

## 4 **The States of the Predicand** **(*aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh*)**

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### 4.1 **Operations on the Predicand**

The chapter on the states of the predicand (*aḥwāl-i musnad ilayh*) discusses how the predicand can be manipulated to produce a range of effects. So far, this exploration of the science of meanings has examined how predicand and predicate combine in a statement. From here, it moves on to examine the syntactical semantics of each constituent of the informative utterance. The processes by which the predicand takes on the most basic sense or more subtle secondary meanings are explored in this section. General operations on nominals are also introduced.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'general operations on nominals' is borrowed from Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 127.

The taxonomy of the operations on the predicand occupies most of this chapter. Some of the operations count as pairs of opposites: occurrence (*dīkr*) vs ellipsis (*ḥaḍf*), definite reference (*ta'rif*) vs indefinite reference (*tankīr*), preposing (*taqdīm*) vs postposing (*ta'hīr*). In addition, some Persian manuals mention that the predicand undergoes variations of meaning also in the case of emphasis (*ta'kid*), attribute (*waṣf*), linker (*'atf*), permutative (*badal*), and explanatory apposition (*'atf-i bayān*). A special case, seldom mentioned, is the stylistic feature called *iltifāt* 'reference switching'. The following paragraphs will discuss each of them.

#### 4.2 Occurrence (*dīkr*) and Ellipsis (*ḥaḍf*)

The informative utterance generally envisages mentioning the predicand and the predicate (see also § 5.2). The two constituents, though always extant, may appear or not at the surface level. On this basis, the science of meanings individuates a binary distinction that opposes occurrence (*dīkr*, literally 'mention') to ellipsis (*ḥaḍf*, literally 'cutting off'). Compare *imrūz rūz-i 'ayd ast* 'Today is a festive day' to *rūz-i 'ayd ast* '(It) is a festive day'.<sup>2</sup> In both cases *imrūz* 'today' is the predicand. But in the first case the predicand occurs, whereas it is elided in the second. Occurrence of the predicand (*dīkr-i musnad ilayh*) is the standard way (*aṣl*) of formulating the utterance. That is, a speaker should generally mention the predicand to produce an adequate utterance. Ellipsis of the predicand (*ḥaḍf-i musnad ilayh*), on the other hand, should satisfy some specific conditions.

Ellipsis is only allowed if it is possible to recover the missing element. The existence of a *qarīna* 'contextual reference' is crucial in this regard. There are two means to understand what the elided predicand is: the addressee can rely on verbal (*qarīna-yi lafẓī*) or logical evidence (*qarīna-yi ma'nawī*). In one case, the speaker omits a predicand that has been stated before. In the latter case, the speaker omits an element whose clues the cognitive faculties can retrieve in world knowledge.

In principle, the speaker should avoid useless repetitions, and ellipsis is a good strategy to do so. As a consequence, the ellipsis of the predicand is not only possible, but often strongly encouraged. Typically, it is compulsory whenever it does not result in a lack of informativity. The need for ellipsis, which is considered a means to avoid banalities (*iḥtirāz az 'abat* 'avoid being pointless') in the science of meanings, happens almost automatically when a predicand has occurred earlier at a short distance. Wherever the verbal con-

<sup>2</sup> Example adapted from Aḥmadniżād 2003, 118.

text (*qarīna-yi lafẓī*) provides sufficient clues to identify the predicand, the predicand would be better omitted.

Even if the predicand has never been stated, but solid logical clues point to it, the ellipsis is still a viable strategy. In those instances, the predicand is not recalled on a lexical basis but stands out thanks to the logical connection (*qarīna-yi ma'nawī*). The ellipsis characterises occasions where the speaker and his audience share the same world knowledge. In classical Persian poems, one example occurs whenever the poet omits the name of God, the beloved, or the praised patron. From a *ma'ānī* perspective, omitting the name of God rests on the fact that the actions or qualities that appear in the utterance's predicate pertain to God exclusively. In such a case, the predicate sufficiently clarifies who the intended predicand is. Similarly, a subjectless third-person singular verb will generally refer to the beloved in a love poem or to the praised patron in an encomiastic ode. Of particular interest in such reflections is that the shared knowledge, and ultimately the *qarīna-yi ma'nawī*, may depend on literary conventions.<sup>3</sup>

