachers, reciters, tutors etc.). Whenever a scholar was dismissed from these posts upon losing the Sultan's favor, he could find himself in a remote post, but his salary would not necessarily diminish, especially in certain cases of well-established scholars. In other words, a scholar-bureaucrat could lose the Sultan's favor at any time and be removed from his post even receiving an inferior one, but the salary that he received always reflected his merit, and even in such cases, losing a judgeship did only temporarily affect his academic prestige in the long run.

There were recounted cases in which a prestigious scholar lost the Sultan's favor and received a remote post upon the machinations of certain other court members, as in the case of Hocasade in later life. Due to the grand vizier Karamani's animosity, he was reportedly removed from the judgeship of Constantinople and given a position at the Orhaniye medrese, along with the judgeship of İznik, the latter of which Hocasade abandoned due to his devotion to teaching and learning. It is true that his judgeship at İznik was an inferior post after his position at Constantinople. As compensation, therefore, he was given two posts with a probably equal amount of salary compared to his previous one – one of these appointments being the most reputable teaching posts in İznik at the oldest Ottoman medrese Orhaniye. Bayezid II was reported as having reversed many policies implemented during the last years of his father Mehmed II and his grand viziers.⁵⁶ For instance, when Bayezid II was enthroned, Hocasade was reappointed to a teaching post at Sultaniye from one hundred aspers a day, probably in reaction against the much-hated Karamani's decision, a figure who had favored Prince Cem (d. 900/1495) for the throne and executed after having lost the bet.

It was during his first year at Sultaniye that Hocasade was asked to pen an initial question (*su'âl*) for the disputation against Zeyrek's unqualified criticism against Jurjani. He was then summoned to the capital to debate Zeyrek on the topic of unicity. Shortly after the encounter, Hocasade was also promoted to chief judge of Constantinople. In the marginalia of Mecdî's *Hadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, it is reported that Hocasade was appointed to the former position in the year 871/1466, right after the Zeyrek debate, a fact which evidenced the year of the debate at hand.⁵⁷

3.1.2.1 Hocasade's Scholarly Breadth and Esteemed Argumentative Skills in Debate

The professional competition was ubiquitous in the Ottoman scholarly world, and the monetary rewards, as in the case of the Italian Renaissance,⁵⁸ was only second to scholarly recognition and academic promotion. In some cases though, the extra rewarding did also mark a nuanced distinction between

it is a curious question whether *Güldeste's* claim that Hocasade was appointed to the position in place of his *Tahâfut* rival Tûsî was true or not. This point is not mentioned in other sources.

⁵⁶ Neşrî, *Ğihânnümâ*, 320.

⁵⁷ Mecdî, *Hadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 149.

⁵⁸ Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 270; Biagioli, *Galileo, Courtier*, 60.

the academic outputs of scholars. The accounts of Ḥocazāde's life in Ottoman biobibliographical dictionaries transition to his famed adjudication (*muḥākama*) on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*⁵⁹ written in competition with the Persian Ash'arite Sufi-scholar 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 887/1482).⁶⁰ Kātib Çelebi narrates the Sultan's order as follows: Ḥocazāde completed the manuscript in four and Ṭūsī in six months, and the Sultan favored the former by presenting each ten thousand silver coins (*dirham*), but an additional precious mule (*bughla nafīsa*) only for Ḥocazāde. Ṭūsī's departure from the land of Rūm is often attributed to his disappointment associated with the debate.⁶¹ Most of the Ottoman biographical sources, as well as references in contemporary scholarship, say that Ṭūsī's receiving less favor and recognition (minus a mule) could be the main reason for Ṭūsī's return to his homeland.⁶²

Ḥocazāde was among the seven scholars who, according to the seventeenth-century encyclopedist Kātib Çelebi, combined post-classical Avicennan philosophy (*hikma*) with the Islamic doctrine (*Sharī'a*), and were among the famed arbitrators of knowledge during the day, who upheld the validity of certain arguments and proofs included in the philosophical corpus.⁶³ Today he is mostly remembered for his aforementioned adjudication on the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, as well as numerous scholarly debates that he participated in and won. He was one of the few scholars during his time who predominantly worked on topics related to metaphysics and physics,⁶⁴ and wrote super-glosses on almost all medrese handbooks of philosophical theology and post-Avicennan philosophy, including Abharī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma*, Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-i'tiqād*, and Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, suggesting his interest, aptitude, and erudition in philosophical studies.⁶⁵

Ḥocazāde was a master in debate, participating in many scholarly disputes. He was recorded of having only lost once,⁶⁶ which was to the fellow scholar Ḥayālī (d. 845/1470 [?]), a master in theology and creed. The latter

59 Mecdī, *Ḥadā'ikū's-ṣakā'ik*, 149; Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā'iq*, 130; and Belig, *Güldeste-i riyāz*, 269. For the intellectual context of the adjudications, Özervarlı, "Arbitrating Between al-Ghazālī and the Philosophers" and Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Coherences*, 346-61.

60 Ḥocazāde prepared his adjudication after having received Zeyrek's post at the *Şahn* (Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tacū't-tevārīḥ*, 2: 467).

61 "Fa-kataba al-Mollā Khojazāda fī arba'a ashhur wa-kataba al-Mollā al-Ṭūsī fī sitta ashhur. Fa-faḍḍalū kitāb al-Mollā Khojazāda 'alā kitāb al-Ṭūsī, wa-'aṭā al-Sultān Muḥammad Khān li-kull minhā 'ashara ālāf dirham wa-zāda li-Khojazāda bughla nafīsa wa-kāna dhālik huwa sabab fī dhihāb al-Mollā al-Ṭūsī 'ilā bilād al-'Ajm" (Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 1: 513). Also see the section about Ṭūsī's *Dhakhīra fī al-muḥākama bayna al-hukamā' wa'l-Ghazālī*: "'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī al-Ṭūsī al-mutawaffā sana [...] allafahā fī al-Rūm wa-lammā ṣāra marjūḥan bi-ta'līf-i Khojazāda taraka al-Rūm wa-sāfara 'ilā Khorāsān" (Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 1: 825).

62 Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 1: 825. For instance also see "wa-kāna huwa al-sabab fī dhihāb al-Mollā al-Ṭūsī 'ilā bilād al-'Ajm" (Kātib Çelebi, *Sullam al-wuṣūl*, 2: 403).

63 Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 2: 680. For the analysis and context of Kātib Çelebi's designation see Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 1-23.

64 For instance, see Ḥocazāde's treatise on rainbows, as well as on the hypothetical center of the world: Fazlıoğlu, "Evrenin Bir Merkezi Var mıdır?", and Ziaee, "Ḥocazāde's Contributions to Islamic Sciences".

65 For a tentative list of Ḥocazāde's extant works: Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 466-72.

66 Ḥocazāde's case brings the example of the well-read and formidable debater Italian theologian Achillini who, according to a document called "Dispute in Scolari", appeared in forty-four scholarly disputes, either as a disputing Master or as a supervisor of a student's disputation exercise (Matsen, "Alessandro Achillini (1463-1512) and 'Ockhamism'").

was known for his extreme solemnity, and he was only spotted once smiling (*tebessüm*) in his life, which was when he was declared victorious against the master verifier. In the wake of the debate, Ḥayālī refers to Ḥocazāde in a derogatory manner as the grandson of “Şāliḥ the stingy” (*bin Şāliḥ baḥīl oğlunuñ*) referring to his privileged background.⁶⁷ The debate itself is depicted in the Topkapı copy of Muḥtesibzāde’s translation of *al-Shaqā’iq*, and Ḥayālī is portrayed there with an open mouth (maybe having a quirky smile). Mecdī wrote that Ḥayālī beat Ḥocazāde in a debate due to his divinely inspired power (*kuvve-i kudsiyye*),⁶⁸ a capacity that dwelled in saints, which implied that the verifier Ḥocazāde lacked this quality. Ḥocazāde was said to have filled with fear (*havf*) whenever Ḥayālī’s name came up. This was because of the latter’s superiority in knowledge⁶⁹ since Ḥocazāde was able to sleep with peace of mind only after Ḥayālī’s death.⁷⁰

It was clear that scholarly disputations were how fledgling scholars built their reputation and fame, yet in some cases, they even made a fool of themselves, as in the case of the young and ambitious scholar Ḥatībzāde who tried to challenge the senior Ḥocazāde but overturned twice.⁷¹ Ḥatībzāde was proud of his scholarly preoccupations and was said to have spent all of his life reading and studying – never expecting a career outside academia. As mentioned earlier, his competitiveness was embroiled in scandals, to the degree that there were several occasions where Ḥatībzāde made a fool of himself and tried to challenge his seniors in a hasty manner without being able to make right justifications. His youthful vanity (*gurūr-ı şebāb*) was often emphasized partially because of his premature attempt to challenge senior scholars.⁷²

During his first attempt at debating Ḥocazāde, the Sultan immediately dismissed the novice Ḥatībzāde. Meḥmed II challenged the young scholar, asking whether he was actually capable of debating with a master verifier, having contested his competence in Islamic sciences.⁷³ The Sultan and his viziers generally decided who would debate with whom. When it came to merit and rank, there was always a question of reputation, and junior scholars were not expected to challenge their seniors without justifiable reason, especially for the sake of gaining rash prestige, since an outright respect for the experienced elders was a strict rule of moral conduct to be abide by.

⁶⁷ Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tācū’t-tevārīḥ*, 2: 479. Mecdī mentions that this is Ḥocazāde’s nickname (*mütelaḳḳıb*) (Mecdī, *Ḥadā’ikū’ş-şakā’ik*, 159).

⁶⁸ Mecdī, *Ḥadā’ikū’ş-şakā’ik*, 159.

⁶⁹ Meḥmed Tāhir does not mention this incident between two scholars, but writes that Ḥayālī was on the same level with Ḥocazāde in terms of knowledge (Bursalı Meḥmed Tāhir, *‘Oşmanlı Mü’ellifleri*, 1: 291).

⁷⁰ Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā’iq*, 141.

⁷¹ A similar penchant for controversy was the case of Galileo whose case was documented by numerous treatises written by him and his adversaries (Azzolini, “There Were No Medals”, 264, f. 17). It was noted in biographical sources that Ḥatībzāde’s preoccupation with knowledge (*iştigāl-i ‘ilm*) was motivated by his greedy passion for winning scholarly debates (*galebe-i ḥırşdan*) to prove his intellectual superiority (Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tācū’t-tevārīḥ*, 2: 483). Indeed it was true that he was able to win most of the scholarly debates that he participated, but with the exception of those with Ḥocazāde (Hüseyn, *Bedāyi’ü’l-veḳāyi*, 2: 291a; Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā’iq*, 147).

⁷² Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tācū’t-tevārīḥ*, 2: 473.

⁷³ “Anıñla bahşe kâdir misin?” (Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tācū’t-tevārīḥ*, 2: 473). *Tācū’t-tevārīḥ*’s account in probably based on an Arabic exchange in *al-Shaqā’iq*: “Anta taqaddara al-baḥḥ ma’hu?” (Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā’iq*, 147). Yet the exchange is not included in Hüseyn, *Bedāyi’ü’l-veḳāyi*.

Having broken such a rule of etiquette, Ḥatībzāde seemed to have been dismissed from the Sultan's immediate circle and appointed to a certain medrese so that he would continue his teaching and learning away from the Sultan's sight.⁷⁴

Ḥatībzāde challenged the master verifier for a second time, and the story is as follows: after his post at the *Şahın*, Ḥocazāde left academia one more time to become the judge of Constantinople. Yet, after a short period, he was removed from the post due to the intervention of the grand vizier Kārāmānī Meḥmed Paşa,⁷⁵ a student of his academic nemesis Tūsī. Our sources point out that there was a connection between Kārāmānī and Tūsī, an emphasis that suggests that Kārāmānī's intervention could be associated with the debate. Karamanī convinced the Sultan that the air of Constantinople had a bad impact on Ḥocazāde's memory and promoted him to a double appointment as the chief jurist of İznik and the head of Orḥāniye medrese at the same time.⁷⁶ The judgeship of İznik was a less paid post than that of Constantinople in the Sultan's Code of Law, and Ḥocazāde's double appointment both as a teacher and a jurist to compensate the loss could be attributed to his relegation to an inferior position in teaching through the intervention of the grand vizier.⁷⁷ After some time Ḥocazāde left the judgeship for good, and devoted himself to full-time teaching (*tedrīs*) at Orḥāniye, a school where Ḥayālī was previously appointed.

It was during his İznik days that the bold Ḥatībzāde challenged the senior scholar after being provoked (*taḥrīz*) by the same notorious Karamanī Meḥmed Paşa.⁷⁸ The exact nature of the challenge is not mentioned; however, there is a treatise attributed to Ḥocazāde on the nature of good and evil (*ḥusn wa-qubūḥ*) in certain sources,⁷⁹ which dealt with the question of whether good and evil were absolute (*muṭlaq*) or essential (*dhātī*) qualities, or whether they were among intellectible beings (*aqliyyāt*).⁸⁰

After being summoned, Ḥocazāde went to Constantinople to visit the tent of Karamanī in the company of Mollā Yarḥişārī, a scholar at the medrese of Murād Paşa, as well as two of his best students Mollā Bahāüddīn and Mollā Sirācüddīn, both of whom were teaching at the *Şahın* at the time. When Kārāmānī Meḥmed told Ḥocazāde that he was summoned to the capital to participate in a debate with Ḥatībzāde, the master scholar replied that the scholars in his company were already capable of debating him, and his two best students, Mollā Bahāüddīn and Mollā Sirācüddīn, who also held posts at the *Şahın* like Ḥatībzāde, were rather his equals - definitely not him. Ḥocazāde then added that he would only face him if only Ḥatībzāde

74 Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā'iq*, 147

75 The story should have taken place sometime during the grand vizierate of Kārāmānī Meḥmed between the years 882/1477 and 886/1481.

76 Belig writes that Ḥocazāde was promoted to the latter post in place of Ḥasan Çelebi in the year 877/1472-73 (Belig, *Güldeste-i riyāz*, 269).

77 Yet Orḥāniye is considered as the first medrese founded by Orḥān Gāzī and was not inferior to the prestigious Sultāniye in salary (quoted in Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 68).

78 Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tācū't-tevārīḥ*, 473; Ḥüseyn, *Bedāyī'ü'l-veḳāyi*, 2: 287b.

79 As for Ḥocazāde's treatise on good and evil: *Risāla fī al-jadhr al-aşam*, SK, MS Esad Efendi 1143/18, fols. 89-91; MS Şehid Ali Paşa 2830/21, fols 74a-b; MS Halet Efendi 802, fols 52b-56b. As for Ḥatībzāde's reply, *Risāla fī ḥall maghlaṭat al-jadhr al-aşam*, Bayezid Devlet, MS Veliyüddin Efendi 2122; SK, MS Laleli 2200.

80 Köse, "Hocazāde Muslihiddin Efendi", 209.

beat his students first. The grand vizier insisted, but another scholar in his company, Sinân Paşa, warned him that when Hocaazâde debated with scrutiny, there was no way to win.

Mehmed II's previous rhetorical remark whether Hâtîbzâde had the right credentials to challenge Hocaazâde also echoes the scholar-vizier Sinân Paşa's warning.⁸¹ After Sinân Paşa's intervention, Kârâmânî Mehmed chose not to organize the debate. The sixteenth-century compiler Mecdî further speculates that Hâtîbzâde allegedly spread the fake news (*töhmety eyledi*) that the reason why Hocaazâde avoided debating him was that the master got scared of (*havf*) or intimidated (*haşyet*) by Hâtîbzâde's scholarly scrutiny.⁸² The anecdote suggests that there was a clear distinction in terms of rank and merit among the Ottoman ulema, and whoever dared to challenge a senior scholar without any legitimate reason could be ended up being ridiculed. It was right after this debate that Mehmed II passed away and Bâyezîd II was enthroned, so the challenge attempt must have been around the year 886/1481.⁸³

3.1.2.2 Common Phrases Used for Hocaazâde's Vast Knowledge in Various Sciences

The classical titles and epithets given to the patrons and scholars with a good record of public disputations generally included the fifteenth-century Italian ideals of excellency (*magnificentia*) and magnanimity (*maganimitas*), both of which had connotations that placed wisdom, glory, and civic conduct above all else with an emphasis on the greatness of one's soul.⁸⁴ If one were asked to provide the best phrase to designate Hocaazâde's scholarly attitude, his (sometimes presumptuous) assertiveness and ambition (*hırş*) in knowledge would be the most suitable conditions to describe his personality. In addition to his ambition, Mecdî also underlines Hocaazâde's perseverance (*azm*) in knowledge. He further quoted Taşköprizâde's father's words that when Hocaazâde's legal opinion was challenged due to a legal disagreement (*hilâf*), he presumptuously claimed that he belonged to an elite group of scholars who had the ultimate license to offer authoritative solutions to legal issues by reasoning.⁸⁵

Hocaazâde's pride in his knowledge did not always stop him from being overly competitive or making *ad hominem* comments and jokes about his students or academic rivals. However, when it came to scholarly issues, if he was wrong, he would stand corrected and give the other person his due. In an anecdote that only appears in Mecdî, Sultan Husayn of Herat sent presents to the newly crowned Bâyezîd II via his emissary from Khorasan in the year 866/1481, a fledgling scholar who wanted to study with Hocaazâde during his time in the lands of Rûm. The person who narrated this story was also in the same class with the emissary from Khorasan, and they read Jurjânî's gloss on Ibn Hâjib's work in the principles of jurisprudence *Sharh mukhtaşar al-muntahâ* together. The scholar from Khorasan had two objec-

81 "Anîñla münâzara itmeđe kâdir olmaz" (Mecdî, *Hadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 151).

82 Mecdî, *Hadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 151. This piece of information is not included in other sources.

83 Mecdî, *Hadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 151-2.

84 Stephens, *The Italian Renaissance*, 98-102.

85 "Tabakam tabaka-ı 'âliyedir, rütbe-i ictihâda vüşülüm" (Mecdî, *Hadâ'ikü's-şakâ'ik*, 152).

tions to Hocasāde and the narrator of the story objected to the emissary convincingly. The next day, when the emissary from Khorasan made another objection, Hocasāde did not favor his student's answer and, this time found the emissary's point justifiable. Later when they went over Jurjānī's text one more time, Hocasāde changed his mind and, instead, accepted his student's reply. This shows that the experienced master did not refrain from correcting himself when someone caught his misreading.⁸⁶

The most common phrases employed in praise of Hocasāde include Arabic expressions and adjectives, such as intelligent (*zakī*), virtuous (*faḍīla*), good at writing and speaking (*ḥusn al-tahrīr wa'l-taqrīr*),⁸⁷ as well as epithets, such as the learned scholar (*'ālim*), perfect human being (*kāmīl*),⁸⁸ and savant (*baḥr*, *mubaḥḥir* or *baḥru'l-faḍā'il*).⁸⁹ There are certain Persianized Ottoman Turkish constructions which emphasized his scholarship and perfection (*'ilm ü kemāl*), deep knowledge and perfection (*dāniş ü kemāl*),⁹⁰ distinction in knowledge (*şeref-i 'ilm*)⁹¹ and virtues in knowledge and learning (*fezā'il-i 'ilm ü 'irfān*).⁹² And some works did not refrain from referring to him as a philosopher (*ḥakīm*).⁹³

3.2 The Diversity of Genres in Philosophy and Theology. Two Types of Scholars at Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Medreses

In biobibliographical sources, there were two different registers of science denoting the philosophical corpus, *falsafa* and *ḥikma*, each possessing distinct connotations in the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholarship. Along with a third discipline, the philosophical theology of the post-classical scholarship (*kalām*), these three genres incorporated a lot of Aristotelian conceptions through Avicenna's works in later centuries.

Falsafa and *ḥikma* could have been used interchangeably in many sources; yet they might have also conveyed a subtle distinction such that *falsafa* could be used as an umbrella term which included Ancient Greek Philosophy, whether Aristotelian or Platonic, and the Neo-Platonist thought, as well as their incorporated forms in the Islamic tradition (i.e. Graeco-Arabic philosophy and Illuminationism). *Falsafa* could or could not have been in line with the teachings of religious sciences and classical theology. That is, for instance, Islamic theology accepted that the world was created by an omnipotent God at a specific time (*ex nihilo*); whereas the Aristotelian-Neoplatonist tradition in the works of Muslim philosophers Fārābī and Avicenna conceded the pre-eternity of the world, meaning that the world was never created but always emanated pre-eternally.

⁸⁶ Mecdī, *Hadā'ikü'ş-şakā'ik*, 155. The late nineteenth-century dictionary *Ḳāmūsü'l-a'lām* misrepresents this story by asserting that there were people who came all the way down from Khorasan to study with Hocasāde (Sāmī, *Ḳāmūsü'l-a'lām*, 3: 2064).

⁸⁷ Hoca Sa'deddīn, *Tācü't-tevārīḥ*, 2: 468.

⁸⁸ Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā'iq*, 129.

⁸⁹ Belīğ, *Güldeste-i riyāz*, 262.

⁹⁰ Belīğ, *Güldeste-i riyāz*, 262 and 264.

⁹¹ Hüseyn, *Bedāyi'ü'l-veḳāyi*, 2: 286a.

⁹² Belīğ, *Güldeste-i riyāz*, 263.

⁹³ Al-Kaḥḥāla, *Mu'jam mu'alifī al-kutub*, 12: 290.

On the other hand, the term *ḥikma*, which means ‘wisdom’ in Arabic, seems to gain a special meaning in post-classical Islam, specifically after the thirteenth century, such that the term *ḥikma* was reserved for the canonized reworkings of Aristotelian-Neoplatonist doctrines in Avicenna’s philosophical works, most importantly, including those Avicennan doctrines that did not go against the cosmological assumptions of Islamic theology. In other words, the term *falsafa* belonged to the scholarly pursuit of previous centuries, but for the fifteenth-century Ottoman intellectual context, *ḥikma* was still vital and, by this way, post-classical Avicenna philosophy would be the best way to describe this common genre. According to his scrutinous study on the formation of the post-classical philosophical tradition in the greater Islamic world, Frank Griffel observes that the texts in *ḥikma* could report, doubt, and criticize Avicenna, as well as implementing the principle of sufficient reason and endorsing or correcting Avicennan philosophy.⁹⁴

The difference between certain scientific disciplines, as in the cases of *falsafa*, *ḥikma*, and *kalām*, was often blurred, and the definition, as well as the categorization of these disciplines, could cross one another. Thus, it is not easy to exactly determine which category should be used to classify a particular philosophical or theological medrese handbook. Both the Sultan’s Code of Law and Gelibolulu Âlî’s *Künhü’l-ahbâr* give an outline of the hierarchical organization of Ottoman medreses based on the levels of education, studied texts, and salary. According to these sources, the most common philosophical and theological handbooks studied at Ottoman medreses were Abharî’s *Hidāya al-ḥikma* in *ḥikma*, Tūsî’s *Tajrîd al-i’tiqād* and Jurjānî’s *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* in *kalām* and Ḥayālî’s gloss on the *Sharḥ al-‘aqā’id* in Muslim creed.

Most of the Ottoman encyclopedists distinguished *kalām* from *ḥikma* such that the latter category included the post-classical handbooks extracted or compiled from the Avicenna corpus, such as *al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt*, *Hidāya al-ḥikma* and *Ḥikma al-‘ayn*.⁹⁵ With regard to discussions in metaphysics and natural philosophy, *ḥikma* was also taken on the same level with *kalām*⁹⁶ such that metaphysics and natural philosophy were covered by both *ḥikma* and *kalām* texts save their differences in approach, origin, and scope. The traditional Avicennan-Aristotelian themes, on the other hand, continued with certain modifications and mitigations in the post-classical renderings of *ḥikma*, corresponding to the general outline of the religious community on basic issues.

Avicenna’s modified doctrines were still in use and dominated the scientific paradigm save his emanative cosmogony.⁹⁷ Common handbooks of philosophical theology *Tajrîd* and *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* were known to have synthesized certain philosophical and theological doctrines under the cosmological frameworks of the theologians, rejecting the Avicennan emana-

94 Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 326, 341, 407, 524.

95 Avicenna’s *Ishārāt* was categorized under *ḥikma* (see Kâtib Çelebi, *Kashf al-zunûn*, 1: 94). In the same vein with Uzunçarşılı and Baltacı, İzgi has classified *Hidāya al-ḥikma* and *Ḥikma al-‘ayn* as works in *ḥikma*, and has a lengthy list of their commentaries and glosses under the categorization of “theoretical *ḥikma*” (İzgi, *Osmanlı Medreselerinde İlim*, 2: 115-27).

96 “Kamâ’anna al-ḥikma al-ṭabî’iyya wa’l-ilâhiyya minhâ bi-manzila al-kalâm minhâ” (Kâtib Çelebi, *Kashf al-zunûn*, 1: 677).

97 In the sixteenth-century Safavid world, there is an upsurge of interest in early layers of Graeco-Arabic philosophy as a reaction against the domination of the Avicennan *ḥikma* in philosophical studies, see Pourjavady, Schmidtke, “An Eastern Renaissance?”.

tionist scheme. In that regard, for the context of the post-Avicennan scholarship, these handbooks gave a new perspective to *kalām* such that they could also be characterized as texts in ‘philosophical theology’, which had elements from Graeco-Arabic philosophy and its post-classical interpretation. There were, thus, certain crossovers between *ḥikma* and *kalām* by the time of the Ottomans.

The significance of this categorization was that there existed three types of genres, e.g. *falsafa*, *ḥikma*, and *kalām*, that dealt with metaphysical and physical questions in Ottoman scholarship and, since there were different approaches to similar questions, such as existence, quiddity, causality, and unity, there also existed different typologies of scholars who followed different formulations among Ottoman handbooks.

Ḥocazāde and Zeyrek represented two different types of scholars in the sense that the former was a type who tended to incorporate elements from philosophical works or, at least, when the question of the validity of the philosophers’ doctrines came about, he tried to outline, acknowledge, and defend the philosophers’ positions as clearly as possible. Zeyrek, on the other hand, seemed to be more prone to the theological corpus and tended to reject most controversial aspects of Arabic philosophy due to his ontological assumptions about the nature of God and the universe. Each represented a distinct ‘scholar type’ that prevailed at Ottoman medreses, and the reason why the Sultan may have asked them to present on such a fundamental topic in theology could be to see how different types of scholars would react to the philosophers’ formulation, a fact which indicates the scope of the Sultan’s patronage, education policies, as well as scholarly interests.

3.3 Ottoman Culture of Court Debate and Disputation Etiquette

The Zeyrek-Ḥocazāde debate followed the formal rules of debate and disputation in the style of ‘questions and answers’ (*masā’il wa-’ajwiba*), a technique of argumentation that included unsolved problems or inquiries followed by explanations and refutations.⁹⁸ The written disputations were set forth as motives and authorities supporting the opposite view often in the form of invalidations, objections, replies, and counter-arguments. This method of argumentation was construed differently from monographs since the scholar’s main intention was not to set his own views in the form of a systematic account with clearly outlined supporting arguments. Through certain *dubia*, the scholar investigated each and every case, and arbitrated among possible options. Recent studies have shown that this formula constituted a new science of ‘dialectical inquiry and investigation’ (*ādāb al-baḥṭh wa-l-munāzara*) in post-classical Islamic intellectual history, which was not only limited to Arabic literary context, but extending to other Islamicate traditions.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Daiber, “Masā’il Wa-’Ajwiba”, 636. The genre also existed previously in Syriac and Nestorian sources: Pietruschka, “Streitgespräche”, 159; Clarke, *The Selected Questions of Ishō bar Nūn*; and for the prevalence of this genre among Nestorian, Jacobite, and Melkite scholars, see Varsányi, “The Concept of ‘aql in Early Arabic Christian Theology”. For the context of dialectic in early Arabic philosophy, see Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 52-86.

⁹⁹ Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 196. Also for its influence in Urdu literature, Bruce, “Debate Literature, Urdu”.

Among the conspicuously low number of works on dialectic (*jadāl*) in ‘Aṭūfī’s Ottoman palace inventory, there were no early dialectic books included before the thirteenth century. The holdings mostly constituted Turco-Persian works with only a few Ottoman manuscripts, yet the standard handbook of disputation of the day was a short treatise by the fourteenth-century astronomer and mathematician Shams al-Dīn al-Samarkandī,¹⁰⁰ who was, according to Larry Benjamin Miller, the first Arab logician to have devoted himself, *qua* logician, to the logic of debate,¹⁰¹ by turning the Aristotelian dialectic into an alternative appellation for the science of disputation based on demonstration (*istidlāl*) and investigation (*baḥṭh*).¹⁰²

The verifier Samarkandī most notably defines *munāzara* as a way of speculative reasoning (*naẓar*) directed at revealing truth through mutual effort; and the activity of *naẓar* here denotes paying attention to meanings (*iltifāt al-nafs ‘ilā ma’ānī*).¹⁰³ Arriving at truth is not the only function of such investigations, whereas it is also about invalidating the other side’s assertions.¹⁰⁴ According to Samarkandī’s texts on the fundamentals of Arabic disputation (*al-Qusṭās* and his epistle on *ādāb al-baḥṭh*), the scholarly debates should ensue as follows: the claimant (*mu’allil*) sets down his thesis (*iddi’ā’*) and argument (*qawl*) and, when establishing his proof (*dalīl*), he also lays out two sound premises (sing. *muqaddima*), being responsible for the validity of the proof. The exchange then begins in the form of ‘questions and answers’ in theological dialectic.¹⁰⁵

For Samarkandī, both sides of the disputation are called *mu’allil* since both are responsible for bringing out sound justifications in order to demonstrate their own rationales, whereas starting with the seventeenth-century Ottoman scholar Saçaklızāde, the later scholars rather assign *mu’allil* unilaterally to the person who defends a thesis, i.e. the scholar on the side of the assent (*taşdıq*).¹⁰⁶ In this case, Ḥocazāde as a defender of the philosophers’ proof falls under the role of the ‘claimant’, whereas Zeyrek who challenges the validity of the philosophers’ demonstrative reasoning by a series of rebuttals is the ‘questioner’ (*sā’il*).

The questioner has several options: he may raise specific objections (sing. *man’*) and counter-objections/indications (sing. *munāqaqa*) directed at one

100 El-Rouayheb, “Books on Logic (*Mantiq*) and Dialectics (*Jadal*)”, 894-5.

101 Nevertheless Belhaj has argued that Larry Miller’s and Nicholas Rescher’s statement about *ādāb al-baḥṭh* as being a ‘logical art’ of disputation is inaccurate since this claim has been often conflated with the logicization of *jadāl*. Samarkandī’s main agenda, instead, was to reorganize debates in theology and philosophy on the same model adopted for juridical dialectic, so that debates in both disciplines would be upgraded to the level of rigorous abstract argumentation through the partial syllogization of legal dialectic. In short, Samarkandī transformed juridical dialectic into an art of disputation – his concern for theology and philosophy being only secondary (Belhaj, “Al-Samarkandī’s *Ādāb al-baḥṭh*”, 46-7, 53). For Rescher’s statement, see Rescher, *The Development of Arabic Logic*, 209.

102 Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 107.

103 Güney, *Kemālüddīn Mes’ūd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânî’nin (905/1500)*, 139. *Naẓar* also has the senses of ‘approach’, ‘logical inquiry’, and ‘investigation’ in Avicenna terminology (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 99).

104 Güney, *Kemālüddīn Mes’ūd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânî’nin (905/1500)*, 140-2.

105 For an outline of argumentation and debate etiquette in post-classical disputation theory, see Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic*, 127-39; especially see the chart on 137-9, as well as the Arabic edition on 266-79; and Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 196-234.

106 Pehlivan, “Saçaklızāde’de Mu’allil”, 188-9.

or more premises of an argument, devise an objection to the claimant's proof in a general way without establishing the truth of the purported conclusion (*naqd*), and bring out counter-evidences (sing. *mu'āraḍa*) to set up a proof contrary to the one set up by the opponent.¹⁰⁷ *Man'* asks specifically for further proof or evidence (*dalīl*) to support a statement, whereas *naqd* is directed at the charge of incommensurability of the *definiens* and the defined - challenging what is generally accepted (*al-mashhūr*).¹⁰⁸ *Naqd* often argues for the absence of judgment from the evidence, and *munāqaḍa*, in contrast, denotes "disagreement" or "contradiction" by disallowing a premise of the proof, often formulated as "we do not grant x".¹⁰⁹ According to Samarkandī, the opponents can turn the tables at any moment, directing questions at one another's arguments. A contestant is always obliged to respond to every objection that a claimant brings.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, refutations (sing. *naqd*) are directed at the contestant's inconsistencies in argumentation by way of contradiction.¹¹¹ Once there are no further objections and the refutation has been established, a contestant is silenced (*ifhām*), or expected to concede the outcome (*ilzām*)¹¹² - the latter of which is often through forcing your opinion to commit a mistake.¹¹³ One of the contributions of Samarkandī's new method in disputations concerning philosophy and theology includes an accentuation on *taqrīr* and *tahrīr*, as a way of identifying the main problematic, as well as restricting argumentation only to the subject matter under the rubric of *ta'yīn maḥall al-nizā'*.¹¹⁴

In light of the new studies, Khaled El-Rouayheb has argued that the practice of commentary and gloss associated with the genre of *ādāb al-baḥth* was not simply "comment-mongering" as previously thought, which rather transcended the generic structure of recrossing familiar grounds in the same familiar way, by undergoing significant reformulations and developments in the centuries to come.¹¹⁵ Samarkandī's text was the most prevalent work in this genre with a number of significant early commentaries, including *Sharḥ ādāb al-Samarkandī* by the verifier Kamāl al-Dīn Mas'ūd b. Ḥusayn al-Shirwānī (d. 905/1500) - arguably the most popular commentary in *ādāb al-baḥth* at the fifteenth-century Ottoman medreses with more than 170 copies in Turkish manuscript libraries.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁷ El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 60-96; esp. 72-5. Belhaj, "Al-Samarkandī's *Ādāb al-baḥth*", 49-51.

¹⁰⁸ Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 109.

¹⁰⁹ Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 112, 122.

¹¹⁰ Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 110.

¹¹¹ Güney, *Kemālüddīn Mes'ūd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvānī'nin (905/1500)*, 160.

¹¹² Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory*, 111.

¹¹³ "Innahu qad yakūn al-gharaḍ min jānibay al-khuṣūṣa ka-layhumā taḡliḥ al-khaṣm" (Güney, *Kemālüddīn Mes'ūd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvānī'nin (905/1500)*, 140).

¹¹⁴ In his *Tahāfut*, Ḥocazāde, for instance, recontextualizes Ghazālī's discussions which he deemed to be the inferior *jadāl*, under the new rubric of "locating the main point of contention" via *taqrīr* and *tahrīr* (Pehlivan, "Ādābu'l-Bahs ve'l-Münāzara", 95, 99).

¹¹⁵ El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 71.

¹¹⁶ For the epithets of 'verifier' used for Samarkandī and Shirwānī, as well as the list of glosses on Shirwānī's commentary on the former, see Kâtib Çelebi, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 1: 39-40. According to his autobiography, Taşköprizāde was said to have studied this work at a young age (Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā'iq*, 554).

Having expanded on Samarkandī's outlined aspects, Shirwānī's popular commentary makes certain points regarding how to attain precision without falling into the common fallacies associated with the method of scholarly investigation in disputations. For instance, Shirwānī divides counter-objections/indications (sing. *munāqqāda*), which are directed at refuting the antecedent of the argument into two types for argumentational rectitude: in order for counter-objections to be effective, one could also include an additional point of substantiation (*shāhid*), supplementing the refutation of the overall claim. If the latter is the case, then this is called an 'overall refutation of a proof' (*naqd ijmalī*); if not, it is considered to be resorting to 'haughtiness' (*mukābara*).¹¹⁷ For the case of setting up proofs against the opponent's points by propounding another proof (*mu'āraḍa*), Shirwānī further comments that these types often appear in sophisticated arguments (*mughalāṭa*) such that if the adversary's so-called new proof corresponds to the claimant's initial version, then this is called an 'inversion' (*qalb*).¹¹⁸ Lastly, with regard to *naqd*, Shirwānī adds that if the questioner argues that the proof does not correspond to the proof's consequent, it is again called an 'overall refutation'; and if the questioner rejects the validity of the proof according to his criteria for evidencing, then it would be a 'counter-indication by way of inversion' (*mu'āraḍa 'alā sabīl al-qalb*).¹¹⁹ In addition to these types of objections, there are also justifications (sing. *mustanad*) that can be employed in debates, which are rather weaker forms of objections based on the claimant's assumptions.¹²⁰

Another classical work on *ādāb al-baḥth* based on Samarkandī's urtext is the *littérateur* Ṭaşköprizāde's popular and useful manual at the intersection of ethics, logic, and law, which, nevertheless, made less demands on students by leaving out Samarkandī's abstruse examples in theology and philosophy,¹²¹ but also including the primary proof attested at the Zeyrek-Ḥocazāde debate: the proof in reciprocal hinderance (*burhān al-tamānu*).¹²² The genre of *ādāb al-baḥth* went beyond the rules of argumentation and logical reasoning, having also covered the moral conduct and etiquette of debates in accordance with Islamic norms. In that sense, it was necessary for the debater to avoid the criteria of conciseness/brevity, redundancy, strange/ambiguous words, responding without understanding the adversary's thesis, digressions, laughing or raising one's voice, underestimation, as well as disputing with someone who inspired him fear or veneration.¹²³

In the context of disputation etiquette, Ṭaşköprizāde warns that unsubstantiated refutations directed at the questioner may be perceived as

117 Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mes'ûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânî'nin (905/1500)*, 158-9, 170-7.

118 Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mes'ûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânî'nin (905/1500)*, 158-9.

119 Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mes'ûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânî'nin (905/1500)*, 160-1.

120 Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mes'ûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânî'nin (905/1500)*, 161-2.

121 El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History*, 72. Yet it should be noted that Samarkandī's text assumes that there were different ways of arguing in *ḥikma* and *kalām*, providing different sets of examples for these genres (Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 14).

122 The unicity of the Necessarily Existent was one of the most popular topics discussed in *ādāb al-baḥth* (see Güney, *Kemâlüddîn Mes'ûd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânî'nin (905/1500)*, 195-6).

123 Belhaj, "Ṭaşköprüzāde's *Ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāzara*", 291-2. Belhaj has also suggested that the Aristotelian origins of *ādāb al-baḥth* is unfounded; the genre rather had roots in ethics and juridical dialectic (Belhaj, "Ṭaşköprüzāde's *Ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāzara*", 299).

‘haughtiness’ (*mukābara*), that is, the outright rejection of the claimant’s thesis without any evidence or direct proof, a move that was often associated with scholarly precipitation, superciliousness, and arrogance.¹²⁴ Following Samarkandī’s manual, Taşköprizāde mentions another fallacy in argumentation called ‘usurpation’ (*ghaṣb*), which is a way of avoiding the questioner’s initial thesis by introducing a fresh new position, a move to be avoided by verifiers, i.e. scholars who based their scientific positions on scholarly arbitration.¹²⁵ This might have been the reason why Ḥocazāde warned his opponent in the initial written response that any question related to the Avicenna’s notion of ‘pure existence’ would be perceived as a digression, probably knowing that Zeyrek could resort to usurpation. Ḥocazāde here follows Samarkandī’s principle of ‘designating the main point of contention’ (*ta’yīn maḥall al-nizā*).

In several cases during the debate, Zeyrek repeated the theologians’ view without qualifying his opponent’s points, and he did not seem to engage in the philosophers’ proofs by rejecting their views outright or disregarding their textual evaluations (see chapter 4 below). It was probably due to Zeyrek’s failing of these two proscribed protocols that the main arbiter (*ḥākim*) of the debate, Mollā Hüsrev, might have considered some of Zeyrek’s debate tactics in the context of *mukābara* – all the more since, as we will see below, in two instances he dared to declare himself as the *fait accompli* winner in the presence of the Sultan and other attendants. While Ḥocazāde seemed to have taken the *munāzara* etiquette more seriously by only focusing on verifying the truth, Zeyrek was more interested in his opponent’s assent and silencing so that his position would be accepted without further hesitation, having failed in fulfilling the criterion of verification. In the eyes of the attendants, the scholars differed in scholarly approach, argumentation and execution, and thus the official winner was announced to be Ḥocazāde.

3.4 A Question of Unbelief

Zeyrek’s claim of Ḥocazāde’s unbelief (*takfīr*) occupies a special place in Ottoman Turkish biobibliographical sources, and the accusation is often recounted as follows: after a day of discussion, Zeyrek accused Ḥocazāde of denying the unicity of God by using the expression *inkār al-tawḥīd*¹²⁶ and continued to repeat his objections insistently. In his commentary on Tūsī’s handbook of philosophical theology *Tajrīd al-i’tiqād*, Shams al-Dīn al-Işfahānī (d. 749/1348) noted that *kufr* denoted a lack of belief in a single God (*īmān*), since it precluded obedience, not in the absolute sense, but with regard to

¹²⁴ “Fa-‘in mana‘a bi’l-shāhid fa-huwa al-naqd. Wa-ammā mana‘uhu bilā shāhid fa-huwa mukābara gayru masmū‘atin ittifaqan”. See the edition of Taşköprizāde’s *Risāla fī ādāb al-baḥth* in Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic*, 272; the translation and analysis of this episode in Arif, “The Art of Debate in Islam”, 207 and Belhaj, “*Ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāzara*”, 303-6.

¹²⁵ For the Arabic text, Güney, *Kemālüddin Mes‘ūd b. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvânî’nin (905/1500)*, 167, “Wa-ammā mana‘ahu bi’l-dalīl; fa-huwa ghaṣb gayru masmū‘i ‘ind al-muḥaqqiqīn” (Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic*, 272; Arif, “The Art of Debate in Islam”, 206-7).

¹²⁶ Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā‘iq*, 124. Or see the Ottoman Turkish “tevhīd-i münkir imiş” in Ḥoca Sa‘deddīn, *Tacūt-t-tevārīḥ*, 2: 467.

the particular articles of belief.¹²⁷ Zeyrek's accusation did not yet have a serious impact on Hocaẓāde as in the case of the sharp-tongued scholar Mollā Luṭfī (d. 900/1495), a victim of political intrigue who was claimed to have committed apostasy or concealed belief (*zandaqa*), as well as, according to the contemporary scholar Ḥatībẓāde, provided support for the obsolescent doctrines of the philosophers (*tamassaka bi-muḥmalāt al-falāsifa*).¹²⁸ Unlike apostasy, the claim of *takfīr* may not imply dire consequences¹²⁹ and was not particularly covered as a topic in jurisprudence manuals.¹³⁰ Unbelief was perceived as a lighter form of apostasy since the latter was closely associated with non-monotheist traditions as in the Dualists arguing against God's unicity.¹³¹

The accusations of unbelief, as Sonja Brentjes suggests, may have differing rationales, such as covering religious matters, issues of social relationship (including loyalty towards a patron, upholding an oath, exerting influence in scholarly circles, ruining competitors for positions of power and wealth, etc.), standards of proper behavior and culture, as well as military conflicts and rebellions.¹³² Yet, for the context of scholarly exchange, the shades of the *takfīr*'s meaning can also vary from intellectual inferiority, shallow learning, age or status, the power dynamics between the two men,¹³³ as well as supporting the doctrines of the philosophers.¹³⁴ In his encyclopedia of sciences, Taşköprizāde set 'religious benefit' as a criterion for any science, whether rational or religious. According to him, if unicity was discussed in the context of the Mu'tazilites, such a central doctrine could be harmful; this should not, nonetheless, expunge its significance as a topic of

127 Al-İşfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawā'id*, 2: 1219.

128 Winter, "İbn Kemāl (d. 940/1534) on Ibn 'Arabī's Hagiology", 142. For the politics of hatred and jealousy involved in Mollā Luṭfī's execution, see the articles by Şükrü Özen: "Molla Lutfi'nin İdamına Karşı Çıkan" and "İslām Hukukunda Zındıklık Suçu". According to Özen, *münkir* and *zındık* are two different categories in Islamic jurisprudence – yet the denial of God's unicity or existence could have also led one to be condemned to death due to the claim of *zandaqa*. Also for the case of Mollā Kābız (d. 933/1527) (Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar*, 203-50). By referring to the post-classical verifiers like Jurjānī, Taftāzānī, and Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233), the verifier İbn Kemāl gives a detailed analysis of lexical and religio-legal definitions of the term *zındık* along with its shared valences with *munāfiq* and *mulḥid* (See İbn Kemāl, "Taşhīḥ lafẓ al-zındık wa-tawḍīḥ ma'nāhu al-daḥiḳ").

129 The later writings of Ghazālī point out that capital punishment may be applied to "unbelief" (Griffel, "Toleration and Exclusion", 352). As Griffel has pointed out, Ghazālī denied the right of repentance (*istitāba*) to those found guilty of *zandaqa*, yet this also paved the way for state representatives to adjudicate the status of one's belief based on one's external actions, thereby blurring the distinction between internal unbelief (*kufr*) and professed apostasy (*irtidād*) (Griffel, "Toleration and Exclusion", 344-54; al-Tikriti, "A Contrarian Voice", 66; "Kalam in the Service of State", 131-49).

130 Özen has observed that religious rulings concerning *takfīr* were not covered by the books of Ḥanafī jurisprudence but generally amended in lieu of legal opinions (Özen, "Molla Lutfi'nin İdamına Karşı Çıkan", 61-2). For instance, Mollā Ḥüsrev's *Durar al-ḥukkām fī sharḥ gurar al-aḥkām*, a work in jurisprudence completed and presented to Meḫmed II in the year 883/1478, does not mention *takfīr* as a topic.