The notion of covert *qarīna* is also essential in utterances that omit the predicand. As mentioned before, the covert *qarīna* refers to the framework of references that have not been directly recalled in the communicative exchange and are not necessarily part of the shared knowledge. The speaker can draw on a range of knowledge known to him but not necessarily to others. By eliding the predicand, the speaker possibly takes advantage of his knowledge to exclude some of his listeners from understanding. Also, the ellipsis can provide an excellent test to check the level of understanding and awareness of information available only in the covert *qarīna*. Only those who know the covert *qarīna* will understand the message.

Ellipsis is also used to cover additional pragmatic purposes and effects (*aḡrād*). The speaker may feel unworthy of pronouncing the predicand out of reverence or modesty or, conversely, he may judge the predicand so unfavourably that he prefers not to mention it. In such cases, the ellipsis can express respect or contempt. It is possible to use ellipsis for opportunistic reasons when silence about the predicand allows the speaker to later retract what has been said. Sometimes the situation limits the speaker's options because of a lack of time or a fear of missing an opportunity.

The tacit principle of avoiding redundancy finds some exceptions. Different reasons motivate the occurrence of a non-necessary predicand. These include reasons of clarity, respect or irony. For example, if the speaker believes that the extant *qarīna* may not be sufficiently clear, he may, as a precaution, consider mentioning the predicand to avoid any possible misunderstanding. This precautionary approach

<sup>3</sup> On this topic, see Taḡlīl 1983, 13 and Šamīsā 1994, 76.

is called *iḥtiyāṭ kardan-i qarīna-yi wāḍiḥ* ‘to disregard clear contextual evidence for the sake of caution’. Another reason for mentioning a redundant predicand is that the statement gets more explicit and incisive (*ziyādat-i taqrīr wa iḍāḥ*). Also, the occurrence of epithets, from honorific titles to harsh sobriquets, works even in those contexts where ellipsis would fit as well. Since such nouns have positive or negative connotations, expressing them allows one to convey respect (*taʿẓīm* ‘glorification’) or contempt (*ihānat*). The same applies whenever mentioning the predicand is deemed pleasant (*istildād*) or a blessing (*tabarruk*). Examples include the occurrence of the beloved’s or the Prophet’s name. Implicatures of a different kind are also possible. For instance, a non-necessary occurrence of the predicand allows ridiculing the addressee. The speaker treats the addressee as if he were such a fool that he could not infer the predicand from the context. This technique, which resembles irony, is called *tanbih bar jabāwat-i sāmī* ‘admonishing the stupidity of the listener’.

Ellipsis and occurrence may affect any element of the utterance. However, in this section, only the predicand has been considered. The plan, which organises the contents according to the constituents of the utterance, forces us to rediscuss the same operations at different points of our outline. Therefore, further considerations on ellipsis will appear elsewhere (see §§ 5.2, 6.2, 6.3, 10.2).<sup>4</sup>

### 4.3 Definite Reference (*taʿrīf*)

A definite (*maʿrifa*) predicand refers to some individual or entity both the speaker and the addressee know. Several lexical strategies enable the identification of a specific, unique or familiar referent. Adopting the taxonomy inherited from the model laid out by the Arabic grammarians, the science of meanings recognises six types of definite predicands: personal name (*ism-i ʿalam*), personal pronoun (*ḍamīr*), relative construction (*mawṣūliyya/mawṣūl*), definite article (Arabic *alif-lām*), demonstrative (*iṣāra*), and possessive construction (*iḍāfa*).<sup>5</sup> Whatever type is employed, the operation on the nominal

<sup>4</sup> Šamīsā notes the structural lack of a predicand in some Persian constructions of the type: *āwarda and ki* (literally ‘[they] reported that’) ‘it has been said that’, *ū rā ustād midānand* (‘He-OBJECT master they know’) ‘He is known as a master’, *pīrmard-ī rā guftand* (‘To an elderly man [they] said’) ‘An old man was asked’ (Šamīsā 1994, 77). See also chapter 6.