131 For instance, see Kristó-Nagy, "Denouncing the Damned *Zındıq*!".

132 Brentjes, "The Vocabulary of 'Unbelief'", 107.

133 Brentjes, "The Vocabulary of 'Unbelief'", 113, 117.

134 In the context of Safavid Shi'ism, for instance, the Sunnism of Ibn 'Arabī's school, its association with mystical monism, as well as the socially disruptive elitism of *ḥukamā'* were bases for unbelief (Rizvi, "The *Takfīr* of the Philosophers (and Sufis)", 245).

scholarly debate.¹³⁵ Arabic philosophy, in this sense, was only deemed valid as long as it could be employed for the sake of religious benefit.

Disputations and exchanges could often serve as an opportunity and a means for revenge, in which the other party was expected to fall into disrepute.¹³⁶ Zeyrek's allegations about Hocasâde's unbelief, therefore, could be characterized as a retribution against the young scholar's assault on Zeyrek's prestige. Hocasâde objected to Zeyrek's claim by stating that refuting a particular proof would not necessarily undermine the overall statement, since Zeyrek's point of his denial of God's unicity would only undermine the proof itself, not the overall statement that God is singular.¹³⁷

Frank Griffel has noted how the legal meaning of *kufir* had changed during the time of Ghazâlî, from a matter that God dealt with in the Afterlife, that is, rarely implying any action more than social sanctioning, to a legal term that the jurists, the rulers, and their military had to observe and take action especially after the Shâfi'ite legal tradition started to associate this concept with apostasy.¹³⁸ Thus, the claim of *takfir* was not legally binding and could only have rather limited social consequences, such as some scholars' refraining from greeting or welcoming philosophers etc. In other words, declaring someone an unbeliever (i.e. the act of *takfir*) was a tactic often used to slander one's theological opponent with the (rare) implication of legal sanctions – especially in the early theological disputes. Following Ghazâlî to an extent, Zeyrek might have accused Hocasâde with *takfir* probably due to the latter's pro-*falsafa* views in the debate, though this claim was not common and did not have rigid legal consequences (maybe with the exception of the fallen scholar-vizier Sinân Paşa, d. 891/1486).¹³⁹ For the Ottomans, the accusation of *kufir* might have had a rhetorical connotation since, in the case of Zeyrek, it indicated a resorting to *ad hominem*, which signaled that the accuser might have lost the debate, or simply gone straight to the top during the exchange.

It should be noted that the *takfir* of the philosophers was a minority view among the later generations of Ottoman scholars. An Ottoman jurist and scholar of high caliber Cârullâh Efendi (d. 1151/1738) was said to have dismissed Ghazâlî's *takfir* of the philosophers, arguing that the claims of *takfir* are legal opinions and even if there is a single person in the religious community who does not have the same opinion, the claim is ruled out.¹⁴⁰

Another reason for Zeyrek's accusation could be a historical reference to the early reception of *burhân al-tamânu'* among religious scholars, such as 'Abd al-Laṭîf al-Kirmânî (d. 505/1111) and Abû al-Mu'in al-Nasafî (d. 508/114-15), who deemed this proof to be an outcome of unbelief. In his book of Matûrîdite theology *Tabşira al-adilla*, Nasafî voiced this view, after having cited the Mu'tazilite scholar Abû Hâshim al-Jubbâ'î's (d. 321/933) objection to the proof, by deeming it to be incomplete due to its false prin-

135 Taşköprizâde, *Mevzû'âtü'l-'ulûm*, 1: 335.

136 For the cases of revenge from the Italian Renaissance in the context of artistic competition, see Holman, "For Honor and Profit", 556-63.

137 "Delîle i'tirâz ve inkârdan müdde'âyı inkâr lâzım gelmez" (Hoca Sa'deddîn, *Tâcû't-tevârîh*, 2: 467).

138 Griffel, *al-Ghazâlî's Philosophical Theology*, 104-5; *Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam*, 223-6.

139 Hoca Sa'deddîn, *Tâcû't-tevârîh*, 2: 499.

140 Arıcı, "Müzmin Felsefe Okuru Cârullah", 16-20.

principles.¹⁴¹ In other words, before the philosophers employed the Necessarily Existent in *burhān al-tamānu'*, there had been an early context, in which failing to provide a certain proof in *tawhīd* was associated with unbelief.¹⁴² Zeyrek's claims of Ḥocazāde's unbelief and the former's use of the term *tamma al-dast*, a term borrowed from Jurjānī's text which signified that his opponent was formally silenced in the debate, shows that he saw Ḥocazāde as an apologist for the philosophers' doctrines that went against the fundamental aspects of Sunnī creed, including God's unicity.

3.5 Extant Manuscripts

There is a single extant copy of each exchange written during the final day of the debate. The treatise titled *Risāla li-Mawlānā Zeyrek fī baḥth nafs al-māhiya*, also recorded as *Mubāḥatha bayna Ḥocazāde wa-Zeyrek Efendi* in manuscript catalogues, includes Zeyrek's positions and rejoinders in lieu of lemmata in reply to Ḥocazāde. The manuscript is housed at Süleymaniye Library in MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, ff. 120b-121b,¹⁴³ and the initial title suggests that the central topic of discussion concerns the nature of God's quiddity. The text seems to be written in a cursory manner without following many of the classical conventions of consonant pointing, vowel marks, and supplementary diacritics, as well as manuscript framing, which indicate that the text might have been for personal use. The *waqf* seal on the flyleaf is partially defaced and unreadable (see [fig. 4]).¹⁴⁴ The flyleaf also lists the titles of the works in red ink.

Unlike Ḥocazāde's text, the treatise does not include an invocation (*ḥamd ü senā*) section, as well as an introduction stating the overall argument and context. It is, therefore, hard to reconstruct Zeyrek's text, envisioning the subject matter covered each day. The manuscript must have been from the year circa 1082/1671, a date noted by the copyist Mu'īd Meḥmed Efendi¹⁴⁵ at the end of another treatise in the same manuscript, that is, Şadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī's (d. 903/1497) super-gloss on the famed handbook of logic called *al-Shamsiyya*, by Najm al-Dīn 'Omar al-Kātibi al-Qazvīnī (d. 675/1277).¹⁴⁶

141 See the reference for *kufr* in the context of the proof for God's unicity, see al-Nasafī, *Tabṣira al-adilla*, 88; Yavuz, "Vahdāniyyet", 429. For a list of those scholars who deemed this proof as unbelief, see Ibn Kūtluboḡa, *Hāshiya 'alā al-musāyara*, 49. A contemporary of Zeyrek, Ibn Kūtluboḡa (d. 879/1474) writes in his commentary on his teacher Ibn Humām's *al-Musāyara* that the demonstration of God's singularity via the proof from reciprocal hindrance is an impossibility by way of rational proofs due to its allegedly false principles (Ibn Kūtluboḡa, *Hāshiya 'alā al-musāyara*, 49).

142 Yavuz, "Vahdāniyyet", 429.

143 This *majmū'a* was initially recorded under 3571, which was later changed into MS Giresun 99. The same collection also houses a copy of Ḥocazāde's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (see MS Giresun 107).

144 It seems that there are two seals on the flyleaf, one in the middle and the other on the lower left side. Most probably the latter is the acquisition (*temellük*) seal. Hasan Tetik of Süleymaniye Manuscript Library was kind enough to check the original flyleaf to see whether the seals could be read, but no avail.

145 An instructor at the prestigious Süleymaniye medrese, as well as the jurist of Haleb, Mu'īd Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1090/1679) was an established scholar of his time known for his knowledge in various Islamic sciences (Şeyḫī Meḥmed, *Vekāyi'ü'l-fuḍalā I*, 3: 459-60).

146 See Şadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, *Hāshiya 'alā ḥāshiya 'alā al-shamsiyya* housed at Süleymaniye, MS Giresun Yazmalar 3571, f. 48b.

Zeyrek's rejoinder is included in MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, a miscellany (*majmū'a*) with twenty-three treatises on a wide range of subjects from logic, astronomy, natural philosophy, and theology to disputation, semantics, and eschatology, written mostly by the famous post-classical Persian verifiers of philosophical theology – such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), Naşir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Jurjānī, Shirāzī, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 918/1502), as well as the Ottoman scholar 'Alī Kuşçu (d. 879/1474), who has two works listed, which are his famous treatises concerning theoretical astronomy (*hay'a*) and the science of imposition ('*ilm al-waḍ'*) in semantics. There are two eschatological works attributed to the classical Arabic philosopher Avicenna (d. 428/1036) in the manuscript, one on the throne of God ('*arsh*), and the other on grave visitations, proceeding Ghazālī's epistle on death and the Afterlife. Ṭūsī has the greatest number of philosophical treatises with specific discussions covering complete causes, eternal life of souls after body, and separate substances. In the context of the central topic of our current debate, one could count Rāzī on God's unicity, as well as Ḥusayn al-Ḥalḥālī (d. 1030/1621) on the proof of God's necessary existence as treatises the closest.

Risāle fī al-tawḥīd by Rāzī is a short treatise that outlines different approaches to God's singularity in the Islamic world, ranging from the standard Sunnī and Shī'ite views to the explanations purported by various scholarly communities, such as theologians, philosophers, Illuminationists, mystics, and star-worshippers. In spite of his partial sympathy towards each of these groups, Rāzī prefers the positions of philosophers and theologians as valid, even upholding the philosophers' view being stronger than the former due to its religious authentication based on reasoning.¹⁴⁷ It is highly interesting that such a treatise acknowledging the validity of the philosophers' proof is included in the same compilation with Zeyrek's defense of the theologians' position.

Ḥocazāde's defense of the philosophers is preserved at Süleymaniye Library under the title of *Risāla fī al-tawḥīd* in MS Ayasofya 2206, ff. 12-21. Similar to MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, Ayasofya 2206 is also a miscellany compiling seven treatises written in various subjects, including theology, creed, eschatology, and *ḥadīth* commentary. Most notably, the collection includes the popular gloss on Şa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī's *Sharḥ al-'aqqā'id* prepared by the Ottoman scholar Şemseddīn Ahmed bin Mūsā el-Ḥayālī (d. 875/1470 [?]), as previously noted, the only scholar who was known to have won a debate against Ḥocazāde.

The flyleaf includes the small round seal of the Ottoman Sultan Selīm I (r. 918/1512-926/1520) but not Bāyezīd II's almond-shaped seal that may be found in the extant books included in 'Aṭūfī's palace inventory (see [fig. 5]). Given these facts, the manuscript is probably dated from the reign of Selīm I. According to Gülru Necipoğlu, the 915/1509 earthquake, also known as the Lesser Apocalypse (*küçük kıyāmet*), transformed the Inner Treasury into a storage space crowded with accumulating treasures. A couple of years after the disaster, Selīm I decided to lock down the room, which was still in need of repair, in order to close the space (except for his rare visits), es-

¹⁴⁷ See Ceylan's chapter on Rāzī's arguments from the existence of God, which is based on the Persian translation of the work housed in Süleymaniye, MS Fatih 5426 and, for Rāzī's upholding of the philosophers' view being stronger, see f. 23a (Ceylan, *Theology and Tafsir*, 109-11).

pecially until the annual revenues came from the newly conquered Egypt.¹⁴⁸ The inscription on the upper right corner, *odadan çıka ‘arabī*, an expression that could be also found in books included in Bāyezīd II’s famed library, indicates the circulation policy of the book, further suggesting that the work might have been transferred from the Privy Chamber to the Treasury for reading or study purposes, a convention practiced from Selīm I onwards.¹⁴⁹

There is a *waqf* inspection note on the flyleaf written by an inspector named Şeyhẓāde Aḥmed, who worked for the Pious Endowment of the Two Holy Cities (*Awqāf al-ḥaramayn al-sharīfayn*). The inscription indicates that the book was bequeathed by Maḥmūd I (r. 1143/1730-1168/1754)¹⁵⁰ most probably to the public library that he established adjacent to the Ayaşofya (Hagia Sophia) mosque when renovating the edifice. The collection today is known as Ayasofya, which was transferred to the Süleymaniye Library in 1968.¹⁵¹ The date of bequest should be after 1147/1734 since Maḥmūd I received the epithet of *el-Gāzī*, i.e. ‘the holy warrior’, after having taken Tabriz back from Nāder Şāh Afshār (d. 1160/1747), which he lost it to him again during the following year.

MS Ayasofya 2206 is a well-preserved, meticulously-prepared *majmū’a* with a conscious attention given to writing conventions, including consonant pointing. The script is elaborate, and the folio layout displays a clear ruling pattern of text framing and bordering. The invocation section and the first two words (i.e. *qāla/aqūlu*) of some lemmata (indicating the authors of the cited remarks) are copied in red ink. The change of color in subheadings may suggest a transition from one discussion to another, perhaps even implying each successive day in the timeline of the debate.

Coming from the early 1870s, an Ottoman writer and political activist Nāmık Kemāl (1840-88) was known to have penned a series of biographies of prominent Ottoman Sultans, including Sultan Meḥmed II, crediting him as one of the key historic Muslim figures who transformed the Ottomans into a civilized society.¹⁵² With the intention of criticizing the rulers of his time, as well as historicizing an imagined past to be proud of, Kemāl instrumentalized Meḥmed II as an idealized enlightened figure in Turkish history, whom he believed to have single-handedly established the conventions of the Ottoman scholarly culture. For Kemāl, Meḥmed II was the founder of a civilizing Muslim state on a truly nationalistic basis, whose existence culminated in Ottoman nationalism;¹⁵³ yet his political motivations and interest in giving the Sultan the utmost intellectual agency led him misconstrue the factual realities of this debate. He rather utilized this scholarly event as a landmark of the Sultan’s accomplishments without paying much atten-

¹⁴⁸ Necipoğlu, “The Spatial Organization of Knowledge”, 9.

¹⁴⁹ Necipoğlu, “The Spatial Organization of Knowledge”, 21.

¹⁵⁰ “Der vaḳf-ı hāzā’l-nüşḫatü’l-celile Sultān’l-ā’zīm ve’l-ḥākānū’l-mu’azzam mālikü’l-dīn ve’l-muḥarrameyn ḥādimü’l-ḥarameyni’l-şerīfeyn es-Sultān bin es-Sultān bin es-Sultān el-Ġāzī Maḥmūd Ḥān vaḳfen şāḫiḫen şer’iyyen li-men ta’āla ve-istirāde ve-emāne ve-isti’āde ḥāledallāhu mülkehu ‘illā Muḥammed ḥarrarahu el-faḳīr Aḥmed Şeyhẓāde el-müfettiş bi-evḳāfi’l-ḥarameyni’l-şerīfeyn evvelihimā” (*Risāla fī al-tawḫīd* in MS Ayasofya 2206, 1a). For a similar note by the same inspector with a similar inscription: Sobieroj, *Variance in Arabic Manuscripts*, 177-8.

¹⁵¹ Necipoğlu, “The Spatial Organization of Knowledge”, 23; Kut, “Sultan I. Mahmut Kütüphanesi”, 99-103.

¹⁵² Kaplan, “Namık Kemal ve Fatih”, 74-6; Brockett, “When Ottomans Become Turks”, 406-8.

¹⁵³ Kuran, “Ottoman Historiography of the Tanzimat Period”, 426-7.




Figure 4
The flyleaf of MS Giresun Yazmalar 99



Figure 5 MS Ayasofya 2206 is stamped with the small round Inner Treasury seal of Selim I (center), the large round waqf seal of Mahmud I (upper left), and the oval seal of his waqf inspector (bottom). Selim I's seal represents the perpetuity of his endowments, stating "My trust/confidence comes from my Creator" in Arabic (*tawakkuli' ala khāliki*)

* For the waqf seals of Selim I and Mahmud I respectively, see Kut, *Yazma Eserlerinde Vakıf Mühürleri*, 20, 31.

tion to the content or the efforts of scholars, even mispronouncing Zeyrek's name as *Ḥatībzāde*.¹⁵⁴

İsmail Hakkı İzmirli (1869-1946), a celebrated teacher and scholar of Islamic theology and philosophy, was one of the first modern scholars to write on the debate along with the Turkish physician and historian Süheyl Ünver (1898-1986).¹⁵⁵ Having corrected Nāmık Kemāl's encyclopedic mistakes, İsmail Hakkı noted that the debate concerned the philosophers' version of the argument from reciprocal hindrance (*burhān al-tamānu'*). Yet, when parsing the main point of contention, he made an oversight by constructing the proof generically around the "impossibility of having two Gods with equal power (*qudra*)", instead of establishing the "reducibility of necessity and existence into quiddity/essence in God" as the central discussion of the debate. İsmail Hakkı İzmirli, in that context, might have based his impressions of the debate on biobibliographical sources, since the question of God's attribute of power was neither mentioned in the debate nor as part of the main context. He further notes that Ḥocazāde, in a similar fashion with Taftāzānī, did not see the philosophers' formulation as certain (*qaṭ'ī*) but presumptive (*ẓannī*).¹⁵⁶ Still, there does not seem to be a reference in the debate mentioning the name of the Timurid theologian Taftāzānī per se. Most recent scholars seem to have based their description on secondary sources overlooking the extant copies of the debate.

154 "Giceli gündüzlü eṭrāfını ih̄āṭadan bunca aşhāb ma'rifeti dā'imen ḥuzūrunda bahş itdirür ve ba'zı göre kendi mümeyyiz olurdu. Nitekim Ḥocazāde ile Ḥatībzāde beyninde cereyān iden işbāt-ı vācib cedel meşhūrunda hük-m-i Fātih idi" (Kemāl, *Evrāk-ı Perişān*, 251). Instead of acknowledging Maḥmūd Paşa and Mollā Ḥüsrev in decision-making, Kemāl chose to give the full agency to the Sultan, probably mixing the current debate with Ḥatībzāde's unsolicited attempt with the senior Ḥocazāde (Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 86-90).

155 The debate is briefly mentioned in Ünver via İsmail Hakkı's notes written especially for his book, see Ünver, "Molla Zeyrek'in güvenmesi", 68-73, as well as İzmirli, "Tevhid Burhanı meselesi", 209-10 and Adivar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, 40. There are no studies at hand about the philosophical content of the debate. Also see Arslan, "Osmanlı Entelektüel".

156 Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi*, 209.

4 The Philosophical Context of the Zeyrek-Hocasāde Debate

Summary 4.1 God's Unicity in Early Interreligious Debates. – 4.2 Background in Philosophy I. God as the Necessarily Existent (*al-wājib*). – 4.3 Background in Philosophy II. Existence, Quiddity/Essence, and Necessity in Post-Classical Philosophical Theology. – 4.4 The Rise of Conceptualism. *l'tibārāt*, Avicenna, and Beyond. – 4.5 Main Intellectual Context I. God's Unicity in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*. – 4.6 Main Intellectual Context II. Aspects of the Philosophers' Proof.

The philosophical theology of the fifteenth-century Ottoman world combined post-classical Avicennan philosophy (*ḥikma*) with (mostly Ash'arite) philosophical theology (*kalām*). This trend could be observed in Ottoman medrese handbooks, since discussions related to physics, metaphysics, and theology were mostly covered in three key texts belonging to past Perso-Islamic scholars from the Il-Khanid and Timurid courts studied through their commentaries and glosses at the fifteenth-century Ottoman medreses. These texts were as follows: Abharī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma* in Avicennan philosophy (via commentaries by Central Asian scholars Ibn Mubārakshāh al-Bukhārī (d. ca. 735/1335) or Mullāzāde al-Kharziyānī (d. 809/1407),¹ as well as two works in philosophical theology, Tūsi's *Tajrīd al-i'tiqād* (via Iṣfahānī's commentary and Jurjānī's gloss) and Ījī's *al-Mawāqif fī 'ilm al-kalām* (via Jurjānī's commentary and Ḥasan Çelebi's gloss). The fact that these urtexts were studied through their commentaries highlights the influence of Timurid and post-Timurid philosophical theology on Ottoman educational institutions, cur-

¹ A great deal of confusion has surrounded the real identities of Ibn Mubārakshāh and Mullāzāde, who were often conflated with other figures. For their identification, see El-Rouayheb, "The Fourteenth-Century Islamic Philosophers".

ricula, and study practices. Many comments and modifications of Ottoman scholars were dependent on the arbitrations of such post-classical verifiers as the general framework.

In light of the formulations on God's unicity (*tawḥīd*) present at Ottoman medreses, this chapter intends to provide an intellectual background to the current discussion. After mentioning the early interreligious context of unicity debates, the chapter will first outline the doctrines included in classical Arabic philosophy – through referencing Avicenna's modal designation of God as the Necessarily Existent vis-à-vis his ontological conceptions, such as existence, quiddity/essence, and necessity. Afterwards, the chapter will trace the later interpretations of Avicenna's formulation by looking at how the philosophers' unicity appeared in Jurjānī's popular commentary on Ījī's *al-Mawāqif*, which was the main text for the Zeyrek-Ḥocazāde debate.

4.1 God's Unicity in Early Interreligious Debates

Going back to the early interreligious dialogues in Late Antiquity, God's unicity was one of the most referenced issues in the early Muslim theological corpus – both as theological attempt to describe God as One, and as apologetic to justify the Christian description of his consubstantiality. This is because unicity, on the one hand, concerned the central conception of Muslim monotheism and, on the other, represented a philosophical effort to find a logically coherent predication of the One (the Aristotelian-Neoplatonist First Principle).² From the ninth century onwards, Christian scholars penned debates in order to explain the ways in which how Christian theological corpus upheld the unity and trinity of God. For the Muslim critics though, the principles of the Trinity and hypostases in Eastern Christianity had apparent problems in the eyes of God's singularity, since their binary presence could imply plurality in God's essence.

In reply to his Muslim adversaries in his *Treatise on the Affirmation of the Unity of God*, the tenth-century Nestorian Christian scholar Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, for instance, attributed two different meanings to unicity: 'uniqueness' and 'oneness'. By using these different shades of meaning, he achieved a 'modulated' understanding of monotheism to prove that the Trinitarian formulation upheld the Divine Unity.³

The philosophical definition of God in the Islamic tradition, as well as 'Adī's exposition, was based on Aristotle's Chapter Six of *Metaphysics* Λ, which stated that the One, i.e. the First Cause, is one neither as a genus nor a species, nor by virtue of some relations or as a continuous or indivisible being.⁴ In other words, the One is 'one *qua* substance', and it has plurality only in virtue of the constituent parts of its definition, i.e. attributes that may be predicated of His divine essence. Also these aspects of the Trinity are inseparable from the One in divine knowledge since the Intellect is in-

² Lizzini, "What Does *Tawḥīd* Mean?", 254.

³ Lizzini, "What Does *Tawḥīd* Mean?", 263; Martini Bonadeo, "On Ideas in Motion", 242.

⁴ In the words of Bertolacci, Avicenna places God's existence outside the context of common logico-ontological categories, saying that God is not a substance (Bertolacci, "The 'Ontologization' of Logic", 44).

separable from its knowing and the object of its knowledge.⁵ In the cases of unicity and trinity, God is only one in definition, which implies that He is one in essence and, therefore, His multiplicity and diversity should be understood from a certain point of view not applicable to contingent beings.⁶

4.2 Background in Philosophy I. God as the Necessarily Existent (*al-wājib*)

The specific arguments in the Zeyrek-Hocazâde debate unfolded in a particular philosophical context, which took its cue from the Muslim Peripatetic Avicenna. One of the most significant contributions of Avicenna's ontology was his introduction of modal concepts, such as necessity, possibility, and impossibility, when describing the existence of God in relation to that of other beings. All of these aspects of Avicennan philosophy found their ways into Timurid and Ottoman medrese handbooks in philosophical theology via modifications. To show how particular beings differ from God in terms of essence, existence, and modality, Avicenna defines God as *the* Necessarily Existent, that whose existence does not depend on the existence of any another, but rather must be necessary by virtue of being itself. In turn, he sees all other existents as being contingent on another, thereby addressing them as 'possibly existents'.⁷

There are various cosmological proofs of God's necessary existence, including arguments from distinct aspects, such as causality, priority, simplicity, and unicity. However, in order to argue for these aspects for God, the philosophers (represented here by Avicenna) must also consider the complex relationship among certain concepts, such as necessity, quiddity/essence, and existence, by reducing them into one in the reality of God to be able to acknowledge His unicity. Being *the* Necessarily Existent does not entail that this aspect is an attribute of God, but God's quiddity/essence itself is simply the same as the Necessarily Existent, suggesting that God does not have a quiddity apart from it. Thus, all these aspects must be essentially one in the Necessarily Existent, implying neither multiplicity nor particularity.⁸ This formulation brought with it numerous questions discussed in later centuries: In what sense does contingent existence differ from God's

5 Martini Bonadeo, "On Ideas in Motion", 243; Lizzini, "What Does *Tawhīd* Mean?" 263; Endress, "Theology as a Rational Science", 232-3.

6 'Adī developed his position over time, arguing in his *Risāla fī tathbīt* that in addition to being one in definition, the Creator was also one in species. This point is linked to his defense of Christian Trinity since both definitions of the Creator provided valid explanations for the hypostases: God being one in species answers the question how three hypostases may be one God, while that God is one in definition answers the question how the one God may be three hypostases (Holmberg, *A Treatise*, 39-40). Israel of Kashkar follows 'Adī especially in the utilization of God's being one in species.

7 Hourani has provided various translated passages from four treatises along with certain sections from *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt* and *Dānish-nāma*, in which Ibn Sinā concentrated on the question of necessary and possible existence (Hourani, "Ibn Sinā"). Also on the Avicennan doctrine of God: Donaldson, "Avicenna's Proof"; Adamson, "From the Necessary Existent to God".

8 This concept was an Avicennan trademark which may have found its way into the medieval Latin tradition via Thomistic commentators with certain modifications (Carlo, *The Ultimate Reducibility*). For an exposition of the Avicennan thesis that the Necessarily Existent is 'pure existence' and its textual influences in the medieval Latin tradition, see Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 78-82; for the critique of the Avicennan unity of God's essence and existence by Ockham (1237-1347) and Duns Scotus (1265-1308), 83-4.

existence? How could it be deemed that different from contingent beings, God's existence is not composite? More importantly, how could the relationship between God's essence and existence be construed so that His existence would not connote multiplicity?

4.3 Background in Philosophy II. Existence, Quiddity/Essence, and Necessity in Post-Classical Philosophical Theology

As indicated above, the distinction between essence and existence is a distinguishing feature of Avicennan metaphysics.⁹ It is a contested phenomenon which continued to haunt the post-classical commentators of Graeco-Arabic philosophy in the following centuries¹⁰ including the early Ottoman scholarship,¹¹ and this feature pervades the Zeyrek-Ḥocazāde debate. This notional differentiation was also carried over into the ontological proof of unicity, consequently including necessity in its formulation.¹² Avicenna did not distinguish God's necessity from His existence, since this would cause diversity in His unity. He regarded God's 'necessary existence' on a par with His 'necessity of existence', thereby implying the unicity of these notions (essence, existence, and necessity) in God's essence. Avicenna sees essence and existence as inseparable and mutually correlative, such that existence may be interpreted as being always and everywhere a 'necessary concomitant' of the essence.¹³

Following the third-century Hellenistic philosopher Plotinus' principle of simplicity, Avicenna points that quiddity and existence correspond to the distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically necessary existence, which makes him achieve a simpler formula than the Neoplatonists since, according to the latter, God as One is distinguishable from God as God. God exists through or by virtue of His quiddity and so has 'proper existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*) that is entirely of His own. 'Many-in-the-one' seems to be a fundamental aspect of His essence,¹⁴ such that God's proper existence is unique to him with no 'acquired sense of existence' (*wujūd muḥaṣṣal*) in the mind or the concrete. It should be noted that the philosophers are interpreted to have made a distinction between God's 'special existence' and the universal category of existence, which is also called 'absolute existence'

⁹ For the Avicennan distinction between quiddity/essence and existence, see Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, 149-53; "Essence and Existence"; Bertolacci, "The Distinction of Essence and Existence".

¹⁰ For the post-classical context, see Eichner, "Essence and Existence"; Benevich, "The Essence-Existence Distinction".

¹¹ For example, the fifteenth-century scholar 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī al-Ṭūsī finds Avicenna's equating existence with essence in God faulty following Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī ('Alā' al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 209-29).

¹² With regard to different senses of necessity (i.e. essential versus predicative) and how this terms is related to the distinction between essence and existence, see Benevich, *Essentialität und Notwendigkeit*, 43-70.

¹³ This is a formulation that also diffused into the Christian Latin tradition: Black, "Mental Existence", 25; and MacIntyre, "Essence and Existence", esp. 60. For the reception of the Avicennan concomitance of essence and existence in medieval Europe with regard to Aquinas, see Corrigan, "A Philosophical Precursor" and Wippel, "The Latin Avicenna". Aquinas recognizes the primacy of the existential over the essential order, whereas Avicenna argues for the vice versa (Black, "Mental Existence", 44).

¹⁴ Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 31-2.

(*wujūd muṭlaq*). This distinction was often conflated into one category, in which God is equated to ‘absolute existence’ by the later theologians and the Akbarī Sufis.¹⁵

The concept of pure quiddity is simple and ontologically distinct with essential constituents that are embraced all at once due to its essential irreducibility. God’s pure quiddity preserves its irreducible and special mode of existence even when it is a part of a complex or a composite being as a mode that essentially precedes that of the universal existence; and it is not in itself a genus, although ‘genus-ness’ can be attached to it in the mind. As Damien Janos has argued, quiddity itself neither exists in the mind nor in the concrete in a contingent and composite mode, but exists in the mind in a mode which concerns only itself and which excludes all other things.¹⁶ In God’s intellect, quiddity is for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from His essence without producing multiplicity. This means that God can be regarded as only existence, as well as only necessity. In God, necessity, quiddity, and existence become one. In this context, existence and essence have been interpreted as being *coextensive* and *coimplicative* in Avicenna (albeit not coextensive in terms of acquired existence (*wujūd muḥaṣṣal*), which is restricted to things that owe their existence to another)¹⁷ that is, extensionally identical but intentionally distinct.¹⁸

Examining the relationship among these three concepts in the context of the necessarily and possibly existents, Avicenna first considers the link among them by way of three possibilities, i.e. identicalness, a strong relation of concomitance, or a weaker form of accidentality. Eliminating the last two, he then demonstrates that equivalence is the best way to describe His nature ontologically. In order for God to retain His unicity, His necessity should be equal to His quiddity/essence, which is due to His necessary existence. This formulation links all three concepts, i.e. existence, quiddity, and necessity, without undermining God’s singularity.

For the Ottoman context at hand, the key passage is included in Jurjānī’s post-classical handbook of philosophical theology, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, a commentary on the Il-Khanid theologian Ījī’s popular work with the same title. Position Two, Observation One, Intention Three (2.1.3) in the book is a section that lists all accepted positions in philosophy and theology with regard to the relationship between existence and quiddity/essence among the necessarily and possibly existents. According to Ījī/Jurjānī’s outline there are three cases: (i) Ash’arī’s view that existence and essence are identical in both God and the possibly existents; (ii) the philosopher’s (and the Akbarī Sufis’)¹⁹ view that existence and essence are only identical for God but su-

15 Altaş, “Varlık, Varlığın Birliği”, 110-13.

16 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 189, 201-3, 211.

17 See Jari Kaukua’s “Review Article” of Damien Janos’ *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, especially pages 156-7. For the distinction of special and acquired existences, see Ibn Sinā’s *Madkhal* I.12 in Ibn Sinā, *al-Shifā’*, 471-88, 500-1, 531-6.

18 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 393-2, 531. Yet it should be also noted that essence enjoys a logical priority over existence (Wisnowsky, “Essence and Existence”, 29).

19 The term also appears in Jurjānī’s designation of these types of the Sufis with the epithets of *muwahḥid*, *wujūdiyūn*, *muḥaqqiq*. The main differences between the philosophers and the Akbarī Sufis are as follows: the latter group does not hold the distinction between *wujūd khāṣṣ* and *wujūd muṭlaq*, basing their method on *kashf* rather than *’aql*, and taking existence as negative (*salbī*). For instance, see the case of the thirteenth-century Akbarī Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī

peradded for possibly existents; and **(iii)** the theologians' view that existence is superadded or occurs externally to essence both in the necessarily and possibly existents.²⁰

According to Ījī, the philosophers' rationale is based on the notion that if existence is superadded to God's quiddity/essence, then existence has to subsist in it, implying need, composition, or multiplicity, the aspects to be avoided for unicity. Subsequently, subsistence and superaddition imply that existence is in need of a quiddity, and the relation of need is only reserved for the possibly existents whose existence depends on others.²¹ One of the main reasons why the post-classical theologians tended to go against Avicenna's equating existence (and necessity) with quiddity/essence in necessary existence is that the theologians had the doctrinal tendency of **(a)** refuting 'modulation'; **(b)** seeing existence as a species/genus' nature; **(c)** omitting the distinction between special and absolute existence; **(d)** equating 'abstracted existence' with 'absolute existence'; and **(e)** regarding that absolute quiddity has existence.²² And all these points that Ījī covered also appear in the Zeyrek-Hocazāde debate.

As a conclusion, neither Ījī nor his commentator Jurjānī seems to single out one view over another with a clear preference, which leads one to wonder whether they were agnostic about the exact nature of existence and quiddity/essence vis-à-vis one another.²³ Alnoor Dhanani has recently observed that if we assume that mental existence is ruled out, then the first case that is attributed to Ash'arī above would probably be Ījī's preferred position, whereas Jurjānī was probably inclined towards the third option **(iii)** above in order to rule out the philosophers' equating necessity with quiddity in God.²⁴

The philosophers argue that as God's existence and quiddity/essence are equal to one another, it could be assumed that necessity will be the same as both concepts in the Necessarily Existent so that God's unicity still holds to be true. And in the post-classical paradigm, the nature of *i'tibārāt*, which is only distinguished in the mind conceptually, can be interpreted as having conformed to the philosophers' equating necessity and existence in necessary existence.

(Altaş, "Varlık, Varlığın Birliği", 104-12; Keklik, *Allah-Kâinat ve İnsan*, 73-5). With regard to the Sufi doctrine *waḥdat al-wujūd*, Jurjānī has further other texts including his gloss on al-İşfahānī's commentary on the *Tajrīd*, which affirm the view **(ii)** above (see Heer, "Five Unedited Texts").

20 Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 135-68; for the philosophers' view, 135-7. For the summary of accepted positions in philosophy and theology in this medrese handbook, Dhanani, "Al-Mawāqif fī 'ilm al-kalām", 381-4. A fourth option can be attributed to the Mu'tazilites, who, different from the philosophers, argued that non-existent (*ma'dūm*) beings can exist conceptually in the external immutability (*thubūt*); that is why, existence can be superadded to quiddity. With regard to the statuses of existence and quiddity among the possibly existents, see İbn Kemāl, "Risāla fī ziyāda al-wujūd".

21 Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 135-6.

22 It should be noted that Jurjānī's views regarding the nature of existence vis-à-vis God are also included in two other texts in addition to *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*: his treatise on *marātib al-wujūd* and gloss on İşfahānī's commentary on the *Tajrīd* (Heer, "Five Unedited Texts"; Altaş, "Varlık, Varlığın Birliği", 105-6). Among the Islamic manuscripts copied for Meḫmed II, there is a manuscript at the Topkapı Palace R.472 belonging to Jurjānī, *Risāla al-wujūdiyya*, a simple production with small blind-tooled stamps in the form of the *tschang* knot (see Raby, "East and West in Mehmed the Conqueror's Library", 311).

23 Eşref Altaş seems to be in the same opinion, though he also expresses that Jurjānī tends to have an unfavorable take on the Akbarī Sufi position as implied in his *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 35 (also quoted in Altaş, "Varlık, Varlığın Birliği", 121-2).

24 Dhanani, "Al-Mawāqif fī 'ilm al-kalām", 384.

The Zeyrek-Ḥocazāde debate concerns the validity and use of this formulation in the context of unicity. Zeyrek maintains that the philosophers' proof is incomplete since necessity is a superadded accident to quiddity which cannot be defined in the way that the philosophers formulated. Ḥocazāde's counterposition in this context features a synthesis with Avicennan metaphysics, highlighting the dynamism and flexibility of fifteenth-century Ottoman knowledge production (see § 4.4).

4.4 The Rise of Conceptualism. *I'tibārāt*, Avicenna, and Beyond

With its probably roots in Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's separation between universals and quiddities,²⁵ *i'tibār* is a term initially employed by Avicenna with a variety of meanings. According to Damien Janos' recent study, the expression *i'tibār* appears 324 times in all *al-Shifā'* with its conceptual, psychological, and logical shades of meaning in Avicenna's philosophy.²⁶ An *i'tibār* is neither faculty- nor object-specific, and can be infinitely multiplied at will – a term that chiefly refers to the rational operations of the mind and its ability to unite and divide intellectual/mental conceptions, as well as creating and multiplying relations and distinctions between them.²⁷ *I'tibārāt* require that a mental operation is feasible or possible and its object intrinsically conceivable, in which human mind can devise various considerations with no multiplicity.²⁸ They are not primary or necessary notions, rather suppositional and presumed. Strictly speaking, an *i'tibār* is divested from *nafs al-'amr* ('the thing in itself' or 'the fact of the matter') since it is purely conceptual and suppositional.²⁹

The term also appears in Islamic philosopher and physician Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 547/1152 [?]), who employed it as a distinguished method of reflection through careful arbitration.³⁰ In post-classical philosophy, the term was further modified into a broader category launched by the twelfth-century scholar Suhrawardī, probably having influenced by the Persian mathematician and philosopher 'Omar Khayyām (d. 526/1132), who was said to have incidentally passed away while perusing a section highly relevant to the current discussion, i.e. "the One and the Many" included in the Metaphysics of Avicenna's *Shifā'* III.2-3.³¹

25 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 81, 85; Frank, *Beings and Their Attributes*, 53.

26 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 85-7.

27 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 96, 100-1.

28 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 93, 107, 235-6.

29 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 121-2, 206. For a recent study on *nafs al-'amr* as objective truth and Taşköprizāde's new formulation of this term in the Ottoman context, see Spiker, *Things as They Are*, 1-5, 82-99, 155-62.

30 To bracket out Avicennan epistemological realism, Abu'l-Barakāt used *i'tibār* as a method of critiquing apodeixis in philosophy, i.e. "establishing something through personal reflection or careful consideration" (Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 563, 490, 493-7; also see Pines, "Nouvelles études", 97). On a similar note the medieval Muslim poet Usāma ibn Munqidh (d. 584/1188) used the term as "a way of gaining knowledge by contemplation via instructive examples or proofs" (Ibn Munqidh, *The Book of Contemplation*, xxxiv; via Nur's unpublished paper "On the Meaning(s) of *i'tibār* in Arabic").

31 The earliest account on the life of Khayyām is in Zahir al-Din al-Bayhāqī's *Tarīkh al-ḥukamā' al-Islām* completed before 549/1154-55, which also served as the source for *Chahār Maqāla* of Niẓām-e 'Arūḍī (d. 552/1157 [?]), as well as *Nuzha al-arwāḥ* of Muḥammad Shahrazūri (d. af-

The term *i'tibār* was construed as a critique of the distinction between essence and existence in God³² by later Avicennan scholars,³³ as well as Abū Ḥashim's controversial coinage of *aḥwāl* (states) as an intermediary category that neither falls under existence nor non-existence. Abū Ḥashim devised his theory of states as a response to the Mu'tazilite position, which entailed that all attributes could collapse into God's self, a case, according to him, that reduced the semantic content of God's attributes into meaningless attributive assertions.³⁴ To uphold against the skepticism about the real existence of attributes including existence, Khayyām undermines *aḥwāl* since this principle is in violation of the Law of Excluded Middle enunciated by Aristotle, i.e. that there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate.³⁵ Khayyām rather sees existence as conceptually (*ma'nā i'tibārī*) superadded (*zā'id 'alā*) (not extramentally), which can be separated in the mind (*tafṣīl fī al-'aqlī*).³⁶

In his translation-cum-commentary of a treatise on existence attributed to Avicenna, *Risāla fī al-wujūd*, Khayyām divides attributes into various types, such as essential (*dhātī*), accidental (*'araḍī*), necessary concomitant (*lāzim*), as well as a fourth category, conceptual (*i'tibārī*), the latter of which is separable from the characterized thing *only* in the faculty of estimation (*mufāriq bi'l-wahm*) without any existence in the outside world.³⁷ Based on the distinction between an existential and an accidental attribute, the classic example that Khayyām used to address non-existential mental constructs is 'blackness' as color, a quality not located in a body. For Khayyām, the observed 'blackness' in bodies is indeed something superadded in concrete reality, yet when 'blackness' is separated from the corporeality, that is, as the attribute of coloriness, it indicates something conceptual/mental without

ter 687/1288). See Denison Ross, Gibb, "The Earliest Account of 'Umar Khayyām", 470 (Arabic) and 473 (English).

32 Wolfson translates the term as "mental and estimative considerations" (*i'tibārāt dhāniyya wa-taqdirīyya*) (Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 199). By ruling out certain aspects regarding the relationship between quiddity and existence, Suhrawardī argues that existence cannot be a concrete thing that could be added to the former, and existence should be taken among "beings of reason" (*i'tibārāt 'aqliyya*). As for mental considerations vis-à-vis the Necessarily Existing, see al-Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, 45-7, 83, as well as Sajjad H. Rizvi, who offered the translation mental considerations or notionals for *i'tibārāt*, in "An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?", 222-3. The nature of 'beings of reason' (sing. *ens rationis*) garnered the attention of scholars like the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez who, in one of his expositions, defined them as "shadows" of true beings that can only be treated derivatively and distinct from real essences (Novotný, *Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel*, 38; for the intension and extension of 'beings of reason', see also 48-51). As for mental considerations as opposed to extramental realities in mathematics and natural philosophy, Fazlıoğlu, "Hakikat ile İtibar".

33 Unlike the commonly held view, Suhrawardī rather responds to Rāzī's univocity of existence (Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 46).

34 Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 36; Thiele, "Abū Ḥashim al-Jubbā'ī's (d. 321/933) Theory of 'States' (*aḥwāl*)".

35 Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 176, 199-200.

36 For the edition of the text: Khayyām, "Risāla fī'l-wujūd", 106, 113; Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 413, 498.

37 Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 37.

an existential notion.³⁸ *I'tibârî* notions associated with God are only many-in-the-one without violating His oneness.³⁹

The term *i'tibârî* is often used in opposition to *wujûdî*, which denotes external existence, that is, a real external addition. This term is regarded within the broadly construed category of mind-dependent concepts, that is, intellectual predicates that we are bound to use in all cognition. These entities consist of a wide variety of logical second-order concepts, such as universal, particular, genus, species, and differentia, as well as second intentions/intelligibles like quiddity/essence, existence, privation, necessity etc.⁴⁰ The *i'tibârî* nature of necessity according to Suhrawardî⁴¹ was a conceptualization that denoted no real value, in which, for him, all reality relies on the hierarchy of light; in other words, quiddity and existence are only distinguishable in the mind, not in concrete reality.⁴² This view is also acknowledged in common handbooks of philosophical theology studied at Ottoman medreses, as in the case of Shams al-Dîn al-İşfahânî's (d. 748/1348) commentary on the *Tajrîd al-i'tiqâd*.⁴³

The term was initially rejected by Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî in *al-Mulakkhkhaş fî al-ḥikma* due to his earlier Ash'arite epistemological convictions.⁴⁴ The nature of mental considerations and their utilization for certain philosophical terms, such as existence and quiddity, were also common issues discussed among the works of following generations of verifiers, such as Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-'Allâma al-Ḥillî (d. 648/1250) and the above-mentioned İşfahânî, who were famed early commentators on the *Tajrîd* by Naşîr al-Dîn Ṭûsî (Râzî's great rival in interpreting Avicenna). Following the philos-

38 Khayyâm, "Risâla fî'l-wujûd", 103-4; Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 38-40; Aminrazavi, *The Wine of Wisdom*, 180-3.

39 Hayyâm, *Ruba'îler ve Silsilat-al-Tartîb*, XXVIII, as well as 130 (Persian) and 180 (Turkish). Also see the term *bi-i'tibâr-ı 'aqlî* in Khayyâm's Persian translation-cum-commentary of an invocation to God attributed to Avicenna concerning God's existence, unicity, eternity, omnipotence etc. In Khayyâm's Persian translation, the passage is as follows: "He does not belong to any genus because there is no plurality in His Self; neither *intellectually* (*bi-i'tibâr-ı 'aqlî*), so as to make the limit of His essence plural by Him, like the limit of whiteness in color and quality; nor (physically) in the composition parts, like that of a body in matter and form. In the names and meanings attributed to God, such as existent and necessary are adjectives and relative concomitants which do not constitute plurality, like some many relative and negative names" (Akhtar, "A Tract of Avicenna", 228 [Persian], and 223 [English]).

40 Starting with Suhrawardî, *i'tibârât* has been defined as 'second intentions', i.e. necessary entailments of the first-order concepts in which they are grounded - rather than arbitrary mental constructs (Kaukua, "*I'tibârî* Concepts in Suhrawardî", 41-2, 48-53). The term is also translated as "intellectual frictions" in Walbridge, *Science of Mystic Lights*, 45-6 or "beings of reason" in al-Suhrawardî, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, xxi.

41 The term can be traced to Suhrawardî's *Mashâri'* (Benevich, "The Necessary Existent", 138).

42 Wisnovsky, "Essence and Existence", 45. Following the Avicennan thesis that essence and existence are identical in necessary existence, Abharî also endorses the view that existence is a mental construct in his *Muntahâ al-afkâr* via the influence of Suhrawardî, as opposed to Râzî's understanding of existence that is being shared without its gradations (Eichner, "Essence and Existence", 126-8).

43 İşfahânî often mentions the term 'mental consideration' in the contexts of specification (al-İşfahânî, *Tasdîd al-qawâ'id*, 1: 425-6), singularity (437-8), as well as the ontological modalities, such as necessity, possibility, and impossibility (253). Furthermore, he counts quiddity, essence, reality (477), thingness (243), cause and effect (489) as secondary intentions that are sometimes used interchangeably with mental considerations. This is because both denote abstractions derived from primary intentions (i.e. from things with extramental existence).

44 Except in a passage in *al-Mabâḥith al-mashriqiyya*, Râzî does not seem to accept mental existence arguably due to its lack of presence (*hudûr*) (Eichner, "Knowledge by Presence", 118-20).

ophers' position, the latter holds that existence as a mental consideration is equal to the quiddity of God's reality (*ḥaqīqa*), thereby being self-evident (*badīhī*), whereas the former takes existence as a reality that precedes the quiddity of reality due to its being simple, by concluding that they cannot be the same.⁴⁵

The common view in the post-classical world was that existence and necessity are mental considerations denoting no concrete reality; thereby being connected to quiddities in general but as in a relationship of priority/posteriority. There are certain other objections to both Ḥillī's and İsfahānī's positions in the context of fifteenth-century scholarship. For instance, Jurjānī objects to the former saying that existence does not have extramental existence, hence existence and quiddity are self-evident *i'tibārāt* belonging to the same type of entities with no relationship of priority/posteriority. As an objection to this point, though, the Ottoman scholar Taşköprizāde brings a twist to the self-evident nature of existence vis-à-vis quiddities in his epitome on the *Tajrīd*. He argues that existence cannot be solely reduced to a mental consideration because it is a mental concept that can be abstracted from extramental existents or, more precisely, that it is a secondary intention/intelligible 'by modulation' (*bi'l-tashkīk*).⁴⁶ The exact natures of existence and quiddity will continue to occupy a significant place in the centuries to come, and there is much that is worthy of further study, not least the further uses of *i'tibārāt* in metaphysics, but also its analogous transformations over time in *ḥikma* and *kalām*.

4.5 Main Intellectual Context I. God's Unicity in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*

The main focus of the Zeyrek-Hocazāde debate is a discussion about the proof of God's unicity included in Position Five, Observation Three (5.3) of Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, a section that outlines various proofs by various Muslim schools of thought (including theologians and philosophers) marshalled against the claims of the Dualists (see Appendix). More specifically, the discussion covers various versions of *burhān al-tamānu'* (the proof from reciprocal hinderance), a classical formulation devised against the possibility of one or more beings with absolute attributes who could act as partners to God - thereby concluding that the world would not be able to come into existence due to each partner's conflicting powers.⁴⁷ This proof is directed at preventing the existence of two gods at the same time, by showing the impossibility of a commonality between two such existents, and by further affirming that God has to be unique and one.⁴⁸

Owing to the influence of Avicenna's ontology, post-classical theologians continued to classify 'what exists' into the categories of the necessarily and possibly existents.⁴⁹ As the only being with necessary existence, God was of-

⁴⁵ Altaş, "Taşköprizāde'nin Tecrīd Hâşiyesi", 2319.

⁴⁶ Altaş, "Taşköprizāde'nin Tecrīd Hâşiyesi", 2320.

⁴⁷ See a short overview of *burhān al-tamānu'* and Taftāzānī's hesitation in acknowledging this proof (al-Taftāzānī, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, 37-9; Yavuz, "Vaḥdāniyyet", 428).

⁴⁸ Gimaret, "Tawḥīd".

⁴⁹ The concept of God as the Necessarily Existent here existed in pre-Avicennan theological discussions but the ontological distinction between the necessarily and possibly existents was

ten used interchangeably with the term ‘the Necessarily Existent’ in post-classical manuals of philosophical theology. Since now God can be defined as the Necessarily Existent, the interplay between the concepts of necessity and existence becomes significant in the philosophers’ version of this proof.

All Muslim schools in both philosophy and theology agreed on the validity of this proof’s logical consequence, because the proof from reciprocal hinderance was one of the central arguments upholding the main tenet of monotheism, which underscored the singularity (*waḥdāniyya*) and oneness (*aḥadiyya*) of God.⁵⁰ Though used interchangeably, it should be noted that both terms have certain nuances in theology and Sufism: *waḥdāniyya* expressed a superior notion defined as recognizing God’s unity vis-à-vis His essence, attributes, and other creations in a universal way (*kullī*). *Aḥadiyya*, on the contrary, denotes oneness as in knowing God’s essence through His essence without taking His attributes and creations into the equation.⁵¹

Over the centuries, not only did Muslim scholars develop arguments to eliminate commonality and partnership to God in order to demonstrate God’s oneness, but they also avoided attributing to Him those particular qualities used for the possible existents, such as commonality, multiplicity, individualization, and composition,⁵² because all of these qualities implied contingency and particularity, as opposed to necessity, oneness, or singularity. Nevertheless, a contention arose among these schools especially when the theologians further investigated whether the philosophers based their proofs on premises that had been demonstrated to be certain and valid, having looked for loopholes in their argumentation.

Muslim philosophers provided proofs in favor of monotheism, but their proofs resulted from their conceptualizations and terminologies and, therefore, drew fierce criticism from their theologian counterparts. For the latter group, the main problem of the philosophers was their premises, especially their assertions about the Necessarily Existent, i.e. that, in the case of God, necessity would be the same as quiddity/essence, as well as ‘pure existence’ (i.e. existence as it is), a debated Avicennan designation.

thanks to Avicenna. See Wisnovsky, “Avicenna’s Islamic Reception”, 203, 211.

⁵⁰ The tenth question of Jurjānī’s famed debate with the Sufi shaykh Shāh Ni’matullāh Walī in 815/1412 covers the question of unicity’s definition. As an Akbarī Sufi, Ni’matullāh Walī sees *tawḥīd* as a specific term closely associated with Ibn ‘Arabī’s ontological unity between God and His creation, a view that will be associated with *waḥdat al-wujūd* (the unity of being) in the generations to come. The tenth question concerns the difference between the terms ‘the One’ (*aḥad*) and ‘the Singular/Unique’ (*wāḥid*) in God, and Walī responds that God is One (*aḥad*) in essence but Unique in terms of attributes, such that he defines Unicity (*wāḥidiyya*) as the “unity of the attributes of the One which are subsumed in him”. On the other hand, Jurjānī wants to distance unicity from its Akbarī connotations by arguing that *tawḥīd* presupposes the plurality of beings (*dar tawḥīd kardan ta’addud lāzim ast*), and using this notion to prove *waḥdat al-wujūd* would be similar to “explaining water by referring to a desert image” (*ke bā sarāb-e bayābān ḥaqīqat-e āb-e ḥaywān rā rūshan gardānd*), so this term only encourages a seeker on the path of the truth but the real *tawḥīd* can only be experienced in the Afterlife (Binbaş, “Timurid Experimentation”, 286-9; for Jurjānī’s Persian text, Muṭlaq, “Iskandariyya yā Risāla dar uṣūl al-dīn”, 1446-7).

⁵¹ Uludağ, “Ahadiyyet”, 484.

⁵² As for commonality and composition as aspects to be avoided in the Necessarily Existent, see al-İşfahānī, *Tasdiḍ al-qawā’id*, 945-7.

4.6 Main Intellectual Context II. Aspects of the Philosophers' Proof

According to *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* 5.3, two philosophical artefacts filtered their way into the philosophers' version of *burhān al-tamānu*.⁵³ The first is by resorting to the 'argument from entification' (*ta'ayyun*), which asserts that it is impossible to have two equal Necessarily Existents, since differentiation by entification will eliminate the possibility of a common quiddity and an entification existing at the same time. This will, otherwise, lead to the affirmation of a Necessarily Existent with entification, which is impossible.⁵³ There can be no such cases of the Necessarily Existents since entification refers to a being with a particular identity and existence that cannot be associated with God. In other words, in order for these Necessarily Existents to distinguish themselves from one another, the principle for differentiation, i.e. entification, has to penetrate into their individual haecceities. This will assume that each haecceity (*huwiyya*), which is applicable to all existents,⁵⁴ will be composite of both a common quiddity and an entification, thereby undermining the Necessarily Existent's singularity.⁵⁵

The philosophers define necessity as "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others", just as the term 'entification' suggests a sense of 'differentiation'.⁵⁶ This crossover between necessity and entification is where Ḥocazāde bases his initial argument regarding how this meaning of necessity corresponds to the senses of necessity in the philosophers' initial thesis. The philosophers' reasoning here, according to *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, relies on the assertion that necessity is an existential notion (*wujūdī*), that is, externally existing (a term that is often used in juxtaposition to *i'tibārī*). This approach might be based on a previous misrepresentation by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, an argument criticized by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in his *Ishārāt* commentary and ruled out in Ḥocazāde's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*.⁵⁷

In later centuries, Jurjānī observes that in order to make their proof more complete and certain, the philosophers ought to demonstrate the existentiality of necessity, which is missing in their exposition. This is because the Necessarily Existent has to exist necessarily, and the philosophers assume that if existence is identical to the quiddity in the Necessarily Existent, then necessity will be equal to God's quiddity/essence *only due to the condition of existentiality*. Adding to this point, Jurjānī's text further asserts that the philosophers' version should be taken as incomplete, since it does not adequately demonstrate the immutability (*thubūt*) of necessity and entification, giving the impression that both can denote diversity when present together.

The philosophers' first criterion for the proof acknowledges the requirement of entification for necessity; the second aspect, which is also based on

⁵³ One of the exchanges between the Akbarī Sufi Qūnawī and Ṭūsī concern the status of 'entification' (*ta'ayyun*) with regard to the necessarily and possibly beings. Ṭūsī argues that entification is only reserved for individuals since they need an additional entification to come out, whereas God cannot have this additional quality since His so-called 'entification' (i.e. appearing in existence) corresponds to His very reality - not amounting to whether it is equal to His existence or superadded to it (Konevi, *el-Mūrāselāt*, 117-18).

⁵⁴ Al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawā'id*, 2: 278.

⁵⁵ Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45-6.

⁵⁶ Jurjānī defines entification as "that which distinguishes a thing from another insofar as it does not participate in the other" (al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-ta'rīfāt*, 65).

⁵⁷ Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 193. See also ch. 4 and Conclusion.

the same premises, asserts that, contrary to Avicenna's position about entification's being concomitant (*lāzim*) to quiddity in *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt*,⁵⁸ it has to be superadded (*yanḍimmu 'alayhi*) to quiddity (and necessity) in order to prevent God's multiplicity. To prove this, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* then outlines two other possibilities, namely 'entification's requiring necessity' or 'necessity's and entification's requiring one another', ruling out both options by resorting to the problems of posteriority (*ta'akhhur*) and separation (*infikāk*) in each aspect respectively. Ottoman scholars in the current debate indeed commented on both cases.

For Jurjānī, the reason why necessity requires a superadded entification is because entification, otherwise, may become a prior term or a cause to necessity. This is impossible because *first* necessity and entification have to be separated from one another since the latter is a superaddition; and *second*, necessity is the cause for entification (not the other way around). So, for Jurjānī, a thing is always in need of entification to differentiate itself from others, but entification does not necessarily need to be an 'existential' quality, that is, a real quality that externally exists. Quiddity requires entification to restrict the species' quiddity by an individual to be able to come out and, if this process of entification should be necessary for the case of God, then this leads us to the conclusion that there cannot be two differing Necessarily Existents existing and requiring entification at the same time.

In conclusion, in order to refute the position of the Dualists, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* lists various positions regarding God's unicity that are put forth by various past schools of thought, including the philosophers' classical position. When parsing out their formulation, Jurjānī (and Ījī) observe that for the philosophers it is impossible for a thing to exist without entification, albeit not meaning that entification always requires necessity since it is also true for the possibly existents (i.e. *the first aspect*). In other words, once these two equally Necessarily Existents are differentiated from one another via entification, they would also contradict the principle of singularity that the Necessarily Existent connotes. This means that necessity requires entification to emerge and, for this reason, necessity cannot be more than one when requiring entification (i.e. *the second aspect*). By this way, the quiddity that requires an entification restricts the species of that quiddity by an individual, preventing another Necessarily Existent from appearing.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Avicenna's point about "entification's being a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*)", see al-Taḥṭānī, *al-Ilāhiyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

⁵⁹ A similar view was also mentioned in Ḥocazāde in response to Ghazālī's point about the first aspect of the philosophers' proof (Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 181-2; also see Conclusion).

5 “If Only Necessity Were God’s Quiddity” Analysis of the Debate

Summary 5.1 Outline of Zeyrek’s (Z) Position. – 5.2 Outline of Hocasade’s Position. – 5.3 Analysis of Zeyrek’s Position. Necessity Occurs to God Accidentally. – 5.3.1 Day One. On the Philosophers’ Premise That Necessity Is Equal to Quiddity in God. – 5.3.2 Day Two. On Whether Any of the Stated Meanings Can Prove that the Intension of Necessity Is Equal to God’s Quiddity/Essence. – 5.3.3 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence. – 5.3.4 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (*Wujūdiyya*). – 5.3.5 Background to Z’s Position on the Univocity of Existence. An Overview of Univocity, Equivocity, and Analogicity Among the Early Verifiers. – 5.3.6 Day Four. Concluding Remarks. – 5.3.7 Day Five. On Whether Necessity *Necessarily* Denotes a Single Essence. – 5.3.8 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Conform to Singularity According to Their Thesis. – 5.4 Analysis of Hocasade’s Position. Making the Philosophers’ Proof Cohere with Post-Classical Scholarship. – 5.4.1 An Invocation on God’s Unicity. “He Neither Begets Nor Is Born”. – 5.4.2 Day One. H’s Response to Objections to the Philosophers’ Thesis by J/HÇ. – 5.4.3 Day Two. On Why the Third Meaning of Necessity Corresponds to That of the Philosophers’ Thesis and on Whether Necessity Has to Be Singular. – 5.4.4 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence. – 5.4.5 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes Composition in Relation to Entification. – 5.4.6 Day Five. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (*Wujūdiyya*). – 5.4.7 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Be a Single Essence according to Their Thesis.

According to the Ottoman biobibliographical sources, the debate between Zeyrek and Hocasade continued for five days and, on the sixth, the Sultan asked the scholars to prepare copies of their responses for further evaluation on the next day. The extant texts reproduced in the Appendix below include these accounts from the last day of the debate. Due to the fragmented nature of both responses, it is hard to determine which objection followed which response exactly. Given that post-classical disputations followed a standard of specific sets of objections and explanations along with rejoins-

ders and counter-objections in reply, the analysis below intends to include a possible timeline of the debate, matching each scholar’s lemmata on a given day, and thereby showing how the debate evolved over the course of one week. The blow-by-blow reconstruction, in this sense, provides us with fresh insights about how the Ottoman scholars defended their points within the formal framework of debate etiquette and how the method of verification and referencing past scholarship were further utilized.

There are certain other hardships in reconstructing the event from extant texts. Both sides adamantly repeated their positions during the debate, having resisted any concessions to each other’s arguments. This insistence was to such a point that they sometimes ended up repeating the same points over and over again. In their restatements each scholar also resorted to several points included in past texts, having digressed into various other aspects and positions in philosophy and theology, and this must be the very reason why the debate extended over a week with no resolution.

By referencing some key points and contexts related to the debate, my analysis divides the exchange into six days, assuming that the seventh was the final day of review based on the treatises prepared on the previous night. The name of scholars and some common terms below will be given in abbreviations, as in Zeyrek (Z), Hıcazâde (H), İjî (İ), Jurjânî (J), Hasan Çelebi (HÇ), and the Necessarily Existent/God (NE).

The terms ‘quiddity’ (*māhiya*) and ‘essence/quintessence’ (*dhāt*) were often used interchangeably during the debate: the philosophers’ ‘quiddity’ was an ontological term used by Avicenna, denoting ‘whatness’ or ‘what a thing is [by essence (*bi’l-dhāt*)]’, whereas ‘essence’, a term most commonly employed by the theologians, denoted the real underlying nature of a thing.¹ The preference and use of these terms signified each scholar’s tendency in arbitration, thereby Hıcazâde, as a scholar with a background in *hikma/falsafa*, mostly employing the former definition, and Zeyrek, who was more prone to the theological literature, the latter. To avoid confusion, I used both terms interchangeably as in ‘quiddity/essence’.

1 Demir, “Zât”, 148-9. Quiddity or essence (*māhiya*), which arguably corresponds to ‘whatness’ or, arguably, ‘pointability’, is the result of conception and, in certain contexts, may be used as a synonym for ‘quintessence’ (*dhāt*) or reality/true nature (*haqiqa*) (Arnaldez, “*Māhiyya*”, 1261). Yet, technically speaking, there exists a distinction between the philosophers’ *māhiyya* and the theologians’ *dhāt*, such that the latter group considers *dhāt* as ‘unoriginated’ (*gayri maj’ūl*), criticizing that the former considers the concept of *māhiyya* originated due to their wrong reasoning. In a treatise that dispels the assumptions of quiddities’ origination (*ja’l*), the Ottoman scholar İbn Kemāl (d. 940/1534) writes that the theologians like İjî and Jurjânî mistake the philosophers’ term for the Mu’tazilite concept of a “non-existent essence” (*dhāt ma’dūm*), such that the philosophers never claim that quiddities are originated. What they, instead, meant is that quiddity is not originated through the Originator’s (hence God’s) origination/making (*ja’l al-jā’il*, the Creator’s creation) directly, but takes on the attribute *maj’ūl* as an external and mental accident, which can well attach to a haecceity (*huwiyya*). It is in this sense for İbn Kemāl that quiddity is originated in their doctrines (Demirkol, “Kemalpaşazâde’ye Göre Mahiyetin Mec’uliyeti”). For the Arabic text of the treatise, see İbn Kemāl, “Risāla fī bayān ma’n al-ja’l”. For the Turkish translation, İbn Kemāl, “Yaratmanın (Ca’l) Anlamının Açıklanması”.

5.1 Outline of Zeyrek’s (Z) Position

DAY ONE: In Response to Ḥocazāde’s (Ḥ) Initial Written Question (*Su’āl*) on the Philosophers’ Premise That Necessity Is Equal to Quiddity in the Necessarily Existent (NE)

Z’s thesis and initial objection: Necessity and quiddity cannot be the same for the NE because a commonality in both aspects would undermine God’s unicity.

Ḥ’s written response: The philosophers’ argument is true based on the fact that necessity has three meanings, which are (1) “essence’s requiring existence”; (2) “that which has no need of others in existence”; and (3) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”. And the third affirms the meaning of necessity in their argument. This statement neither implies change nor diversity since both necessity and quiddity are mental considerations (*i’tibārāt*).

Zeyrek’s further objection to Ḥ’s premise: The third meaning of necessity does not exactly support the philosophers’ statement since it cannot be an ‘intension’ (*mafḥūm*) but only ‘what falls under’ (*mā-ṣadaq*) the third meaning, i.e. its extension. That is why, necessity has to occur to God’s quiddity/essence externally as a superaddition accidental to it.

DAY TWO: On Whether Any of These Three Meanings Can Prove That the Intension of Necessity Is Equal to God’s Quiddity/Essence

Z’s two counter-objections: (a) Even if the third meaning corresponds to the intension of their argument, there is no guarantee that God’s quiddity/essence will be singular in this case. Necessity has to occur to quiddity externally as an attachment; therefore, such meanings cannot be affirmed with certainty. (b) There is no certain proof that the first two meanings, which Ḥ claims both to be connected to the third, do not *necessarily* imply compositeness in God.

DAY THREE: On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence

Z’s objection to Avicenna: As a response to Avicenna’s statement that the NE is the same as ‘pure existence’, Z asks why one should assume that God would be equal to ‘pure existence’ just because it is singular. Here Z might have been mistaken ‘pure existence’ for ‘absolute existence’ – a debated distinction in Avicennan philosophy. Next, Z resorts to the theologian’s position that existence has to be superadded to God’s quiddity.

Ḥ’s repeated counter-objection to Z in defense of the philosophers: Necessity’s being the same as ‘pure existence’ in reality corresponds to the intension of necessity’s third meaning. Then Ḥ turns the table, asking how his opponent could hinder this fact.

Z’s repeated reply: All three meanings of necessity are accidental superadditions with no implications in reality. Far from being this statement’s intension, the third meaning can only be regarded as a mental consideration that

falls under this meaning, with the condition that necessity is something that occurs to God’s reality externally. And this case does not even demonstrate certainly that necessity has to be a single reality.

DAY FOUR: On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (*Wujūdiyya*)

Z’s provided proof and two objections: First, Z states that H may define necessity as “that which distinguishes the NE from others”; yet God’s quiddity/essence can also be defined as such, and there is no certain proof that this meaning is only restricted to necessity. Second, necessity’s being without extramental existence means that it is ‘relational’ (*nisbī*), a term that does not denote an existential notion. Relational aspects can get into interaction with possibly existents by attaching to them externally, and there is again no certain proof that necessity here does not refrain from such relational qualities that lead to multitude. Z further follows the position shared by Ījī (Ī), Jurjānī (J), and Ḥasan Çelebi (HÇ), which states that necessity may well be considered ‘non-existing’ (negational, *‘adamī*) for possibly existents. Necessity does not have to be externally existing as an accidental quality, and it may well be used in the context of contingent beings. Zeyrek might be misattributing absolute or specific existence here to the philosophers’ ‘pure existence’.

Z’s rebuttal and conclusion: Necessity does indeed denote an existential notion/existentiality (*wujūdiyya*) as in the case of possibility. This means that necessity, like possibility, is an accident that could occur to things externally and, therefore, cannot be equal to God’s quiddity/essence, which is beyond existence. Z’s tries to point to a contradiction in the philosophers’ thesis but arguably conflating absolute or specific existence again with ‘pure existence’.

DAY FIVE: On Whether Necessity *Necessarily* Denotes a Single Essence

A possible objection by the philosophers: Both Z and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī are wrong in asserting that according to Avicenna, God’s essence can acquire a generic accident (*‘araḍ ‘amm*) or a genus’ nature (*ṭabī‘a jinsiyya*). Naşir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī attributes this criticism to Rāzī’s misinterpretation of Avicenna.

Z’s rejoinder: Existence in general cannot be the same as the NE because it can be applied to other existents which may take on species. Species is simply a logical category to be avoided in God. Due to the univocity of this word, the existence of the NE may be applied to possibly existents, and hence Z also regards existence as an accidental superaddition that avoids change/diversity. By referencing J, Z denies that the philosophers’ so-called ‘pure existence’ is different from the generic category of ‘absolute existence’ since the word ‘existence’ may reference a wide range of meanings.

DAY SIX: On Whether the NE Must Conform to Singularity According to Their Thesis

Z’s conclusion: The definitions of necessity do not demonstrate whether necessity has to have a single essence or can be attached to multiple essences, a point ironically mentioned in H’s adjudication on the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*

(see Conclusion). Z’s implied conclusion is that both necessity and existence are generic concepts that occur to essences externally as accidental super-additions, thereby following the post-classical theologians’ position as represented in (iii) (see § 3.3). This means that both of these concepts should be avoided when proving God’s unicity, and the philosophers’ proof is neither complete nor proven to be certainly true.

5.2 Outline of Ḥocazāde’s Position

DAY ONE: Ḥ’s Initial Response to Two Common Objections to the Philosophers’ Thesis Addressed by J/ḤÇ

Ḥ’s thesis and argument: The third meaning of necessity corresponds to the meaning of necessity in the philosopher’s initial statement about God’s unicity.

ḤÇ’s two objections: ḤÇ invalidates the philosophers’ version of *burhān al-tamānu’*, by questioning (a) whether the denial of a partner in species could be applicable to the case of divine metaphysical principles (i.e. God), and (b) whether the existence’s necessity has to refrain from receiving a haecceity (*huwiyya*). For ḤÇ both imply individuation and multiplicity.

Ḥ’s response: Rather, the thrust of the debate is whether the negation of an equal partner is required for God’s unicity when necessity is the same as His quiddity, not existence. Hence ḤÇ’s above-mentioned objections are invalid.

DAY TWO: On Why the Third Meaning of Necessity Corresponds to That of the Philosophers’ Thesis and On Whether Necessity Has to Be Singular

Exposition of Ḥ’s thesis: There are three meanings associated with necessity, which are (1) “essence’s requiring existence”, (2) “that which has no need of others in existence”, and (3) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”. The first two meanings are not directly related to the nature of the NE but the third corresponds to the meaning of necessity that appears in the initial premise of the philosophers’ proof. This is true only if we assume that necessity is a mental consideration that has no reality in the extramental world.

Restatement of Ḥ’s thesis vis-à-vis ḤÇ: The third meaning of necessity here appears more in the sense of ‘specification’ (in the sense of ‘differentiation’ only reserved for the NE), and ḤÇ does not disagree with this point.

Ḥ’s textual proof from J: By referencing various passages from *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*’s section 2.1.3, a passage devoted to various positions on God’s quiddity and existence, Ḥ shows that Ī/J also follow his position, by implying that the third meaning of necessity is valid and widely accepted.

Ḥ’s critique of J: Unlike J, Ḥ states that the first two meanings of necessity may not be directly related to the third but they are also true and relevant in its demonstration. Ḥ also wants to establish a relationship between the first two and the third meanings.

Ḥ’s additional textual proof from J: A note in the marginalia probably added by the author or a later commentator verifies that J sees the third meaning in a restricted sense as an extension (*mā-ṣadaq*) – not as an intension (*mafḥūm*). Afterwards, Ḥ repeats a previous comment, noting that it will be inconceivable that necessity constitutes multiple essences or individuals since these will ultimately need to be differentiated from one another, which is impossible given that necessity is singular.

Ḥ’s additional textual proof from J: The first two meanings imply a limitation in participation for two equal partners, and the same limitation should be considered in the case of the third. Otherwise, necessity here will imply accidentality, i.e. an *‘arīḍ-ma’rūḍ* relationship.

Şeyḥ Şücā’s argument: According to the philosophers’ proof, there is no guarantee that necessity has to be a singular entity with regard to God. One cannot be set for sure what meanings of necessity are appropriate here and, therefore, necessity here cannot correspond to existence as the philosophers claimed.

Ḥ’s response to Şeyḥ Şücā: Necessity should be taken as ‘singular by default’ when discussed in relation to the philosophers’ God, especially because the third meaning (necessity as a differentiator of essences) does not undermine the singularity of the NE. It is because of this reason necessity can be equal to ‘pure existence’ in God as Avicenna claimed. It should be noted that Avicenna distinguishes ‘absolute existence’ from ‘pure existence’. The former could be shared by multiple entities and linked to particular existences upon individuation, yet not the latter since, according to Avicenna, it corresponds to God’s quiddity/essence.

DAY THREE: On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence

Ḥ’s disclaimer from Ī/J: Necessity is neither universal nor particular, so it can correspond to quiddity, which also has similar features and no real existence *in concreto*.

Ḥ’s point: Each individual may well be composed of quiddity and entification, but this does not mean necessarily that both imply multiplicity or superaddition due to their mental nature.

Ḥ’s reply to Ī/J: Each individual may need entification to be able to come out by distinguishing their natures, yet this does not mean that entification, which is also required for the NE’s necessity to distinguish itself from others, denotes multiplicity. Thus, there is no question of unbelief here when entification is used in the context of the NE (this point is probably in reference to Z’s claim of Ḥ’s unbelief [*kufr*]).

Question of entification: Every individual might be composed of quiddity and entification in the philosophers’ exposition, yet these are similar to genus and differentia, which do not really exist and only distinguished by the mind, as the term ‘mental considerations’ (*i’tibārāt*) suggests. Ḥ here wants to show that the post-classical *i’tibārāt* could be reconciled with Avicennan philosophy.

Ḥ’s further analogy regarding species’ quiddities (sing. *māhiyya naw’iyya*): Likewise, individuation and species’ quiddities are mental capacities in consideration. The Glossator ḤÇ is wrong in thinking that necessity will be in need of intelligible parts (sing. *juz’ ‘aqlī*) since necessity, as mentioned above, has neither universal nor particular existence for the case of the NE.

ḤÇ’s counter-evidence: ḤÇ, similar to Shahrastānī/Rāzī and other Ottoman contemporaries like Ḥayālī² and Ṭūsī,³ claims that the philosophers regarded necessity and existence as ‘species’ natures’ (sing. *ṭabī’a naw’iyya*). This point takes him to the conclusion that both concepts lead to multiplicity and contingency; therefore, cannot be used when providing a proof for God’s unicity. In this context, ḤÇ points out two possible contradictions in the philosophers’ thesis that (a) existence and necessity are ‘species natures’, and (b) necessity relies on another thing due to its being a ‘species nature’. Based on these, ḤÇ aims to show that, contrary to their claim, necessity and existence are accidents that are superadded to quiddity by occurring externally.

Ḥ’s reply: J divides the philosophers’ version of *burhān al-tamānu’* into two aspects: the first aspect affirms the requirement of entification for necessity, whereas the second aspect states that entification has to be superadded to necessity and quiddity. Ḥ seems to affirm the validity of the first as long as necessity is not regarded as a ‘species’ nature’ in the absolute sense, and argues that the second aspect supports the fact that entification is a superaddition. Ḥ’s position here, different from the philosophers’ argument, follows Taḥṭānī’s *al-Muḥākamāt*.

DAY FOUR: On Whether Necessity Denotes Composition in Relation to Entification

ḤÇ’s critique of entification: Ī/J argue that if the philosophers assume that entification requires necessity, then there will be circular reasoning. This is because necessity already requires the former by default. ḤÇ notes that there is no circularity here since entification’s requiring necessity, which is based on the necessity’s lack of requiring entification, does not imply circularity.

Ḥ’s response: ḤÇ is misinformed since, as J explains in some other text, necessity is a cause for entification – not the other way around. It does not follow that entification requires necessity; and only if the latter statement is taken to be true, then there will be circularity. A similar analogy could be made with regard to first and second intentions, such that entification as a second intention cannot be a cause of a first intention.

Ḥ’s further citation from J: Necessity is associated with ‘pure causality’ (*mu-jarrad al-‘illiyya*); and entification, as argued by Taḥṭānī, is only a superaddition to necessity. Ḥ does not follow Avicenna’s view that entification is a ‘(necessary) concomitant’ (*lāzim*).

2 Ḥayālī, *Sharḥ al-‘allāma al-Ḥayālī ‘alā al-nūniyya*, 164.

3 ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 220-1.

H’s further citation from J: The definition of necessity depends on neither its requirement nor lack of requirement by entification or any other entity. That is, necessity is not bound by entification, and both terms are *non-entitative*, that is, mental considerations that are distinguished in the mind; therefore, they do not exist in the outside world as two separate entities at all. Here H uses a quote from J to strengthen his hand.

DAY FIVE: On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (*Wujūdiyya*)

Question of existentiality: The questions of whether necessity is externally existing and how it is further related to existence are begging for an answer in the eyes of certain theologians, such as Razī, Ī, Z, and HÇ. Due to these questions, HÇ deems that only the first two meanings may fall under ‘necessity’ in the philosophers’ initial thesis. H rebuts HÇ’s claim, stating that what is mentioned here as existence refers to the ‘special existence’ of God, a nuance which should not be confused with existence’s absolute or particular senses. Given this fact, the third meaning, for H, matches with the very sense of necessity in the initial thesis.

DAY SIX: On Whether the NE Must Be a Single Essence According to Their Thesis

H on the nature of the NE: The terms related to the NE can neither be regarded as ‘generic accidents’ nor ‘genus’ natures’, since these suggest multiplicity. And none of these terms makes the NE a composite being due to their *i’tibārī* nature as mental considerations.

H’s conclusion regarding the nature of entification: H signals that even though he is defending the validity of the philosophers’ statement in their own paradigm, he follows Taḥṭānī’s *al-Muḥākamāt* in certain aspects, especially with respect to entification’s being an accident to necessity and quiddity. H suggests that as long as entification is taken as a superadded quality, the question of multiplicity in God is resolved. H’s enthusiastic support of certain aspects of the philosophers’ view could simply be for the sake of the debate. In conclusion, H is in agreement with Z as long as necessity is mental (*i’tibārī*) but not accidental (*‘araḍī*), since *i’tibārāt* do not go against the philosophers’ version of unicity.

5.3 Analysis of Zeyrek’s Position. Necessity Occurs to God Accidentally

The main framework of the debate is based on the problem of commonality in necessity, which is a consequence for Z to be avoided in proofs from reciprocal hindrance (*burhān al-tamānu‘*). The philosophers based their version of the proof on the assumption that necessity is identical to God’s quiddity/essence of the NE. On the contrary, Z’s intention here is to show that this premise cannot be validated with certainty as none of the stated meanings⁴ (sing. *ma’nā*) of necessity can be equal to God’s quiddity/essence or existence, thereby deeming the philosophers’ overall proof incomplete. Later on, Z brings certain vexed aspects of Avicennan philosophy, such as ‘pure existence’ (*mujarrad al-wujūd*), existential notion/existentiality (*wujūdiyya*), privation/non-existence (*‘adm*), genus/species’ nature (*ṭabī‘a jinsiyya/naw’iyya*), and entification (*ta’ayyun*), into discussion in order to demonstrate that there are certain irreconcilable aspects of the philosophers that contradict God’s singularity. As a reply to Z’s objections, H will show that these aspects (with the exception of entification and species’ nature) are in line with their views and do not implicate composition in God’s essence.

5.3.1 Day One. On the Philosophers’ Premise That Necessity Is Equal to Quiddity in God

As the first lemmata of the extant texts suggest, Z objects to the philosophers’ proof of God’s unicity on the grounds that its consequent cannot be true because, otherwise, a commonality in necessity would imply a commonality in quiddity, by asserting multiplicity in God. Z disregards the reducibility of necessity and quiddity into one as in their description, by pointing out that this would imply differing commonalities for each of these concepts (necessity and quiddity) in God. On the first day, Z formulates his initial objection as follows:

If necessity (*wujūb*) were [to be] the same thing as quiddity (*māhiya*), a commonality (*ishtirāq*) in necessity would also participate in this very quiddity. **The poor soul [Ḥocazāde] states** that necessity (*wujūb*) here cor-

⁴ As Damien Janos observes, ‘meaning’ (*ma’nā*) here is a generic Avicennan term “employed to describe the quidditative meaning itself, as well as the internal or constitutive elements that compose it and, finally, to the concomitants that are entailed by it” (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 655). That is to say, meanings may correspond to the quidditative meaning itself, the intension of a composition, or its external concomitants. In Avicennan philosophy, the term ‘meaning’ may suggest a variety of connotations based on logical, psychological, and metaphysical contexts. In Arabic logic, ‘meaning’ designates a notion in abstraction from any ontological consideration. In metaphysics, similar to the term *i’tibār*, it is often associated with the conceivable and enunciable aspects of quiddity, whereas different from the former, ‘meaning’ has a emphasis on the intrinsic intelligibility of pure quiddity (rather than those of generic quiddities associated with the universals). Furthermore, ‘meaning’ in metaphysics may also describe the quiddity in itself (see “1.3. Quiddity in Itself as a Meaning or Idea (*ma’nā*)”, in Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 128-52; esp. 132, 137, 143, 656). In the context of Avicenna’s *al-Ibāra (De interpretatione)* in *al-Shifā‘*, meaning does not necessarily fall under a fixed ontological category (i.e. neither mental nor extramental) with a sense of the signification of an expression (Mousavian, “Avicenna on the Semantics of *Ma’nā*”). In the context of Abu’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Pines defines *ma’nā* as ‘thought-content’, which is an attribute of mental forms (*suwar dhihniyya*) linked to the medieval *intentio* (Pines, “Studies in Abu’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s Poetics and Metaphysics”, 279) – though Gutas will later distance ‘intention’ from the Avicennan *ma’nā* (Gutas, “The Empiricism of Avicenna”, 430-1).

responds to three meanings (sing. *ma'nā*): [necessity defined as] (i) “essence’s (*dhāt*) requiring existence”; (ii) “that which has no need of others in existence”; and (iii) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others”. There is no doubt that neither of the first two meanings assumes that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent since both meanings are only mental considerations (sing. *al-i'tibārī*). Then what is intended by the philosophers’ statement about necessity’s being the same as the Necessarily Existent’s quiddity only falls under the third meaning (*mā yaṣḍiqu 'alayhi*), but it is not [the same as] the very meaning itself. Then [there is] no doubt for a rational man that the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is not the intension (*mafḥūm*) of what distinguishes essence [as in (iii)] but, rather, this intension is accidentally superadded to (*āriḍ lahu*) essence.

Z begins his initial objection by quoting his opponent’s initial written response ordered by the Sultan, which includes three historical meanings of necessity purported by the philosophers. These definitions are: (1) “essence’s requiring existence”, (2) “that which has no need of others in existence”, and (3) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”. Based on these, necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the NE, *not only* because the third meaning listed here validates this statement, *but also* this statement would not insinuate multiplicity in reality. Necessity and quiddity can be regarded as two separate entities *only* mentally. H, in turn, will base his position on the premise that one of the definitions of necessity directly fulfills the meaning included in the initial statement.

As an immediate objection to H’s premise, Z then asserts that the first two meanings of necessity do not support its being the same as quiddity. Instead, the only possible case could be that this statement may only *fall under* the third meaning as its *extension* – not exactly corresponding to its meaning per se. To show that none of the meanings of necessity can correspond to the philosophers’ usage, Z here resorts to a distinction based on ‘what a term designates’ (extension) versus ‘what it means’ (intension).⁵ In post-classical logic, *mā-ṣadaq* is often contrasted to *mafḥūm* such that the *mafḥūm* of a concept is the meaning or intension, and its *mā-ṣadaq* is what it is true of and what falls under this concept as extension. Thus, *mafḥūm* gives the universal meaning. The *mafḥūm* of a human being, for instance, is rational animal, whereas its *mā-ṣadaq* includes an ostensive definition, as in individual human beings that fall under this concept – a term that ultimately suggests multiplicity and diversity. If two things are said to have different intensions but the same extension, then it means that they convey distinct meanings, referring to the same set of entities.⁶

This point takes Z to the conclusion that necessity cannot be the same as quiddity – due to the fact that the third meaning corresponds to the extension of quiddity, not to its intension. This resolution suggests that necessi-

5 In intensional logic these terms distinguish an expression’s intension (roughly, its ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’) from its extension (‘reference’ or ‘denotation’). See Garson, “Intensional Logic”. In the context of the ninth-century dispute on the consubstantiality of God between the neo-Arian Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Arabic philosopher Kindī, intension and extension were defined as “undistributed and distributed commonness” in the context of philosophy and logico-semantics (see Schöck, “The Controversy”).

6 Bertolacci, “The Distinction of Essence and Existence”, 260; for extension, 275.

ty is something that occurs to God’s quiddity externally (*al-‘āriḍ lahu*), attaching to it accidentally. For Z, none of the definitions above directly gives this meaning as a ‘universal’ that exactly corresponds to the philosophers’ statement; however, the concept of necessity, as restated here, may only fall under this meaning, which makes the philosophers unable to demonstrate the validity of their statement with certainty.

5.3.2 Day Two. On Whether Any of the Stated Meanings Can Prove that the Intension of Necessity Is Equal to God’s Quiddity/Essence

In that case, we say that what you claimed about compositeness (*tarkīb*) with respect to multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent follows that if ‘what falls under’ this statement were to be [120b] the intension of necessity, then the veracity of an ‘accidental affection’ (*‘āriḍ*) occurring to an ‘object of accident’ (*ma‘rūḍ*) would be a single reality with two isolated constituents (sing. *fard*). This is impossible because why would it not be permissible that two different essences that distinguish themselves [from one another] would not resort to the need for the first two meanings without the implication of compositeness (*luzūm al-tarkīb*)? Consequently, the unicity of the Necessarily Existent, in that case, cannot be established by the meanings of “essence requiring His existence” and “that which has no need of others in terms of His existence”.

On the second day, Z provides two counter-objections. The first is a counter-objection to H’s possible answer by repeating that the meaning of necessity addressed in the philosophers’ statement cannot be the exact meaning/intension of the third. For Z, avoiding the accidentality of necessity will undermine God’s singularity since, by this way, God can be also denoted as a single reality with two separate constituents. In his first counter-objection, the headstrong Z repeats this previous point that an *‘āriḍ-ma‘rūḍ* relationship is the best way to describe the attachment of necessity to God’s essence/quiddity without undermining His singularity. This is because *‘āriḍ* and *ma‘rūḍ* are just two accidental units in a single reality of God that occur externally – without directly affecting His quiddity/essence.⁷

Second, Z objects to H’s other claim that all three definitions of necessity has a role in the philosophers’ initial statement since the first two meanings provide support for the third. Z here challenges H to demonstrate that the ‘differing essences’ mentioned in the first two meanings of necessity would not imply compositeness in God. Z’s precipitate attack seems to ignore H’s earlier comment that the first two meanings are already mental conceptions (*i’tibārāt*) with no implications on His singularity. Z’s main intention is to show that necessity, as defined by the philosophers, can come across as an accidental entity and this, in turn, undermines its essentiality vis-à-vis God. Yet, as H suggests, necessity’s being a mental conception does not still undermine this, and the post-classical designation of *i’tibārāt* could be reconciled with the paradigm of classical Arabic philosophy.

⁷ The expression *‘āriḍ lahu* denotes an external additional or attachment to something. Izutsu translates the term as “that which occurs or happens to externally” (Izutsu, *The Concept and Reality of Existence*, 91).

5.3.3 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence

On the third day the discussion moves to another relevant question, whether necessity is the same as existence as the philosophers claimed. Avicenna is known to have arguably equated the Necessarily Existent (God) with ‘pure existence’, and this controversial formulation incurred the criticism of the theologians in the centuries to come. As H̄ makes a reference to Avicenna’s enigmatic passage to demonstrate the link between necessity and existence in God, Z sees this as an opportunity to evince the inconsistency of the philosophers’ thesis. H̄ deems Z’s point to be a digression moving away from the main point of contention, yet to demonstrate that this statement is valid on their own terms, he refers to the discussions in *al-Shifā’*’s Book Eight, Chapters Four and Five (VIII.4-5), which concern the primary attributes of the One that is necessary in its existence, as well as the unity of the NE and His attributes. Before asserting that the NE is equal to ‘pure existence’,⁸ Avicenna gives an overview of the definition of the One with regard to necessity, quiddity, essence, and individual existence.

The Necessary Existent is one, nothing sharing with Him in His rank, and thus nothing other than Him is a Necessarily Existent, He is the principle of the necessitation of existence, necessitating [each thing] either in a primary manner or through an intermediary. [...] The Necessary Existent does not become multiple in any respect whosoever and that His essence is utterly unitary, pure truth [...]. He is one in essence and does not become multiple is that He is as such in His essence. [...] The First has no quiddity other than His individual existence. [...] It would not be true [to maintain] that the Necessary Existent has a quiddity of which necessary existence adheres as a necessary concomitant.⁹

One of the most important points in this passage is that Avicenna does not assign a specific quiddity to the Necessarily Existent as he does with created beings, since, for the case of God, quiddity here will correspond to God’s being the Necessary Existent (*wājib al-wujūd*)¹⁰ or His very individual essence (*inniyya/anniyya*)¹¹ that does not depend on any other being for existing (rather than a specified quiddity which opens some leeway for contingency).

⁸ See Book Eight, Chapter Four (VIII.4), in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, 275-7. Marmura translates both *mujarrad al-wujūd* and *al-wujūd al-ṣīrf* as ‘pure existence’.

⁹ Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, VIII.4.1-6, 273-4.

¹⁰ See VIII.4.13: “[T]here is no quiddity for the Necessary Existent other than its being the Necessary Existent. And this is [the thing’s] ‘thatness’, [its individual essence]”. Also see VIII.5.3, which states that necessary existence has no quiddity that connects with it other than necessary existence (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, 276 and 279 respectively).

¹¹ Also VIII.4.3: “The First has no quiddity other than His individual essence (*inniyya/anniyya*)” (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, 274). *Inniyya/anniyya* refers to the essential characteristics of a thing that identify it as an individual, which is distinct from quiddity, such that the former refers essentially to the question of ‘which’ (*ayy*) thing it is, whereas the latter pertains essentially to ‘what’ (*mā*) a thing is (see Marmura’s note in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, 383). For the term *inniyya/anniyya*, which is associated with the Latin *anitas* ‘whether-ness’ or *esse* ‘being’, see Frank, “The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term *anniyya*”, and, for other recent studies, Lizzini, “Wuḡūd-Mawjūd/Existence-Existent in Avicenna”, 112; esp. fn. 5.

The First, hence, has no quiddity. Those things possessing quiddities have existence emanate on them from Him. He is ‘pure existence’ (*mujarrad al-wujūd*) with the condition of negating privation and all other description of Him. Moreover, the rest of the things possessing quiddities are possible, coming into existence through Him. The meaning of my statement, “He is pure existence with the condition of negating all other additional [attributes] of Him”, is not that this is the absolute existence (*wujūd muṭlaq*) in which there is participation [by others]. If there is an existent with this description, it would not be the pure existence with the condition of negation, but the existent without the condition of positive affirmation. I mean, regarding the First, that He is the existent with the condition that there is no additional composition, whereas this other is the existent without the condition of [this] addition. For this reason, the universal is predicated of anything that has addition. [And] everything other than Him has addition (*ziyāda*).¹²

Avicenna defines God as ‘pure existence’ (*mujarrad al-wujūd*), yet with the condition of negating privation and all other descriptions of Him, warning his readers that ‘pure existence’ should not be mixed with ‘absolute existence’ (*wujūd muṭlaq*), the latter of which participates in others. This means that the First is a Necessarily Existent with the condition that there is no composition, diversity, or change in Him, that is, being refrained from any sense of addition (*ziyāda*). On the other hand, the universal properties are predicated of anything that has addition; for this reason, it is only everything other than Him that has composition, diversity, change, and addition.