<sup>5</sup> I adopt here ‘definite’ as a broad equivalent of *maʿrifa*. See also Marogy who argues: “I should like to add a terminological note concerning the confusion of the term *maʿrifa* and *nakira* with the syntactic categories of definite and indefinite. For the reader’s benefit the terms will further be used as equivalents but only in the broadest sense of the term. The view of definiteness advanced here rests upon the consideration that it is a morphosyntactic category that imperfectly grammaticalises the pragmatic cat-

leading to definiteness is called the state (*ḥāl*) of ‘making the predicand known, defining the predicand’ (*ta’rīf-i musnad ilayh*).

#### 4.3.1 Names and Epithets (*‘alam*)

Designating the predicand by his name or epithet (*‘alam*) is a privileged way to refer to somebody in a definite manner. A personal name (*ism-i ḥāṣṣ* ‘distinctive name’) is a name that brings one specific person to mind. The first time the predicand occurs in the utterance, use of a name is an apt strategy. Subject to conditions, a pronoun may replace it in later occurrences. One example of a definite predicand and a personal name is Bahrām in the examples given in §§ 2.3 and 3.1.

Further goals motivate the occurrence of a personal name. They mainly have to do with emotions, feelings or psychological attitudes towards the person given that name and the effect that verbalisation conveys. An honorific title implies respect, while a sobriquet shows contempt. A name is pleasant or gives a chance for a blessing. On the other hand, it also happens that the speaker prefers not to mention an unpleasant name. As the reader will probably notice, the effects of mentioning the predicate and those of mentioning names and epithets largely overlap (see § 4.2).

#### 4.3.2 Personal Pronoun (*ḍamīr*)

Personal pronouns, such as *man* ‘I’, *tu* ‘you (singular)’, *ū* ‘he/she/it’, *mā* ‘we’, *šumā* ‘you (plural)’ and *ānhā* ‘they’, usually refer to specific individuals. As mentioned in § 4.3.1, they may replace a personal name after the first occurrence. Manuals consider the essential condition for a personal pronoun to occur is that there is a lexical antecedent or a logical referent for which the pronoun stands. Clarity reasons would generally recommend mentioning the antecedent (*muraḡḡa’*) (i.e. the referred thing or person) before the first occurrence of a pronoun. However, some techniques allow one to do the opposite and employ the pronoun before clarifying its antecedent. When the antecedent is entirely missing from the verbal context, the acceptability of the pronoun in the utterance depends on the non-verbal frame of reference (*qarīna-yi ma’nawī*). In those instances, the speaker evokes knowledge commonly shared with the addressee. For example, Per-

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egory of identifiability” (Marogy 2010, 95). On the Arabic grammar taxonomy of definite and indefinite nouns, see also Kouloughli 2007, 106-7. On the interplay between definite vs indefinite and specific vs non-specific in Persian, on nouns with an individuated reference, and on the ways in which Persian grammaticalises the reference of a noun to a *denotatum*, see Orsatti 2011.

sian poetry accepts a reference to God or the beloved to appear in the third-person pronoun without any previous antecedent. The reason is that the pronoun identifies a single highly salient referent in that context. The speaker and the addressee clearly identify the predicand in view of the *qarīna*.<sup>6</sup> Such considerations mainly apply to third-person personal pronouns, while a more limited level of ambiguity characterises first- and second-person pronouns.<sup>7</sup>

Manuals give a taxonomy of first-, second-, and third-person pronouns and their purpose. Their primary functions are called *takallum* ‘speaking about oneself’, *muḥāṭabat* ‘addressing someone’ and *ġāyibat* ‘talking about somebody absent’. The first-person pronoun (*ḍamīr-i mutakallim*) generally refers to the speaker himself, the second person (*ḍamīr-i muḥāṭab*) to the addressee, and the third person (*ḍamīr-i ġāyib*) to someone not directly involved in the communicative exchange. Plural personal pronouns (*ḍamāyir-i ġam*) generally refer to a group of individuals, although they can also refer to an individual in limited cases (for example, *mā* ‘we’ refers to the first-person singular in many examples of Persian classical poetry).

In some instances, the first- and second-person pronouns can denote a generic persona (*āmm*) instead of a specific one. In the example below, the person speaking in the first-person is not referring to himself but embodies an unidentified self:

*man malak būdam u firdaws-i barīn ġāy-am būd*  
*Ādam āward bad-īn dayr-i ḥarābābād-am*<sup>8</sup>

I was an angel and my home was the highest Paradise.  
 Adam brought me into this temple of the abode of desolation.

The second-person pronoun also fits universally valid statements. Claims directed to a generic addressee also exist. This occurs particularly in warnings and advice as in:

*tu k-az miḥnat-i dīgarān bīgam-ī*  
*našāyad ki nām-at nihand ādamī*<sup>9</sup>

You who are unsympathetic to the troubles of others,  
 It is not fitting to call you human.

<sup>6</sup> Similar considerations applied to *ḡikr*; see above § 4.2.

<sup>7</sup> Humāyī suggests that the highest definiteness belongs to the first- and second-person personal pronouns. He claims that they identify a unique referent and cannot be used figuratively (Humāyī 1991, 119).

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 121. Ḥāfiż 1983, 636-7, *ġazal* 310, v. 3. Avery 2007, 386.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 122. Sa’dī 1937b, 25. Thackston 2008, 22.

A universal value is sometimes assumed when first- and second-person pronouns come in pairs. In mottos and general statements, *man u tu* stands for ‘everyone, no one excluded’. According to Humāyī (1991, 120-1), such a use stresses universality (*‘umūmiyyat*). The following line provides one example:

*man u tu dar miyān kār-i nadārīm*  
*ba-ğuz bihūda pandār-i nadārīm*<sup>10</sup>

You and I [and everyone] have nothing to do with it.  
We have nothing but vain thinking and no proper understanding.

Some manuals note that the use of personal pronouns in Persian is limited. Since Persian inflectional endings express person and number, subject pronouns are sometimes redundant or irrelevant.<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.3.3 Relative Construction (*mawṣūliyya, mawṣūl*)

At this point, the science of meanings turns its attention to predicands defined by means of a relative construction (*ta’rif-i musnad ilayh ba mawṣūliyya*, or *ba mawṣūl*). For example, *ān kas ki...* ‘the/that person who...’ + relative phrase. Older manuals describe relative constructions in terms of three components: *mawṣūl* (literally, ‘connected element’) ‘referent, antecedent, head (of the relative clause)’, *ism-i mawṣūl* ‘relative marker, connective’, and *šila* ‘relative phrase, content of the relative clause’ (Āq-Iwlī n.d., 69; Rağā’i 1961, 59-60). This description reflects traditional grammar usage. More recent manuals use simplified terminology and, in line with contemporary usage, use the term *mawṣūl* to refer to the relative marker *ki* ‘who, whom, that (animate)’ (for example, Šamīsā 1994, 84) or *či* ‘that (inanimate objects)’.

The examples given in the manuals illustrate utterances in which the relative marker follows or is fused with an antecedent. The typical Persian device is a group of words introduced by a complex relative pronoun such as *ānki* ‘the one who..., he/she whom...’ or *ānči* ‘that which...’ followed by essential information relevant to identifying the referent.<sup>12</sup> Thus, this section mainly considers a specific class of relative constructions that combine the antecedent *ān* and the relative marker *ki* or *či*. Other markers include *ān kas-i ki* ‘that person who...’

<sup>10</sup> Quoted in Humāyī 1991, 121. Ğāmi 1999, 2: 36, *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā*, v. 342.

<sup>11</sup> A similar point is also claimed valid in Arabic, see Jenssen 1998, 85.

<sup>12</sup> I will not address the question of whether *ki* should be interpreted as a relative pronoun or a conjunction.

and *ān kasān-ī ki* ‘those persons who...’. Comparatively little attention is paid to relative constructions in which a noun phrase is followed by the suffix *-ī + ki*, as in the following example: *dānišāmūzān-ī ki dars namīḥwānand bidānand ki...* ‘The students who do not study should know that...’ (Šamīsā 1994, 85). Furthermore, constructions like *Sa’dī ast ki guft...* ‘It was Sa’dī who said...’ (84) are even much rarer.