By referencing this passage, H provides a further answer for Z’s point by showing how necessity can be equal to existence according to Avicenna’s paradigm:

It cannot be said that necessity is not a thing other than ‘abstracted existence’ (*mujarrad al-wujūd*) just because there is no change/differentiation (*ikhtilāf*) in abstracted existence. Indeed, an existence conjoined (*muqārin*) with quiddity changes in accordance with its attachment (*iḍāfa*) [to that quiddity]. As for ‘mere existence’ (*maḥḍ al-wujūd*), it is a single concept in itself which has no diversity, **because we say that** what is demanded here is that the true nature/reality of necessity (*ḥaqīqa al-wujūb*) is the same as the intension of ‘sole existence’ (*wujūd baḥt*), which is different from existence’s occurring to quiddity; and this would be absurd. If what is meant here is that the reality of necessity’s being true for ‘pure existence’ (*wujūd širf*) denotes “an accidental affection’s occurring to its object of accident”, then this is conceded. However, we do not concede that what falls under ‘pure existence’ does not contain in it any. Then, why would it not be permissible that pure existence could be two different realities such that both are not being distinguished from quiddity?

Z starts the third day with an objection to Avicenna, arguing that existence is shared by all existents including God, and its being equal to Him will hinder unicity (an interpretation previously attributed to the twelfth-century

¹² See VIII.4.13 in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, 276-7.

theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī).¹³ Now the tables have turned, not only Z has to refute the philosopher’s point but also prove that existence occurs to God’s quiddity externally.

As a follow-up, Z objects to the claim of H and the philosophers, arguing that the NE cannot be just the same as ‘abstracted existence’ because ‘pure existence’ is singular and devoid of composition. In line with the theologians’ common position quoted in J’s *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*,¹⁴ Z resorts to a similar argument that he previously employed with regard to necessity and quiddity, pointing out that existence should also be externally added to quiddity. Opposing Avicenna, he underlines the distinction between two ontological states, i.e. ‘being conjoined with something’ (*muqārin*) and ‘being added to something’ (*iḍāfa*), to further restate that the reality of necessity cannot be the same as the intension of ‘sole existence’. This is because, for Z, existence is an added quality that already occurs to quiddity/essence, making the latter come out in the extramental world.

In defense of the philosophers’ thesis, H insists that necessity’s third definition meets the intension of their statement. Here the philosophers are portrayed as having an ontologically realist point of view, in which they argue that the true nature of God’s necessity is the same as that of His ‘pure existence’, hence His quiddity. H’s emphasis on the post-classical term *i’tibārī* (‘mental conception’) here is a result of his conceptualist interpretation of Avicennan realism, a post-classical rapprochement between Avicennism and philosophical theology.¹⁵

Z continues to defend his position with a further counter-objection:

If you say that what is mentioned previously proves the sufficiency of the intension of necessity’s being the same thing as quiddity, then how would you negate this fact? **I reply to this that** we verify that we necessarily know that the first two meanings are only mental considerations with no extramental existence. We also know necessarily that the very intension that distinguishes essence (*dhāt*) is a mental consideration occurring to the accidents of the Necessarily Existent’s reality. Thus, it is claimed that the Necessarily Existent is one (*wāḥid*) in the sense that, as mentioned previously, the Necessarily Existent is the same thing as quiddity. Therefore, this [point] is abolished totally as a rejoinder never heard [before], even

¹³ Quoted in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* as the theologians’ view, Rāzī posits that existence is superadded to both necessarily and possibly existents, arguing for the later Ash’arite position that existence is an accident superadded to God’s quiddity: “This answer [i.e. existence is equal to God’s essence] is not a remedy for us since it confesses that the share of being in the extramental world is accidental to God’s quiddity, as in the case of its being accidental to the quiddity of the possibly existents”. Quoting from *al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya*, J also references the following point regarding the univocity and superaddedness of existence from Rāzī: “If you were to say that [a sense of] existence that is common among the existence of the possibly existents in conception is concomitant to the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, then the making of existence in the truth of the Necessarily Existent would be conjoined with His quiddity [...]. There is no difference between the necessarily and possibly existents in terms of existence since in both cases existence is added as an accident to the quiddity” (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 159-60).

¹⁴ Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 156-69; esp. 156-61.

¹⁵ Benevich traces this sort of epistemological conceptualism back to the works of the twelfth-century scholars Abu’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and Shahrastānī. Their epistemological ‘conceptualism’ holds that words do not refer to extramental objects but to the concepts in the mind (Benevich, “The Metaphysics of Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī”, 333-5, 345-8; Grif-fel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Islamic Philosophy*, 386; Pines, “Studies in Abu’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s Poetics and Metaphysics”, 284).

if one claims that what falls under the third meaning is the same thing as quiddity. Then this is conceded; yet, this does not [still] require that necessity is a single reality, so what is demanded is not established here.

Just as the first two meanings of necessity are mental considerations with no real existence in the extramental world, Z replies his opponent that the third meaning also denotes a mental consideration *but* in the sense of an attachment that occurs to the reality of the NE, not in a way applied to God essentially. Therefore, for Z again, none of these meanings supports the reality of necessity’s being the same as quiddity – maybe with the exception that necessity may only ‘fall under’ the third, as passed previously. Even if this is the case, the third meaning’s extension does not necessarily demonstrate that necessity has to be a single reality, because necessity, in the eyes of the theologians, is an accidental mental consideration that denotes externality. This point hinders the fact that necessity has to be a single reality, further suggesting the possibility that necessity can still take on multiplicity.

5.3.4 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (*Wujūdiyya*)

Starting with the fourth day, Z digresses into other controversial aspects of Avicennan philosophy, compelling H to resolve them in light of the philosophers’ doctrines. On the last two days, Z tends to repeat his arguments through restatements, with the hope that his adversary and the arbitrators of the debate will acknowledge the superiority of his point of contestation.

Hocazāde, may Almighty God have mercy on him, exercises little much patience in discernment, such that he says that necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent, is what distinguishes essence. Why would it not be that what distinguishes one from another is an essence for each one of them? This intension is accidental to both of these aspects without deliberation. In the statement of the author of *al-Mawāqif*: it cannot be said that necessity opposes an isolated constituent, and necessity’s being relational (*nisbī*) contradicts with the aforementioned purpose, that is, necessity’s [121a] being an existent. **For this, we say that** [this is] because one cannot say that the quest to know this expression is conveyed by the statement of the author of *al-Mawāqif*. If necessity were to be an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), then it would not be added to quiddity such that what is meant by necessity here would cast doubt on its being externally existing. Yet, it should be that necessity is related to non-existence (*adamī*), as it was previously proven by the word of *al-Mawāqif*, in such a way that if this were to be true for them, then the competition has ended.

The outcome is that there is no doubt for the rational ones that this statement about necessity, which was claimed to be true by some, concerns necessity’s external proposition together with that of possibility. And there is no doubt that possibility is a single thing. Likewise, necessity, yes, this very necessity in terms of its externally existing, is what distinguishes essence from others. Whoever discerns this position is marveled at this argument by Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

After having an *ad hominem* attack on H’s ability to reason, Z states that H, equating necessity with the NE, ends up defining God in the third sense (“that which distinguishes essence”). However, for Z, this does not again hold true for two reasons: *first*, as repeated early on, God’s quiddity/essence can still be defined as such and there is no certain proof that this meaning is only reserved for necessity. And *second*, based on Rāzī’s assertion, necessity must be relational (*nisbī*), rather than essential (*dhātī*).¹⁶

As for the second point, Ī/J rule out the possibility that necessity is relational, yet the glossator HÇ, along the same line with Z, opens leeway for this possibility by stating that *what falls under* a relation may *fall under* necessity as well.¹⁷ HÇ’s leeway for relationality depends on the following condition: necessity’s being relational does not rule out the possibility of an individual (an isolated constituent) in necessity, as well as its being non-existent for contingent beings, thus linking necessity with contingency by disassociating it from God. This point makes Z’s hand stronger since, proving a negative, he wants to establish that if necessity is taken as a non-existent quality, then it can never be connected to existentiality through its absence. In other words, necessity’s being a relational quality via non-existence provides some leeway for contingency, precluding that the philosophers’ necessity is directly equal to God’s quiddity/essence.

The support for necessity’s being non-existent (hence relational) is present in J, which is outlined in Z as follows: if necessity were to denote an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), that is, if it were to exist externally, then it would not be an added quality, which is, as claimed in J, impossible. This means that necessity’s being non-existent could be related to its being relational essentially.

The question whether or not necessity can be qualified as an existential notion was a common topic discussed by post-classical commentators. For instance, if A denotes B, then there is no B that we cannot refer to as A, but it is observed that necessity does not exhaust all existential notions, meaning that it is only *one* among many existential notions.

To refute H’s (and Avicenna’s) point about necessity’s being existential, Z further cites Ī’s passage on unicity, arguing that necessity can be well regarded as ‘non-existent’ (*‘adami*), a line of thought that insinuates that if a term has connections to non-existence, then it cannot be an existential notion. That is, if necessity’s non-existentiality provides that existence does not need to exist externally, necessity, for Z, cannot be on a par with existence either.¹⁸ In this text, Ī also brings a similar point as a counter-argument to the philosophers’ argument by questioning whether necessity has to be an existential notion.

¹⁶ Another figure who argues that necessity is a relational attribute is Rāzī. Yet, given the number of books that he composed, Rāzī seems to have changed his mind regarding the nature of necessity in different passages. In *Nihāya al-‘uqūl*, he is recorded as having considered this and, in *Muḥaṣṣal*, he seems to have accepted necessity as a *wujūdī* aspect with external existence (Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 144).

¹⁷ According to J’s Position Two, Observation Three, Intention Two (2.3.2) in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, necessity is the very quiddity itself, not a relation (*nisba*) - especially if one considers the third meaning of necessity as valid. Yet, HÇ criticizes J’s point, arguing that necessity’s being an existent does not rule out that it could be a relation as well (see the lemma “annahu nisba”, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 116).

¹⁸ This apophaticism in handling necessity is included in Rāzī’s criticism of Avicenna: as Rāzī puts it, the fact that multiple things share in necessity does not follow that there is multiplicity. These qualities may also share in their negation of everything else, and sharing in negativity also implies multiplicity (Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 210).

As not to fall afoul of God’s unicity, an influential historian and scholar Abū al-Faṭḥ al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153), basing some of his views on Avicenna, brings an alternative solution to the problem of composition, in which he deems all attributes of God, including necessity, as *non-entitative* by way of either relation or negation. Necessity may signify that God’s existence does not depend on anything else. Yet, there are specific other ways to describe God, as in the case of First Cause or the First Principle of Graeco-Arabic philosophy. Taking all these attributes as ‘relational’ or ‘negational’ with regard to other beings would not add anything entitative to God, hence avoiding multiplicity.¹⁹ This view is also present in Ghazālī, such that God’s essence is one, and the names associated with it become many by “relating something to it”, “relating it to something”, or “negating something of it”. And, for him, neither relation nor negation in this context can denote multiplicity in the NE.²⁰

Referring back to Ī’s position, Z still insists that the philosophers never demonstrate the existential quality of necessity with certainty. The same point is also repeated by J and HÇ on the grounds that accepting that necessity is an existential notion contradicts the philosophers’ point that quiddities do not exist. So, for Z, if quiddity is not an existential notion that exists outside (Ī, in fact, establishes its being non-existent), then how can existence be equal to it? This rather shows that existence has to be a *non-entitative* relational quality superadded to a quiddity that is beyond existence.²¹

Resorting to non-existence, Z follows a similar line of reasoning here as in Rāzī’s objection to Avicenna’s equating God’s quiddity with ‘pure existence’.²² Rāzī aims to prove the univocity of existence since it is a concept that may seem to be shared by all beings, yet its applicability to the cases of both necessarily and possibly existents brings in the question of its ambiguity in meaning and its consequent disassociation from existence.

19 Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 140.

20 Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, 89-90. Yet could it be said that quiddities do exist? It is a vexed question that has been recently tackled by Damien Janos who concluded that there are different modes of existences, and quiddities do ‘exist’ in God in a special mode - not in a different mode from essence - as well as being a necessary concomitant to ‘pure existence’, without producing any multiplicity (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 648, 712-15).

21 See HÇ’s lemma “mabnī ‘alā ’anna al-wujūd wujūdī”, which argues for the irreducibility of quiddity and existence into one due to the latter’s being an existential notion: “If necessity were to be a non-existing thing superadded to quiddity, then the way that the philosophers constructed these two proofs here would be based on the existentiality of existence; therefore, the latter’s being the same thing as quiddity would be terminated” (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 46).

22 Avicenna argues that existence cannot be superadded to quiddity in the NE since this will imply need, priority/posteriority, or cause/effect, which are only reserved for contingent beings. As an objection to Avicenna’s proof in his *Muḥaṣṣal*, Rāzī brings the counterevidence that a quiddity cannot be negated by way of existence, since non-existence itself is also a quiddity. Thus a quiddity must be a separate essential entity, and Rāzī argues that the philosophers contradict with this aspect by equating it with existence. For Rāzī’s argument and Ṭūsī’s rejoinder, see Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 97 and also mentioned in Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 210 and Altaş, *Fahreddin Rāzī’nin İbn Sînâ Yorumu*, 399-400.

5.3.5 Background to Z’s Position on the Univocity of Existence. An Overview of Univocity, Equivocity, and Analogicity Among the Early Verifiers

The nature of existence vis-à-vis God and His created subjects is one of the most debated aspects in metaphysics. The main question remains, which Z also instrumentalizes in the debate, is that if created beings do also exist like God, in what ways will He be different? Or, in other words, if absolute existence is a universal capacity that is applicable to all beings, then in what ways can God’s existence be perceived as ‘special’? Moreover, does this suggest that existence is a relational or a contingent faculty, thereby making it impossible that it can be equal to God’s quiddity/essence? Based on a critique in Rāzī’s *Ishārāt* commentary, these questions make Z’s hand stronger by compelling Ḥ to make some clarifications.

The status of existence concerns whether an existent is predicated with existence in a similar or different way, that is, by way of equivocity or univocity – a point of contention closely linked to the status of existence and quiddity vis-à-vis God and created beings. How could God be necessary existence if existence is an accident superadded to His quiddity? Or what are the ways in which one could separate “God *qua* existence” from that of contingent beings if it is observed that existence inheres in the divine essence. Along with health (*ṣiḥḥā*) and others,²³ there are various other modulated terms in Avicennan philosophy, most importantly two paradigmatic cases which concern the present debate, i.e. oneness (*waḥda*) and existence (*wujūd*). In this case, Avicenna’s ‘modulation’ applies mostly to external and non-constitutive concomitants (sing. *lazim*) of quiddity, whereas strict univocity is reserved for the quiddities of natural things (such as ‘horse’ or ‘human’) that are constitutive of essence and associated with genera.²⁴

Asserting the “superaddedness of existence to essence” (*ziyāda al-wujūd ‘alā al-māhiyya*),²⁵ Rāzī reformulates Avicenna’s position in a way that essence and existence are regarded as indistinguishable extensionally while remaining distinguishable intensionally. This means that existence is a univocal entity (i.e. in one meaning) that can be shared between all things including God, hence quiddity/essence and existence have to be distinguished in God and contingent beings. There are several reasons for Rāzī’s position. The first, according to Robert Wisnovsky, is to conform to the Kullābites

²³ For the case of existence, see Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna)’s *The Metaphysics of “The Healing”*, I.5, 24.11-12 and, for that of oneness, III.2, 74.4. In addition to health, existence, and oneness, Avicenna also includes form (*ṣūra*), possibility (*imkān*), strength (*quwwa*), soul (*nafs*), and medical condition (*tibbī*) among modulated concepts (Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation”, 54). Also see Druart, “Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being’s Univocity”, 19-22. For Avicenna, primary notion of ‘one’ notionally amplifies the intension of the notion of ‘being’, without affecting its extension (De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 268-70).

²⁴ Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation”, 50-1. On the other hand, Druart interprets that oneness is a concomitant of *mawjūd* which is univocal (Druart, “Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being’s Univocity”, 21). Strict equivocity concerns names that do not possess the same intension, that is, there is no intensional similarity among diverse meanings, whereas pure univocity requires that a name is predicated of some object with a universal meaning that is perfectly unified in its intension and extension (De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 268-70).

²⁵ According to Rāzī, existence and essence are regarded as strictly distinct from one another and could be distinguished in terms of necessary concomitant (*lāzim*), relation (*muḍāf*), concomitant/consequence attribute (*lāhiq*), accidental attachment (*‘arīḍ*) (Wisnovsky, “On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism”, 206, 275).

view that the divine attributes are meaningfully distinct from the divine self and that there is a non-identity between the divine self and His attributes.²⁶ Second, God’s essence has to be also distinct from His existence since, for Rāzī, if existence and essence are the same, there will be then no causation (thus God’s existence must be concomitant to its existence being causally followed by Him).²⁷

Avicenna identifies the quiddity in itself as a distinct and fully legitimate consideration, as an existing form and intelligible in the mind, which is considered abstractly and prior to its particularization in nature or the universalization that occurs when expressed in a universal proposition.²⁸ On the other hand, Rāzī disregards this, arguing that existence has to be an external and a *non-constitutive* concomitant of quiddity (quiddity in abstraction from existence): existence is simply a predicate that cannot be understood as an entity by itself.²⁹ In order to bridge the difference between essence and existence, Rāzī uses the Avicennan notion of (necessary) concomitant (*lāzim*) to make sure that God’s existence is not only separate but also concomitant to His essence (based on essence’s priority).³⁰ This means that existence is construed as univocal, remaining distinct from quiddity as a superaddition.³¹ It should be noted that this view is in direct opposition to Ash’arī who argued that both quiddity and existence are intensionally and extensionally the same.³²

In defense of Arabic philosophy, Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī is often known to have clarified and amended Rāzī’s so-called oversights in favor of the philosophers’ doctrines in his famed commentary on the *al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt*, a work that dispels the qualms about the intricacies of Avicenna’s terminology. It is, in this context, that Ṭūsī criticizes Rāzī of misrepresenting the philosophers’ point, by misattributing ‘absolute existence’ (*wujūd muṭlaq*) to ‘pure/abstracted existence’ (*mujarrad al-wujūd*).³³ The former is a universal category, a conceptual matter that falls under the secondary intentions/intelligibles (*ma’qūlāt thāniyya*), whereas Avicenna’s ‘pure/abstracted exis-

26 This view is rejected by ‘Allāma al-Ḥillī via Ṭūsī such that this is only possible in the possible beings, not intrinsically in necessary beings. Both identify God’s essence with existence (as in “His essence is identical to His existence”), and Ḥillī was said to have reverted the Il-Khanate historian, vizier and scholar of the Rāzī lineage Rashīd al-Dīn al-Hamadānī (d. 718/1318) to the Ṭūsīan position, by convincing him to accept the position of “soft univocity” (Wisnovsky, “On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism”, 277-8, 294, 302).

27 Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 415.

28 De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 284.

29 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 239-45, 394.

30 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 399. For *lāzim* and its essential form in Avicenna, Benevise, *Essentialität und Notwendigkeit*, 347-65.

31 It should be noted that Rāzī is not consistent with this view in all works. In *Sharḥ ‘uyūn al-ḥikma*, he writes that God’s reality (*ḥaqīqa*) is equal to His existence (Wisnovsky, “Essence and Existence”, 43).

32 Wisnovsky, “Essence and Existence”, 41-3.

33 In his commentary on Avicenna’s *al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt*, Ṭūsī makes a distinction between ‘absolute existence’, which is intelligible, and God’s ‘necessary existence’, which is called the philosophers’ ‘pure existence’ that goes beyond intellection (Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt*, 3: 461). *Mujarrad* is an ambiguous term, which could be applied to both pure and universal quiddities. Avicenna arguably uses this expression for universal quiddities that are abstracted from matter, whereas his post-classical critics often (mis)interpret the term arguably by extending to Avicenna’s “pure quiddity” (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 236).

tence’ denotes something that is beyond universality and particularity, an expression only reserved for God. Rāzī’s reading, on the other hand, unduly paves the way for associating God with contingent beings, which instigates Ṭūsī to clarify that Avicenna is not saying that God is existence, rather He is identical to His own ‘special existence’,³⁴ i.e. the highest grade of existence, which is neither absolute nor specific but only in its purest form.³⁵ In opposition to Rāzī’s view that existence is a real accident superadded to quiddity, he furthermore argues that the being of quiddity cannot be mentally separated from existence.³⁶ For Ṭūsī, pure quiddity is not disconnected from existence but only exists abstractly in the mind, contrary to his opponent, who sees pure quiddity as being fully abstracted and distinct from existence.

As a further response to Rāzī, Ṭūsī brings the interpretation that God’s essence is identical to His perfect existence, which is also predicated of it. It is in this sense that existence can neither be, as Rāzī claims, predicated in a strictly univocal way, nor equivocally to God and contingent beings following Shahrastānī – but with a specific way called ‘by modulation’ (*bi’l-tashkīk*), which denotes a sense of gradated differentiation in meaning.³⁷ According to Ṭūsī’s Avicennan thesis of ‘modulation of existence’ (*tashkīk al-wujūd*)³⁸ in response to Rāzī’s univocity, even if it is agreed that existence is predicated of the necessarily and possibly existents, it will apply to different objects in different degrees (a view probably influenced by Suhrawardī), making God’s existence distinct from that of others.³⁹ In another work called *Tahṣīl al-muḥaṣṣal*, which is a critical commentary on Rāzī’s *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn*, Ṭūsī brings more objections to Rāzī’s designating existence as a superaddition to God’s quiddity as well as a univocal term, by arguing that if existence is superadded to His quiddity, then it will be in

34 This view is also mentioned in Iṣfahānī’s *Tajrīd i’tiqād* commentary as a proof that the NE’s existence depends on the negation of an equivalent partner to Him, such that the NE’s ‘special existence’ can only be described with respect to necessity in itself. This implies that ‘special existence’ cannot be shared by two such beings (see the section on the negation of a partner – *naḥī al-sharīk* – in al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasdīd al-qawā’id*, 2: 945). For God’s ‘special existence’, see Benevich, “Die ‘göttliche Existenz’”, 125 and Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 214.

35 Donaldson, “Avicenna’s Proof”, 297.

36 Rizvi, “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?”, 224.

37 For Ṭūsī’s sense of ‘modulation’, see Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 150. There are several English terms that have been used interchangeably for *tashkīk*, such as “ambiguous/amphibolous” (Wolfson), “analogicity” (Vallat, De Haan, McGinnis) and “modulation” (Treiger). See Janos, “Avicenna on Equivocity and Modulation”, 23; as well as the studies by aforementioned scholars: Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms”; Vallat, *Farabi et l’école d’Alexandrie*; Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *The Physics of The Healing*; De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”; Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion”.

38 In a series of letters exchanged between the Akbarī Sufi Qūnawī and Ṭūsī, the first inquiry is devoted the issue whether existence in the Necessarily Existent is extraneous (*zā’id*) to its reality (*ḥaqīqa*) or identical with its quiddity. While Qūnawī goes with the first view (arguing that existence is simply an superadded attribute (*ṣifa*), Ṭūsī goes with the latter view because, otherwise, the quiddity’s priority to existence will be absurd, deeming quiddity neither existing nor non-existing. For Ṭūsī, the relationship between existence and quiddity is by way of ‘modulation’ (*tashkīk*) such that existence, like light, becomes related to different realities in differing degrees (Chittick, “Mystic versus Philosophy”, 101; Konevī, *el-Mūrāselāt*, 114-15). For a study of the extant manuscripts of this correspondence: Schubert, “The Textual History”.

39 Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 134-5. While holding the ontological primacy of quiddity, Suhrawardī states that quiddity/essence in itself is a conceptual and an unreal notion like existence, which has no correspondence to reality or real value. And this is due to the fact that all reality is seen as a hierarchy of lights (Rizvi, “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?”, 222-4).

need of it, making God a contingent being in essence.⁴⁰ On the contrary, this sense of existence can only be in need of a haecceity (*huwiyya*) among the contingent beings.⁴¹

The notion of *tashkik* goes back to Avicenna who arguably devised the notion in order to distinguish God’s existence from other modes of existence. According to one reading, the basic sense of being for Avicenna extends to all concrete and mental entities, to all substances and accidents, albeit according to a gradation or modulation of meaning. By virtue of this, the modulation of existence explains how existence applies exactly to each instance as an external concomitant of essence. The special modulated version of existence belongs exclusively and irreducibly to ‘pure quiddity’, which finds its originative source in God’s ‘special existence’.⁴² Whether Avicenna’s *tashkik* could be interpreted as ‘soft-univocity’ or ‘soft-equivocity’ is a still debated topic among contemporary scholars who offered differing propositions to the problem.⁴³

Another view which argues for the equivocity of existence appears in Shahrastānī’s *Kitāb al-muṣāra’a*, namely *Wrestling with the Philosophers*, a work that aims at modifying Avicenna’s positions rather than rejecting them outright. The third chapter of the book concerns how Avicenna proves God’s unity and simplicity, in which he argues that existence only applies to all created things, establishing the absolute transcendence of God by distancing His existence from a Rāzīan sense of univocity.

For Shahrastānī, defining God as the Necessarily Existent, i.e. as a necessary being on which the existence of other contingent beings depends, is problematic because existence here is being postulated as if it is a genus of existents, that is, subdivided into two species by the differentiae of ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ (thereby turning the Necessarily Existent into a species). And Avicenna’s modulation does not solve the problem. Likewise, this will imply that God’s essence will be composite such that it will be dependent on the notions of existence and necessity (as constituents of the Necessarily Existent), violating the principle of oneness.⁴⁴ Shahrastānī might have proposed the category of ‘modulated terms’ (*asmā’ mushakkika*) in or-

⁴⁰ Al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 98. Also in the next lemma, Ṭūsī states that necessity (*wujūb*) is never part of the “objects of accident” (sing. *ma’rūḍ*), and hence it should be taken as a mental quality (*kayfiyya ‘aqliyya*) (not extramentally). In the case of two NEs in the philosophers’ version of *burhān al-tamānu*, necessity is an intelligible (*ma’qūl*) equivalent to the case of a homonym (not a synonym) (al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 100, 102). So, similar to existence, necessity can neither be univocal nor common (*mushtarak*) in the case of the philosophers’ two NEs (101).

⁴¹ Al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 100.

⁴² Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 449, 497, 712.

⁴³ As for recent arguments that vie for the Avicennan *tashkik al-wujūd*’s denoting a sense of univocity, which are mostly based on his *Ilāhiyyāt* 1.2 and 1.5, see Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion”; Druart, “Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being’s Univocity”, 15-24; Menn, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics”, 163; De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 261-86. Based on various discussions scattered in different works of Avicenna, including *al-Shifā’*, along with certain passages in the philosopher’s letter to the vizier Abū S’ad, Damien Janos, alternatively, argues that Avicenna’s modulation connotes a moderate sense of equivocity. See Janos, “Avicenna on Univocity and Modulation”, 1-62; esp. “Avicenna’s Distinction between Univocal, Equivocal, and Modulated Terms”, 6-16. Contrary to Janos’ claim, Kaukua argues that his designation of “moderate equivocity” still falls under “a modulated univocity of being” (Kaukua, “Review Article”, 162-3).

⁴⁴ Genera always apply to their species equally (not in a modulated way), and the NE cannot be a genus since, otherwise, God’s essence will imply a composite nature of a genus and a differentia (Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion”, 329-30).

der restrict the univocity and equivocity of being; however, he was not able to successfully accomplish his task since, in the end, Avicenna had arguably to vie for upholding a univocity making existence a single genus for all things whose species would be necessary or possible.⁴⁵ Shahrastānī’s misunderstanding of Avicenna’s conception of the Necessarily Existent is a way of turning God into a species of the genus ‘existence’, with ‘necessary’ serving in the role of differentia.⁴⁶

As a way of conclusion, the question whether existence is ‘univocal’ (Rāzī/Zeyrek),⁴⁷ ‘equivocal’ (Shahrastānī), or ‘modulated’ (Avicenna/Ṭūsī)⁴⁸ is a highly contentious subject for the post-classical world. The common questions are: in what way can existence predicate others? Does this predication suggest contingency and multiplicity? And if it suggests these aspects, in what ways could we say that existence is related to God’s essence?

For the late medieval theologians, ‘predication’ suggests something beyond a logical relation. It was a reference to metaphysical entities and theological consequences about the nature of God and His creatures. The predication of a term (let it be an animal or an abstract concept, such as health) indicated a term’s relation to others and gives clues about its very nature and meanings. There were three common ways to predicate a term in medieval theology, as in ‘univocally’, ‘equivocally’, and ‘analogously’ (*analogia entis*); and the predication of existence was equally central in many post-classical Islamic and medieval Latin scholarly disputations.⁴⁹ For instance, the thirteenth-century theologian Thomas Aquinas defined these three terms as follows: ‘Univocally’, which is predicated according to the same name and reason; ‘equivocally’, which is attributed of some things; and ‘analogously/by modulation’,⁵⁰ which is predicated of many whose reasons/definitions are different from each other. Going back to the thirteenth-century Islamic context, existence in the sense of God and His creatures fits with the third case in Ṭūsī, since existence in the same line here could be applied to distinct entities due to different reasons.

45 Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 449-50.

46 Wisnowsky, “On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism”, 297; Madelung “Aṣ-Ṣahrastānīs Streitschrift”, 250-3.

47 It should be noted that the univocity of existence in its application to God and created beings opens some leeway for religious monism. Even though Ghazālī would be in agreement with Rāzī, he does not give an opinion in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* whether existence is univocal or equivocal since neither view violates his Ash’arite convictions. See Griffel, “Ismā’īlite Critique of Ibn Sinā”, 223, 229.

48 Ṭūsī is known to have vied for “soft-equivocity” and it is still debatable whether Avicenna’s sense can be regarded in the framework of Ṭūsī’s interpretation, or denotes a sense of “soft-univocity” closer to Rāzī’s reading, or not.

49 The fifteenth-century Italian Ockhamist theologian Alessandro Achillini, also a contemporary of Ḥ, defended the case of existence’s analogicity based on certain interpretations of Aristotle and Averroes (Matsen, *Alessandro Achillini*, 119-21). What distinguished Achillini from Ḥ was that he was an anti-realist, but with a moderate nominalist bent inherited from Ockham.

50 Achillini, known for his *dubia* on key theological aspects, based his argument concerning the analogicity of existence in Thomas Aquinas’ description. Having famously employed by Aristotle and Avicenna, health (*ṣiḥḥa*), in the words of Aquinas, was a great example of this aspect, since health is said of an animal body and of urine and of a medicine but it does not signify the same entirely (i.e. meanings of ‘health’) in all these instances. Existence like health is analogical (Matsen, *Alessandro Achillini*, 102-5).

5.3.6 Day Four. Concluding Remarks

By overseeing ‘pure existence’ as ‘absolute existence’ as Rāzī does, Z falls into the same pitfall: he does not regard that ‘pure existence’ is a special term only reserved for God and this leads him to assume that existence is univocal, thereby making God’s existence comparable with that of the possibly existents.⁵¹ Z seems quite confident that if his opponent cannot prove otherwise, he has won the debate. Used in J’s discussion on unicity as a polemical utterance against the Dualists, *tamma al-dast* (also passes in HÇ’s gloss)⁵² is a rhetorical expression in Islamic dialectics, which implies that a contestant has silenced his opponent by providing certain refutations and proofs, and that the competition is over in his favor.⁵³

At the end of the fourth day, Z concludes that the reason why necessity has to be taken as an existential notion is only because its binary term ‘possibility’ is also existential. In other words, if possibility is a single thing superadded, how will then necessity’s singularity be different? The possibility has a capacity to exist externally, and this may easily apply to the case of necessity. Z also provides proofs backing necessity’s being non-existent in order to show that the philosophers’ point about necessity’s being an existential notion is not justified. If and only if necessity is defined as an existential notion, it may well correspond to the third meaning since only an ‘externally existing’ necessity can ‘fall under’ the third meaning. Apart from this condition, we cannot say that the third meaning meets the exact intension of necessity in the philosophers’ initial thesis. Again, Z overlooks the distinction between ‘pure existence’ and other types of existence, including universal and absolute.⁵⁴

5.3.7 Day Five. On Whether Necessity Necessarily Denotes a Single Essence

If you say that we do not concede that the Necessarily Existent is entified (*muta’ayyan*) by His essence, [because] then there would be a limitation in that meaning. The reason why this is as such is that only if the Necessarily Existent were of a single essence, then this would have followed; but it is impossible since it would be permissible that it could be a generic accident (*‘araḍ ‘āmm*) or a genus’ nature (*ṭabī‘a jinsiyya* or lit. ‘the nature pertaining to genus’). There are species under Him and every specie requires its essence being entified (*ta’ayyun*). What follows is that [while] every specie (*naw’*) is limited to an individual (*shakhṣ*), the Necessarily Existent is not [limited to an individual]. **It is replied to this such that** the Necessarily Existent cannot be existence itself, since if it were to have

⁵¹ Z’s support for the univocity of existence may have had some parallels with Duns Scotus’ view based on the assumption of *natura communis* (Matsen, “Alessandro Achillini (1463-1512) and ‘Ockhamism’”, 444-5).

⁵² See the lemma “wa-dhālik li-wajhayn” in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

⁵³ *Dast* is a game or a single act of a game, and the rhetorical expression *tamma lahu al-dast* can be translated as “the game ended/has ended in his favor” (Lane, *The Arabic-English Lexicon*, 878).

⁵⁴ Shahrastānī also overlooks this distinction in *Struggling with the Philosophers*, 52-3 (Arabic) and 48-9 (English).

species, it would then have various realities (*ḥaqā’iq mukhtalifa*). Existence would have a commonality in utterance [i.e. equivocal as in homonyms], and this is false. There is a weakness in this [statement], because the Necessarily Existent is not the same as ‘absolute existence’ (*wujūd muṭlaq*), but as ‘proper existence’ (*wujūd khāṣṣ*). The purpose in this chapter is that various realities have specific existences, so the absolute commonality of existence is not required in utterance [i.e. not univocal].

On the fifth day, the discussion moves to another central question: whether or not necessity has to denote a single essence. Z directs pointed questions at Ḥ by asking how come Avicenna’s designations of genus’ and species’ natures would be in line with the philosophers’ initial thesis.

The philosophers are known to have objected to necessity’s being relational or accidental, thus holding that necessity signifies a single essence with no implications of multitude. Their answer to a possible counter-thesis by the theologians is the following: God’s necessary existence can neither be entified nor added to God’s essence since the NE then will not qualify to be a single essence – meaning that He can acquire a genus’ nature that leads to multiplicity and individuation. The NE, therefore, has to be one and equal to His quiddity. If the NE were to have a species or a genus that is normally necessary for an individual thing to come out, then God would be individualized, which is impossible.

Genus’ and species’ natures are generic accidents applied to the existence of contingent beings, and the philosophers here, therefore, want to avoid their direct involvement with God. In various works, Avicenna repeatedly states that the NE does not have a genus or a species, so it cannot be defined, and is neither generic nor specific.⁵⁵ In his *al-Shifā’*, the genus’ nature (sing. *ṭabī’a jinsiyya* or lit. ‘the nature pertaining to genus’) primarily refers to the nature or quiddity considered in itself, a nature that when so considered is neither particular nor universal, neither one nor many.⁵⁶ Yet, due to Avicenna’s ambiguous use of the term, it is easy to misinterpret the genus’ nature as, similar to what Z does in the debate, something that exists individuated in external reality. This interpretation led some later commentators to identify existence with multiplicity.⁵⁷

The common misconception of associating a genus’ nature with existence also resonates with Rāzī’s misattribution of existence having a ‘species’ nature’ (*ṭabī’a naw’iyya* or lit. ‘a nature pertaining to species’). Basing on Avicenna’s statement that a species’ nature is applied to all its individuals on equal footing, Rāzī observes that the same thing can be said for existence as well, insinuating that existence has a connection to multiplicity and individuation, i.e. aspects to be avoided for God.⁵⁸ Ṭūsī detects that Rāzī again bases this view on an inaccurate representation of the philosophers. Based on Ṭūsī’s interpretation, the philosophers rather argue that

⁵⁵ For the definition of the NE, see Ṭūsī’s commentary on *al-Ishārāt*, 3: 472-4, 479-81.

⁵⁶ Marmura, “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals”, 39.

⁵⁷ Marmura, “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals”, 42.

⁵⁸ In one of many objections directed at Avicenna in his commentary on *al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt*, Rāzī questions how existence can be both applied to the necessarily and possibly existents, by making the incorrect assertion that existence is among natures pertaining to species (Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 213; Altaş, *Fahreddin Rāzī’nin İbn Sînâ Yorumu*, 407).

existence is not directly applied to the possibly existents but only ‘by modulation’ (*bi’l-tashkīk*).⁵⁹

Similar to Z, the Perso-Ottoman theologian ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī also maintains that a certain number of great verifiers have found the philosophers’ equating existence with God’s quiddity to be equally valid, yet adding that he, nonetheless, firmly holds that existence is an accident superadded to quiddity following the theologians’ position (especially Rāzī’s). Ṭūsī believes that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s proposed solution by way of introducing modulation is invalid for it does not deter the fact that existence might be an accident.⁶⁰ Reiterating Avicenna’s point as mentioned in Taḥṭānī’s adjudication,⁶¹ Z, in line with ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, follows Rāzī, by firmly settling on the theologians’ position as outlined in (iii) as a way of consensus (see § 3.3).⁶²

The truth in this answer is that what is mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in his *al-Shifā’* is that the Necessarily Existent is not something other than ‘pure existence’ (*mujarrad al-wujūd*), and there is no change in it. **Indeed**, an existence conjoined with quiddities changes in accordance with its attachment [to them]. As for ‘mere existence’, it is the same thing as existence that there is no real change [in it] with respect to the veracity of *al-Muḥākamāt* by Mawlānā al-‘Allāma [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī], Peace be upon him.

In closing, Z reiterates his points one more time: indeed, for Z, the NE cannot be the same as existence just as He cannot have any genus or species; otherwise, He will be constituting varied realities that denote multiplicity and composition. Existence here nevertheless has the problem of equivocality simply because it denotes a commonality in utterance as in homonyms in languages. Aristotle distinguishes words applied to different things with a single meaning (i.e. synonyms/univocals) from those that applied to different things but with different definitions (i.e. homonyms/equivocals).⁶³ In a similar way, the Neoplatonic tradition defines homonymous predication as “inhering in a subject”, a term in opposition to synonymous predication, which denotes “being said of a subject”, an essential predication.⁶⁴ For Z, if existence is the same as necessity, it will then only imply a sense of commonality in utterance (like homonyms) with regard to the modes of participation (*mushārahāt*), which is impossible. In Avicenna, on the other hand, homonyms share the name only, whereas synonyms share both the name and the

⁵⁹ For a reference that existence is applied to other things by modulation, see Rāzī’s considering existence in terms of a species’ nature in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 161, 167. Similarly, Iṣfahānī writes that existence is superadded to quiddity but only by modulation, i.e. different from other types of attachments (al-Iṣfahānī, *Tasḍīd al-qawā’id*, 1: 199). See Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 203, 212; and on how perfections are predicated of God by modulation in later medieval Latin tradition via Avicenna: Acar, *Talking About God*, 50-5.

⁶⁰ Al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 220-1.

⁶¹ This fact may indicate that Z gathers most of his information about Avicenna’s philosophy from later handbooks of *kalām*, not specifically from Avicenna’s original writings.

⁶² For the theologians’ position which states that existence is superadded or occurs externally to essence both in the necessarily and possibly existents, see § 3.3, “Background in Philosophy II”.

⁶³ Wisnovsky, “On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism”, 285.

⁶⁴ Kalbarczyk, *Predication and Ontology*, 74-5, 82.

definition,⁶⁵ such that the philosophers’ formulation (as well as Naşir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Ḥ’s points) rather perceive the relationship between existence and necessity as in the case of homonyms.

Z is resistant to accept his rival’s explanations: Ḥ’s position is arguably mistaken since, for Z, Avicenna, on the contrary, might have regarded existence as ‘univocal’.⁶⁶ As mentioned earlier, Z’s oversight might rely on the assumption of equating the NE’s special existence with absolute (or generic) existence, thereby assigning God an unfounded capacity for receiving a genus/species and an individualization. For Z, existence, in line with the above-mentioned theologians’ view in (iii), has to be an externally added entity with a capacity to receive a genus and a species, which are universal logical categories indispensable for particular existences and individuals to emerge in the extramental world.

Reducing existence to a homonym restricts this term to a generic category for all existents. Absolute existence, in this case, is an unqualified aspect of existence common to all contingent beings but significantly different from ‘pure existence’. The philosophers will hypothetically object to Z’s designation of ‘pure existence’ as a commonality of existence in utterance since he seems to anachronistically apply something that is true for the possibly existents to the ontological category of the Necessarily Existents, by equating God with contingency without any foundational basis.

Another possible answer to Z’s argument in favor of the univocity of existence among the necessarily and possibly existents, which follows Rāzī, could be by demonstrating that these divisions are only lexical (*lafḍī*), that is, equivocal in meaning (*bi’l-ishtirāq al-lafḍī*), which is in direct opposition to univocity (*bi’l-ishtirāq al-ma’nawī*). When describing the commonality between two partners, Ghazālī’s second point in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* about the philosophers’ inability to prove God’s unicity, i.e. the argument from commonality, similarly resorts to nominalism, which could be summarized as follows: if there are two hypothesized NEs, then these must be either similar in every way or totally different. The first is absurd (*muḥāl*)⁶⁷ since two things cannot be separate and be similar in every way. Even if the NEs differ from another, it must be that they either share in something or not share in anything. The latter is impossible due to the shared necessity of existence within the NE’s characterization, and the former implies that there will be composition and lexical division.

Based on this thought experiment, necessary existences cannot have composition due to their being qualitatively indivisible. The composition will, otherwise, dictate that they either share in something or not share in anything. The latter is impossible due to the shared necessity of existence within the NE’s characterization, and the former implies that there will be composition and lexical division, thereby not implying a real one. Thus, both

⁶⁵ Kalbarczyk, *Predication and Ontology*, 138.

⁶⁶ Benevich, “The Necessary Existent”, 150.

⁶⁷ As Avigail Noy suggests, the term *muḥāl*, which is found in Islamic texts in linguistics, literary theory, and philosophy, denotes a “co-occurrence of two contradictory [things] within the same object at the same time, in the same element [or] the same relative state”, such as describing an object as being both black and white at the same time. *Muḥāl* is not only non-existent but also inconceivable; and the philosophers make a distinction between “that which does not exist but is imaginable” and “that which does not exist and is unimaginable” (Noy, “Don’t Be Absurd”, 29).

cases are impossible. Ghazālī sees existence ontologically one with essence in God, yet, different from Z’s accidentality of existence, he regards existence as a ‘(necessary) concomitant’ (*lāzim*) due to the nominalism of lexicality – not as ‘subsisting in essence’.⁶⁸ Regardless, Z neither seems to entertain this counterposition in his evaluation nor comments on the nature of concomitants vis-à-vis different shades of existence.

5.3.8 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Conform to Singularity According to Their Thesis

I say that if the utterance ‘necessity’ were to be valid for a single mental consideration and this mental consideration is dislodged from being existing externally, then there would not be any competence (*majāl*) here, [121b] since one could respond [to this] by the permissibility that this intension would be attached to two differentiated essences, one differing from the other in essence. If the author of *al-Mawāqif* says “thus, the existence of the Necessarily Existent is true for philosophers”, then the competition has ended in favor of Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

The last day of the debate concerns the question whether the NE has to conform to singularity according to the philosophers’ proof. Since now Z applies existence in utterance to necessity, maintaining that necessity is an accidental superaddition, he is certain that the commonality here would be only in utterance, as in the case of homonymous expressions.⁶⁹ Upon this point, Z further argues that the necessity’s intension, in this case, does not again provide the certain proof that necessity has to be a single essence that does not attach to multiple essences.

In conclusion, neither existence nor necessity, for Z, can be specifically defined for God. Both are generic univocal categories that may be shared by all existents and, therefore, should be regarded as superadded accidents that occur externally to the quiddity, that is, with no direct involvement with God’s quiddity essentially per se (a point that he follow Rāzī). This contingency, for Z, proves that the concepts of necessity and existence are non-essential relational qualities that are not suited for providing proof in support of God’s unicity. Also Z questions the certainty of the philosophers’ proof, trying to demonstrate that there is no guarantee that necessity must be the same as God’s quiddity/essence. It could be easily argued that necessity can be construed as, let’s say, relational (*nisbī*), non-existent (*adamī*), or superadded accidentally (*araḍī*) etc. Most importantly, the philosophers’ proof cannot rule out the possibility that necessity can be a superadded accident. Thinking that he has refuted his opponent by showing the contingency and imprecision of the philosophers’ proof, Z, at the end of the debate, declares himself victorious for the second time.

⁶⁸ Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, 86-7.

⁶⁹ For Rāzī’s statement about the linguistic commonality with respect to the necessarily and possibly existents, see al-Ṭūsī, *Talkhiṣ al-muḥaṣṣal*, 101.

5.4 Analysis of Ḥocazāde’s Position. Making the Philosophers’ Proof Cohere with Post-Classical Scholarship

The philosophers give a central role to necessity in their version of *burhān al-tamānu*’ and, to achieve this end, they resort to the reducibility of necessity to quiddity/essence in God – a view regarded in line with their premise that He is the same as ‘pure existence’. This is the main point of contention between them and the theologians, and the latter group represented by Z, as shown, denies this by claiming that necessity is a superadded accident denoting no essentiality. On the other hand, Ḥ defends the validity of the philosophers’ statement as the main thrust of his reply, arguing that necessity at least corresponds to one of its stated meanings in philosophy, especially the third (“what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”).⁷⁰ Ḥ’s defense of the philosophers is closely linked to a passage in J’s *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* on God’s unicity in Position Five, Observation Three (5.3). Here he follows J’s expositions on this point, critiquing his academic adversaries Z and ḤÇ on the same subject matter who, instead, prefer the theologians’ view indefinitely due to the philosophers’ inability to demonstrate their claim.⁷¹

Both Z/ḤÇ assert that the philosophers’ proof is incomplete due to their unsubstantiated premise that necessity is the same as God’s quiddity/essence, a statement which, according to ḤÇ, contradicts with their claims about (a) quiddity’s not being an existential notion, and (b) entification’s implying individuation and multiplicity (see the analysis below).⁷² To refute ḤÇ/Z, Ḥ provides more citations from J, evidencing that at least one of the stated meanings of necessity can be taken in the philosophers’ sense. He also insists that ḤÇ might have misrepresented J’s line of thought in certain lemmata: for instance, the commentator J does not seem to reject the philosophers’ proof outright, only mentioning his concern with (a), but found no fault in (b), adding that the author Ī does not raise any objection to the latter either.⁷³

Ḥ’s defense concerns the validity of the philosophers’ contested premise. Setting J’s expositions as evidence, he demonstrates his opponents that not only this meaning of necessity is true on their own terms but also widely conceded by later post-classical commentators and critics as a term that does not suggest multiplicity. Throughout the debate, Ḥ sets out to verify Avicenna’s ‘many-in-the-one’ approach, determinedly providing counter-arguments and additional textual proofs from past masters against those of Z and ḤÇ. Bringing out learned expositions to the counter-arguments from past and contemporary scholars, Ḥ further clarifies in the second half of his defense how certain controversial philosophical terms – such as ‘entification’ (*ta’ayyun*), ‘individuation’ (*tashakkkhus*), ‘specification’ (*takhsīṣ*), and

⁷⁰ There are three levels to ‘meaning’ (*ma’nā*) in the scholarly context: the lexical meaning, the intention of the speaker, as well as the meaning or function of a particular word as discussed by the grammarians (Versteegh, “The Debate Between Logic and Grammar”, 59).

⁷¹ See ḤÇ’s lemma “fa-yalzimu tarkībuhumā”: “I will, therefore, suggest that what we have pointed out here as an answer (i.e. necessity and existence are accidental qualities superadded to God’s quiddity) is established based on the principles of the theologians, just as we alerted you about it before” (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45).

⁷² Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

⁷³ Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 47.

‘genus/species’ nature’ (*tabī‘a jinsiyya/naw‘iyya*) – do not overall contradict with the philosophers’ thesis. In most instances he closely follows their exposition for the sake of the debate. Only in one point, though, he disagrees with them, favoring that entification and species’ nature are rather super-added accidents. Except these, Ḥ argues as a way of conclusion that the philosophers’ doctrines are coherent in their own paradigm and they can even be reconciled with the current trends in post-classical Islamic scholarship.

5.4.1 An Invocation on God’s Unicity. “He Neither Begets Nor Is Born”

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Glory be to Him who is one and who neither begets nor is born, nor is there to Him any equivalent. [*al-Ikhlās* 112:3-4] Pray on Muḥammad and on the family of Muḥammad.

Ḥ’s defense of the philosophers begins with verses from the Meccan *sūra* of *al-Ikhlās* [112:3-4], which was included as a literary topos, implying the central subject matter of the debate (*tawḥīd*).⁷⁴ Invocation sections have a key role in defining a locus for the central argument of a text,⁷⁵ and here the quotation from the Qur’ān sets the main thrust as God’s singularity. The verse “He neither begets nor is born” implies that God neither has a partner nor is caused by another, that is, the intended conclusion of the debate.

Having studied the exegetical texts included in Ottoman scholar and librarian al-‘Atūfī’s (d. 948/1541) recently edited inventory of Bāyezīd II’s royal library, Mohsen Goudarzi highlights the centrality of al-Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf* and the prevalence of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s voluminous exegesis *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* in the fifteenth-century Ottoman intellectual world.⁷⁶ Indeed the connection between the debate’s subject-matter (*burhān al-tamānu‘*), and the quotations from *al-Ikhlās* can be traced in these popular works: for instance, *al-Kashshāf* writes that the verse “He neither begets nor is born” is significant in negating partners to God since the concept of one (*aḥad*) implied here is a property of His singularity.⁷⁷ Likewise, according to Rāzī’s voluminous Qur’ānic exegesis also known as *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, *sūra al-Ikhlās* is referred as the “Chapter on [Divine] Unicity”,⁷⁸ a verse which, for him, not only uses God’s singularity (*waḥdāniyya*) as a proof of unicity (especially due to the first verse “Say, He is Allah, who is, One”), but also provides a direct revelation (*naqlī*) for God’s singularity.

⁷⁴ Islamic treatises originally start with an invocation, though Z’s version does not include such a prefatory note, which may indicate that Z’s surviving text might be a later scholar’s personal copy or cursory notes – i.e. a text that was not prepared as an officially commissioned copy.

⁷⁵ Tezcan, “The Multiple Faces of the One”.

⁷⁶ Goudarzi, “Books on Exegesis”, esp. 267-73. Goudarzi writes that Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf*, which is represented by thirteen copies and thirty-six glosses and commentaries in the list, has the highest number of copies under the exegesis section along with Rāzī’s *Mafātīḥ* and Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī’s (d. 685/1286) *Anwār al-tanzīl* (p. 270). Books on exegesis are included in the first section of the inventory, a case that highlights the importance of exegetical works among religious and rational sciences. Though Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf* precedes the *Mafātīḥ* chronologically, it is observed that the latter’s is the first work to be listed on the inventory probably due to the former’s immediate affiliation with the Mu’tazilite thought (pp. 270-2).

⁷⁷ “Aḥad waṣf bi’l-waḥdāniyya wa-nafī al-shurakā’” (al-Zamakhsharī, *Tafsīr al-kashshāf*, 1228).

⁷⁸ Al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 175.

ty, without making Muslim scholars resorting to reason (*‘aql*) and rational inference (*istidlāl*).⁷⁹

There is, however, another context of evaluating God’s unicity in the Meccan *sūra* of *al-Anbiyā’* [21:22], which states “Had there been other gods besides Allah in the heavens or the earth, both realms would have surely been corrupted. So Glorified is Allah, Lord of the Throne, far above what they claim”. A century after the debate, a Persian émigré scholar Muṣliḥuddīn al-Lārī (d. 979/1572) pens a treatise on *burhān al-tamānu’*,⁸⁰ in which, debating the ideas of past masters, such as Jurjānī, Taftāzānī, and Dawānī, he argues that the mentioned verse presents a sound rational proof of God’s singularity.⁸¹

5.4.2 Day One. Ḥ’s Response to Objections to the Philosophers’ Thesis by J/ḤÇ

The author [‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī/al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī], may Almighty God have mercy on him, said in Observation Three [of *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*] on God’s unicity (*tawḥīd*), a discussion also mentioned in the Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi], that the denial of a partner to God is required for His unicity; and there is no need to pursue this further. [With regard to God’s unicity] Ḥasan Çelebi replied that the negation of an equal partner (*sharīk*) in species (*naw’*) does not require the negation of a partner in divinity (*ulūhiyya*), and that the existence’s necessity literally permits each partner’s requiring a haecceity (*huwiyya*).⁸²

Isay that if the necessity (*wujūb*) of existence (*wujūd*) were to be the same thing as essence (*dhāt*), as this is the basis for the proof here, then an equal partner would be eliminated in terms of species. There is no doubt that the reverence [of God] is required [to be refrained] from a partner that shares [the same] divine attributes, as well as the necessity of **[12b]** existence – unless it is claimed that the course of the argument in the competition just concerns the negation of an equal partner and existence’s being the same as necessity (or not) is never noted.

As outlined in the first lemmata, Ḥ’s thesis included in his initial written response is as follows: according to the philosophers, necessity has to be equal to God’s quiddity/essence since the third meaning of necessity (i.e. “what distinguishes the NE from others”) corresponds to the meaning in the initial statement. Ḥ notes that the denial of a partner is an indispensable element of *burhān al-tamānu’*, an aspect conceded by all scholars in the religious community, further adding that there are certain objections to the various aspects of this proof.

Most notably, his contemporary ḤÇ objects to this thesis in his gloss on the *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, by questioning **(a)** whether the denial of a partner in species can be applicable to the case of metaphysical principles, and **(b)**

⁷⁹ Al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 177-8.

⁸⁰ Akay, “Musliḥuddīn el-Lārī’nin”.

⁸¹ Tezcan, “Musliḥiddin Lari (d. 1572)”, 619.

⁸² Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

whether the existence’s necessity can refrain from receiving a haecceity.⁸³ Both cases imply individuation and multiplicity; therefore, for HÇ, taking necessity as an essential aspect of God must be avoided.

It is ironic that H starts his defense of the philosophers by quoting two objections from HÇ, who, having allegedly incorporated certain sections of H’s gloss on the *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* into his own, was accused of plagiarism during the early years of his teaching in the city of Brusa. H’s targeting HÇ at the beginning of his text may echo the purported bad blood between two scholars and, most probably, was not a coincidence.

H’s reference here is a passage that passes in HÇ’s gloss on the *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*. The full text of HÇ’s objections addressed here are as follows (see the main point in italics):

HÇ’s gloss on Jurjānī’s statement “with regard to God’s unicity [...]”: Unicity here refers to all meanings included under the conviction of unicity, that is, those denoting a lack of commonality (*mushāraka*) with others in divinity; and this is what is intended here. A commonality in divinity requires a commonality in necessity, such that the latter of which is the source of each perfection and the temple of each deficiency. That is why, the philosophers are content with negating the [option of] a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*) [for necessity, but argued for its equivalence to quiddity]. If one is to say that negating the equivalent partner (*mathl*) is required, then there is no need for what J discusses. *Then I will say that negating an equivalent partner (sharīk mumāthil) in species does not require that in divinity – adding that the necessity of existence here is taken literal due to the permissibility that each would require a haecceity.* If this is conceded, then it will be accepted that what is understood by this implication also appears in the section about God’s deanthromorphism, which is of importance.⁸⁴

HÇ’s objections (a) and (b) point out the most problematic aspect of the philosophers’ proof, which is, in the words of HÇ, “refuting an equal partner to God *in species* implies refuting a partner *in divinity*”. This statement highlights the discrepancy between the necessarily and possibly beings and, as an objection, questions whether particular conclusions can be reduced to divine aspects, and if so, on what basis this must be.

The philosophers argue that the necessity of a partner’s existence may not permit its requiring a ‘haecceity’ (*huwiyya*). Haecceity here refers to an individualized aspect of quiddity in the outside world that leads to multiplicity. However, this does not mean that this same principle can be applied to divine or metaphysical realities since haecceity may well be associated with contingency.

For HÇ, to negate a commonality among partners *in divinity*, a scholar needs to first negate the commonality *in necessity*, not *in species*. Similar to Z’s point in the debate above, his lemma suggests that due to its univoc-

⁸³ See J’s passage related to quiddity in Discussion Two, which asserts the following: “Whether it is general or particular, every being has a reality (*ḥaqīqa*). If it is a particular reality then it is ‘identity’; if it is a general reality; then it is ‘quiddity’” (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 18-21; esp. 18).

⁸⁴ See the lemma “qawluhu: fī tawḥīdihī ta’ālā”, which is quoted by Ḥocazāde verbatim during the debate, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

ity, necessity is a concept that may also interact with the possibly existents that are defined – unlike the Necessarily Existent – as beings that are only necessary by another. HÇ implies that there is no guarantee that necessity has to be absolved from multiplicity and plurality in the philosophers’ case. This is simply because necessity may be regarded as attaching to multiple essences and, more importantly, receiving a haecceity, leads him to the conclusion that it will be better to consider it as ‘accidental’ (instead of ‘essential’). Or else, if necessity is defined in terms of a ‘necessary concomitant’ (*lāzim*) or as identical to God’s quiddity/essence, then this will indeed open some leeway for multiplicity in God. In order to bridge this gap, HÇ mentions that the philosophers are ready to negotiate that necessity is a concomitant rather than being equal to God’s quiddity/essence.

According to HÇ’s conceptualization, receiving a haecceity means that it is possible for the necessity of the partner’s existence to be individualized among species via the philosophical term ‘entification’ (*ta’ayyun*), and these aspects applied to the possibly existents (as in haecceity, individualization, and entification) should not be used in proofs defining God’s singularity:

HÇ’s gloss on Jurjānī’s statement “so the compositeness of both is required

[...]”: If you were to say that entification’s being an accident is a possibility – as mentioned in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*’s Intention Two, Observation One – then compositeness would not follow. Thus, I say that we point to an answer here in the sense that what we mentioned is established based on the principles of the theologians – just as we alerted you about this before [i.e. regarding the theologians’ view that necessity and existence are superadditions]. As for the philosophers, they said that entification superadded to quiddity does not defend the implication of a haecceity’s compositeness. *As for its being superadded to quiddity, this is not intelligible because haecceity is a particular individual, in which the very conceptualization of its intension (mafḥūm) refrains from the occurrence of a partner that would participate in it.* If the way of the universal quiddity were to be regarded as something *either* by itself (*bi’l-‘ayniyya*) or by another particularity (*bi’l-juz’iyya*), then the very intension could not be imagined insofar as its being hindered from the occurrence of commonality in it. That is why, quiddity cannot be a particular individual [and there is no composition in it].⁸⁵

HÇ’s objection in (b) is related to the term ‘entification’ that is often defined as “what distinguishes a thing from another without being participating in another”.⁸⁶ Entification is closely associated with necessity, since both terms denote how beings could be distinguished from one another: the latter in terms of ontology, and the former by way of extramentality. Along with Z, HÇ takes entification as a superadded accidental quality following the theologians, further suggesting that if entification is a necessary concomitant as in the philosophers’ sense, then it cannot be used in Avicenna’s proof for unicity (because it will still denote multiplicity).

⁸⁵ See the lemma “fa-yalzimu tarakkubuhā”, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

⁸⁶ “Al-ta’ayyun: mā bihi imtiyāz al-shay’ ‘an gayrihi bi-ḥaythu lā yushārikuhu fīhi gayrihi” (al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-ta’rifāt*, 65).

Entification is an aspect mentioned in the philosophers’ formulation of *burhān al-tamānu*’; and the NE, by default, is expected to require an entification by essence to be able to distinguish Him from other beings.⁸⁷ Unlike HÇ’s gloss though, J seems to acknowledge this premise as true in the philosophers’ paradigm, suggesting that entification does not necessarily contradict with God’s singularity, as well as their initial premise.

In short, HÇ’s and Z’s points, for H, are not valid objections since the thrust of the debate (as in Samarkandī’s principle *ta’yīn maḥall al-nizā*) is whether or not the negation of an equal partner is required for God’s unicity, and this thrust is based on the philosophers’ initial premise that necessity is the same as God’s quiddity, a case which is coherent. Thus, probably knowing that Z, similar to the theologians of the past like Rāzī, would likely bring up the philosophers’ oft-misrepresented thesis that God is the same as ‘absolute existence’, H comments that Z’s last contention is not directly relevant and should, instead, be treated as a digression. Despite H’s disclaimer, the third day of the debate will cover the exact status of existence with respect to God’s quiddity/essence, hence their relationship to necessity.

5.4.3 Day Two. On Why the Third Meaning of Necessity Corresponds to That of the Philosophers’ Thesis and on Whether Necessity Has to Be Singular

On the second day, H provides a set of answers for his opponent’s thesis that none of the stated meanings of necessity corresponds to the philosophers’ sense. Z’s view is based on the common fact that necessity is construed as accidental and suppositional, not suited for God’s case essentially. H’s detailed reply is as follows:

The author, may God have mercy on him, said that you have set forth beforehand that necessity is the same as quiddity. The unique mind of his time [Hocazāde]⁸⁸ said concerning the refutation of this premise: “I know that necessity corresponds to three meanings (sing. *ma’nā*): [necessity defined as] (i) “essence’s (*dhāt*) requiring existence”; (ii) “that which has no need of others in existence”; and (iii) “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others”. There is no doubt that one thing that is not mentioned in the first two meanings is that necessity is the same as quiddity since both [necessity and quiddity] are mental considerations (sing. *i’tibārī*). What is intended by the [philosophers’] statement is that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, which refers to the third meaning. **Indeed, in this case**, as for the assumption about the Necessarily Existent’s multiplicity, it is objected that [13a] the Necessarily Existent requires composition if necessity is a single reality that has two isolated units (sing. *fard*) etc.

I say that there is no doubt why this question appears, and you should not worry about its answer – but [know that] the statement about the term

⁸⁷ For the relationship between the NE and entification, see Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), *al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt*, 3: 464.

⁸⁸ In the marginalia Hocazāde is noted as the subject of this argument, which might have been added by a later copyist.

‘specification’ (*takhṣīṣ*) in the third meaning denotes necessity. **The Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi] expressed** this view insofar as specification is not objected.

As a reply, Ḥ further defends his point by arguing that the post-classical term *i’tibār* could be applied to the very cases of necessity without undermining the validity of the philosophers’ initial thesis. Ḥ’s defense is stated as follows: in section 5.3, J defines necessity as *i’tibārī*, i.e. a conceptual/mental consideration with no real existence in the outside world, thus not lacking multiplicity.⁸⁹ This aspect does not undermine the philosophers’ unicity since Ḥ notes that there are three meanings associated with necessity as passed: **(1)** “essence’s requiring existence”, **(2)** “that which has no need of others in existence”, and **(3)** “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent from others”. In the first two meanings there is no direct allusion to the nature of necessity and quiddity in God, yet the third, for Ḥ, meets this condition, since both concepts are taken here as equivalent mental considerations with no real existence in the extramental world. This means that necessity cannot be a single reality that constitutes multiple units at the same time, as, otherwise, the NE would be perceived as composite. Following J, Ḥ here appeals to the position that necessity and existence are simply *non-entitative*, meaning that they do not constitute a distinct entity in the extramental world. This new designation in the post-classical world, for Ḥ, does not necessarily contradict with the view of classical Arabic philosophy, so making it valid within the limits of the philosophers’ paradigm.

After arguing that the *i’tibārī* nature of necessity can be reconciled with necessity’s third meaning in Arabic philosophy, Ḥ expands his argument to other confusing cases of Avicenna metaphysics. For instance, the third meaning of necessity may have the sense of ‘specification’ (*al-takhṣīṣ*), an ontological term that denotes ‘differentiation by limitation’. This term may well correspond to the meaning of necessity in the philosophers’ thesis and, as Ḥ suggests, the glossator ḤÇ appears to have agreed with this point.⁹⁰

In the later lemmata of Day Two, Ḥ uses extensive citations from *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* to prove that J’s position does not necessarily clash with the philosophers’ initial premise. Ḥ wants to show his opponent Z that the third meaning of necessity has been already in use among the theologians as well.⁹¹ Then the conversation moves on to consider the question in what sense the third meaning is linked with the first two, and Ḥ continues to demonstrate, on the second day, how the third meaning is indirectly related to other two meanings by further referencing J’s *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*.

[Jurjānī] states that this is because both [necessity and quiddity] are mental intelligibles (sing. *i’tibārī ‘aqlī*) which do not have existence in the extramental world; and this is accepted such that both are taken absolutely (*alā al-iṭlāq*); otherwise why would it not be permissible that the specific one [of the two] is a real entity different from the quiddity of the Neces-

⁸⁹ Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 112.

⁹⁰ The closest reference to ‘specification’ is probably the lemma about ‘specificity’ (*khuṣūsiyya*), used in reference to the specificity of the NE’s essence in relation to other existents (see ḤÇ’s lemma “mabnī ‘alā ‘anna al-wujūb wujūdī”, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45-6).

⁹¹ See ḤJ’s mentioning the third meaning as a valid definition of necessity in section 2.3.2 on necessity in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 116.

sarily Existent, as the scholars would all agree? **[Jurjānī] states that** what is intended by the philosophers’ statement is that necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, as in the third meaning.

I say that this limitation⁹² is an opinion of **[13b]** this virtuous scholar [Jurjānī] himself, and this claim has been put forth in some books. So there is no need for a thing to be contrary to what the evidence testifies, and this is noted in Discussion Three concerning necessity – especially in the later sections of this proof – such that the first or second meaning of necessity is and was the same [thing] as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, God bless him. Their statement did not pay attention to the fact that it is obligatory for these two meanings to exist among all externally existing things and to be the same as the Necessarily Existent. [This is] due to the weakness of their statement about this subject. The limitation of their statement does not depend on the question; rather it is just based on the demonstration of [its] occurrence. Whoever addresses an answer with a statement lacking the philosophers’ intention [also] has the third meaning according to their statement, in which necessity is the same as [His] reality [*ḥaqīqa*]. **Rather [14a]** the intention of one of the first two meanings does not bring anything to support the advent of the question by this virtuous scholar, because its advent, in that case,⁹³ is more obvious and clear. Upon my life, the answer remarked by some of the virtuous scholars accompanied by certain additional points is more exalted than those that stand on the horizon of the heavens of my thought, but when the headstrong intentions of this verifier [Jurjānī] manifests, then the answer is concealed and becomes impossible [to refute].

According to the lemmata above, H’s first textual proof from J is the following: the philosophers suggest that the exact logical intension (*mafḥūm*) of their initial premise only corresponds to the third definition of necessity, a view which can be traced in J’s passage about the definitions of necessity,⁹⁴ as well as the early theologians’ position quoted by Ī.⁹⁵ In his *Mashriqiyūn*, Avicenna identifies a defined quiddity with an intension, as a real definition of quiddity sought through conceptualization.⁹⁶ If a meaning corresponds to the intension of a term, then it will be identified as a real definition of its quiddity, a case which may well correspond to the third meaning of necessity in this statement.

As a determined realist, Avicenna arguably assumes that this correspondence is a real case, so his initial suggestion is different from the nominalist tendencies of the post-classical context. The post-classical verifiers, such

⁹² “A notional constriction consists in adding an intensional layer to some notion, thereby constricting or limiting the scope or extension of the initial meaning of a notion” (De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being”, 264).

⁹³ In the marginalia: “Its purpose is to express the meaning only in a more informed manner and no more”.

⁹⁴ Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 163.

⁹⁵ Ī/J cite the Mu’tazilite theologian Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī’s (d. 303/915) view that God’s essence is distinguished from others in four ways, and necessity is considered among the four distinguishing marks of the NE outlined by him (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 17).

⁹⁶ See the translation and analysis of *al-Mashriqiyūn*’s section on Logic 39.8; 45.1-2. Beneich, “Meaning and Definition”, 34.

as J and Ḥ, on the other hand, try to make sense of this case through their conceptualization of *i’tibārāt*, affirming that both necessity and quiddity are mental considerations with no real extramental existence. Both entities here are taken in their most absolute/generic sense (i.e. not as existing physically) as opposed to Avicennan realism, since, otherwise, they both have to be acknowledged as God’s real entities, which will ultimately imply multiplicity in Him. It is in this context that Ḥ, following J, asserts that one of the ways to make the philosophers’ thesis consistent is to acknowledge that all these entities are *i’tibārī*. In this way, even if necessity is taken as a single reality with more than two individuals, this will not imply diversity due to its being a mental consideration.

As passed in section 3.5 of this book, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* is devoted to the exposition of three common positions concerning the nature of existence and quiddity among the necessarily and possibly beings.⁹⁷ And Ḥ’s conclusion is that the theologian’s view here refers to the third meaning of necessity as a limitation, but still affirming the philosophers’ sense.⁹⁸

Even though Ḥ provides evidence from J to support his point, this does not prevent him from critiquing the past master. Ḥ further comments that J acknowledges the validity of the third meaning, yet conceding that the first two meanings of necessity may not correspond to the meaning in the philosophers’ premise exactly. This is because both meanings imply external existence, as well as a relationship of need and priority/posteriority, that is, aspects to be avoided when necessity is taken as a distinguishing mark. J underlines that the philosophers’ initial thesis does not correspond to the intensions of the first two meanings completely, and he further eliminates these two options for a sound designation of necessity.

As a response, Ḥ critiques the second half of J’s point, writing that the first two meanings may not be directly related to the debate at hand, but they are true and relevant only with regard to the demonstration of necessity’s occurrence in the third sense. In other words, the first two meanings are indispensable to derive the third and, that is why, still relevant to the philosophers’ proof. It is in that sense that Ḥ defends the validity of the philosophers’ oft-critiqued ‘argument from entification’ (i.e. the NE can be distinguished from others via entification) as still suitable to affirm God’s unicity. This argument, for Ḥ, is correctly based on necessity’s third meaning directly.

[Jurjānī] states that what is intended by their statement is that necessity’s being the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is the third meaning, which comes from this statement such that what is intended is the third meaning’s being the same as quiddity by itself, and likewise their intention here is rather such that ‘what falls under’ this statement (*mā-ṣadaq ‘alayhi*) is not [necessity’s being] the same as quiddity. Otherwise, this would not be correct. **[Jurjānī] states that** consequently what

⁹⁷ For a summary of the views in this discussion, see section 17.2 on “Essence and Existence” in Dhanani, *Al-Mawāqif fī ‘ilm al-kalām*.

⁹⁸ “Essential necessity implies two sides in the NE, one side is existence and the other is quiddity. This is because necessity is what distinguishes the NE from others [which is also the definition that is supported by the philosophers and Ḥ in the debate]. And this thing corresponds to the NE’s essence because the NE has to be distinguished from other essences” (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 2: 163). For essential necessary concomitants that are *min haythu’l-māhiyya* in Avicenna, Benevise, *Essentialität und Notwendigkeit*, 349-54.

I claimed to be composition (*tarkīb*) in relation to the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent [14b] will be rather required if necessity is a reality with two isolated units. Yet, whenever necessity has two different essences, each being differentiated from one another, then it is no secret that one meaning cannot be conceivable since two different essences would be distinguished from each other essentially.

Upon this short digression, H continues to cite other additional textual proofs from J. In the next lemma, H insists that the validity of the third meaning already appears in J - albeit with a later correction in the manuscript: a curious marginal note⁹⁹ that might have been added by the author or a later commentator notes that he checked J once again verifying that J (ironically similar to Z) only saw the third meaning in a restricted sense as the extension of the philosophers’ thesis (that is, as neither its exact equivalent nor intension). It is still a question how one should make sense of this later addition: could we see this as a correction on H’s behalf? Or does J, as H claims, support the fact that the third meaning of the philosophers is an intension of their thesis? The authorship of the note could give us a perspective about J’s verdict.

H might have corrected one of his attestations to J but, later during the day, he continues to cite other passages in support of his position, affirming that, for J, the third meaning never implies multiplicity. Even if it is assumed that necessity is a reality with two individuals, it will be still inconceivable for J that necessity has two essences simply because these two essences can be differentiated from one another essentially, a case which is evidently impossible, and hence not violating simplicity.

H’s main intention in providing proofs from J is to show that none of the stated meanings of necessity assigns it multitude, settling that necessity has to be singular in nature. After these points, the exchange briefly moves on to discuss another question regarding how the limitations on the meanings of necessity are related to God’s quiddity/essence. H includes another textual support from J, warning that the meanings mentioned here still have restrictions: if all three meanings are used in an unrestricted way, then they may suggest, as Z claims, an *‘arīḍ-ma’rūḍ* relationship, so that they cannot be directly associated with God. The emphasis on restriction here seems to be a precaution against further counter-objections by Avicenna’s critics.

[Jurjānī] states that the two partners mentioned in the first two meanings suggest a limitation in participation, and this is not as such [for the third meaning], since the unrestricted application of the third also [implies] a shared accidental affection, occurring to both [meanings externally] in this respect. This is apparent for those who paid attention and

⁹⁹ In the marginalia: “After writing this we found out a detailed version of this book to verify this matter. He explained here that, as we mentioned, what is intended is not the same as the third meaning (i.e. its intension), rather [it is] a judgment that falls under (*mā-ṣadaq ‘alayhi*) a particular question (i.e. its extension)”. This note maybe added by H who was known to have glossed J’s text. In a discussion about the undulation of tidal waves with ‘Alī Kūşçu (upon the latter’s arrival to Constantinople), H asks one of his assistant to bring his gloss to J in order to refresh his memory about the exact place of his gloss on the past master’s text (Taşköprizâde, *al-Shaqā’iq*, 161; Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tâcū’t-tevâriḥ*, 2: 490-1; al-Laknawī, *al-Fawā’id al-bahiyya*, 352; Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*, 94-5). H may have later added this point upon the perusal of his notes.

thought about this. Mawlānā Shujā‘’s (d. 929/1523) statement, which we consider to be evidently invalid, responds to this question with the third meaning, such that if the third meaning were to have two different realities, then the meanings of [15a] necessity would not be equipollent with the [concept of] existence in the first two senses – without each of these realities being in the other. Then, it would be necessary that the third meaning is a single reality, and the likely diversity needed to be refuted corresponds to the multiplicity of an isolated unit. So, if a multiplicity accompanied by oneness in reality requires composition, which is impossible, then the way of its appearance will be that the implication (*talāzum*) here corresponds to nothing other than [something] between the first two meanings and the absolute sense of the third. This is because absoluteness was common in this respect, not distinguishing any of these three meanings from one another. **What is obtained** [from this discussion] is that the answer depends on the proof that a single entity is the same as the Necessarily Existent – regardless of whether this entity is necessity or some other thing. [15b] What they said is that ‘sole existence’ (*wujūd baḥt*) is the same as the Necessarily Existent, only if Ibn Sīnā’s answer is correct in his *al-Shifā’*, which was excerpted in [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī’s] *al-Muḥākamāt*.¹⁰⁰

In the last lemmata of the second day, Ḥ cites a counter-objection from a fellow scholar, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s student Şeyḥ Şücā’ (d. 929/1523),¹⁰¹ who was also said to have upheld J as more virtuous than his peer Taftāzānī like Ḥ.¹⁰² Şücā’’s argument assumes that necessity does not need be a single reality and, for this reason, it cannot be equal to ‘proper existence’ (*wujūd khāṣṣ*) in Avicenna’s famous formulation that equates ‘pure existence’ with

100 Al-Taḥṭānī, *al-Ilāhiyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

101 Due to the epithet *şeyḥ*, the scholar referred here should probably be Ṭūsī’s brilliant student Şeyḥ Niyāzī Şücā’üddīn-i İlyās, not Ḥ’s student with the same name, who also held a post at the prestigious *Şahn-ı semān*. At the time that Şeyḥ Şücā’üddīn İlyās was Ṭūsī’s assistant, he also became Eşrefzāde-i Rümī’s (d. 874/1469-70 [?]) close associate in Sufism. Eşrefzāde considered him better at solving puzzles than his master Ṭūsī (Ḥoca Sa’deddīn, *Tâcû’t-tevâriḥ*, 2: 567). As a great admirer of Ḥ, Şücā’üddīn-i İlyās also contemplated to study with the master in Brusa but did not go against the will of his mother who did not want him to study in peripheral Anatolian cities (Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā’iq*, 318; Mecdî, *Ḥadā’ikü’ş-şakā’ik*, 330-1). Having taught for many years in cities, such as Edirne, Brusa, and Constantinople, Şücā’üddīn also wrote glosses on J’s gloss on the *Tajrīd al-i’tiqād* (Süleymaniye, MS Fatih 2939), as well as Ḥayālī’s gloss on Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-aqā’id* (Süleymaniye, MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513). Taftāzānī’s work briefly refers to *burhān al-tamānu’* with regard to the arguments from power, free will, unity and contradiction, incipience, need, and possibility – without dwelling much on arguments from necessity and existence (al-Taftāzānī, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, 37-9). One possible place of this argument might be in Şücā’’s gloss on Ḥayālī where he argues that quiddities do not imply diversity in God since they do not come from the genus of things, which would, otherwise, require the Necessarily Existent to be composite. See the lemmata “kawnuhu ta’ālā min jins al-ashyā” and “fa-lā yalzimu al-tarkīb, na’m, yalzimu mushārakatahu ta’ālā li’l-ashyā” fi tamām al-māhiya, fa-yalzimu al-imbkân wa-hādihā muḥāl”, in Şücā’üddīn-i İlyās, *Ḥāshiya ‘alā ḥāshiya ‘alā sharḥ al-aqā’id*, MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513, f. 26b).

102 The text in *al-Shaqā’iq* implies that Şücā’ found J more virtuous than Taftāzānī since, though the latter was a noble man, [some of his views] were troublesome (Taşköprizāde, *al-Shaqā’iq*, 318). Mecdî adds that the latter was stricken with a junk of unfounded apprehensions, delusions, and doubts (“ḥis ü ḥāşāk-ı tevehümât ve şükük u şubḥât ile mükedderdür”, in Mecdî, *Ḥadā’ikü’ş-şakā’ik*, 330). This is also apparent from the fact that Şücā’üddīn provides specific references from J’s *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* on many instances in his gloss in comparative perspective with Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-aqā’id* (see MS Kılıç Ali Paşa 513, ff. 20b-21a, 30a, 40a, as well as 36b, the latter of which also refers to J as a virtuous “verifier” [*muḥaqqiq*]).

the NE. In other words, if the philosophers cannot guarantee that the third meaning is not composite of multiple realities, that is, if necessity here has two realities, then, for Şüçâ’, it cannot be equivalent to existence as in the first two meanings.

As the text indicates, H̄ responds to Şeyh Şüçâ’'s counter-argument in the following way: necessity can never have multiple essences in the context of the NE, because the third meaning already guarantees that necessity is a differentiator of essences that ensures that the NE is singular. For H̄, avoiding multiplicity is a must, and here it precisely refers to the multiplicity of isolated units that necessity may constitute. As follows, the necessity in the third sense has to be taken as a single reality in any case with regard to God.

As an answer to both Şüçâ’ and Z, H̄ then concludes that this case is still in line with Avicenna’s argument concerning ‘pure existence’. Otherwise, there would be no way to pinpoint necessity’s exact meaning here for it may denote anything from the first two meanings to the absolute sense of the third. H̄ notes again that this cannot be the case, since absoluteness may also denote a commonality that is shared among multiple entities. In certain passages, Avicenna distinguishes ‘absolute existence’ from ‘pure existence’, and the former cannot denote God’s singularity but refers to a generic logical category shared by other entities. This distinction is in a passage excerpted by the celebrated post-classical theologian Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī in *al-Muḥākamāt*.¹⁰³ What Avicenna may mean here is that God has a *special* mode of existence called ‘pure existence’, which is perfectly consistent with his initial thesis.

5.4.4 Day Three. On Whether Necessity or the NE Can Be Equal to (Pure) Existence

H̄ ended the previous day by linking necessity with the philosophers’ ‘pure existence’. Upon Z’s counter-arguments and denial of this claim, the thrust of the debate on the third day moves to the status of existence and necessity in the philosophers’ God and the question whether necessity can be equal to His ‘pure existence’.

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that this aspect has been preceded by the argument that necessity is the same as quiddity. This statement assumes that the universal quiddity here belongs to the Necessarily Existent, and this is not correct regardless of whether it directly has external multiplicity by what is required by this proof. Thus, what is intended by quiddity [here] is an individuated haecceity (*huwiyya shakhsīyya*). **The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that** then this implies composition.

H̄ continues his defense with a disclaimer from Ī/J: according to H̄, both scholars observe that the philosophers’ claim concerning ‘pure existence’ is preceded by the premise that necessity is equal to quiddity. However, in this

¹⁰³ In a discussion about the nature of entification, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥṭānī writes that the reality of the NE is ‘pure (or abstracted) existence’ that subsists in essence. See “wa’l-jawāb: ‘inna ḥaqīqa al-wājib mujarrad al-wujūd al-qā’im bi-dhātihi, wa-laysa nafs al-wujūd al-muṭlaq”, in al-Taḥṭānī, *al-Ilāhiyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

context, necessity, like quiddity, can neither be universal nor particular,¹⁰⁴ so this premise contradicts with their thesis.¹⁰⁵ This is because quiddities, for \bar{I}/J , are never specific to universal categories or individuated haecceities; otherwise, they will undermine the singular nature of God, which cannot be conceived similar to the logical categories of universality and particularity.

Upon citing \bar{I}/J 's view, \bar{H} 's point here is to clarify certain philosophical vocabulary like individuation and haecceity in the face of God's existence. According to the philosophers, each particular individual is composed of a quiddity and an entification at the very moment when each individualizes to distinguish itself from others. This hinders multiplicity, since both terms are only mental entities (and pure quiddities do not exist in the outside world unless they receive concomitants). Likewise, an existent is a thing with a distinctive individuality, and the unity of all these features does not imply multiplicity either. Again \bar{H} emphasizes the status of *i'tibārāt* to indicate that these terms are not real entities: necessity and existence defined as conceptual can well justify the Avicennan thesis.

Another possible reply to \bar{I}/J can be phrased through the *i'tibārī* term 'entification' (*ta'ayyun*), and the argument is as follows: each individual composed of quiddity is in need of an entification to be able to emerge externally; thus, there cannot be two Necessarily Existents because they will eventually have to distinguish themselves from one another.¹⁰⁶ Contrary to the positions of Z and Rāzī, entification here denotes neither composition nor outside existence, since it is, as \bar{H} underlines, simply “in relation to the mind” (*bi-ḥasab al-dhihn*) – with no implications in extramentality.

Blasphemy was a common accusatory rhetoric employed in court debates and theological exchanges, especially when a losing party had no grounds to argue further against his opponent other than desperately accusing him with blasphemy. Also served as a reply to Z's claim of *kufr* on the same day, \bar{H} 's rejoinder underscores that entification is a mental consideration as in the cases of quiddity, existence, and necessity, which may be called 'Avicenna's trinity'.¹⁰⁷

What quiddity is to individuals here is like what genus is to differentiae, and all these terms are among *i'tibārāt*. This point also passes \bar{H} 's gloss on Mullāzāde al-Kharziyānī's *Hidāya al-ḥikma* commentary, which states that genus and differentia are only mental capacities that are one in making and

104 Marmura, “Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna”, 61. Marmura writes that Avicenna sometimes uses ‘universal’ in a broad sense to refer to quiddity/essence, which is not properly speaking related to ‘universality’. Also see Marmura, “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals”, 39.

105 Quiddities are described as being neither one nor many, neither particular nor general, and neither existing nor non-existing. These points also appear in J's Position Two, Observation Two, Observation Two (2.2.2) on Quiddities (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 18-21). Also see Avicenna's and Tūsī's comments in *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbihāt*, 3: 472-4, 479-81.

106 The first aspect regarding the philosophers' proof is the argument from entification, which is as follows: “If there are two Necessarily Existents, these two existents will then be differentiated by entification, primarily because necessity, as we said before, is the same thing as quiddity” (al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45). In the same line with \bar{H} , this argument defines necessity as that which requires to be distinguished from others by essence.

107 Ghazālī asserted that the root cause of the philosophers' unbelief (*kufr*) was due to their emulation of the Jews and the Christians in thinking, which led their disregard for religious law and negligence of religious duties (Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy*, 83). Provided that Avicenna's formulation of simplicity and singularity went back to Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's formulations of simplicity in the Trinity, it could be arguably claimed that Z might have accused \bar{H} of emulating a controversial Christian Orthodox doctrine.

existence,¹⁰⁸ meaning that the relationship between quiddities and distinct individuals can be freely applied to the case of logical categories.¹⁰⁹ H’s emphasis on the *i’tibārī* nature again is probably to silence Z, since, from the theologians’ perspective, mental conceptions can also conform to their assumption that necessity and existence are accidentally superadded to God’s quiddity/essence.

I say that the author has explained in the discussion about entification (*ta’ayyun*) that an auxiliary individual (*shakhṣ mu’ayyan*) is composed of quiddity [and entification], and the entification [here] is rather with regard to the mind with no [implications in] extramentality (*khārij*) since the author said that the relationship of quiddity to concrete individuatednesses (*mushkhaṣṣāt*) is here like the relationship of genus (*jins*) to differentia (*faṣl*). It is that **[16a]** a genus is ambiguous (*mubham*) in the mind having a capacity for multiple quiddities, and there is no entification for any of them – except differentia’s attachment (*inḍimām*) to genus. Both [quiddity and entification] are united in essence, in making, and in existence in the extramental world, and the genus [here] can be distinguished only in the mind. Likewise, this ‘species’ quiddity’ (*māhiya naw’iyya*) has a capacity for multiple entities that do not have multiplicity for any of them – albeit individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*), which is conjoined with the quiddity pertaining to species. These are united outside in essence, in making, and in existence, being distinguished only in the mind. **[16b]** So, there is no quiddity existent in the extramental world, and an existent is a distinctive individual (*shakhṣ*) such that an isolated unit (*fard*) is composed from both (nonetheless it is not correct to predicate quiddity with its individuals). Yet, there is nothing here except a single existent, that is, an individual haecceity – with the exception of the mind breaking both into a species’ quiddity and an individuation, which is like breaking the species’ quiddity into a genus, a differentia, and a mental composition under the truth of Almighty God’s reality. And no evidence [of this] has ever been refuted. The Glossator explains this in his discussion of necessity insofar as saying “as for the contradiction (i.e. the contradiction of necessity), the need of an intellective particular (*juz’ aqlī*) would not be then apparent”. And this cannot be proven since what is needed [here] is its conceptualization (*taṣawwur*), not its existence in the extramental world.

To put H in a tight spot, Z then picks up on the philosophical terms ‘entification’ (*ta’ayyun*), ‘individuation’ (*tashakhkhuṣ*), and ‘species’ quiddity’ (*māhiya naw’iyya*, lit. ‘a quiddity pertaining to species’), compelling his opponent

108 See H’s lemma “**Qāla:** ‘an law thabata [...]’, which investigates the ways in which the term ‘form’ (*ṣūra*) could be defined. See H’s gloss on Mullāzāde al-Kharziyānī’s *Hidāya al-hikma* commentary housed in Süleymaniye, MS Carullah 1326, 98b (dated 889/1484): “**He said:** ‘If it is affirmed that [...]’. **I say:** ‘Genus is an equivocal (*mubham*) thing which penetrates into existence only after acquiring a specified difference, and both are in agreement with respect to the extramental world in making and existence’”. The next lemma states that form is a species’ quiddity. For the Arabic: “**Qāla:** ‘an law thabata [...]’. **Aqūlu:** Al-jins ‘amr mubham lā yadkhuḥu fī al-wujūd ‘illā ba’d taḥṣīlihi bi-faṣl yu’ayyanahu wa-humā muttaḥidān bi-ḥasab al-khārij fī al-ja’l wa’l-wujūd”.

109 Criticizing Porphyry’s definition of differentia as being predicated of many items differing in species, Avicenna redefines differentia as “an [essential] universal that is predicated of a thing in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ with regard to its substance” in *al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt* (Di Vincenzo, “Avicenna Against Porphyry’s Definition”, 179).

to clarify how their involvement will not affect God’s singularity. During the rest of the day, H̄ makes specific analogies between necessity and other mental considerations to show how necessity will not denote multiplicity *in concreto*. With one crucial difference from Avicenna, H̄ does not see entification and species’ quiddity as ‘necessary concomitants’ (sing. *lāzim*), a term that denotes essential co-existence rather than accidental superaddition. For him, their existence does not limit the philosophers’ proof; nonetheless, his own verified position is that the two are superadded entities.

As a way of clarification, H̄ expands on the nature of entification as such: according to the philosophers and their later critics like Ī, entification is required for quiddity to come out in the extramental world, and is a key step before individuation. There are no real entifications extramentally, and this is true again for the similar case observed in differentia’s attachment to genus. For instance, if animal is a genus of human beings, then the differentia here, that is, the characteristics that distinguishes human beings from other animals, will be rationality, a term that gives haecceity to this quiddity.

Technically speaking, entification is a mental quality that only comes out when there is a differentia, that is, a universal distinguishing mark in relation to a genus, entifying one individual from another. Otherwise, a genus among individuals will have the capacity of receiving multiple quiddities only in the mind. The division among them is precisely mental, with no existence in the outside world. In short, for H̄, quiddity, entification, and distinctive individuals in this case are all one in essence, making, and existence, but only distinguished in the mind to overcome composition. This is the reason why the cases of genus and differentia are used as analogies in H̄’s text.

Moving along the same line, a similar analogy can be also applied to the Avicennan cases of individuation and species’ quiddity, both of which are among mental considerations. Individuation is an aspect that appears when predicating a quiddity of a subject in terms of particularity,¹¹⁰ and it is conjoined with a species’ quiddity only mentally and accidentally.¹¹¹ As H̄ states, both terms are united outside in essence, making, and existence, being only distinguished in the mind. Once an entity becomes distinct through quiddity’s receiving a species’ quiddity via entification, it becomes existent as an individual haecceity. Again, none of these terms entails multiplicity, since they are simply the mind’s apparitions that provide explanations for individuation. Quiddity’s acquiring individuation and entification simply belongs to our mental capacity.