Relative constructions are intended to be another strategy for marking definiteness (*ta’rīf*). The devices in this class are generally used in cases where it is impossible to use a proper name or a personal pronoun – this their primary function. Imagine a situation in which there are many people at a gathering, and the speaker does not know the name of one of the participants. Hence, the speaker cannot use a personal name to identify that person. Furthermore, using a third-person pronoun would be unclear because there are too many people to whom the pronoun could refer. Thus, a different strategy is needed. In such situations, a clause introduced by *ānki* would be appropriate. The content of the clause specifies a state, action or quality that uniquely identifies the predicand.

A relative construction is also helpful in various other situations, such as, for example, preventing awkwardness. A noun phrase used as the head of a relative construction is a good substitute for a proper name that is unpleasant or difficult to pronounce. In the latter case, a relative construction prevents cacophony, one of the faults that hinders linguistic purity (*faṣāḥat*). A relative construction also helps the speaker to fix the utterance more incisively (*ziyādat-i taqrīr*) or express glorification (*ta’zīm*). For example, to exalt God’s majesty, the typical tool used by poets is to refer to God’s unique features using a relative construction, as in:

*ānki haft iqlīm ‘ālam rā nihād  
har kas-ī rā ānči lāyiq būd dād*<sup>13</sup>

The one who endowed the world with the seven climates,  
Gave to each one what was appropriate.

One more use of the relative construction occurs when the speaker wants to distance himself from what he imagines to be a false belief of the addressee (*tanbīh bar ḥaṭā-yi muḥāṭab*) as in:

*ānki ū rā bar ‘Alī-yi Murtaḍā ḥwānī amīr  
bi-llah ar bar mīṭawānād kafš-i qanbar dāštan*<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 63. Sa’dī 1941, 210.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 63. Sanā’ī 1996, 245.



He whom you call Prince instead of ‘Ali the Beloved of God,  
God take me if he can even aspire to Qanbar’s shoes!

#### 4.3.4 Persian Zero-Article (Ar. *alif-lām*)

In adopting the Arabic scheme, Persian scholars had to tackle the typological differences between Persian and Arabic grammar. One controversial point is the treatment of the definite article (*alif-lām*) of Arabic. The Arabic science of meanings considers at length the definite article *al-* as a tool to achieve specific goals.<sup>15</sup> A definite article does not exist in Persian, which only has an indefinite article *-ī* (*yā-yi tankīr* ‘*-ī* of indefiniteness’; see § 4.4). However, a zero-article noun in Persian may feature pragmatic functions similar to those of a noun with the definite article in Arabic, under certain conditions. A question arises. Does a section on the definite article fit a Persian manual of the science of meanings?

Persian scholars have variedly assessed the issue. In the passage from one language to another, theorists have had to choose between respecting formal or functional parameters. Some have avoided any section on the definite article. Others have offered Persian examples fulfilling pragmatic functions similar to those expressed by the *alif-lām* article in Arabic. The latter group of scholars individuated a bare noun, devoid of any markers, as equivalent to the definite value the Arabic article gives to a noun. These scholars assumed that a zero-marking common noun may be definite in Persian and designed their manuals accordingly. Thus, the correspondent in Persian is the absence of overt marking on the noun (see Aḥmadniżād 2003, 128).

A summary of their view follows with a selection of Persian examples taken from the manuals. The question concerns the referent of a common noun with a zero-determiner, which can be specific or not. Some distinctions apply. A bare noun may refer to an individual (for example, *šāh* ‘king’, and thus ‘the king’), or to a concept or idea (for example, *pārsā’ī* ‘abstinence’ or ‘the abstinence’). Also, the number of referents identified by a noun intended to be definite may vary. For instance, the word *gurg* ‘(the) wolf’ may refer to one wolf or to the whole class of wolves, every wolf in general.