It is observed that the same point also appears in H̄’s *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, which is as follows: being composed of individuation and quiddity is like being composed of intelligible parts (sing. *juz’ ‘aqlī*), which are among intelligibles – not of extramental parts.¹¹² Having argued that entification and individuation are mental qualities similar to the logical categories distinguished in the mind, H̄ comes to the conclusion that the glossator H̄Ç is wrong in thinking that necessity is in need of intelligible parts. Necessity neither depends on anything to exist nor has any real existence in the outside world. Thus, the necessity’s dependence on mental particularities can-

¹¹⁰ Marmura, “Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna”, 62-3.

¹¹¹ Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 205.

¹¹² “Al-tarakkub min al-tashakkkhuṣ wa’l-māhiya tarakkub min al-ajzā’ al-‘aqliyya, li-’anna al-māhiya wa’l-tashakkkhuṣ min al-ajzā’ al-‘aqliyya li’l-shakḥ lā min al-ajzā’ al-khārijīyya” (Hocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 187-8).

not be true in reality. The only modification to Avicenna’s position that H brings is that despite the philosophers’ thesis that entification and species’ quiddity are necessary concomitants that coexist with quiddities essentially, both terms should be interpreted as ‘superadded accidents’.

The Glossator said that each of these aspects relies on existence’s being a species’ nature (*tabī’a naw’iyya*). I say that there is a disagreement [here] since if we were to assume the validity of both aspects, then [the aspects of] “necessity’s being a nature pertaining to species” and “its relying on a thing (*shay*)” would be invalid. It is certain that this is true and evident according to the validity of this thing. As for that, there is a contradiction between [the statement about] necessary concomitances [with regard to] the validity of these aspects and [the statement about] existence’s being [17a] a species’ nature. This is because the validity of both [of these statements] requires the negation of multiplicity absolutely; and necessity’s being a species’ nature requires [the aspect of] multiplicity. At least, this [aspect] is in the mind, and one should beware of, so to speak, the composition of species’ nature and entification necessarily.

In the next lemma, H entertains a possible objection by HÇ. Again to evidence that Avicenna’s sense of necessity connotes diversity, HÇ notes that, in certain passages, the philosophers identify existence and necessity with species’ natures, which are, in certain other passages, described as capacities applicable to particulars.¹¹³ If necessity is a species’ nature, then it will rely on another quiddity, thereby becoming an existent with real existence *in concreto* – not mentally as previously suggested. HÇ’s original lemma that appears in J’s discussion on God’s unicity is as follows:

His statement “This has two aspects [...]”: Each of these aspects relies on necessity’s being a species’ nature, and this is impossible due to the permissibility that the intension of necessity is a universal that occurs externally to what falls under it among the realities of necessity’s isolated units. There is no doubt that what is imagined by necessity’s being equal to the Necessarily Existent’s quiddity is not this generic intension but ‘what falls under it’; therefore, two Necessarily Existents will end up being distinguished [from one another] by essence. As a result, compositeness will not follow, and this special necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent’s quiddity, will require an entification. Thus, the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent is impossible, and what we have said shows that the Necessarily Existent is not dependent on the proof of the philosophers. The statement of the author is invalid, and the competition is over.¹¹⁴

HÇ renders the philosophers’ point by interpreting that necessity is associated with a species’ nature; therefore, necessity cannot be the generic intension of God’s quiddity. HÇ does not, however, realize that the philoso-

¹¹³ The same misconception about the philosophers that they apply species’ natures to the Necessarily Existent, a debatable interpretation which makes God, in turn, predicated by many, also appears in Shahrastānī’s section on “On the Unity of Necessary Existence”, in *Struggling with the Philosophers*, 46 (Arabic/English).

¹¹⁴ See the lemma “qawluhu: dhālik li-wajhayn”, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

phers do not precisely say this. For them, the terms like quiddity, existence, and necessity (especially in relation to God’s essence), are concepts transcending universality and particularity. In fact none of these implies multiplicity in the philosophers’ paradigm by way of ‘species’/genus’ natures’ (sing. *ṭabī’a naw’iyya/jinsiyya*). This oversight leads HÇ to conclude, similar to Z’s repeated point, that necessity cannot be the exact intension (the real meaning of its quiddity) since it is associated with a species’ nature only in the case of ‘what falls under it’.

Based on this, HÇ further points out two possible internal contradictions in Avicenna, which are also mentioned in Rāzī’s commentary on *al-Ishārāt*. If the philosophers’ doctrine is interpreted to be dependent on existence’s being a species’ nature, this will suggest the assertions that (a) necessity is a species’ nature and (b) relies on another thing.¹¹⁵ As a reply to Rāzī, Ṭūsī has rebutted such claims, noting that the philosophers never stated that existence and necessity are species’ natures.¹¹⁶ And Rāzī’s view might simply be picked up by HÇ.

The argument that necessity is a species’ nature was a common attribution to the philosophers, and many fifteenth-century Ottoman theologians, such as Ṭūsī and Ḥayālī, in a similar fashion to HÇ, seemed to have based their interpretations on this assumption.¹¹⁷ Remembered most notably for his famed gloss on the *Sharḥ al-‘aqā’id* and a commentary on his tutor Hızır Beg’s (d. 863/1459) *al-Qaṣida al-nūniyya*, Ḥayālī penned a similar exposition in the latter work:

The philosophers said that if the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent were to be by His [own] essence and if the necessity [here] were the same as His quiddity, then both partners would be distinguished by entification. This is because there can be no dualism without differentiation (*imtiyāz*) by [way of] entification (*ta’ayun*), and the compositeness of each of these two haecceities would require a common quiddity and a differentiating entification, which would be absurd. It is no secret that the basis [of this proof] is [related to] necessity’s being a species’ nature. For, otherwise, provided that necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, both partners will never differentiate [from one another] by essence without the need for entification. On the contrary, the Necessarily Existent is regarded as immutable, [but this is not guaranteed] in any respect. There is no proof of this. Rather, the verified view is that necessity is a mind-dependent attribute, so there will be no compositeness whatsoever. I know that this issue is almost bound by the necessity’s premises that are crucial for this proof. That’s why, you see that the wise ones do not adhere to the dispute other than the Dualists.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Mayer writes that Rāzī’s interpretation regarding the NE being a species’ nature is also implied in Avicenna’s argument (Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Din ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 203). Regarding Rāzī’s point on the existence being a species’ nature, see also Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Din ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 212.

¹¹⁶ One of the four inconsistencies that Shahrastānī identifies in his *Muṣāra’a* is related to the fact that the Necessary of Existence can be predicated by many, which makes God a species even though He cannot be (see al-Shahrastānī, *Struggling with the Philosophers*, 46 [Arabic/English]).

¹¹⁷ A similar (mis)attribution to the philosophers is also present in al-Ṭūsī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 220-1.

¹¹⁸ Ḥayālī, *Sharḥ al-‘allāma al-Ḥayālī ‘alā al-nūniyya*, 164.

According to Ḥayālī’s commentary, the philosophers claim that if there are two NEs, then they will have to distinguish themselves from one another by *entification* in order to realize their respective necessary existences. This is absurd since, in turn, this will imply composition. Entification, for Ḥayālī, cannot be an essential aspect, and if it is, then cannot be used for God.

Again Ḥayālī oversees the fact that this proof derives from necessity’s being a species’ nature (an attribution to the philosophers by Shahrastānī and Rāzī). This is because, otherwise, both partners will not be able to differentiate one another due to Ḥayālī’s associating entification with a species’ nature since only contingent beings can get entified. He claims that the point about the nature of entification cannot be proven, yet based on this, it could be demonstrated that necessity is an accidental superaddition to quiddity since this is the only thing that will guarantee no composition in God’s nature. Due to necessity’s purported links to a species’ nature, there are other similar views in support of Z’s claims about the accidentality of necessity, a conceded view among Ottoman theologians.

The lemma above indicates that Ḥayālī conversely envisioned entification as evoking a sense of commonality due to its being associated with a species’ nature. Therefore, he thinks that there is no place for entification in certain proofs, including that of God’s unicity. Similar to Z and Rāzī, he simply follows the theologians’ view that necessity is solely superadded and accidental. After summarizing his opponent’s views, Ḥ ends the day with some concluding remarks as follows:

So the correct answer is the position in the first sense, which states that necessity’s reliance [on a thing] is [due to] necessity’s being a species’ nature, not absolutely, but with respect to the assumption of multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent or its being the same as the Necessarily Existent [itself]. These are required for the position, and it is no secret that this reliance does not refute the assumption of the aforementioned aspect’s validity. As for the second aspect, it relies on necessity’s being the same as the Necessarily Existent, not on the species’ nature that it has. This is because if the statement that is based on “necessity’s being the same as a species’ nature” here follows that the Necessarily Existent is composed of both [necessity and nature pertaining to species] [17b], as well as an entification that is not observable, then the occurrence [here] would imply a difficulty (*maḥdhūr*). Let’s think about this! **It is no secret that** even if the reliance of these two aspects were to be correct with regard to necessity, but not with regard to a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*), [this is] because, according to the assumption of multiplicity, their reliance in reality would be based on the immutability (*thubūt*) of a thing’s being the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, as well as on the immutability of this thing being a common species’ quiddity. Just as [the philosophers] claimed that necessity is the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, they, likewise, also agreed that existence is the same as its very quiddity. This does not validate their consideration that each of these things would be the same as the Necessarily Existent. In this way, what is said about the first aspect is correct: if there were two necessary beings to be distinguished by entification – because existence is, in this case, a shared reality between the two – then the differentiation does not acquire an entification, which does not necessarily verify [18a] a dualism. Thus, the difficulty [here] implies composition. For the sec-

ond aspect, existence is what is required for entification, so if it were to be as such, then existence would either require entification (hence circularity follows), or not. As follows, the separation of both would be permissible without entification, and this would be absurd.

As a possible reply to Z, HÇ and, indirectly, to Ḥayālī, Ḥ makes the following conclusion. In his discussion on God’s unicity, J divides the philosophers’ version of *burhān al-tamānu’* into two aspects via Ī: while the first aspect of the proof acknowledges the requirement of entification for necessity, the second aspect, which is also based on the same premises, asserts that entification is superadded (*yanḍimmu ‘alayhi*) as an accident to necessity and quiddity to prevent composition.

Ḥ acknowledges the validity of the first aspect, which is based on the assertion that necessity relies on another thing due to necessity’s being a species’ nature. The first aspect is correct for Ḥ, insofar as necessity is not taken here as a ‘species’ nature’ in the absolute sense since the requirement of entification by itself prevents the existence of two Necessarily Existents. The only difficulty here is the implication of multiplicity due to necessity’s being a species’ nature. Ḥ settles that necessity’s being equal to God’s quiddity/essence neither supports the first aspect nor acknowledges J’s point.

The second aspect, on the other hand, relies on the philosophers’ initial thesis concerning necessity – albeit without the implication of a species’ nature. For Ḥ, this leads J to the mistaken conclusion that the NE will then consist of species’ nature and necessity. He rather notes for the second aspect that entification requires existence, but it cannot be said vice versa or else there will be circularity, and the separation of both partners without entification will be impossible. Unlike the first there does not seem to any hefty objections to the second aspect by Ḥ.

As a way of conclusion on the fourth day, Ḥ suggests that the terms ‘entification’ and ‘species’ nature’ cannot necessarily signify composition according to the philosophers’ original thesis. Their proof may hold these terms to be ‘necessary concomitants’, yet, from the post-classical perspective, their existence is still problematic because they create multiplicity in quiddity and, to hinder this fact, both should be simply accepted as being superadded accidentally. And accepting them as necessary concomitants as the philosophers did in the past, will, nonetheless, make them unfitting for this proof for his contemporaries – a position of the philosophers that Ḥ ends up amending and modifying in the debate.

5.4.5 Day Four. On Whether Necessity Denotes Composition in Relation to Entification

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that if entification requires necessity, then it requires to be posterior, and this is circular. **I say that** [this is] necessity’s being justified by entification. **The Glossator said** that an objection could be raised [here] such that entification’s requiring necessity with respect to the privation (*adm*) of necessity’s requiring entification does not bring circularity. This is because entification would only require necessity if it were not to assume this privation first. **It is responded that** this assumption does not prevent the necessity of circularity as the fact of matter (*nafs al-amr*), not **[18b]** correspond-

ing to the occurrence [itself] since necessity is [in fact] a cause for everything else as in reality (*nafs al-’amr*).

The fourth day continues with a discussion on the status of entification. H first outlines HÇ’s points in the latter’s gloss and then argues for their insufficiency by providing further references from J’s *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*. HÇ’s initial critique of entification along with a summary of Ī/J’s line of thought is as follows: Ī writes that if entification requires necessity, then it is assumed that entification is obtained by necessity as well – a position that may lead to circularity since necessity is already a cause for entification. Following Ī, J acknowledges a problem here, for entification may be perceived as a cause for necessity. This is simply impossible because entification will still need to be acquired by necessity in the first place.

Based on these two comments about circularity, HÇ takes the contrary view, writing that entification’s requirement of necessity is based on necessity’s lack of requiring entification. For him, Ī is wrong in saying that there is circularity here, because entification’s requiring necessity with respect to the privation of necessity’s requiring entification will imply neither complementarity nor circularity.¹¹⁹ As a follow-up, one possible response to HÇ’s denial of circularity could be that necessity is a cause for everything else including entification; so if entification requires necessity, then the other way around is also true, a fact leading to circularity.¹²⁰

Contrary to HÇ, H denies that there is no circularity here, arguing the following: entification cannot be a cause for necessity since the latter is already the cause of the former, preventing entification to require necessity. In the lemmata above, H defines entification as a second intention in relation to the first intension of necessity, not vice versa. The distinction between first and second intentions can be traced back to Avicenna, who speaks of logic as a science dealing with second intentions as applied to the first.¹²¹ Entification cannot be a cause of necessity, since, deriving from first intentions, second intentions act as causes to them. As follows, necessity does not necessarily need entification; therefore, there is no evident case of circularity.

I say that it is no secret that this answer [here] is terrible since the second intention is an entification that is based on the first intention for necessity. Thus, if entification is considered to be a real characteristic (*ḥāla*) for necessity, i.e. its cause, then there is no doubt that this real characteristic would not come together with the aforementioned intention, meaning that it will not be a cause. Then the first intention is invalidated and the second [intention] is corrupted for its being based on it; hence, there is no circularity. A similar statement also precedes the Glossator in a discussion about smooth surfaces (sing. *ṣafḥa mulassa’*), but he [also] had a [different] position there.

¹¹⁹ For the quote verbatim, see the lemma “qawluhu: wa-yalzimu al-dawr li-’anna al-wujūd”, in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 46.

¹²⁰ See the quote verbatim in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 46-7.

¹²¹ First intentions are concepts of extramental things, such as horses, while second intentions are ‘concepts of concepts’ (for example, species which includes horse and human). See Amerini, “Intention, Primary and Secondary”, 555.

Ḥ supplements his answer with three further references from J’s same work showing that the past master already speaks of the philosophers’ sense: as for the first reference, Ḥ makes an analogy between necessity/entification and the case of smooth surfaces (sing. *ṣafḥa mulassa*). The latter example passes in J’s passage on place (*makān*), which is as follows: the philosophers argue that two equal smooth surfaces that perfectly correspond to one another will not be separated (like entification does with necessity), whereas it is the theologians who argue that they are two different things that can be distinguished.¹²² What J indicates here is that the philosophers’ case of smooth surfaces could be applied as an analogy to that of entification.

[Jurjānī] states that after accepting the sufficiency of ‘pure causality’ (*mujarrad al-‘illiyya*), the privation of sufficiency is [now] imagined; however, if necessity were to be a complete cause – just as it is apparent in [the case of] necessity’s being [19a] the same as the Necessarily Existent – then there is no doubt about the sufficiency of this premise. It is also objected to this by the author in such a way that necessity is a requirement for an entification useful in limiting it, since, otherwise, this statement would be a negation of this limitation not due to a principle of requirement. As follows, it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement, as well as the implication of circularity, are based on the first possibility, and the permissibility of separation (*infikāk*) on the second. And this is subject to debate in this answer.

[Jurjānī] states that it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement are conceded. What is imagined from this is that the negation for limitation is not due to a principle of requirement. How is it then conceivable that the lack of requirement is nothing more than this? [Jurjānī] states that the implication of circularity is based on the first possibility and the permissibility of separation from the second is not apparent [19b] since the center of discussion in the examples of these cases is one only in mental consideration. [Jurjānī] states that these aspects are aware of the soundness of the first two ways. Both have preceded their states and this question has been [further] inquired. He has taken this as the correct answer, which is mentioned by the Glossator after taking his statements and positions into account so that it is responded to this as such etc.

As for the second reference, J associates necessity with ‘pure causality’ (*mujarrad al-‘illiyya*), concluding that necessity requires entification as a quality that limits, in some ways, the extent of necessity (not the other way around). And for the third, which is supplemented by two additional short glosses by J, the definition of necessity depends on neither its requirement nor its lack of requirement of entification and any other entity. The circularity in the third reference is due to entification’s requiring necessity, which cannot be true. Otherwise, if entification and necessity are taken as separate entities from one another, then there will be no circularity due to the fact that these aspects are distinguished only mentally.

¹²² Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 5: 142-3. ḤÇ further comments that the possibility of two smooth surfaces touching one another is evident (see the lemma “wa-illā lam yakun al-tamāss”, al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 5: 142-3).

Ḥ concludes on the fourth day that the question whether necessity requires an entification, hence circularity is directly related to the first aspect mentioned above, which requires necessity to take on entification. Yet the permissibility of separation between necessity and entification is, in fact, associated with the second aspect, which can be further interpreted as having vied for entification’s being a superaddition, a view that departs from the philosophers.

5.4.6 Day Five. On Whether Necessity Denotes an Existential Notion (*Wujūdiyya*)

The fifth day is devoted to the question whether, as the philosophers claim, necessity can be regarded as an ‘existential notion’ (*wujūdiyya*). Given the fact that Ḥ, along with the most post-classical theologians, see necessity, as well as existence, among *i’tibārāt*, it cannot be said that necessity can be externally existing by way of *wujūdiyya*. The problem of associating necessity with existential notion has been addressed before in the context of *al-Ishārāt* and its commentaries on Z’s fourth day, and Ḥ provides a possible answer to him through referencing Ī and ḤÇ in critical light.

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that [this statement] is based on necessity’s being an existent. **The Glossator said that** even if this is not necessarily so, it will be because necessity [here] is [defined as] either “essence’s requiring existence” or “that which has no need of others in existence”. **I say that** the aspect of limitation in this is [similar to] what was mentioned previously in the discussion about necessity and possibility, such that necessity in the second meaning is not in reality but unrestrictedly applied to it either by the allegorical interpretation (*ta’wīl*) of necessity, or by that of the principle of necessity. **[20a]** This [i.e. what the Glossator mentioned] is the foundation of proof for the invalid premise, and there is nothing wrong with it. There is no way to prove this invalid premise, and the proof that they have established does not work. Yet, it is possible that we can object to the proof, as the Glossator has also invalidated this, by questioning why it would not be permissible according to them that necessity would be a specific case (*khāṣṣ*), and what falls under these two intensions would be the same as what makes [the specific case’s] non-existence inconceivable by way of equating existence to necessity. Thus, existence is a thing *in concreto* (*fī al-a’yān*). There is no doubt that [necessity] is a thing in mental consideration that cannot be verified in the extramental world, and the position is that they proved that the specific [case] and what falls under it would be the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent. As for [the case of] derivative predication (*ḥaml ishtiḳāqī*),¹²³ **[20b]** this occurrence is also in existence

123 Does Ḥ refer to compositional or attributable predications by the term ‘derivative predication’ here? Different from homonyms (identifying “inhering in a subject”) and synonyms (identifying “being said of a subject”), another category of predication, paronyms, which share a ground with homonyms, can be associated with derivative predications that denote composition and accidentality. Among none of the genera the predication is paronymous, which rather needs to be predicated univocally, since they are predicated synonymously with species. Going back to the Baghdad Peripatetics, there are two types of predications that inhere in a subject, i.e. homonymous and paronymous predications, the latter of which stresses “having mode of attribu-

(*fī al-wujūd*). The answer lies in the answer of this point. [Jurjānī] states that an unintelligible thing is intelligibly unintelligible, yet the statement here is not about something intelligible, which is a generic thing in mental consideration, but rather about the specific, and a specific thing’s being an intelligible thing by its true nature is prohibited.

In a passage in his *al-Mawāqif*, Ī writes that the philosophers’ initial thesis relies on necessity’s being an existent, which is not true for their doctrine because, like quiddity, necessity is not an existent that has a real existence *in concreto*, only conceptually superadded. The glossator ḤÇ agrees on the view of the author Ī by stating that if it were not to be the case, it would still be due to the first two meanings of necessity mentioned above, i.e. (a) “essence’s requiring existence” and (b) “that which has no need of others in existence”.

In a later lemma on ḤÇ’s objection against necessity’s being an existential notion, Ḥ argues that the second meaning may only imply this but ḤÇ’s objection about the first is far from valid. As a more correct way to address this issue, Ḥ further suggests that ḤÇ could have directed his critique in a different way, maybe by asking why the proof here do not relate to a specific case or what falls under the first two meanings of necessity. It should be further noted that one of Ḥ’s contributions in the debate is to set necessity as *i’tibārī* (not *wujūdī*) in order to conform to the position that it can be equal to God’s quiddity/essence rather than being superadded.

After this comment, Ḥ concludes that necessity’s being an existential notion is widely accepted in post-classical scholarship,¹²⁴ and that the philosophers has successfully articulated that the special case of existence, as well as what falls under the meaning of necessity, is identical to God’s quiddity/essence. Thus, Z’s objections are not valid.

5.4.7 Day Six. On Whether the NE Must Be a Single Essence According to Their Thesis

The last day of the debate concerns whether it could be proven that the NE has to be a singular essence in light of the philosophers’ formulation. In order to prove that there is no instance of multiplicity in God, Ḥ has to further reconcile certain philosophical terminology like entification, individuation, and genus’ natures, by referring to the post-classical scholar Taḥṭānī’s famed book of arbitration *al-Muḥākamāt*.

The author of *al-Muḥākamāt* said that if you say that we do not accept that if the Necessarily Existent were to be an entification of its essence,

tion” and is defined as just like we say “Socrates is a grammarian”. Those which are *in* a certain subject that correspond to accidents are predicated by way of paronymy. In the words of Alexander Kalbarczyk, the species and genera of accidents according to Avicenna may be predicated of substances only in the *having* mode of attribution or by way of paronymy, and hence the meaning or definition of any accidental attribute is not predicated of a substance as something which it *is* (Kalbarczyk, *Predication and Ontology*, 75-6, 214, 216). For Aristotle, derivative expressions are deprived of being in their own right and, paronymous expressions, which are often associated with adjectival and attributive predications, are introduced as a relation between two beings and not between two expressions (Bäck, *Aristotle’s Theory of Predication*, 155-6).

¹²⁴ See ĪJ’s description of necessity in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 3: 116.

then this would be limited by that auxiliary principle; and, indeed, this would be likewise if the Necessarily Existent were a singular essence. This [point] would prevent the permissibility of the Necessarily Existent being a generic accident or a genus’ nature. Also this [aspect] is subject to debate because if necessity were a genus’ nature, then this would be correct. Distinguishing species that are classified under the Necessarily Existent from differentia follows from this. This [point also] brings a difficulty for the Necessarily Existent since He would be dependent on the composition of a species’ nature and an individuation. There is then no difference between them such that [21a] each of them has a mental composition, as we have mentioned previously.

The Commentator said: “What is required for entification that superadded to it [...]”. **I say that** this requirement is in line with [the points concerning] the addition of entification and the requirement of composition. **FINIS.**

Elaborating on a previous point, Ḥ brings evidence from Taḥṭānī’s *al-Muḥākamāt*, noting that mental conceptions like necessity, quiddity, and existence, which are all equal to the NE according to the philosophers’ formulation, cannot again be considered as ‘genus’ natures’ due to these terms’ connotating contingency. Avicenna notes that the Necessarily Existent has no differentiating factors additional to His quiddity, such as entification or individuation, which are parts of a thing’s haecceity.¹²⁵ If the NE is accepted to be an entification of its own essence, then it is of a singular essence, demanding neither universality nor particularity. Otherwise, if necessity is taken as a species classified under the NE, then it will be requiring a differentia to emerge distinctly. This is impossible because this case will imply that the NE is composite of a species’ nature and an individuation. Affirming Taḥṭānī’s position, Ḥ makes the conclusion that there is no problem in this statement as long as all these terms are one, only being distinguished mentally.

While Ḥ defends the philosophers’ version of *burhān al-tamānu’*, he also adheres to Taḥṭānī (and Rāzī) in other aspects, like the nature of entification vis-à-vis that of necessity.¹²⁶ Upon following the post-classical verifiers who accepted that entification is an accidental superaddition, Ḥ ends the debate amending the position of Avicenna (and Ṭūsī), such that if and only if entification is prevented from being a necessary concomitant as the theologians have claimed, then the problem of entification’s constituting composition in God will be solved.

In conclusion, the nature of entification is the only part on which Ḥ seems to disagree with the philosophers. In other occasions, he follows them very closely in the nitty-gritty of their unicity proof, especially with regard to the stated meanings of necessity. Yet, when the discussion is extended to other tangential topics, he does not also refrain from stating his own view, such that entification and species’ natures, contrary to Avicenna, are accidental superadditions (rather than necessary concomitants). Ḥ’s main aim in his defense is to show that Z is mistaken in his evaluation of the philos-

¹²⁵ Mayer, “Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique”, 289-97.

¹²⁶ Al-Taḥṭānī, *al-Ilāhiyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 79. Rāzī states that entification cannot be a concomitant since *first* it denotes commonality and, *second*, it ultimately leads to multiplicity (al-Rāzī, *al-Ilāhiyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 80).

ophers’ doctrine, and the nuances of their exposition are coherent in and of themselves. As a post-classical scholar who is skeptical about Avicennan realism, H̄ argues that the Avicennan model can also be translated into the conceptualism of post-classical thought with certain modifications – especially through the conceptualization of mental considerations. In either case, necessity is taken as an ontological term that is conceptually distinct but the same as God’s quiddity/essence, as well as ‘pure existence’ in reality, a view for H̄ that does not affect God’s singularity. While most theologians take necessity as a superadded accident, H̄ argues that as long as necessity (as well as existence and entification) is taken as an *i’tibār*, a *non-entitative* term that can only be distinguished in the mind, the philosophers’ thesis that necessity and existence are the same as God’s quiddity/essence can still be verified.

6 Conclusion

Verifying the Truth on Their Own Terms

Summary 6.1 Summary of the Debate. Hıcazâde's Persistent Point on the Non-Entitativity of Necessity. – 6.2 Hıcazâde's Personal Opinion. His Perusal of *al-Shifâ'*, *Tahâfut al-falâsifa*, and Beyond. – 6.3 For the Sake of the Debate. Verification in Defense of the Philosophers.

In baħr-e wujūd âmade bîrûn ze nehoft,
Kas nîst ke ïn gowhar-e taħqîq basoft.
Harkas sokhanî az sar-e sowdâ gofte ast,
Zânry ke hast, kas namîdâned goft.

This ocean of existence has come from the Obscure,
And none can verify the truth of this substance.
Each has uttered according to his humor,
None being able to define it from the surface level.¹
Omar Khayyâm

The present debate is a product of the tension between two widely studied disciplines at early Ottoman medreses, *ħikma* (post-Avicennan philosophy) and *kalâm* (philosophical theology), which, over the course of centuries, accumulated a great number of crossovers, valences, as well as discrepancies among various schools of thought. Each scholar present in the exchange

¹ The English version is based on Khayyâm, *The Ruba'iyat of Omar Khayyam*, 39. I modified the terms that appear in the quatrain, such as *wujūd*, *jawhar*, and *taħqîq*, according to their philosophical meaning in Avicennan metaphysics. The Persian version is Number Fourteen in Furūghî and Ghânî's selection published in 1941 and Number Eight in Hedâyat, *Tarânahâ-ye Khayyâm*. Also see Balıkcıođlu, "Şair, Feylesûf ve Şüphe", 114-15.

showcases their knowledge in past positions and objections by making references to various classical and post-classical authors. The texts that they refer to during the debate reveal their expertise in rational and religious sciences, especially their background in debates involving the discrepancies between *falsafa/hikma* and *kalām*. The current debate, in this context, addresses how prominent Ottoman scholars can respond to the antinomies of past schools and articulate their own take through referencing other contemporaries. It should be noted that the debate culture in the post-classical world followed the formal rules of debate etiquette, and the way that a scholar employed his own proofs and premises or objected to his opponent's was granted more important than sometimes arriving at a certain conclusion. The ornate detailing in post-classical argumentation during the Ottoman age of scholarly debates particularly favored the deconstruction of the opponent's method and argumentation style, as well as exactitude in referencing, which also interplayed a significant role in one's scholarly arbitration.

The Sufi-scholar Zeyrek brings an initial rebuttal of the validity of the philosophers' proof concerning the univocity of terms like necessity and existence when described with regard to God, by criticizing the Timurid verifier Jurjānī's inability to refute it. As a response, even though he does not uphold the philosophers' thesis as being true precisely, the verifier Ḥocazāde, for the sake of the debate, defends the philosophers' doctrine concerning unicity, by proving Zeyrek that the philosophers' version is coherent on their own terms. To convince the Sultan and the scholars present during the debate, Ḥocazāde justifies certain aspects of Avicennan metaphysics not only through referencing the philosophical corpus with scrutiny, but also referring to acclaimed post-classical critics, such as Jurjānī and Taḥṭānī, concluding that the philosophers' proof can also be upheld as true according to the post-classical paradigm.

During the debate both scholars accept that necessity is a mental consideration (*ītibār*), a widely conceded position in post-classical philosophical theology, yet they are not in agreement with the ways in which necessity as an *ītibār* is linked to God's quiddity/essence or whether its being an *ītibār* also entails its accidentality or, as Ḥocazāde claims, it can be said to have conformed to the philosophers' position. The term *ītibār* chiefly refers to the rational operations of the mind and its ability to unite and divide intellectual/mental conceptions, as well as creating and multiplying relations and distinctions between them. Yet, different from accidentality, it neither implies extramental existence nor external occurrence as an accidental superaddition (see § 3.4). The term *ītibār*, in this context, seems to harmonize with the alternative views listed under *hikma* and *kalām*, such that it refers to the conceptual distinctness of existence in an agnostic way without particularly singling out one view (whether its being equal or superadded) over another.

Following Rāzī and other post-classical scholars who argued for the accidental superaddition of existence and necessity to quiddity/existence in necessary beings, Zeyrek argues that this mind-dependent concept, necessity, should be deemed as a separate superadded (*zā'id*) accident, hence cannot be equal to neither God's quiddity/essence nor His existence. Ḥocazāde, on the other hand, defends that the post-classical conceptualization of *ītibārāt* does not go against the philosophers' thesis (i.e. that God's quiddity/essence is equal to His existence and necessity), even cohering with it, since it conforms to God's singularity. In this context, the main point of Ḥocazāde's de-

fense of the philosophers is that he wants to demonstrate his opponent that Avicenna's realist account of necessity can be successfully resituated in the new post-classical context of *i'tibārāt* by regarding the term as *non-entitative* (without its connotations in accidentality).² The diverse number of topics outlined, as well as the references to past and contemporary commentators, proves, as evidenced in this analysis, the breadth of Ḥocazāde's knowledge and careful arbitration before settling his own position.

6.1 Summary of the Debate. Ḥocazāde's Persistent Point on the Non-Entitativity of Necessity

Following the theologians' view, Zeyrek objects to Jurjānī's treatment of a premise on the philosophers' formulation of *burhān al-tamānu'*, by arguing that the premise "necessity is equal to quiddity/essence in the Necessarily Existent" cannot be true because the nature of necessity raises the problem of multiplicity in God. For Zeyrek, as a better option, not only does necessity need to be accidental to God's quiddity, but also to His existence.

When Ḥocazāde brings the counter-evidence that the third meaning of necessity, a view that also appears in the fifteenth-century handbooks of philosophical theology including *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, corresponds to the meaning of necessity in the philosophers' statement, Zeyrek counters that the meaning in the third sense cannot even be the intension of this concept, but what falls under it. Unlike intensions, extensions are identified as ostensive definitions according to which certain individuals are enumerated, and the use of necessity here as an extension implies that necessity may occur or attach to God's quiddity externally. Post-classical thinkers often see God's essence as a case of metaphysical necessity, yet the role of necessity's modality in understanding the concept of essence has been recently contested since no modal account of essence seems possible.³

Then Zeyrek moves to another aspect of the discussion, namely, the question of the philosophers' equation of necessity with 'pure existence', in which he seems to equate 'pure existence' with 'absolute existence' following Rāzī,

² One of the later glossators of Ḥocazāde's *Tahāfut*, Meḥmed Emīn el-Üsküdarī (d. 1149/1736) will associate this position (i.e. that existence is not superadded externally to quiddity but only in the mind – *fī al-dhihn* – as a mental consideration – *i'tibār 'aqlī*) with Suhrawardī's *Ḥikma al-ishrāq*. In the gloss, Üsküdarī rules out this option arguing that existence will be characterized (*ittiṣāf*) by quiddity being in need of it – a fact that will undermine their being equivalent to one another (Üsküdarī, *Telḥīsu*, 168 [English] and 169 [Arabic]). Before describing Avicenna's view that existence cannot be a superadded accident to God's quiddity (since, otherwise, existence will be subsisting in it), Üsküdarī starts the chapter by acknowledging that Avicenna's position does not go against the principles of Islam. Even though he does not give a definitive answer, he outlines three historical responses to this proof which are listed along with their possible objections: Suhrawardī's view that existence is a mental conception; Rāzī's view that the cause of existence is not prior to its effect, i.e. making existence dependent on another thing; and Ghazālī's view that existence is actually in need of an efficacious agent, hence cannot be the same as God's quiddity. Üsküdarī does not choose one position over another; he rather evaluates the later critics of Avicenna, finding certain faults in their proofs (Üsküdarī, *Telḥīsu*, 168-75; also see Muḥyiddīn el-Ḳarabagī's (d. 942/1535) gloss on Ḥocazāde, which states that no one can speak ill of the philosophers' proof despite their imprecision since the theologians' proofs are also incomplete (Güzel, *Karabaġī ve Tehāfut'ü*, 108).

³ As Kit Fine suggests, "the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equal to a modal notion", meaning that propositions about essences are irreducible to modal propositions (Fine, "Essence and Modality", 1-3).

that is, overlooking pure existence's 'special status' in God, as passed in Avicenna's certain works.⁴ Here Zeyrek makes two objections, arguing that *first*, the term existence also has to be superadded to quiddity in God and, *second*, that all three meanings of necessity imply that it is an accidental aspect. As a result, he states that none of these meanings (which all suggest accidentality and contingency) can provide a substantial proof that the necessity here has to be a single reality with no diversity – and its being a mental consideration does not guarantee this. This point, in turn, deems the philosophers' proof incomplete, and Zeyrek proclaims himself as the winner.

In his textual response, Ḥocazāde affirms the validity of the philosophers' doctrine according to their paradigm, arguing that *at least* one of the three meanings of necessity (namely its third) corresponds to the exact meaning of God's necessity. That is, as opposed to Zeyrek's claim that the third meaning, at the most, can only fall under the philosophers' sense of necessity, Ḥocazāde not only shows that the third is the intension of this term, but also the first two meanings are fundamental in the derivation of the third.

For the philosophers, necessity is the same as God's quiddity/essence, which, likewise, is also identical to His existence. Yet, of course, this does not mean that God is each of these things. On the following days, Ḥocazāde has the harder job of defending the philosophers' thesis, since even though the young scholar asserted that the question of 'pure existence' along with others would be perceived as a digression, Zeyrek is determined to bring the questions of 'pure existence', entification, and individuation vis-à-vis God's singularity, demanding him to show that each of these Avicennan doctrines is consistent with the other.

The young scholar's position in the debate is difficult for another reason: his defense of the philosophers does not mean that Ḥocazāde supports their views completely. As a post-classical scholar who follows the works of verifiers like Jurjānī and Taḥṭānī, Ḥocazāde holds in his *Tahāfut* that necessity and entification were superadded accidents to God's quiddity/essence. This view is contrary to what he defended during the debate. While arguing thus, he did not outright accept the positions detailed in the handbooks of the philosophers of his time. He perused further interpretations held in *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* with scrutiny, by especially refuting two objections to the philosophers' proof by his long-time adversary Ḥasan Çelebi.

Ḥocazāde may not have held that the philosophers' statement about 'pure existence' was true, but he does show that the philosophers' position is valid in and of itself, since existence's being an accident superadded to quiddity does not do justice to God's necessary existence as it places existence secondary to the essential aspect of quiddity. And, at the end of the debate, when the question came to the status of entification or individuation vis-à-vis God, Ḥocazāde did also defend the philosophers' thesis outlined in Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt*, but also included his own view that if entification, a term closely tied to necessity, is taken as a concomitant in the philosophers' sense: it may indeed imply multiplicity in God's essence. Hence, different from the philosophers, he asserts that entification should be taken as a superadded accident that does not have any real existence in the outside world.

⁴ Avicenna assigns a 'proper mode of existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*) to God which is distinct from 'realized existence' (*wujūd muḥaṣṣal*), the latter of which reserved for universal and particular existences. The conceptualization of the term goes back to Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (Janos, *Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity*, 498-531).

Ḥocazāde's view with regard to the nature of necessity, quiddity/essence, and existence falls under the 'conceptualist' reading of these terms in post-classical philosophy.⁵ It has been argued that there are two such approaches in the philosophical corpus: one group asserts that essence and existence can be distinguished only conceptually, whereas objectively or extramentally they are identical; on the other hand, the rival view states that the distinction between the two is real.⁶ The philosophers' view, as well as Ḥocazāde's rendition follows the former position, which has been also posited by the famed thirteenth-century post-classical philosophers, such as Abharī and Tūsī, who were both instrumental in the transmission of Avicennan concepts through their commentaries and modified doctrines in the post-classical Islamic world.⁷

Zeyrek's position depends on the problem of composition, according to which the presence of both existence and necessity in God, in relation to His quiddity/essence, may require diversity and composition in the Necessarily Existent. One of the most common ways to argue against God's purported multiplicity in pre-Ottoman Islamic scholarship (e.g. theology of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) was to show that necessity and existence were *non-entitative*, by taking both terms as either *i'tibārī* ('with no distinct entitative metaphysical component'), or *'adamī/salbī* (negational, or 'simply ascribing some feature of extramentality which adds nothing to that entity').⁸ Ḥocazāde here certainly follows the *non-entitative* position in the first case, not upholding the second, by concluding that the philosophers' proof, which may not be the most sound formulation, is still true in and of itself, according to their paradigm (though he does not follow this thesis personally in his *Tahāfut*). On the other hand, Zeyrek, acknowledging both aspects of *non-entitativity* to a certain extent, concludes, also following the theologians' view as in the third meaning, that necessity (and existence) should be considered as accidents that occur to quiddity externally; that is, that they are non-essential superadditions not identical to God's quiddity/essence. Zeyrek deems that the philosophers' answer can only be validated through accepting necessity as an accident – a view that goes against their provided assumptions.

6.2 Ḥocazāde's Personal Opinion. His Perusal of *al-Shifā'*, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, and Beyond

Ḥocazāde's main aim during the debate was not only to show that this line of thought was true according to the philosophers, but also the meaning of necessity in their sense was also present in various texts of philosophical theology studied at Ottoman medreses, including Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*. In his exposition of the subject, Ḥocazāde does not directly follow the past verifiers by reporting their views, but he corrects, comments, amends, and

⁵ Different from the case of extreme/absolute nominalism, Pines associates the conceptualist reading with the view that the universals are merely mental forms, which have a relation to many things in such a way that it may be said of each one of them that it is it; and this reading is a weaker form of extreme nominalism (Pines, "Studies in Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's Poetics and Metaphysics", 282-4).

⁶ Benevich, "The Essence-Existence Distinction", 206-7.

⁷ Endress, "Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa", 407-8, 416-19.

⁸ Benevich, "The Necessary Existent", 136.

modifies them if needed in order to craft his own formulation depending on the nature of the disputation.

Indeed, Hıcazâde's defense was not new to the medrese curriculum, since one of the popular works in post-classical philosophy, Abharî's *Hidâya al-ḥikma*, already acknowledges that God's existence, as well as the necessity and entification of His existence, is equal to His real essence in Chapters Two and Three of the *Metaphysics* by giving a summary of Avicenna's views.⁹ In a polemical treatise concerning Jurjânî's mistakes in six theological issues, the acclaimed Ottoman verifier Kaştalânî (d. 901/1496)¹⁰ also argued, different from Jurjânî and Zeyrek, that existence and quiddity may even be the same among the possible existents, yet with one additional condition: the existent in question must be an essential (*dhâtî*) quality.¹¹

Mollâ Kaştalânî was a contemporary of Hıcazâde, who garnered the master verifier's utmost respect as a tutor and a scholar. After having taught Jurjânî's works for many decades, he penned a short *dubia* on six issues, each of which had the intention of revising Jurjânî's points and showing that the scholar's answers failed to verify the truth absolutely. The third question in Kaştalânî's *dubia* concerns Ījî/Jurjânî's third corollary whether or not existence is superadded to quiddity among the possibly existents. Kaştalânî observes that there are two types of existents (sing. *mawjûd*), one type is by way of essence (*li-dhâtîhi*) and the other being external to its essence but in conjunction with it (*khârij 'an dhâtîhi muqâran lahu*), concluding that in the former case one cannot argue that quiddity is prior to existence. This means that, in the first case, once existence is removed from quiddity, the latter will be negated as well, hence there will not be an existent in the first place.

It could be said that the verifier Kaştalânî does the same thing with his contemporary Hıcazâde: in addition to a full-fledged restatement and defense, he also criticizes and modifies Jurjânî's exposition of the philosophers in light of their view. In this lemma, he aims to show off his scrutiny in scholarship, by showing that Ījî/Jurjânî's position here is not categorically absolute, and these scholars did not take distinct types of possibly existents into full account. In his objections to Kaştalânî's objections, the Sufi-scholar Sinân Paşa, on the other hand, points out that Jurjânî did mention this point in another work (i.e. his gloss on İsfahânî's *Tajrîd*), and Kaştalânî was simply unaware of this lemma, by questioning how come he could be called a 'verifier'. This did not, however, stop the skeptical Sinân Paşa to point his arrows of criticism at the famed Persian theologians of the past:

9 See "faşl fî 'anna wujûd wâjib al-wujûd nafs ḥaqîqatîhi" and "faşl fî 'anna wujûb al-wujûd wa-ta'ayyanuhu 'ayn dhâtîhi" (al-Abharî, *Hidâya al-ḥikma*, 96-7).

10 For a short account of Kaştalânî's works, see Şen, "Molla Kestelî'nin Hayatı ve Eserleri".

11 For the Arabic: "Qâla: fî baḥth al-wujûd istidalla 'alâ kawn al-wujûd zâ'idan 'alâ al-mâhiya 'annah law lam yakun zâ'idan 'alayhâ lâkin li-kâna nafsahâ 'aw juz'ahâ, fa-lâ yumkinu salbahu 'anhâ. Wa-'ajibu bi-'annahâ nafsuhâ taqabbala al-'adm, fa-'in al-mâhiya idhâ irtafa'at, irtafa'a wujûduhâ. Fa-li-dhâlik la-dhâ kâna wujûdahâ 'aynuhâ, jâza irtifâ'ahâ. **Aqûlu:** al-mawjûd darbân mawjûd li-dhâtîi, lâ li-ma'nâ khârij 'an dhâtîhi muqâran lahu, fa-lâ yutaşawwaru zawâl wujûdîhi ka-mâ 'anna al-insân lâ-annah insân li-dhâtîhi lâ yutaşawwaru salb insâniyatîhi 'anhu. Wa-darb mawjûd lâ li-dhâtîhi; bal li-ma'nâ muqâran lahu, wârid 'alayhi min ghayrihi. Fa-huwa fî ḥadd dhâtîhi qâbil li-salb dhâlik al-ma'nâ 'anhu, fa-huwa mumkin 'an yujad wa-'in lâ yujad" (Kaştalânî, *I'tirâdât al-Kaştalânî 'alâ al-Sayyid al-Sharîf* [Süleymaniye, MS Karaçelebizâde Hüsameddin 330, f. 3a]). Also see a recent edition of this *dubia*, Şen, "Molla Muslihuddin Kestelî'nin", for a short analysis, 179 and, for the Arabic text, 198-9. Also see a more extensive analysis of Kaştalânî's sources and Ījî/Jurjânî's positions in Yıldırım, *Kestelî'nin Es-Seb'ul-Mu'allaka*, 78-82.

for him, neither Ljī nor Jurjānī brought a new perspective but simply copied the Ash'arī position without adding any ingenuity.¹²

In the fifteenth-century Ottoman world, Graeco-Arabic philosophy was mostly known through Avicenna's compendia of philosophy prepared later in his life, such as *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt*, as well as the verifier Taḥtānī's adjudication on the two famed commentaries on the same text called *al-Muḥākamāt* – not through his complex voluminous masterpiece *Kitāb al-shifā'*. This fact is also evidenced in Zeyrek's and Ḥocazāde's citing the philosophers' thesis concerning 'pure existence' in the debate, since they, in every instance, choose to quote the philosophers via *al-Muḥākamāt* instead of going back to the original sources (a practice that may also be observed in certain discussion in the *Tahāfut* debate).¹³

Ḥocazāde's overutilization of Taḥtānī's *al-Muḥākamāt* is also evident in a heartfelt confession by him, who announced at a banquet in the presence of notable scholars, including Mollā Luṭfī and Ḥatībzāde, that he had never read Avicenna's magnum opus *Kitāb al-shifā'* cover-to-cover, which may indicate that he knew its arguments through close readings of certain parts or from its later renderings. As a reply, the fellow Kaṣṭalānī proudly claims to have read the work at least seven times, and each time he was as enthusiastic as a novice studying the work as if for the first time.¹⁴ This anecdote does not precisely suggest that the master verifier Ḥocazāde never read certain sections of the work with scrutiny or was not aware of the arguments in *al-Shifā'*, since there are certain other cases in the *Tahāfut* where he directly quoted from this book.¹⁵ It may still be inferred that Ḥocazāde, who might have supported the philosophers for the sake of the disputation, did rather follow Taḥtānī in certain regards, including the position that entification, as evidenced here, is a superadded accident to God's quiddity.