As for the specific referent, since the same common noun may indicate many referents, there should be a sort of agreement (*‘ahd*)<sup>16</sup> between the speaker and the addressee on which one is intended. The two actors must know the referent and agree on what is ‘mutually

<sup>15</sup> See al-Taftāzānī 1911, 79-87; Simon 1993, 108-11; Jenssen 1998, 88-9.

<sup>16</sup> On a similar use of the term *‘ahd* ‘mutual knowledge’ by Muslim legal theorists, see Yunis Ali 2000, 57.

agreed' (*ma'hūd*) under that common noun. What prevents misunderstandings is a matter of mutual agreement, which may exist on different premises: co-textual, spatial, or knowledge-based. In other words, an intended definite noun is understood to refer to a particular individual on the basis of what was earlier stated, on the physical presence of the referent, or in view of previous knowledge all the actors involved are aware of. I will give one example of each of the three below.

An agreement on the basis of the co-text is assumed when the referent has been mentioned earlier in the discourse. Manuals call it '*aḥd-i ḡikrī* 'mutual agreement based on (earlier) mention'. This case is exemplified by the recurrence of the same common noun in two forms, once indefinite and once definite. In the second occurrence the bare noun assumes a definite meaning because it has already been mentioned. In the following example, the word *uštūr* 'camel' occurs twice: *uštūr-ī* 'a camel' with the indefinite suffix *-ī* and *uštūr* 'the camel' with zero-article:

*ablah-ī dīd uštūr-ī ba-čārā*  
*guft naqš-at hama kaž ast čirā?*  
*guft uštūr ki andar īn paykār*  
*'ayb-i naqqāš mikunī huš dār<sup>17</sup>*

A fool saw a grazing camel.  
 He said: "Your shape is quite crooked. Why?"  
 The camel said: "In this dispute,  
 You blame the sculptor. Have a care!"

On the contrary, '*aḥd-i ḥuḍūrī* 'mutual agreement based on the presence (in a place)' is the tag given to converging on a referent that is physically there. Physical availability allows the introduction of a definite noun without a previous indefinite occurrence. The word *šāh* '(the) king' assumes a definite reference in the following line because there is only one king in front of the servant:

*banda čūn mulk u 'adl-i šāh bidīd<sup>18</sup>*

When the servant saw the King's power and justice...

Finally, shared knowledge or experience may be enough to agree upon the specificity of the noun when the referent has not been expressed beforehand or is not present. The notion of '*aḥd-i 'ilmī* 'knowledge-

<sup>17</sup> Quoted in Raḡā'ī 1961, 67. Sanā'ī 1950, 83, vv. 8-9. Adapted from de Bruijn 1983, 223, who relied on a different reading.

<sup>18</sup> Quoted in Raḡā'ī 1961, 68. Sanā'ī 1950, 705, v. 6.

based mutual agreement' assumes that world knowledge enables effective communication. For instance, the word *šāh* below is not specified by previous mention or physical presence, but the speaker and the addressee tacitly agree that only one king ruled that area. Therefore, *šāh* means one specific king here, the city of Bukhara's king:

*šāh māh ast u buḥārā āsmān  
māh sūy-i āsmān āyad hamī*<sup>19</sup>

The King is the moon, and Bukhara is the sky.  
The moon stands out in the sky.

Beside identifying a specific referent, the unmarked noun can also refer to a concept or to a whole class. In this case, the science of meanings considers the bare noun to represent the genus (*ta'rīf-i ḡins*) or the nature of something. That is, the bare noun does not refer to one specific individual or thing as in the examples above. What should be understood by 'genus' in this case is threefold: either it is the inherent nature behind this noun, or it is a whole class of similar persons (or things) by extension (*istiḡrāq*), or it is one unidentified person (or thing) under this genus. All three have a definite meaning. I will give some examples below to describe the difference among the three.

In the first instance, a bare noun indicates the true nature (*ta'rīf-i ḥaqīqat*) of something. The idea is that the bare noun can hint at the fundamental essence of that entity. This is better illustrated by abstract nouns. For example, *pārsā'ī* 'Abstinence' below means the quintessence of abstinence:

*tark-i dunyā wu šahwat ast u hawas  
pārsā'ī na tark-i ḡāma wu bas*<sup>20</sup>

Abandoning the world, desires, and lust  
Is Abstinence, not just abandoning the robe.