This piece of biographical information should not make us think that Ḥocazāde was misinformed about the philosophers' point. In fact, one could find his ultimate position on unicity, in lieu of the philosophers' critique, in his famed adjudication on Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, a work that was writ-

12 For the Arabic text, "Hādha kalām ḥaqq lā yaḥūmu ḥawlahu shā'iba shakk wa-inkār. Wa-'ashāra 'ilayhi al-fāḍil al-sharif fi ḥawāshī Tajrīd wa-ghayrihā. 'Illā 'annahu aktifā hahunā baḥl al-kalām al-muṣannif min ṭaraf al-ashā'ira 'alā māhir da'bihi kathīran fi hādha al-kitāb" (Yıldırım, *Kesteli'nin Es-Seb'ul-Mu'allaka*, 45).

13 For instance, Tūsi's Discussion Thirteen in his *Tahāfut* adjudication, in which he summarized the philosophers' position concerning God's knowledge of the particulars via *al-Muḥākamāt* only (al-Tūsi, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 271).

14 During a banquet, blood gushed forth from Mollā Luṭfī all of a sudden, and some of the scholars around the table were amused by the scene and got intrigued by the possible medical reasons for this condition. Kaṣṭalānī explained Luṭfī's condition by quoting from Avicenna's *al-Qānūn fī al-ṭibb*, and Ḥocazāde was highly impressed with the scholar's extensive knowledge about the Avicennan corpus. Upon Ḥocazāde's astonishment, Kaṣṭalānī further claimed that, in addition to *al-Qānūn*, he had read *al-Shifā'* seven times from cover-to-cover, while the master confessed that he never did. As for the text: "Mevlānā daḥī didi ki tenhā Kānūn'ı deḡil belki Şeyḥ'ün 'amme-i mü'ellifātını bā-cem'uhā ḥattā Şifā'yı daḥī tamām-ı muṭāla'a itmişim Ḥocazāde ta'accub idicek eyütü ki yā siz Şifā'yı tamām görmek vâkı' olma muş mıdır? Ḥocazāde eyütü ki tamām görmedüm emmā mevāzı'-ı mühimmesini 'alā ḡadri'l-ḥāce görüb diḡkat üzre muṭāla'a itmek vâkı' olmuşdur. Mevlānā didi ki ben Şifā'yı bi't-tamām yedi kerre muṭāla'a idüb marra-ı sābi'ada ders-i cedid muṭāla'asın ider yeñi dānişmend gibi muṭāla'a itdüm" (Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tācü't-tevārīḥ*, 2: 482). It was due to this exchange, Kaṣṭalānī was one of the two scholars whom Ḥocazāde respected to an extent that he referred to him as *mollā*, and the other scholar was Ḥayālī (Ḥoca Sa'deddīn, *Tācü't-tevārīḥ*, 2: 482).

15 Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 119.

ten soon after this debate. In this adjudication, not only did he repeat his position concerning differentiating factors, such as entification and individuation, that they are superadded accidents to quiddity,¹⁶ but also he argued the opposite of what he had defended against Zeyrek, that even necessity should be deemed as a separate accidental superaddition¹⁷ as in the case of entification, hence not being directly equal to God.

In his *Tahāfut*'s Discussion Seven on the philosophers' inability to prove God's singularity, Ḥocazāde writes that terms such as 'necessity', 'entification', and 'individuation' should be taken as *non-entitative* in the sense of the first aspect above, that is, as *i'tibārī* concepts appearing to quiddity without extramental existence – yet adding that he neither holds that these concepts can be externally existing (*wujūdī*) nor *non-entitative* in the negational (*adamī/salbī*) sense, thereby suggesting their accidentality in several places.¹⁸ As a conclusion, he does not strictly follow *non-entitativity*, finding the philosophers' formulation of unicity imprecise. Ḥocazāde's acknowledgment of this thesis against Zeyrek should simply be for the sake of the debate.

As passed in the analysis of the text presented at the debate, the verifier Ḥocazāde does not hold that the philosophers' designation of entification is true. By way of summary, the philosophers argue that entification is an existent with an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), that is the same as quiddity in the external world, which can only be distinguished mentally. On the other hand, the theologians hold that entification is a non-existent being (with no existence in the outside world) but superadded accidentally to quiddity. In his *Tahāfut*, Ḥocazāde synthesizes both views arguing that entification is an existent that cannot be the same as quiddity in reality but must be superadded to it. Entification implies a 'need-based' relationship associated with identity and specification, such that God's having His own special entification would still go against His necessary existence, and thereby deeming it to be a superadded accident (*'arīḍ*).

In his *Tahāfut*, Ḥocazāde provides three proofs from the philosophers regarding the nature of entification, the first regarding what entification is and whether it is an existent (*mawjūd*) or not; the second regarding the view that it is impossible for two quiddities with necessary existence to be existents; and the third stating that the individuals of a single nature or quiddity dis-

¹⁶ “Rather, the outcome is that if necessity were to denote a sense of commonality between two partners, the entification of the Necessarily Existent could not be the same as His quiddity, and it is apparent [from this] that it would be added to the quiddity”. As for the Arabic: “Bal maḥşūluhu huwa ‘annahu law kāna al-wujūb mushtarakan bayna ithnayn lam yakun ta’ayyun al-wājib nafs māhiyatihi, wa-huwa zāhir bal kāna zā’idan ‘alayhi” (Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 186). Or: “As an answer to this, it is apparent that we do not concede necessity's being the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, rather it is an accident among God's accidents”. As for the Arabic: “Fa-jawābuhu: al-zāhir ‘an yuqālu: lā nusallam kaww wujūb al-wujūd nafs māhiya al-wājib, bal huwa ‘arīḍ min ‘awāriḍihā” (Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 190).

¹⁷ “The answer is that according to the second position [as outlined by Ghazālī], what is intended by necessity is existence's requiring essence. Thus we do not accept that necessity is the very reality of the Necessarily Existent, rather it is a mind-dependent thing with no existence in the outside world strictly speaking. So, how could necessity then be the same thing as the reality of the Necessarily Existent?” As for the Arabic: “Al-jawāb: ‘an al-maslak al-thānī ‘annahu ‘in urīd bi'l-wujūb iqtidā’ al-dhāt al-wujūd, fa-lā nusallam ‘annahu nafs ḥaqīqa al-wājib, bal huwa ‘amr i'tibārī lā wujūd lahu fī al-khārij qat’an. Fa-kayfa kāna nafs ḥaqīqa al-wājib?” (Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 184).

¹⁸ Ḥocazāde rules out the possibility of necessity's existentiality (*wujūdiyya*) based on the philosophers' statement (Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 193), and argues that necessity cannot also be negational (*salbī*) in its *non-entitativity* (Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 191).

tinguish themselves through a superadded entification. He concludes that the philosophers contradict themselves regarding the nature of entification, since while their first proof upholds entification's being equal to quiddity, their second proof, which hypothesizes about the possibility of two Necessarily Existent, employs entification's being superadded in a possible line of thought.¹⁹ The rationale that Ḥocazāde bases his position is linked to the problem of the entification's cause: if God's entification has a cause of itself, then this will cause multiplicity in Him; similarly, if God has His own special entification, that is the same as His essence, then this would also hinder His singularity, which leads us to the conclusion that entification has to be a superadded accident.

In his gloss on Ḥocazāde's adjudication, which chiefly concerns itself with critiquing the ways in which the authors of the *Tahāfut* lineage present and establish their proofs, the Ottoman verifier and religious scholar İbn Kemāl (d. 940/1534) has a passage regarding the nature of entification and its relation to quiddities. For him, all proofs present here could be used in support of the philosophers' argument regarding entification that states that it is the same as quiddity in the outside world, only distinguishable mentally. He follows Ḥocazāde's most points, arguing that in the first proof, entification does not necessarily show that it has to be superadded, but the second could be utilized to make a case for its accidentality. Nonetheless, for İbn Kemāl, as long as entification is taken as a mental consideration, it will conform to the philosophers' doctrine.²⁰

In a partial commentary on the fifteenth-century Persian scholar Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī's *al-Risāla al-qadīma fī ithbāt al-wājib* ("The Old Treatise on Establishing the Necessary"),²¹ as well as his epistle on verifying the necessity of the Necessarily Existent (*al-Risāla fī taḥqīq wujūb al-wājib*), İbn Kemāl also outlines his views regarding the logical and metaphysical status of existence and necessity with regard to God. Following the Avicennan definition of God's unicity, he (via Dawānī)²² argues that God's divine quiddity/essence is equal to His 'proper existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*),²³ since

19 Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 181-8. Also see Ahmet Arslan's analysis in *Haşiye Ala't-Tehāfut Tahlii*, 259-60 and İbn Kemāl, *Tehāfut Hāşiyesi*, 394-5.

20 İbn Kemāl, *Tehāfut Hāşiyesi*, 399-400. Additionally he addresses a third option for the case of entification with regard to Ḥocazāde's synthesis, which is as follows: the philosophers regard quiddity as the reason for the existence of entification; by this way, they argue that entification may be construed as a necessary concomitant to quiddity. On the other hand, post-classical theologians are hesitant in associating entification, a term that denotes individuation and concretization, with quiddity, setting it as entification's cause. In order to justify the philosophers' view in the eyes of post-classical scholarship, İbn Kemāl offers a modification to their doctrine, by saying that if quiddity is taken as the reason for entification's being superadded instead of the direct reason of entification itself, then entification will not be associated with the Necessarily Existent's quiddity, not being able to penetrate into His essentiality. With this amendment to their proof, the philosophers can now justify the position that entification is a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*) (İbn Kemāl, *Tehāfut Hāşiyesi*, 392-3).

21 According to the colophon of MS Ragıp Paşa 1457 in Süleymaniye, this work is dedicated to Bāyezid II in 894/1489. For this work, Dawānī was said to have received a letter from the Sultan along with five hundred filori (Pourjavady, *Philosophy in the Early Safavid Iran*, 11-12).

22 See Dawānī's old treatise *Establishing the Necessary*, which follows the classical Avicennan formula regarding God's necessary existence: "God is equal to His 'special existence' which subsists through its essence that is free of relations and considerations with the necessity denoting the necessity of essence's requiring existence" (in Bḍāiwi, "Philosophia Ottomanica", 324-5).

23 Unlike the theologians and the Akbarī Sufis, İbn Kemāl, seems to distinguish 'absolute existence' from 'special existence', such that the former is a conceptual matter or secondary in-

God's essence should not be reduced to a secondary intelligible shared by all things.²⁴

Several times in the *Tahāfut*, Ḥocazāde directs questions concerning the veracity of the philosophers' point by stating that their doctrine does not provide certain proofs that, for instance, entification can be a concomitant (as supported in *al-Ishārāt*). This is because if entification is not an accident, then entification and necessity will indicate a cause-and-effect relationship as in the case of the possibly existents, thereby implying contingency and multiplicity in God.²⁵ Similarly, Ḥocazāde also highlights one of the premises of the philosophers' inference (i.e. necessity's being the same as quiddity) as problematic. This is because, if we assume that necessity would be a commonality between two equally necessary partners, then their being distinguished from one another by a concomitant entification cannot be valid since the quiddity's species that belongs to the Necessarily Existent here would be in need of a discrete thing (*'amr munfaṣil*), rendering it multiple. Ḥocazāde concludes in his *Tahāfut* that entification should rather be super-added to fulfill the philosophers' criterion.²⁶

6.3 For the Sake of the Debate. Verification in Defense of the Philosophers

The verifier Ḥocazāde's unique synthesis in this debate is in demonstrating that not only was necessity verily identical to God's quiddity/essence, and 'pure existence', according to the philosophers' paradigm, but also, in line with the new trends in post-classical philosophical theology, the use of *i'tibārāt*, a conceptualist interpretation of Avicennan ontological realism, did not undermine their formulation to a certain extent. He even wants to show that *i'tibārāt* can be used to modify their exposition, with the condition that the *non-entitativity* does not suggest accidentality.

telligible. See, for instance, Jāmī who seems to have merged both categories of existence into one following Akbarī monism (Heer, "Al-Jāmī's *Treatise on Existence*").

24 In that regard, İbn Kemāl has an alternative view that links God's 'special existence' to the general concept of existence shared by other beings: for him, the meaning of the divine essence's requiring existence is the requiring of existent-ness (*mawjūdiyya*) as opposed to existence/existentiality (*wujūdiyya*) itself. Unlike Rāzī, for instance, İbn Kemāl (and Dawānī) vie for the identity of essence and existence in God, such that the divine essence distinguishes itself by way of its existent-ness (*mawjūdiyya*), a term with a sense of superaddition. If the term *mawjūdiyya* is employed for God, His divine essence will rather be equal to the specificity (*khuṣūṣiyya*) of existent-ness (as in "the light is luminous" as opposed to "the earth is luminous"), meaning that, in the case of God, existent-ness will not denote a substrate in which existence inheres (rather it results from external effects) (Ansari, "İbn Kemal, Dawānī and the Avicennan Lineage", 257-9, 263). By this way, *mawjūdiyya* via *wujūdiyya* will be a secondary intention that is predicated univocally of all things and extrinsic to their essence, without denoting plurality in God. See al-Fārābī's point regarding different senses of *mawjūd*, which distinguishes *mawjūd* as 'having-a-quiddity-outside-the-soul' from *mawjūd* as 'the true' (Menn, "Al-Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*", 83-4). Following Jurjānī's disclaimer on the Sufis who upheld the controversial doctrine of *waḥdat al-mawjūd*, İbn Kemāl notes in his treatise on existence that multiplicity (*ta'addud*) has to be categorically cancelled out from *mawjūd*, which is a mental conception, so that it would be equal to the reality of existence (for Jurjānī's text, see al-Jurjānī, *Hāshiya al-tajrīd*, 2: 66 and, for İbn Kemāl's Arabic text, Bakhtari, Kocaoğlu, "Kemalpaşazāde'nin *Beyānu'l-vücūd*", 268).

25 Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 182-3.

26 Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 186.

One perennial issue with Ḥocazāde's synthesis is the question of coherence. Can we confidently say that a particular theory coheres when it is restated in a different paradigm? Or if a scholar reenvisioned Avicennan ontological realism in the new framework of post-classical conceptualism, would that be still valid? It should be noted that each paradigm is true in and of itself, and applying one conjecture to another will result in a syncretic effort – not in a comprehensive system of thought that is necessarily coherent in and of itself. Dimitri Gutas has recently argued in a provocative article that the efforts of post-classical scholars should be deemed as “pseudo-philosophy”, since synthesizing different strands of thought does not necessarily mean that there is an encompassing rational basis justified *scientifically* in a systematic fashion.²⁷ Ḥocazāde's synthesis here falls into Gutas' categorization in some ways, since necessity, as the philosophers define, fits in with God's unicity only within the parameters of Avicennan realism; that is, turning it into a conceptualist position does not necessarily correspond to Avicenna's initial framework. In certain other ways, Gutas' designation of pseudo-philosophy is not exactly suiting for this case either. Since Ḥocazāde's defense here is a rhetorical effort for the sake of the debate, and his main aim is to show his erudition through verification – not upholding the philosophers' position, true in his own teachings. His other works reveal that he neither complies with the philosophers' nor the theologians' expositions precisely. Having his own unique position, Ḥocazāde only asserts the *non-entitativity* of necessity as a mental conception in the post-classical world, conforming to some commentators and going against some others.

Ḥocazāde was not interested in whether the philosophers' proof remained valid as an actual argument in his time. Rather, he was keen to showcase his mastery in demonstrating what they had intended, what steps they had taken to realize it, and show whether their doctrines were compatible with the standards of his day. This does not mean that he never contested any of their points. On the contrary, there were cases in which he would follow their expositions in certain other adjudications or glosses.²⁸ Ḥocazāde's defense, in this sense, was a way of holding a mirror to his opponent Zeyrek, so that his opponent would realize how misinformed he was about Arabic philosophy and its reception in post-classical philosophical theology.

The method of verification was a way to digest past debates so that the new generations of scholars could address loopholes in past arguments by questioning their precision, certainty, and validity. Ḥocazāde's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* is a great example of this exercise. As in the philosophers' first position outlined in Ghazālī, it might be true that, if there were to be two Necessarily Existents, both by nature would distinguish themselves from one another through entification, by making two equal Gods impossible. Again Ḥocazāde adds a question mark to this proof, arguing that even though it appears intuitive, there is no guarantee that there would be two different realities, rather than one as in God, so that each one of the partners would require an entification.²⁹ In a similar vein, he continues to further his investigation in the *Tahāfut*, by questioning why we should think that there

²⁷ Gutas, “Avicenna and After”. Also see Jari Kaukua's evaluation of Gutas' thesis, “Post-Classical Islamic Philosophy”.

²⁸ See the case of secondary causes in Balıkcıoğlu, *A Coherence of Incoherences*.

²⁹ Ḥocazāde, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 181.

should be one existence, rather than different realities, each requiring an entification. Or an additional question that investigates the veracity of another point: why should it not be that there are multiple realities distinguished from one another, which fall under 'pure existence'?³⁰

The fifteenth-century Ottoman world was a period in which texts of Islamic philosophy had accumulated to an extent that the literature in philosophical theology was replete with a vast number of distinct positions on various topics. In order to compose a new argument, a competent verifier first had to demonstrate his erudition and pedantry in close textual readings of primary source materials by arbitrating among a number of schools and textual traditions. In that regard, the Ottoman medreses did not feed from a single source, and referencing the past in scholarly discussions encompassed a great variety of positions. It seems to me that Sultan Mehmed II's choice of these scholars for the debate was deliberate, as both represented different backgrounds and choices of arbitration in such an essential topic.

For centuries many theologians found faults in the philosophers' assertions, devising counter-arguments to demonstrate that the philosophers' proofs did not reflect the absolute truth. A master Ottoman verifier, in this context, should be a scholar who traced all these lines of arguments and counter-arguments by heart, even making suitable amendments to bring in his own unique perspective. This debate is a testament to the Ottoman scholars' skills in verifying different schools in order to demonstrate their syntheses of past masters. The time of Hocaşade was a period in the Ottoman world when the state was going through a definitive imperial restructuring, which was based on Mehmed II's cosmopolitan and universalistic ambitions, as exemplified by the all-encompassing selection of books in his glorious palatine library, where this debate most probably took place.

Hocaşade put forth his unique position on God's unicity in his *Tahāfut* adjudication, a view in which he did not follow the philosophers' perspective. Though he seemed to have followed their thesis closely during the debate, he did not also accept it outright – he further modified and corrected their given thesis while justifying it. The nature of the present debate was fairly distinct from the context of his *Tahāfut*, and the main aim in this exchange was to demonstrate his opponent that even if he did not hold this to be true, the philosophers' point was true in and of itself when one considered it within their own paradigm. If the nature of the debate demanded it, Hocaşade could pose as a philosopher in order to uphold the truth for the sake of debate, showing how the philosophers could be compatible with the post-classical context of philosophical theology. In this context, not only did Hocaşade ascertain the truth on the philosophers' terms, but both scholars in the debate also verified their respective versions of God's unicity on their own terms.

Ottoman court debates were combative at heart, not scripted imperial games.³¹ There were real losers or winners, and a respected scholar al-

³⁰ Hocaşade, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 182.

³¹ There were no medals to be won in the Renaissance and so no dire enforcements on the losing party. There were no severe punishments, such as the humiliation of removing a senior scholar from his post (Azzolini, "There Were No Medals", 264-5). A winner might boast for his argumentative skills as in the case of the Italian disputation master Achillini and the polymath Girolamo Cardano, but "victory rather than consensus" was the ultimate goal rather than the ravishing victory of one over another (Grendler, *The Universities in the Italian Renaissance*, 152-6).

ways had the mishap to lose his post and reputation, or to be humiliated in front of his colleagues. It is in this context that the efforts of the Ottoman verifiers should not be seen as futile scholarly attempts of mere apologetics since, as in the case of Hıocazāde, these scholars had the courage and erudition to even argue for doctrines with utmost scrutiny that they did not actually hold to be true or complete.

Appendix
English Translations,
Arabic Editiones Principes,
and Manuscript Facsimiles

Editiones principes

Risāla li-Mawlānā Zeyrek fī baḥṭh nafs al-māhiya (Mubāḥṭha bayna Ḥocazāde wa-Mawlānā Zeyrek) [Süleymaniye, MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, ff. 120a-121b]

[Day one. Response to Ḥocazāde's initial question]

[120a] وإذا كان الوجوب نفس الماهية، كان الاشتراك فيه اشتراكاً في نفس الماهية. **يقول الفقير** الوجوب يطلق على ثلاثة معان، اقتضاء الذات الوجود، والاستغناء عن الغير في الوجود، وما به يتميز الواجب عن غيره. ولا شك أن شيئاً من المعنيين الأولين لا يتصور كونه نفس ماهية الواجب، لأنهما اعتباريان. فالمراد بقولهم إنَّ الوجوب نفس ماهية الواجب هو ما يصدق عليه المعنى الثالث، لا نفس المعنى الثالث. إذ لا شبهة لعاقل في أن ماهية الواجب ليس مفهوم ما يتميز به الذات، بل هذا المفهوم أمر عارض له.

[Day two]

فحينئذ نقول ما ادعيته من التركيب على تقدير تعدد الواجب إنما يلزم لو كان ما يصدق [120b] عليه مفهوم الوجوب، صدق العارض على المعروض، حقيقة واحدة لها فردان، وهو محال، مما لا يجوز أن يكونا ذاتين مختلفتين متميزتين بأنفسهما من غير احتياج إلى معنيين مشتركين في اقتضاء الوجود والاستغناء على الغير من غير لزوم تركيب. فلا يثبت حينئذ وحدة الواجب بمعنى ما يقتضي ذاته وجوده أو ما يستغني عن الغير في وجوده.

[Day three]

لا يقال: الوجوب ليس إلا مجرد الوجود، فلا اختلاف في مجرد الوجود. نعم، الوجود المقارن للماهية يختلف بحسب اختلاف إضافته إليها. وأما محض الوجود، فهو في نفسه مفهوم واحد لا اختلاف فيه أصلاً، **لأننا نقول إن** أريد أن حقيقة الوجوب هو نفس مفهوم الوجود البحت غير الوجود العارض للماهية، فمحال. وإن أريد أن حقيقة الوجوب يصدق عليه الوجود الصرف صدق العارض على المعروض، فمسلم، ولكن لا نسلم أن ما يصدق عليه الوجود الصرف لا اختلاف فيه أصلاً. فلم لا يجوز أن يكون حقيقتين مختلفتين يصدق عليهما الوجود الصرف بمعنى أنهما غير متغايرتين للماهية؟

Translation of the Texts

A Treatise on [Necessity's Being] the Same as [God's] Quiddity by Mollā Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) [Süleymaniye, MS Giresun Yazmalar 99, ff. 120a-121b]

[Day one. Response to Ḥocazāde's initial question]

[120a] If necessity (*wujūb*) were [to be] the same thing as quiddity (*māhiya*), a commonality (*ishtirāq*) in necessity would also participate in this very quiddity. **The poor soul [Ḥocazāde] states** that necessity (*wujūb*) here corresponds to three meanings (sing. *ma'nā*): [necessity defined as] **(i)** “essence's (*dhāt*) requiring existence”; **(ii)** “that which has no need of others in existence”; and **(iii)** “what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others”. There is no doubt that neither of the first two meanings assumes that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent since both meanings are only mental considerations (sing. *al-i'tibārī*). Then what is intended by the philosophers' statement about necessity's being the same as the Necessarily Existent's quiddity only falls under the third meaning (*mā yaṣḍiqu 'alayhi*), but it is not [the same as] the very meaning itself. Then [there is] no doubt for a rational man that the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is not the intension (*mafḥūm*) of what distinguishes essence [as in **(iii)**] but, rather, this intension is accidentally superadded to (*'āriḍ lahu*) essence.

[Day two]

In that case, we say that what you claimed about compositeness (*tarkīb*) with respect to multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent follows that if ‘what falls under’ this statement were to be [120b] the intension of necessity, then the veracity of an ‘accidental affection’ (*'āriḍ*) occurring to an ‘object of accident’ (*ma'rūd*) would be a single reality with two isolated constituents (sing. *fard*). This is impossible because why would it not be permissible that two different essences that distinguish themselves [from one another] would not resort to the need for the first two meanings without the implication of compositeness (*luzūm al-tarkīb*)? Consequently, the unicity of the Necessarily Existent, in that case, cannot be established by the meanings of “essence requiring His existence” and “that which has no need of others in terms of His existence”.

[Day three]

It cannot be said that necessity is not a thing other than ‘abstracted existence’ (*mujarrad al-wujūd*) just because there is no change/differentiation (*ikhtilāf*) in abstracted existence. Indeed, an existence conjoined (*muqārin*) with quiddity changes in accordance with its attachment (*iḍāfa*) [to that quiddity]. As for ‘mere existence’ (*maḥḍ al-wujūd*), it is a single concept in itself which has no diversity, **because we say that** what is demanded here is that the true nature/reality of necessity (*ḥaqīqa al-wujūb*) is the same as the intension of ‘sole existence’ (*wujūd baḥt*), which is different from existence's occurring to quiddity, and this would be absurd. If what is meant here is that the reality of necessity's being true for ‘pure existence’ (*wujūd ṣīrf*) denotes “an accidental affection's occurring to its object of accident”, then this is conceded. However, we do not concede that what falls under ‘pure exist-

فإن قلت: ما ذكره من الدليل يدلّ على كون مفهوم الوجوب نفس الماهية، فكيف يمنع ذلك؟ **قلت:** نحن نعلم بالضرورة أنّ المعنيين الأولين اعتباري محض لا وجود له في الخارج. ونعلم أيضًا بالضرورة أنّ نفس مفهوم ما يتميّز به الذات عارض اعتباري من عوارض حقيقة الواجب. فإنه ادّعى بهذا الاستدلال كون واحد فقط مما ذكر نفس الماهية، فسقط في مقابلة لا يسمع، وإن ادّعى أنّ ما صدق عليه المعنى الثالث نفس الماهية، فمسلم لكن لا يلزم أن يكون حقيقة واحدة، فلا يثبت المطلوب.

[Day four]

خواجه زاده، رحمه الله، لا يتصوّر من صبر له أدنى تمييز أن يقول إنّ الوجوب الذي هو عين الواجب ما به يتميّز الذات، فلم لا يجوز أن يكون ذاتان كل منهما ما به يتميّز عن الغير؟ وهذا المفهوم عارض لهما بلا رويّة. قول صاحب المواقف: لا يقال هذا معارض، إلى قوله: وكونه نسبيًا ينافي الغرض المذكور وهو كونه [121a] كونه موجودًا. **ومن هذا، نقول لأن** يقال فيه إنه طلب للعلم بكلام يفهم من قول صاحب المواقف. إذا كان وجوديًا، لم يكن زائدًا على ماهية إذ المراد بالوجوب ما يشكّ في وجوديته. بل ينبغي أن يكون عدميًا، كما دلّ عليه لفظ المواقف لذا، فإن صحّ لهم تمّ الدست.

والحاصل أنّه لا ريب لعاقل في أنّ الكلام في الوجوب الذي زعم البعض وجوديته مع وجودية الإمكان، ولا شكّ أنّ الإمكان شيء واحد، فكذا هذا الوجوب. نعم، يكون هذا الوجوب على تقدير كونه وجوديًا ما به يمتاز الذات عن الغير. فمن وقف على هذا المقام يتعجب من ذلك الكلام لمولانا زيرك رحمه الله.

[Day five]

فإن قلت: لا نسلم أنّ واجب الوجود لو كان متعينًا لذاته انحصر في ذلك المعنى، وإنما يكون كذلك لو كان واجب الوجود ذاتًا واحدةً وهو محال لجواز أن يكون عرضًا عامًا أو طبيعة جنسية، فيكون تحته أنواع، وكل نوع يقتضي لذاته تعيينًا. فيلزم انحصار كل نوع في شخص، لا انحصار واجب الوجود في شخص.

ence' does not contain in it any. Then, why would it not be permissible that pure existence could be two different realities such that both are not being distinguished from quiddity?

If you say that what is mentioned previously proves the sufficiency of the intension of necessity's being the same thing as quiddity, then how would you negate this fact? **I reply to this that** we verify that we necessarily know that the first two meanings are only mental considerations with no extramental existence. We also know necessarily that the very intension that distinguishes essence (*dhāt*) is a mental consideration occurring to the accidents of the Necessarily Existent's reality. Thus, it is claimed that the Necessarily Existent is one (*wāhid*) in the sense that, as mentioned previously, the Necessarily Existent is the same thing as quiddity. Therefore, this [point] is abolished totally as a rejoinder never heard [before], even if one claims that what falls under the third meaning is the same thing as quiddity. Then this is conceded; yet, this does not [still] require that necessity is a single reality, so what is demanded is not established here.

[Day four]

Ḥocazāde, may Almighty God have mercy on him, exercises little much patience in discernment, such that he says that necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent, is what distinguishes essence. Why would it not be that what distinguishes one from another is an essence for each one of them? This intension is accidental to both of these aspects without deliberation. In the statement of the author of *al-Mawāqif*: It cannot be said that necessity opposes an isolated constituent, and necessity's being relational (*nisbī*) contradicts with the aforementioned purpose, that is, necessity's **[121a]** being an existent. **For this, we say that** [this is] because one cannot say that the quest to know this expression is conveyed by the statement of the author of *al-Mawāqif*. If necessity were to be an existential notion (*wujūdiyya*), then it would not be added to quiddity such that what is meant by necessity here would cast doubt on its being externally existing. Yet, it should be that necessity is related to non-existence (*'adamī*), as it was previously proven by the word of *al-Mawāqif*, in such a way that if this were to be true for them, then the competition has ended.

The outcome is that there is no doubt for the rational ones that this statement about necessity, which was claimed to be true by some, concerns necessity's external proposition together with that of possibility. And there is no doubt that possibility is a single thing. Likewise, necessity, yes, this very necessity in terms of its externally existing, is what distinguishes essence from others. Whoever discerns this position is marveled at this argument by Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

[Day five]

If you say that we do not concede that the Necessarily Existent is entified (*muta'ayyan*) by His essence, [because] then there would be a limitation in that meaning. The reason why this is as such is that only if the Necessarily Existent were of a single essence, then this would have followed; but it is impossible since it would be permissible that it could be a generic accident (*'araḍ 'āmm*) or a genus' nature (*ṭabī'a jinsiyya* or lit. 'the nature pertaining to genus'). There are species under Him and every specie requires

أجيب عنه بأنَّ واجب الوجود لما كان عين الوجود، فلو كان له أنواع لكان له حقائق مختلفة. فيكون الوجود مشتركاً اشتراكاً لفظياً، وهو باطل. وفيه ضعف، لأنَّ واجب الوجود ليس الوجود المطلق، بل عين الوجود الخاص. وغاية ما في الباب أن يكون للوجودات الخاصة حقائق مختلفة، فلا يلزم اشتراك مطلق الوجود لفظاً. **والحق** في الجواب ما ذكره الشيخ في الشفاء أنَّ واجب الوجود ليس إلا مجرد الوجود، ولا اختلاف في مجرد الوجود. **نعم**، الوجود المقارن للماهيات مختلفة بحسب اختلاف إضافته إليها. وأما محض الوجود، فهو في نفسه لا اختلاف فيه حقيقةً محاكمات، لمولانا العلامة رحمه الله.

[Day six]

أقول: إذا كان لفظ الوجود يطلق على أمر اعتباري واحد ويدحر وجودية ذلك الاعتباري، فلا مجال، [121b] لأن يقال بجواز أن يكون ذلك المفهوم عارضاً لذاتين ممتازتين أحدهما عن الآخر بالذات. ولذا قال صاحب المواقف: فإن صحَّ للحكماء وجود الوجود، تمَّ الدست لمولانا زيرك، رحمه الله تعالى رحمة واسعة.

its essence being entified (*ta'ayyun*). What follows is that [while] every specie (*naw'*) is limited to an individual (*shakhs*), the Necessarily Existent is not [limited to an individual]. **It is replied to this such that** the Necessarily Existent cannot be existence itself, since if it were to have species, it would then have various realities (*ḥaqā'iq mukhtalifa*). Existence would have a commonality in utterance [i.e. equivocal as in homonyms], and this is false. There is a weakness in this [statement], because the Necessarily Existent is not the same as 'absolute existence' (*wujūd muṭlaq*), but as 'proper existence' (*wujūd khāṣṣ*). The purpose in this chapter is that various realities have specific existences, so the absolute commonality of existence is not required in utterance (i.e. not univocal). **The truth** in this answer is that what is mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in his *al-Shifā'* is that the Necessarily Existent is not something other than 'pure existence' (*mujarrad al-wujūd*), and there is no change in it. **Indeed**, an existence conjoined with quiddities changes in accordance with its attachment [to them]. As for 'mere existence', it is the same thing as existence that there is no real change [in it] with respect to the veracity of *al-Muḥākamāt* by Mawlānā al-'Allāma [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī], Peace be upon him.

[Day six]

I say that if the utterance 'necessity' were to be valid for a single mental consideration and this mental consideration is dislodged from being existing externally, then there would not be any competence (*majāl*) here, **[121b]** since one could respond [to this] by the permissibility that this intension would be attached to two differentiated essences, one differing from the other in essence. If the author of *al-Mawāqif* says "thus, the existence of the Necessarily Existent is true for philosophers", then the competition has ended in favor of Mawlānā Zeyrek, Peace be upon him.

Risāla fī al-tawhīd li-Ḥocazāde Muṣliḥuddīn Muṣṭafā [Süleymaniye, MS Ayasofya 2206, f. 12a-21a]

[Day one. Response to Ḥocazāde's initial question]

[12a] بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

سبحان من هو واحد أحد لم يلد ولم يولد يا من ليس له كفوا أحد صلّ على محمد وعلى آل محمد.

قال المصنّف، رحمه الله تعالى: المرصد الثالث في توحيدهِ أورد عليه المحشّي أن نفي المثل مستلزم للتوحيد، فلا حاجة إلى ذكره. وأجاب بأن نفي الشريك المماثل في النوع لا يستلزم نفي الشريك في الألوهية؛ ووجوب الوجود ظاهر الجواز كون كل منهما مقتضى الهوية.

أقول: إذا كان وجوب الوجود عين الذات، كما هو مبني الدليل هنا، فالتنزيه عن الشريك المماثل في النوع لا شكّ يستلزم التقديس عن المشارك في صفات الألوهية ووجوب [12b] الوجود، اللهمّ إلا أن يقال مساق الكلام في السباق مجرد نفي الشريك المماثل في النوع ولم يلاحظ فيه عينية الوجود ولا غيريته أصلاً.

[Day two]

قال المصنّف رحمه الله: وقد تقدم أن الوجود نفس الماهية. قال [خوجة زادة] وحيد عصره في منع هذه المقدمة: واعلم أن الوجود يطلق على معان ثلاثة: اقتضاء الذات الوجود والاستغناء في الوجود عن الغير وما به يتميز الواجب عن الغير. ولا شكّ أن شيئاً من المعنيين الأولين لا يتصور كونه نفس الماهية لأنهما اعتباريان. فالمراد بقولهم إنّ الوجود نفس ماهية الواجب هو المعنى الثالث. فحينئذ يقال على تقدير تعدد الواجب [13a] إنّما يلزم التركيب لو كان الوجود حقيقة واحدة لها فردان الخ.

أقول لا شكّ في ورود هذا السؤال بحيث لا يحوم البال بباله حول جوابه لكن الكلام في تخصيصه بالمعنى الثالث للوجوب. وقد أفصح المحشّي حيث لم يتعرض للتخصيص.

**A Treatise on God's Unicity by Ḥocazāde Muṣliḥuddīn Muṣṭafā (d. 893/1488)
[Süleymaniye, MS Ayasofya 2206, ff. 12a-21a]**

[Day one. Response to Ḥocazāde's initial question]

[12a] In the name of God, **the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Glory be to Him who is one and who neither begets nor is born, nor is there to Him any equivalent.** [*al-Ikhlās* 112:3-4] Pray on Muḥammad and on the family of Muḥammad.

The author [‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī/al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī], may Almighty God have mercy on him, said in Observation Three [of *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*] on God's unicity (*tawḥīd*), a discussion also mentioned in the Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi], that the denial of a partner to God is required for His unicity, and there is no need to pursue this further. [With regard to God's unicity] Ḥasan Çelebi replied that the negation of an equal partner (*sharīk*) in species (*naw'*) does not require the negation of a partner in divinity (*ulūhiyya*), and that the existence's necessity literally permits each partner's requiring a haecceity (*huwiyya*).¹

I say that if the necessity (*wujūb*) of existence (*wujūd*) were to be the same thing as essence (*dhāt*), as this is the basis for the proof here, then an equal partner would be eliminated in terms of species. There is no doubt that the reverence [of God] is required [to be refrained] from a partner that shares [the same] divine attributes, as well as the necessity of [12b] existence - unless it is claimed that the course of the argument in the competition just concerns the negation of an equal partner and existence's being the same as necessity (or not) is never noted.

[Day two]

The author, may God have mercy on him, said that you have set forth beforehand that necessity is the same as quiddity. The unique mind of his time [Ḥocazāde]² said concerning the refutation of this premise: "I know that necessity corresponds to three meanings" (sing. *ma'nā*): [necessity defined as] (i) "essence's (*dhāt*) requiring existence"; (ii) "that which has no need of others in existence", and (iii) "what distinguishes the Necessarily Existent (*wājib*) from others". There is no doubt that one thing that is not mentioned in the first two meanings is that necessity is the same as quiddity since both [necessity and quiddity] are mental considerations (sing. *i'tibārī*). What is intended by the [philosophers'] statement is that necessity is the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, which refers to the third meaning. **Indeed, in this case**, as for the assumption about the Necessarily Existent's multiplicity, it is objected that [13a] the Necessarily Existent requires composition if necessity is a single reality that has two isolated units (sing. *fard*) etc.

I say that there is no doubt why this question appears, and you should not worry about its answer - but [know that] the statement about the term 'specification' (*takhṣīs*) in the third meaning denotes necessity. **The Glossator [Ḥasan Çelebi] expressed** this view insofar as specification is not objected.

¹ Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45.

² In the marginalia Ḥocazāde is noted as the subject of this argument, which might have been added by a later copyist.

قوله: (لأنهما اعتباريان عقليان، ليس لهما وجود في الخارج)، مسلم إن أرادهما على الإطلاق، وإلا لم لا يجوز أن يكون الخاص منهما أمراً حقيقياً غير ماهية الواجب عندهم بالاتفاق؟ **قوله:** المراد بقولهم إن الوجوب عين ماهية الواجب هو المعنى الثالث.

أقول هذا الحصر رأي من عند نفس ذلك [13b] الفاضل، وقد يدعي وقوعه في بعض الكتب، فلا يلزم عليه شيء بكونه مخالفاً لما يشهد عليه القرائن ويشعر به الكلام في المبحث الثالث من مباحث الوجوب، وفي أواخر هذا الدليل من أن المعنى الأول أو الثاني للوجوب هو عين حقيقة الواجب. وكأنه، سلمه الله، لم يلتفت لمقالهم في أن الوجوب بهذين المعنيين من الأمور الوجودية وعين الواجب لشدة ضعف كلامهم فيه. وليس حصره لتوقف سؤاله عليه، بل لمجرد بيان الواقع. فمن تصدى لجوابه [مولانا زيرك] ببيان عدم كون مرادهم من الوجوب هو المعنى الثالث في قولهم الوجوب هو نفس الحقيقة، بل كان [14a] المراد أحد المعنيين الأولين، لم يأت بشيء إلا تأييداً لورود سؤال ذلك الفاضل، لأن وروده حينئذ¹ يكون أظهر وأجلى. ولعمري إن الجواب الذي أشرنا إليه من بعض الأفاضل مع نكت زائدة قد أشرق من أفق سماء خاطري، لكن لما تجلت شمس مرام ذلك المحقق احتجب وصار كأن لم يكن.

قوله فالمراد بقولهم إن الوجوب عين ماهية الواجب هو المعنى الثالث، يتبادر منه أن يكون مراده كون المعنى الثالث بنفسه نفس الماهية، وليس كذلك. بل مراده أن ما صدق عليه هو نفس الماهية وإلا لم يصحح² قوله فحينئذ يقال ما ادعيت من التركيب على تقدير تعدد الواجب [14b] إنما يلزم لو كان الوجوب حقيقة لها فردان. وأما إذا كان ذاتان متخالفتان يتمايز كل منهما عن الآخر إلى الآخر إذ لا سترة أن المعنى الواحد لا يتصور أن يكون نفس ذاتين متخالفتين تتمايز كل منهما عن الأخرى بالذات.

1 غرضه إيراد المعنى على وجه أبلغ فحسب.

2 وقد وجدنا بعد تحريرنا هنا نسخة مفصلة للتحقق في هذه المادة. قد صرح فيها بما ذكرنا من أن مراده ليس نفس المعنى الثالث، بل ما صدق عليه.

[Jurjānī] states that this is because both [necessity and quiddity] are mental intelligibles (sing. *i'tibārī 'aqlī*) which do not have existence in the extramental world, and this is accepted such that both are taken absolutely (*'alā al-itlāq*); otherwise why would it not be permissible that the specific one [of the two] is a real entity different from the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, as the scholars would all agree? **[Jurjānī] states that** what is intended by the philosophers' statement is that necessity is the same thing as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent, as in the third meaning.

I say that this limitation³ is an opinion of **[13b]** this virtuous scholar [Jurjānī] himself, and this claim has been put forth in some books. So there is no need for a thing to be contrary to what the evidence testifies, and this is noted in Discussion Three concerning necessity – especially in the later sections of this proof – such that the first or second meaning of necessity is and was the same [thing] as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, God bless him. Their statement did not pay attention to the fact that it is obligatory for these two meanings to exist among all externally existing things and to be the same as the Necessarily Existent. [This is] due to the weakness of their statement about this subject. The limitation of their statement does not depend on the question; rather it is just based on the demonstration of [its] occurrence. Whoever addresses an answer with a statement lacking the philosophers' intention [also] has the third meaning according to their statement, in which necessity is the same as [His] reality [*ḥaqīqa*]. **Rather [14a]**, the intention of one of the first two meanings does not bring anything to support the advent of the question by this virtuous scholar [Mawlānā Zeyrek],⁴ because its advent, in that case,⁵ is more obvious and clear. Upon my life, the answer remarked by some of the virtuous scholars accompanied by certain additional points is more exalted than those that stand on the horizon of the heavens of my thought, but when the headstrong intentions of this verifier [Jurjānī] manifests, then the answer is concealed and becomes impossible [to refute].

[Jurjānī] states that⁶ what is intended by their statement is that necessity's being the same as the quiddity of the Necessarily Existent is the third meaning, which comes from this statement such that what is intended is the third meaning's being the same as quiddity by itself, and likewise their intention here is rather such that 'what falls under' this statement (*mā-ṣadaq 'alayhi*) is not [necessity's being] the same as quiddity. Otherwise, this would not be correct. **[Jurjānī] states that** consequently what I claimed to be composition (*tarkīb*) in relation to the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent **[14b]** will be rather required if necessity is a reality with two isolated units. Yet, whenever necessity has two different essences, each being differentiated from one

³ What is meant by limitation here is that only the third meaning of necessity justifies the philosophers' view that necessity is the same as His quiddity.

⁴ Mawlānā Zeyrek's name is included in the marginalia.

⁵ In the marginalia: "Its purpose is to express the meaning only in a more informed manner and no more".

⁶ In the marginalia: "After writing this we found out a detailed version of this book to verify this matter. He explained here that, as we mentioned, what is intended is not the same as the third meaning (i.e. its intension), rather [it is] a judgment that falls under (*mā-ṣadaq 'alayhi*) a particular question (i.e. its extension)".