Also, non-abstract nouns are sometimes used to convey concepts. For example, *gūsfand* '(the) sheep' in the example below is used to speak in general about all the animals under the same class. The utterance thus formulated states something about all the elements subsumed under the category. In this case, the word is used by way of extension and the science of meanings calls it a case of *istiḡrāq* 'extension, extended coverage'. Since the literal value of the utterance is valid for

<sup>19</sup> Quoted in Raḡā'ī 1961, 68. The verse is given with the word *mīr* 'prince' instead of *šāh* 'king' in Rūdakī 1994, 113, v. 538.

<sup>20</sup> Quoted in Raḡā'ī 1961, 68. Sa'dī 1937b, 56 fn. 4.

all the elements of the same category, this is more precisely a case of *istiḡrāq-i ḥaqīqī* ‘true extension’. In fact, *gūsfand* ‘(the) sheep’ and *čūpān* ‘(the) shepherd’ in the following line stand for all the animals and men of the same genus:

*gūsfand az barāy-i čūpān nīst*  
*balki čūpān barāy-i ḥidmat-i ū-st*<sup>21</sup>

Sheep do not exist for the shepherd.  
Instead, it is the shepherd who exists for serving them.

A different kind of *istiḡrāq*, the so-called *istiḡrāq-i ‘urfī* ‘conventional extension’, applies when a bare noun refers to a limited number of individuals or things. Formally, it resembles a true *istiḡrāq* but has a narrower scope. For example, *bāzārān* ‘(the) merchants’ may conventionally refer to the merchants of a specific market or place, and not necessarily to all the merchants in general. Although vast in scope, a true *istiḡrāq* means exactly what it says. On the contrary, the face value of a conventional *istiḡrāq* indicates more elements than those intended. The exact limit to the number of elements to consider depends on conventional usage.

At times, the bare noun has a value at odds with what one would expect. Though definite, and predominantly leading to a specific referent, a zero-article noun is sometimes non-specific. For example, in the following verse *bulbul* ‘(the) nightingale’ takes the unmarked form of a definite noun but stands for one non-specific nightingale, whatever that may be:

*bulbul zi šāḥ-i sarw ba gulbāng-i pahlawī*  
*mīḥwānd dūš dars-i maqāmāt-i ma‘nawī*<sup>22</sup>

Last night the nightingale, warbling in Pahlavi from the cypress branch,  
Was reciting the lesson of the Stages on the Way of Spiritual Meaning.

When this ‘mismatch’ occurs, the speaker and the addressee should mutually agree that the referent is non-specific, although definite. How do they? They reach this awareness through reasoning and intellectual effort (*aḥd-i dīhnī* ‘intellectual mutual agreement’). Interestingly, reasoning is the last resource to be activated in decoding the utterance.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 68. Sa’dī 1937b, 46. Adapted from Thackston 2008, 38.

<sup>22</sup> Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 68. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 970, *ḡazal* 477, v. 1. Avery 2007, 577.

4.3.5 Demonstrative (*išāra*)

Demonstratives (*išāra*) define the predicand with the utmost clarity provided that the referent is available in the setting of utterance. Persian distinguishes two demonstratives: the distal demonstrative *ān* ‘that’ and the proximal demonstrative *īn* ‘this’. The primary function of the demonstrative is to identify a unique referent from many in the physical setting. The standard (*aṣl*) entails indicating the referent by ‘pointing’. ‘Pointing’, in fact, is the etymological meaning of *išāra*.

If there is not a set of many referents to disambiguate among, the role of demonstratives assumes different purposes. Thus, in addition to the most basic usage, demonstratives may also have secondary meanings. One is to mention the referent in terms of distance from the speaker. Others concern feelings of various kinds. I will give two examples below: one expresses someone’s attitude towards the referent in terms of contempt, and another reveals the addressee’s foolishness (*muta’riḍ šudan ba ġabāwat*).