قوله (مشتركتان في المعنيين الأولين) يوهِم اقتصار الاشتراك فيهما وليس كذلك لأن المطلق من المعنى الثالث أيضاً يكون عارضاً مشتركاً بينهما على ذلك التقدير وهذا ظاهر لمن هو متأمل وناظر فيه. [مولانا شجاع] بهذا الذي ذكرنا ظهر فساد قول من أراد أن يجيب عن ذلك السؤال بأن يقول: إن المعنى الثالث لو كان حقيقتين مختلفتين لم يكن معاني [15a] الوجوب متلازمة لوجود المعنيين الأولين بدون كل واحدة من الحقيقتين في الأخرى. فوجب أن يكون المعنى الثالث حقيقة واحدة والتعدّد المحتمل المحتاج إلى إبطاله هو تعدّد الفرد. فلو تعدّد مع الاتحاد في الحقيقة يلزم التركيب، وإنه محال. وجه الظهور أنّ التلازم ليس إلا بين المعنيين الأولين والمطلق من المعنى الثالث، ولما كان المطلق مشتركاً على ذلك التقدير لم يفترق واحد من المعاني الثلاثة عن الآخر. **والحاصل** أنّ الجواب عن هذا الإشكال موقوف على إثبات كون أمر واحد نفس الواجب، سواء كان ذلك الأمر الوجوب أو غيره. [15b] وما قالوا من أنّ الوجود البحت نفس الواجب لو تمّ لصحّ جواب الشيخ في الشفاء الذي نقله صاحب المحاكمات.

[Day three]

قال المصنّف، رحمه الله، وقد تقدّم أن الوجوب نفس الماهية. هذا يوهِم أن يكون للواجب ماهية كلية وليس بصحيح سواء لم يكن له تعدّد خارجي أولاً بمقتضى هذا الدليل، فالمراد بالماهية الهوية الشخصية. **قال المصنّف**، رحمه الله: فيلزم التركيب.

أقول: قد تبين في مباحث التعيين أن تركيب الشخص المعين من الماهية والتعيين إنما هو بحسب الذهن دون الخارج حيث قال المصنّف: واعلم أنّ نسبة الماهية إلى الشخصيات كنسبة الجنس إلى الفصل. فكما [16a] أن الجنس مبهم في العقل يحتمل ماهيات متعددة ولا تعين لشيء منهما إلا بانضمام فصل إليه وهما متحدان ذاتاً وجعلاً ووجوداً في الخارج. ولا يتمايزان إلا في الذهن. كذلك الماهية النوعية يحتمل هويات متعددة لا تعدّد لشيء منها إلا بتشخص ينضم إليها وهما متحدان في الخارج ذاتاً وجعلاً ووجوداً متمايزان في الذهن فقط. فليس في الخارج موجود هو الماهية وموجود آخر هو الشخص حتى يتركب منهما فرد وإلا لم يصح حمل الماهية على أفرادها. بل ليس هناك إلا موجود واحد،

another, then it is no secret that one meaning cannot be conceivable since two different essences would be distinguished from each other essentially. **[Jurjānī] states that** the two partners mentioned in the first two meanings suggest a limitation in participation, and this is not as such [for the third meaning], since the unrestricted application of the third also [implies] a shared accidental affection, occurring to both [meanings externally] in this respect. This is apparent for those who paid attention and thought about this. [Mawlānā Shujāʿʿs (d. 929/1523)] statement, which we consider to be evidently invalid, responds to this question with the third meaning, such that if the third meaning were to have two different realities, then the meanings of **[15a]** necessity would not be equipollent with the [concept of] existence in the first two senses – without each of these realities being in the other. Then, it would be necessary that the third meaning is a single reality, and the likely diversity needed to be refuted corresponds to the multiplicity of an isolated unit. So, if a multiplicity accompanied by oneness in reality requires composition, which is impossible, then the way of its appearance will be that the implication (*talāzum*) here corresponds to nothing other than [something] between the first two meanings and the absolute sense of the third. This is because absoluteness was common in this respect, not distinguishing any of these three meanings from one another. **What is obtained** [from this discussion] is that the answer depends on the proof that a single entity is the same as the Necessarily Existent – regardless of whether this entity is necessity or some other thing. **[15b]** What they said is that ‘sole existence’ (*wujūd baḥt*) is the same as the Necessarily Existent, only if Ibn Sīnā’s answer is correct in his *al-Shifāʿ*, which was excerpted in [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī’s] *al-Muḥākamāt*.⁷

[Day three]

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that this aspect has been preceded by the argument that necessity is the same as quiddity. This statement assumes that the universal quiddity here belongs to the Necessarily Existent, and this is not correct regardless of whether it directly has external multiplicity by what is required by this proof. Thus, what is intended by quiddity [here] is an individuated haecceity (*huwiyya shakhṣiyya*). **The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that** then this implies composition.

I say that the author has explained in the discussion about entification (*taʿayyun*) that an auxiliary individual (*shakhṣ muʿayyan*) is composed of quiddity [and entification], and the entification [here] is rather with regard to the mind with no [implications in] extramentality (*khārij*) since the author said that the relationship of quiddity to concrete individuatednesses (*mushkhaṣṣāt*) is here like the relationship of genus (*jins*) to differentia (*faṣl*). It is that **[16a]** a genus is ambiguous (*mubham*) in the mind having a capacity for multiple quiddities, and there is no entification for any of them – except differentia’s attachment (*inḍimām*) to genus. Both [quiddity and entification] are united in essence, in making, and in existence in the extramental world, and the genus [here] can be distinguished only in the mind. Likewise, this ‘species’ quiddity’ (*māhiyya nawʿiyya*) has a capacity for multiple entities that do not have multiplicity for any of them – albeit individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*), which is conjoined with the quiddity pertaining to species.

⁷ Al-Taḥṭānī, *al-Ilāhiyāt min al-Muḥākamāt*, 77.

أعني الهوية الشخصية إلا أن العقل يفصلهما إلى ماهية نوعية وتشخص، كما يفصل [16b] الماهية النوعية إلى الجنس والفصل والتركيب الذهني في حق حقيقة الحق تعالى، لم يقم على بطلانه دليل. وقد صرح به المحشي في مباحث الوجوب حيث قال (وأما منافاته، أي منافاة الوجوب للاحتياج إلى الجزء العقلي، فليس ببديهي ولا مبرهن عليه، فإن المحتاج حينئذ تصوّره، لا وجوده في الخارج).

قال المحشي: كل من الوجهين مبني على كون الوجود طبيعة نوعية. أقول: فيه نظر إذا لو فرضنا صحّة هذين الوجهين، يلزم بطلان كون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية، ومبنى الشيء لا بدّ أن يصحّ عند صحّة ذلك الشيء وهذا ظاهر. أما ذلك، فللتنافي بين لوازم صحّة هذين الوجهين وكون الوجوب [17a] طبيعة نوعية، فإن صحتهما يقتضي نفي التعدّد مطلقاً وكون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية يستلزم التعدّد وأقل ما في الذهن، والحذور أعني التركيب من الطبيعة النوعية والتعيّن بالضرورة.

فالصواب نظراً إلى الوجه الأول أن يكون مبناه كون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية، لا على الإطلاق، بل عند فرض تعدّد الواجب أو كونه نفس الواجب، وهذا مستلزم لذلك، **ولا يخفى** أن هذا المبني لا يبطل عند فرض صحّة الوجه المذكور. وأما نظراً إلى الوجه الثاني أن يكون مبناه كون الوجوب نفس الواجب، لا طبيعة نوعية له، إذ لو بني الكلام فيه على كون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية يلزم التركيب منها [17b] ومن التعيّن بلا مرية، فيلزم الوقوع في الحذور؛ تأمل. ولا يخفى أن بناء الوجهين وإن كان صحيحاً نظراً إلى الوجوب، ولكنه ليس بلازم، لأن مبناهما بالحقيقة على ثبوت كون شيء ما نفس حقيقة الواجب، وثبوت كون ذلك الشيء ماهية نوعية مشتركة عند فرض التعدّد. وكما ادعوا أن الوجوب نفس حقيقة الواجب، كذلك أجمعوا على أن الوجود نفس ماهيته ولا يذهب عليك صحّة اعتبارهم كل واحد منهما عين الواجب. فيصحّ أن يقال في الوجه الأول لو وجد واجبان لتمييزاً بالتعيّن، لأن الوجود يكون حينئذ حقيقة مشتركة بينهما، فما لم يحصل الامتياز بالتعيّن لم يتحقّق [18a] الاثنية بالضرورة، فيلزم الحذور أعني التركيب. وفي الوجه الثاني الوجود هو المقتضي للتعين إذ لولاه فيما أن يقتضي التعيّن الوجود، فيلزم الدور، أولاً يقتضي، فيجوز الانفكاك بينهما بلا تعيّن وإنه محال.

These are united outside in essence, in making, and in existence, being distinguished only in the mind. **[16b]** So, there is no quiddity existent in the extramental world, and an existent is a distinctive individual (*shakhs*) such that an isolated unit (*fard*) is composed from both (nonetheless it is not correct to predicate quiddity with its individuals). Yet, there is nothing here except a single existent, that is, an individual haecceity – with the exception of the mind breaking both into a species' quiddity and an individuation, which is like breaking the species' quiddity into a genus, a differentia, and a mental composition under the truth of Almighty God's reality. And no evidence [of this] has ever been refuted. The Glossator explains this in his discussion of necessity insofar as saying "as for the contradiction (i.e. the contradiction of necessity), the need of an intellective particular (*juz*' *'aqlī*) would not be then apparent". And this cannot be proven since what is needed [here] is its conceptualization (*taṣawwur*), not its existence in the extramental world.

The Glossator said that each of these aspects relies on existence's being a species' nature (*tabī'a naw'īyya*). **I say that** there is a disagreement [here] since if we were to assume the validity of both aspects, then [the aspects of] "necessity's being a nature pertaining to species" and "its relying on a thing (*shay'*)" would be invalid. It is certain that this is true and evident according to the validity of this thing. As for that, there is a contradiction between [the statement about] necessary concomitances [with regard to] the validity of these aspects and [the statement about] existence's being **[17a]** a species nature. This is because the validity of both [of these statements] requires the negation of multiplicity absolutely, and necessity's being a species' nature requires [the aspect of] multiplicity. At least, this [aspect] is in the mind, and one should beware of, so to speak, the composition of species nature and entification necessarily.

So the correct answer is the position in the first sense, which states that necessity's reliance [on a thing] is [due to] necessity's being a species' nature, not absolutely, but with respect to the assumption of multiplicity in the Necessarily Existent or its being the same as the Necessarily Existent [itself]. These are required for the position, and it is no secret that this reliance does not refute the assumption of the aforementioned aspect's validity. As for the second aspect, it relies on necessity's being the same as the Necessarily Existent, not on the species nature that it has. This is because if the statement that is based on "necessity's being the same as a species' nature" here follows that the Necessarily Existent is composed of both [necessity and nature pertaining to species] **[17b]**, as well as an entification that is not observable, then the occurrence [here] would imply a difficulty (*maḥdhūr*). Let's think about this! **It is no secret that** even if the reliance of these two aspects were to be correct with regard to necessity, but not with regard to a necessary concomitant (*lāzim*), [this is] because, according to the assumption of multiplicity, their reliance in reality would be based on the immutability (*thubūt*) of a thing's being the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, as well as on the immutability of this thing being a common species' quiddity. Just as [the philosophers] claimed that necessity is the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent, they, likewise, also agreed that existence is the same as its very quiddity. This does not validate their consideration that each of these things would be the same as the Necessarily Existent. In this way, what is said about the first aspect is correct: if there

[Day four]

قال المصنّف، رحمه الله: فإِما أن يستلزم التعيّن الوجوب، فيلزم تأخره ويلزم الدور. **أقول**: وكون الواجب معلّلاً بالتعيّن. **قال المحشّي**: اعترض عليه بأن اقتضاء التعيّن الوجوب على تقدير عدم اقتضاء الوجوب التعيّن لا يستلزم الدور. وإنما يلزم لو لم يفرض أولاً ذلك العدم. وأجيب بأن ذلك الفرض لا يمنع لزوم الدور في نفس الأمر، لكونه غير [18b] مطابق للواقع، لأن الواجب علة لجميع ما عداه في نفس الأمر.

أقول: "لا يخفى أن هذا الجواب في غاية البشاعة، لأن الفرض الثاني التعيّن مترتب على الفرض الأول للوجوب. فلو اعتبرت الحالة الحقيقية للوجوب أعني كونه علة، لا شكّ أنها لا تجمّع الفرض المذكور له، أعني كونه غير علة. فيبطل الفرض الأول ويفسد الثاني أيضاً لكونه مترتباً عليه. فلا يلزم الدور أصلاً. وقد تقدّم من المحشّي شبيهه هذا في مبحث الصفحة الملساء، لكن كان له وجه ثمّه.

قوله: بعد تسليم كفاية مجرد العليّة يوهّم عدم الكفاية، " لكن إذا كان الوجوب علة تامّة، كما هو الظاهر عند كونه [19a] نفس الواجب، لا شبهة في كفاية هذه المقدّمة. وأجيب أيضاً عن ذلك الاعتراض بأن قول المصنّف الوجوب هو المقتضي للتعين يفيد انحصار الاقتضاء في الوجوب، وإذ لولاه أي هذا القول نفى لذلك الانحصار، لا لأصل الاقتضاء. فيحتمل اقتضاء الوجوب وعدم اقتضائه ولزوم الدور مبني على الاحتمال الأول وجواز الانفكاك على الثاني، وفي هذا الجواب أيضاً نظر.

قوله: فيحتمل اقتضاء الوجوب وعدم اقتضائه مسلّم. وما يتوهّم من أن النفي للانحصار لا لأصل الاقتضاء، فكيف يحتمل عدم الاقتضاء، ليس بشيء **قوله**: لزوم الدور مبني على الاحتمال الأول وجواز الانفكاك على الثاني ليس بظاهر، [19b] لأن مدار الكلام في امثال هذه المواضع إنما يكون اعتباراً واحداً. **قوله**: والأوجه يشعر بوجاهة الوجهين الأولين. وقد سبق حالهما وقد اختلج هذا السؤال وجال بالبال مع الجواب الصحيح الذي ذكره المحشّي بقوله والأوجه أن يقال الخ.

were two necessary beings to be distinguished by entification – **because** existence is, in this case, a shared reality between the two – then the differentiation does not acquire an entification, which does not necessarily verify **[18a]** a dualism. Thus, the difficulty [here] implies composition. For the second aspect, existence is what is required for entification, so if it were to be as such, then existence would either require entification (hence circularity follows), or not. As follows, the separation of both would be permissible without entification, and this would be absurd.

[Day four]

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that if entification requires necessity, then it requires to be posterior, and this is circular. **I say that** [this is] necessity's being justified by entification. **The Glossator said** that an objection could be raised [here] such that entification's requiring necessity with respect to the privation ('*adm*) of necessity's requiring entification does not bring circularity. This is because entification would only require necessity if it were not to assume this privation first. **It is responded that** this assumption does not prevent the necessity of circularity as the fact of matter (*nafs al-'amr*), not **[18b]** corresponding to the occurrence [itself], since necessity is [in fact] a cause for everything else as in reality (*nafs al-'amr*).

I say that it is no secret that this answer [here] is terrible since the second intention is an entification that is based on the first intention for necessity. Thus, if entification is considered to be a real characteristic (*hāla*) for necessity, i.e. its cause, then there is no doubt that this real characteristic would not come together with the aforementioned intention, meaning that it will not be a cause. Then the first intention is invalidated and the second [intention] is corrupted for its being based on it; hence, there is no circularity. A similar statement also precedes the Glossator in a discussion about smooth surfaces (sing. *ṣafḥa mulassa'*), but he [also] had a [different] position there.

[Jurjānī] states that after accepting the sufficiency of 'pure causality (*mujarrad al-'illiyya*), the privation of sufficiency is [now] imagined; however, if necessity were to be a complete cause – just as it is apparent in [the case of] necessity's being **[19a]** the same as the Necessarily Existent – then there is no doubt about the sufficiency of this premise. It is also objected to this by the author in such a way that necessity is a requirement for an entification useful in limiting it, since, otherwise, this statement would be a negation of this limitation not due to a principle of requirement. As follows, it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement, as well as the implication of circularity, are based on the first possibility, and the permissibility of separation (*infikāk*) on the second. And this is subject to debate in this answer.

[Jurjānī] states that it is conceivable that the requirement of necessity and the lack of its requirement are conceded. What is imagined from this is that the negation for limitation is not due to a principle of requirement. How is it then conceivable that the lack of requirement is nothing more than this? **[Jurjānī] states that** the implication of circularity is based on the first possibility and the permissibility of separation from the second is not apparent **[19b]** since the center of discussion in the examples of these cases is one only in mental consideration. **[Jurjānī] states that** these aspects are aware of the soundness of the first two ways. Both have preceded their states and

[Day five]

قال المصنّف، رحمه الله: وهو مبني على أن الوجوب وجودي. **قال المحشّي** مع أنه ليس كذلك، لأنه إما اقتضاء الذات الوجود أو الاستغناء عن الغير. **أقول** وجه الحصر فيها ما قد سبق في مباحث الوجوب والإمكان من أن الوجوب في المعنى الثاني ليس بحقيقة، بل اطلاقه عليه إما بتأويل الواجب أو بتأويل مبدء الوجوب. [20a] وهذا الذي ذكره المحشّي إقامة الدليل على المقدّمة الممنوعة ولا بأس به فيه. والمقدّمة الممنوعة لا سبيل إلى إثباتها وما أقاموا لإثباتها من الأدلة لا يجدي شيئاً، لكن يمكن أن نتعرض للدليل الذي أقام المحشّي على بطلانها بما تقدّم من أنه لم لا يجوز أن يكون الخاص وما صدق عليه من هذين المفهومين عين ما استحال عدمه على طريقة كون الوجود عينه عندهم. فإن الوجود، وهو كون الشيء في الأعيان، لا شكّ أنه أمر اعتباري لا تحقّق له في الخارج والحال أنهم أثبتوا كون الخاص منه وما صدق عليه عين حقيقة الواجب. وأما الحمل الاشتقاقي، [20b] فواقع في الوجود أيضاً. فالجواب عنه جواب فيه. **وقوله** (غير المعقول) غير معقول، لكن الكلام فيه ليس في المعقول الذي هو أمر اعتباري عام، بل في الخاصّ وكونه معقولاً بكنهه ممنوع.

[Day six]

قال صاحب المحاكمات: فإن قلت لا نسلم أنّ واجب الوجود لو كان تعيّن لذاته، انحصر في ذلك المعين. وإنما يكون كذلك لو كان واجب الوجود ذاتاً واحدة وهو ممنوع لجواز أن يكون عرضاً عاماً أو طبيعة جنسية [فيه نظر، لأن الوجوب إذا كان طبيعة جنسية]،³ يلزم أن يكون تمايز الأنواع المندرجة تحته بالفصول المقدّمة لها، فيلزم المحذور المترتب على التركيب من الطبيعة النوعية والتشخص، إذ لا فرق بينهما في أن كلا [21a] منهما تركّب ذهني على ما سبق ذكرهما.

قال الشارح: "المقتضي للتعين الذي ينضم إليه." **أقول**: "هذا يشعر بزيادة التعين ولزوم التركيب." **تمّت**.

this question has been [further] inquired. He has taken this as the correct answer, which is mentioned by the Glossator after taking his statements and positions into account so that it is responded to this as such etc.

[Day five]

The author, may Almighty God have mercy on him, said that [this statement] is based on necessity's being an existent. **The Glossator said that** even if this is not necessarily so, it will be because necessity [here] is [defined as] either "essence's requiring existence" or "that which has no need of others in existence". **I say that** the aspect of limitation in this is [similar to] what was mentioned previously in the discussion about necessity and possibility, such that necessity in the second meaning is not in reality but unrestrictedly applied to it either by the allegorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of necessity, or by that of the principle of necessity. **[20a]** This (i.e. what the Glossator mentioned) is the foundation of proof for the invalid premise, and there is nothing wrong with it. There is no way to prove this invalid premise, and the proof that they have established does not work. Yet, it is possible that we can object to the proof, as the Glossator has also invalidated this, by questioning why it would not be permissible according to them that necessity would be a specific case (*khāṣṣ*), and what falls under these two intentions would be the same as what makes [the specific case's] non-existence inconceivable by way of equating existence to necessity. Thus, existence is a thing *in concreto* (*fī al-a'yān*). There is no doubt that [necessity] is a thing in mental consideration that cannot be verified in the extramental world, and the position is that they proved that the specific [case] and what falls under it would be the same as the reality of the Necessarily Existent. As for [the case of] derivative predication (*ḥaml ishtiḳāqī*), **[20b]** this occurrence is also in existence (*fī al-wujūd*). The answer lies in the answer of this point. **[Jurjānī] states that** an unintelligible thing is intelligibly unintelligible, yet the statement here is not about something intelligible, which is a generic thing in mental consideration, but rather about the specific, and a specific thing's being an intelligible thing by its true nature is prohibited.

[Day six]

The author of *al-Muḥākamāt* said that if you say that we do not accepted that if the Necessarily Existent were to be an entification of its essence, then this would be limited by that auxiliary principle; indeed, this would be likewise if the Necessarily Existent were a singular essence. This [point] would prevent the permissibility of the Necessarily Existent being a generic accident or a genus' nature. Also this [aspect] is subject to debate because if necessity were a genus' nature, then this would be correct. Distinguishing species that are classified under the Necessarily Existent from differentia follows from this. This [point also] brings a difficulty for the Necessarily Existent since He would be dependent on the composition of a species' nature and an individuation. There is then no difference between them such that **[21a]** each of them has a mental composition, as we have mentioned previously.

The Commentator said: "What is required for entification that superadded to it [...]". **I say that** this requirement is in line with [the points concerning] the addition of entification and the requirement of composition. **FINIS.**

The Urtext of the Debate: Position Five, Observation Three on God's Unicity in al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif*, 8: 45-51

The author examined the question of God's unicity separately from His deanthropomorphism due to the former's significance. There is one intention in this proof, and it states that there cannot be two gods at the same time.

The philosophers argued that the existence of two [Necessarily] Existents, each of which is necessary by their existence, is impossible, and this has two reasons: *First*, if there were to be two Necessarily Existents, then these two existents would have been differentiated by entification, since, as we said before, necessity is the same things as [God's] quiddity. Rather, these two things that are one in quiddity would not be able to exist without being differentiated by entification that penetrates into each of these haecceities. In this case, the identity of both would be composite of a common quiddity and a differentiating entification, and this would be impossible.

This reasoning relies on the fact that necessity is externally existing (*wujūdī*), because necessity is the same as quiddity, and if the philosophers prove the validity of this statement, then the competition would end, as in the case of a horseman whose hands gain mastery in positioning and movement, meaning that then, the inferences (sing. *istidlāl*) will be complete and the philosophers acquire what they wish. In this way, no one can refute that necessity, especially when certain and immutable, is identical to [God's] quiddity; and in this way, no one can argue that entification is an immutable thing that does not require composition. It was not possible to refute these two inferences before, and I have previously explained and proved these two premises [elsewhere].

Second, necessity, which is the same as the Necessarily Existent's quiddity, requires an entification that is superadded [to it]. As follows, the multiplicity of the Necessarily Existent will be impossible. The reason why necessity requires entification is as such: If this were not to be the case, then entification would require necessity; and due to the rule of the priority of a cause over its effect, necessity would have to be posterior to entification. This [position] implies circularity. Rather, an essential necessity that is the same as the essence will require that necessity is prior to the other things and a cause for them, or both of these would not require one another. In this regard, each could be separated from one another (*infikāk*). This is because there cannot be a third thing that would require both, as well as each of them; and in this case, we would acquire necessity without entification, which is impossible.

In other words, it is impossible for a thing to exist without entification, which means that entification is required without necessity. Thus, this entification would not be an existent and would, on the contrary, be [the same as] the Necessarily Existent by essence due to the impossibility of a Necessarily Existent without [the concept of] necessity. This [aspect] is also based on necessity's being immutable (*thubūt*) so that it could verify its existence's being the same as quiddity. As for the second reasoning, that is, the impossibility of necessity's being more than one when it requires entification, this is due to a thing that you have learnt before: the quiddity that requires its entification restricts the species of that quiddity by an individual. Due to this conclusion, [the author] Ījī did not raise an objection to this [aspect].

مستندة في الطبيعة والضرورة فان تجرت من الروح النفس في الزيادة والزيادة الروحانية
 النفس الناطقة في كونه الاستعداد على الصن بالجلد والجلد كجسم اذا انضمت اليه قوة
 وسرعة وانضمت اليه المواضع التي يحتملها ابرار الانوار والفرق بين ما فيهما كونه
 اكثر ضعفاً او قسراً استجاب واستعدوا انارة بيت الله والجماع
 فوانه مضمون التي يردون في المحفرة الرومية ويقرب من الجحيم في المحفرة اللاهوتية
 وفيها كل عجيبة في فروع بعض النسخ في العوالم الالوهية والادب والادب الكبرياء
 النفس في قتل الاوحى في مفاصل الرتب ولبساتها والاصناف في السواحل
 والاصناف والصفوف والتعبير في الكمال الذي يجرب في الاستعداد لسرور
 الله والامكان التي انقضت بالنفس الناطقة فداننا وانما كماله تجلي في
 هذا العلم المرضي الاذوال انه كماله يمد في كل فعل في حاله والصلوة على محمد وآله

الغاية

والمشاهدة

بشرائ عنت الرسالة لادب على كيننا عوالم الله

وآثارها الروحانية في الالهة الشراكية في الشراكية التي لا تتحول في القيمة الروحانية
 على نعتها من اقصى الذات الجوهري والاشغاف في القيمة الجوهري وما يميزه الواجب
 والاشغاف في القيمة الاولى لا يتصور كونها في الواجب لانها اعتبار
 فالله في كونه في القيمة الواجب هو ما يصدق عليه في القيمة التي لا يتصور
 ان كانت او لا كانت لانها في ذاته الواجب في جميع ما يتميزه الذات بل في
 احوالها في حصول ما اوعيته في كماله في القيمة الواجب في كونه في كونه

عليه من عدم الوجود بصدق العارض في الوجود حقيقة واحدة لها وجودها وهو في الوجود
ايكونها واجباً حقيقياً متميزاً بغيرها في غير الوجود لا ينبغي له في الوجود
والاستغناء لا يغير في غير الوجود بل يثبت حصة الواجب منه ما يتفق ذاته بوجوده

في غير الوجود لا يمكن الوجود ليس الوجود ولا اختلاف في غير الوجود مع الوجود والوجود
عليه يتجلى في اختلاف اضافته اليها والما هو الوجود في غير الوجود لا يتفق ذاته بوجوده

اصلاً لانما تقول ان اريد ان حقيقة الوجود من غير الوجود والوجود والوجود العارض
لما في غير الوجود اريد ان حقيقة الوجود بصدق عليه الوجود العارض على

الموجود في نفس ولكن لا في الوجود بصدق عليه الوجود بل في الوجود في غير الوجود
ايكون حقيقة حقيقياً حقيقياً بصدق عليها الوجود في غير الوجود متميزاً بغير الوجود

فان قلت ما ذكره في الوجود بل في الوجود بصدق عليه الوجود في غير الوجود
بغير الوجود انما العيني الاول باعتبار فرض الوجود في الخارج وهو في غير الوجود

منه ما يتغير في الزمان عرضي اعتباري في عوارض حقيقة الواجب في غير الوجود
كونه واقعاً ما ذكره في الوجود مستقلاً في الوجود لا في الوجود في غير الوجود عليه في الوجود

نفسه في نفس الوجود في الوجود بصدق عليه الوجود في غير الوجود
لا يتغير في الوجود في الوجود بصدق عليه الوجود في غير الوجود

في الوجود في الوجود في الوجود بصدق عليه الوجود في غير الوجود
فانما الوجود في الوجود في الوجود بصدق عليه الوجود في غير الوجود

لا يمكن كبره ان يكون ذلك المصروف عارضاً لذاتنا حتى يختار بين احوالها

بإذات واما حالها في المواقف فانه صحيح لطلبه ووجوده بموجب حق الترتيب

كذلك انما نرى كل الامتنان رتبة واحدة

وذكر في ذلك كلف تلك بينهما في حادركه هذا التفسير في ميدان

بحسب الامراض وبتسليم

مراتب الوجودات في الموجودات بالمتشعب العيان فتمت لا يزيد عليها اذ انها ^{الموجودة}

الاولى في وجودها فهذا الوجه في ذات وجوده وبغير ذاته ووجودها ^{فانظر}

لا ذاته وقطع التفرع في وجوده الحكي في نفس الامر ان تلك الوجود عنه ولا يشبه ان

يكونها في وجودها انما هي عنه فالتصور المتصور كمالها يمكن وهذه حالها كما هي

الكلية كما هو المستور والاولى في الوجود باذات بوجوده ^{بشأنه} في الوجود

وجوده انتفاء يستحيل معه انتفاء وجوده عنه فهذا الوجود له ذات ووجود

ببناز ذاته فتمت انتفاء الوجود عنه بل نظر الاذات على غير هذا الانتفاء

فالتصور في التصور على وهذه حال الواجب الوجود على حسب المبدأ ^{الممكن}

واعلم ان الوجود باذات بوجوده هو عينه في الوجود وجوده في ذاته ^{الموجود}

ليس له وجود بخلاف ذاته فلا يكون تصور تلك الوجود عنه بل الانتفاء ^{محال}

ولا يجوز على ذلك ان لا يرتبه في الوجودية اذ هو في ذاته كونه التبرر ^{موجب}

عنه فبانه ذو وجودها في ذاته وان اردت ان تفرق بين الوجود ^{موجب}

کتاب الجناح والفضیة

آودادن چقاغری



۲۲۰۶

در وصف پده بنو الحسین علیهما السلام
حادم اکرم بن محمد بن سلطان السلطان العارضی
وفاقی بن عثمان طالع و مهر سرداران
جلد اندر تکه الامجد و المقدم احمد سر راه
المصنوعان و اکرم بن محمد بن علی

Azarofyo 2206



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

سبحان من هو واحد احد لم يلد ولم يولد
يا من ليس له كفوا احد صل على محمد وعلى آل محمد

قال المص رحمه الله تعالى المرصد الثالث
في توحيد آورد عليه للحشي ان في المثل
مستلزم للتوحيد فلا حاجة الى ذكره
واجاب بان في الشريك المماثل في النوع لا
يستلزم نفي الشريك في الالهوية ووجوب
الوجود ظاهر الجواز كون كل منهما مقتضى الحق
اقول اذا كان وجوب الوجود عين الذات
كما هو مبني الدليل هنا فالنزيه عن الشريك
المماثل في النوع لا شك يستلزم التفدير
عن المشارك في صفات الالهوية ووجوب

الوجود اللهم الا ان يقال مساق الكلام في
السباق مجرد في الشريك المماثل في النوع
ولم يلاحظ فيه عينية الوجوب ولا غيريته
اصلا **قال المص** رحمه الله وقد تقدم ان
الوجوب نفس الماهية قال وحيد عصره
في منع هذه المقدمة واعلم ان الوجوب يطلق
على معان ثلاثة اقتضاء الذات الوجود
والاستغناء في الوجود عن الغير وابه
يتميز الواجب عن الغير ولا شك ان شيئا
من المعنيتين الاولين لا يتصور كونه نفس
الماهية لانها اعتباريان فالمراد بقولهم
ان الوجوب نفس الماهية الواجب هو المعنى
الثالث في يقال على تقدير تعدد الواجب

خوجبنا

انما يلزم التركب لو كان الوجوب حقيقة
واحدة لها فردان **القول** لا شك في
ورود هذا السؤال بحيث لا تقوم اليك
بيانه حول جوابه لكن الكلام في تخصيصه
بالمعنى الثالث للوجوب وقد افصح المحشي
حيث لم يتعرض للتخصيص قوله لانها
اعتبار بان عقليان ليس لهما وجود في
الخارج سلم ان ارادهما على الاطلاق
والا لم لا يجوز ان يكون الخاص منهما امرا
حقيقيا غير ماهية الواجب عندهم
بالانفاق قوله فالمراد بقولهم ان الوجوب
عين ماهية الواجب هو المعنى الثالث
اقول هذا الحصر رأي من عند نفس ذلك

الفاضل وقد يدعي وقوعه في بعض الكتب
فلا يلزم عليه شيء بكونه مخالفا لما يشهد عليه
القرابين ويشعر به الكلام في البحث الثالث
من مباحث الوجوب وفي اواخر هذا الدليل
من ان المعنى الاول والثاني للوجوب
هو عين حقيقة الواجب وكانه سلمه الله
لم يثبت لفعالهم في ان الوجوب يهدي
المعنيين من الامور الوجودية وعين
الواجب لشدة ضعف كلامهم فيه وليس
حصصه لتوقف سؤاله عليه بل مجرد بيان
الواقع فمن تصدى لجوابه ببيان عدم
كون مرادهم من الوجوب هو المعنى الثالث
في قولهم الوجوب هو نفس الحقيقة بل كان

مولانا نرك

المراد

المراد احد المعنيين الاولين لم يأت بشيء
 الا نأيد الورود سؤال ذلك الفاضل
 لان وروده ح يكون اظهور واجلي واعمري
 ان الجواب الذي اشرنا اليه من بعض الافاضل
 مع نكت زائدة قد اشرف من اقوسماء خاطري
 لكن لما تجلت شمس سرام ذلك المحقق اجنب
 وصار كان لم يكن قوله فالمراد بقوله ان
 الوجوب عين ماهية الواجب هو المعنى
 الثالث يتبادر منه ان يكون مراده كون
 المعنى الثالث بنفسه نفس الماهية وليس
 كذلك بل مراده ان ما صدق عليه هو نفس
 الماهية واله لم يصح قوله فيقال ما ادعيت
 من التركيب على تقدير تعدد الواجب

المراد الفاضل على وجه
 الينغ فحسب ٢

وقد وجدنا بعد خبرنا هذا النسخة
 فصلت بالتحقق في هذه الملاحظة قد
 صرح فيها بما ذكرنا من ان مراده
 ليس بنفس الفاعل الثالث
 بل ما صدق عليه ٢

انما يلزم لو كان الوجوب حفيقة لها فردان
واما اذا كان ذاتان متخالفتان بتمايز كل
منهما عن الاخر الى الاخر اذ لا استرة ان المعنى
الواحد لا يتصور ان يكون نفس ذاتين
متخالفتين تمايز كل منهما عن الاخرى بالذات
قوله مشتركتان في المعنيين الاولين بوجه
اقتصار الاشتراك فيهما وليس كذلك لان
المطلق من المعنى الثالث ايض يكون عارضا
مشتركا بينهما على ذلك التقدير وهذا
ظاهر لمن هو متأمل وناظر فيه وبهذا الذي
ذكرنا ظهر فساد قول من اراد ان يجيب
عن ذلك السؤال بان يقول ان المعنى الثالث
لو كان حقيقتين مختلفتين لم يكن معاني

سؤالا شجاع

الوجوب متلازمة لوجود المعنيين
الاولين بدون كل واحدة من الحقيقتين
في الاخرى فوجب ان يكون المعنى الثالث
حقيقة واحدة والتعدد المحتمل المحتاج الى
ابطاله هو تعدد الفرد فلو تعدد مع الاتحاد
في الحقيقة يلزم التركيب وانه محوجه
الظهور ان التلازم ليس الا بين المعنيين
الاولين والمطلق من المعنى الثالث ولما كان
المطلق مشتركا على ذلك التقدير لم يفترق
واحد من المعاني الثلاثة عن الاخر والحاصل
ان للجواب عن هذا الاشكال موقوف على
اثبات كون امر واحد نفس الواجب
سواء كان ذلك الامر الوجوب او غيره

وما قالوا من ان الوجود المحض نفس الواجب
لو تم لصح جواب الشيخ في الشفا الذي نقله
صاحب المحاكمات **قال الم** رحمه الله وقد
تقدم ان الوجوب نفس الماهية هذا بوجه
ان يكون للواجب ماهية كلية وليس بصحيح
سواء لم يكن له تعدد خارجي او لا. فمقتضى
هذا الدليل فالمراد بالماهية الهوية الشخصية
قال الم رحمه الله فيلزم التركيب اقول
قد تبين في مباحث التعيين ان تركيب
الشخص المعين من الماهية والتعيين انما
هو بحسب الذهن دون الخارج حيث
قال الم واعلم ان نسبة الماهية الى
الشخصات كنسبة الجنس الى الفصل فكما

ان الجنس مبهم في العقل يحتمل ماهيات متعددة
ولا تعين لشيء منها الا بانضمام فصل اليه
وهما متحدان ذاتا وجعلا ووجودا في الخارج
ولا يتمايزان الا في الذهن كذلك الماهية
النوعية يحتمل هويات متعددة لا تعدد
لشيء منها الا بتشخص ينضم اليها وهما متحدان
في الخارج ذاتا وجعلا ووجودا متمايزان
في الذهن فقط فليس في الخارج موجود هو
الماهية ووجود اخر هو الشخص حتى
يتركب منها فرد واللم يصح حمل الماهية
على افرادها بل ليس هناك الوجود واحد
اي الهوية الشخصية الا ان العقل ينصلها
الى ماهية نوعية وتشخص كما يفصل

الماهية النوعية الى الجنس والفصل والتركيب
الذهني في حق حقيقة الحق تعالى لم يقم على
بطلانه دليل وقد صرح به المحشي في مباحث
الوجوب حيث قال واما منافاته اي منافاة
الوجوب للاحتياج الى الجزء العقلي فليس
بيد يهي ولا يبرهن عليه فان المحتاج حينئذ
تصوره لا وجوده في الخارج **قال المحشي**
كل من الوجهين سببي على كون الوجود طبيعة
نوعية اقول فيه نظرا ذلوفرضنا صحة
هذين الوجهين يلزم بطلان كون الوجود
طبيعة نوعية وسببي الشيء لا بد ان يصح عند
صحة ذلك الشيء وهذا ظاهر اما ذاك فللشأن في
بين لوازم صحة هذين الوجهين وكون الوجود

طبيعة نوعية فان صحتهما يقتضي في التعدد
مطلقا وكون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية يستلزم
التعدد واقما في الذهب والمخدر وايضا التركيب
من الطبيعة النوعية والتعريف بالضرورة
فالصواب نظر الى الوجه الاول ان يكون
مبناه كون الوجوب طبيعة نوعية لا على
الاطلاق بل عند فرض تعدد الواجب او كونه
نفس الواجب وهذا مستلزم لذلك ولا يخفى
ان هذا المبنى لا يبطل عند فرض صحة الوجه
المذكور واما نظر الى الوجه الثاني ان يكون
مبناه كون الوجوب نفس الواجب لا طبيعة
نوعية له اذ لو بني الكلام فيه على كون
الوجوب طبيعة نوعية يلزم التركيب منها

ومن التعيين بلاسرية فيلزم الوقوع في المحذور
نأمل ولا يخفى ان بناء الوجهين وان كان صحيحا
نظر الى الوجوب لكنه ليس بلازم لان بناها
بالحقيقة على ثبوت كون شيء ما نفس حقيقة
الواجب وثبوت كون ذلك الشيء ماهية
نوعية مشتركة عند فرض التعدد وكما
ادعوا ان الوجوب نفس حقيقة الواجب
كذلك اجمعوا على ان الوجود نفس ماهيته
ولا يذهب عليك صحة اعتبارهم كل واحد
منها عين الواجب فيصح ان يقال في الوجه
الاول لو وجد واجبان لتمايزا بالتعيين
لان الوجود يكون حـ حقيقة مشتركة
بينهما فمالم يحصل الامتياز بالتعيين لم يتحقق

الاثني عشر بالضرورة فيلزم المحذور اعني
التركيب وفي الوجه الثاني الوجود هو
المقتضى للتعين اذ لولاها فاما ان يقتضي
التعين الوجود فيلزم الدور ولا يقتضي
فيجوز التفكاك بينهما بلا تعين وانه محال
قال المص رحمه الله فاما ان يستلزم التعيين
الوجوب فيلزم تأخره ويلزم الدور اقول
وكون الواجب معللا بالتعين قال المحشي
اعتراض عليه بان اقتضاء التعيين الوجوب
على تغذ بر عدم اقتضاء الوجوب التعيين
لا يستلزم الدور وانما يلزم لولم يفرض اولا
ذلك العدم واجيب بان ذلك الفرض لا
يمنع لزوم الدور في نفس الامر لكونه غير

مطابق للواقع لان الواجب علة لجميع ما عده
في نفس الامر **اقول** لا يخفى ان هذا الجواب
في غاية البشاعة لان الفرض الثاني للتعين
مترتب على الفرض الاول للوجوب فلو
اعتبرت الحالة الحقيقية للوجوب اعني
كونه علة لاشك انها لا تجامع الفرض
المذكور له اعني كونه غير علة فيبطل الفرض
الاول ويفسد الثاني ايض لكونه مترتبا
عليه فلا يلزم الدور اصلا وقد تقدم من
المحيطه شبيه هذا في بحث الصفحة اللساء
لكن كانه وجه ثمه **قوله** بعد تسليم كفاية
بجرد العلية بوجه عدم الكفاية لكن اذا كان
الوجوب علة نامية كما هو الظاهر عند كونه

نفس الواجب لاشبهة في كفاية هذه المقدمة
واجيب ايض عن ذلك الا عنراض بان قول
الم الوجوب هو المقنض للتعين يفيد
اخصار الاقتضاء في الوجوب واذ لوله اي
هذا القول يعني لذلك الا اخصار الاصل
الاقتضاء فيحتمل اقتضاء الوجوب وعدم اقتضاء^{به}
ولزوم الدور مبني على الاحتمال الاول
وجواز الانفكاك على الثاني وفي الجواب
ايض نظر قوله فيحتمل اقتضاء الوجوب وعدم
اقتضائه مسلم وما يتوهم من ان يقع للاختصاص
لا اصل الاقتضاء فكيف يحتمل عدم الاقتضاء
ليس بشيء قوله لزوم الدور مبني على الاحتمال
الاول وجواز الانفكاك على الثاني بظاهر

لان مدار الكلام في امثال هذه المواضع انما
يكون اعتبارا واحدا **قوله** والاوجه
يشعر بوجاهة الوجهين الاولين وقد
سبق لهما وقد اختلف هذا السؤال وجال
بالبال مع الجواب الصحيح الذي ذكره المحشي
بقوله والاوجه ان يقال **الحق قال المص**
رحمه الله وهو مبني على ان الوجوب وجودا
قال المحشي مع انه ليس كذلك لانه اما
اقتضاء الذات الوجود او الاستغناء عن الغير
اقول وجه الحصر فيهما ما قد سبق في
مباحث الوجوب والامكان من ان الوجوب
في المعنى الثاني ليس بحقيقة بل اطلاقه عليه
اما بناويل الواجب او بناويل سبب الوجوب

وهذا الذي ذكره المحشي اقامة الدليل
على المقدمة المنوعة ولا بأس به فيه
والمقدمة المنوعة لا سبيل الى اثباتها
وما اقاموا الاثباتها من الادلة لا يجدي شيئا
لكن يمكن ان نتعرض للدليل الذي اقام
المحشي على بطلانها بما تقدم من انه لم لا يجوز
ان يكون الخاص وما صدق عليه من هذين
المفهومين عين ما استحال عدمه على طريقة
كون الوجود عينه عندهم فان الوجود
وهو كون الشيء في الاعيان لا شك انه
امر اعتباري لا تحقوله في الخارج والحال
انهم اشتوا كون الخاص منه وما صدق عليه
عين حقيقة الواجب واما الحمل الاثنافي

فواقع في الوجود ايضاً فالجواب عنه جواب
 فيه وقوله غير المعقول غير المعقول ^{مفقود}
 لكن الكلام فيه ليس في المعقول الذي هو
 امر اعتباري عام بل في الخاص وكونه معقولا
 بكنهه ممنوع **قال** صاحب المحاكمات فان
 قلت لان ان واجب الوجود لو كان تعيينه
 لذاته انحصر في ذلك المعين وانما يكون
 كذلك لو كان واجب الوجود ذاتا واحدا
 وهو ممنوع لجواز ان يكون عرضا عاما او
 طبيعة جنسية يلزم ان يكون تمايزا نواع
 المتدرجة تحته بالفصول المقومة لها
 فيلزم المحذور المترتب على التركيب من الطبيعة
 النوعية والشخص اذا لفرق بينهما في ان

فيه نظر لانه الوجود اذا كان طبيعة
 جنسية

منها تركيب ذهني على ما سبق ذكرهما قال

الشارح المنضى للثعابين الذي ينضم اليه

أقول هذا يشعر بزيادة الثعابين

ولزوم التركيب

٥

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

سبحان من اضاءت انوار احاديث كبرياته

من مشكاة النبوة ارجاء كونه ومكوناته

وانارت اضواء اثار عظيمته وجلاله من

صباح الرسالة اطراف جملة كايئاته

احمد حمدا متصلا غير منقطع على افضال

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Knowledge Hegemonies in the Early Modern World

1. Omodeo, Pietro (2020). *Amerigo Vespucci: The Historical Context of His Explorations and Scientific Contribution*. Edited by Pietro Daniel Omodeo.

This book is a reconstruction of a previously unedited fifteenth-century court debate between two prominent Ottoman scholars, Mollā Zeyrek and Ḥocazāde, on the philosophers' formulation of God's unicity. The debate was a celebrated court event organized around the year 871/1466, which continued for a week in the presence of the Ottoman Sultan Meḥmed II, his grand vizier Maḥmūd Paşa, and the jurist Mollā Ḥüsrev, most probably at the Sultan's palatine library. This study includes the first annotated edition of this debate in Arabic along with its translation, analysis, and contextual significance in post-classical Islamic intellectual history, covering a wide range of perspectives on Arabic disputation etiquette, the method of scholarly verification, Meḥmed II's patronage and universalism, and Ottoman philosophical discussions on unicity, existence, and necessity.

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