Sometimes the distal demonstrative is a sign of respect and high esteem, while the proximal shows contempt and low value. Sometimes the reverse is also valid. Manifestations of respect (*ta’ẓīm*) and contempt (*taḥqīr*) are not bound to one demonstrative only and both may acquire different values in this regard. Below I report an example where *īn* ‘these’ expresses contempt:

*īn daġaldūstān ki mībīnī*  
*magasān-and ġird-i šīrīnī*<sup>23</sup>

These alleged friends you see  
Are flies buzzing around something sweet.

In another example, which has already been mentioned in § 3.4, the poet jokes with his audience. He pretends the addressee is such a fool as not to be able to distinguish between the earthly and everlasting worlds. Assuming that the addressee needs such clarification, the poet adopts the demonstrative *īn* ‘this’ to refresh the concept that our world is ephemeral:

*īn sarāy-i-st ki albatta ḥīlal ḥwāhad yāft*  
*ḥunuk ān qawm ki dar band-i sarāy-i diġar-and*<sup>24</sup>

This is the house that will certainly go to ruin.  
Blessed are those who prepare their home for the next world!

<sup>23</sup> Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 125. Sa’dī 1941, 207.

<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 67. Sa’dī 1941, 123, 19f, [v. 5].

#### 4.3.6 Possessive Construction (*iḍāfa*)

According to the terminology used in the science of meanings, the term *iḍāfa* ‘annexation’ refers to the construction that interrelates two nouns in a possessed-possessor construction (for example, *ḥāna-yi mu‘allim* ‘the house of the teacher’). The marker that links the head noun to the possessor is an enclitic *-(y)i* commonly referred to as *kasra-yi iḍāfa* ‘the *iḍāfa* particle’. The possessive construction here intended should not be confused with the other functions of the *iḍāfa* particle. For example, the *iḍāfa* particle that binds a noun to an adjective (as in, for example, *ḥāna-yi buzurg* ‘the big house’) is excluded here. Manuals deal with the noun-adjective construction elsewhere in an appropriate section (see § 4.6).

The possessive *iḍāfa* as a technique for defining the predicand (*ta‘rīf-i musnad ilayh ba iḍāfa*) provides a device for an economically composed utterance. It is the most succinct way to talk about several persons or things, all of which share the same possessed-possessor relationship. For example, *dānišgūyān-i dānišgāh-i Tih-rān* ‘the students of the University of Tehran’ is a very short way of referring to a large group of individuals. It would be inappropriate to list the names of all these students, if possible at all. A long list of predicands bores the audience and forces the speaker to rank the items in some order of importance. One of the main functions of the possessive construction is then to shorten (*iḥtišār*) a long list by making all the items equal.

In addition, the possessive construction has other effects. When the possessor or the possessed have positive or negative connotations, the whole *iḍāfa*-construction may convey a sense of respect or contempt. Such an effect is a consequence of combining two nouns. That is, respect or contempt does not spring from the grammatical particle itself but arises from the meaning of the two nouns juxtaposed. If one of the two has a highly positive or negative rate, the same extends to the other. For instance, in *farzand-i rasūl* ‘the Prophet’s offspring’ below, the respect for the possessor *rasūl* ‘Prophet’ extends to the possessed ‘offspring’:

*farzand-i rasūl ast bar īn bāg nigahbān*<sup>25</sup>

The Prophet’s offspring guards this garden.

Conversely, the negative qualities of *ālūdaḡī* ‘stain, filth’ extend from the possessed to the possessor to convey a sense of contempt in:

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 115. Nāṣir-i Ḥusraw 1928, 352, v. 2.

*ālūdagi-y-i ḥirqa ḥarābī-yi ḡahān ast*  
*kū rāhraw-ī ahl-i dil-ī pāksirišt-ī*<sup>26</sup>

The stain of the Dervish gown is the pollution of the world.  
 Where is a follower of the Path, a man of the heart, of pure disposition?

#### 4.4 Indefinite Reference (*tankīr*)

The section on *tankīr-i musnad ilayh* ‘making the predicand unknown’ discusses non-identified predicands and the value the indefinite takes in different situations. In the Arabic science of meanings, the section on *tankīr* almost exclusively offers examples of nominals with the *tanwīn*, the morphological *-n* added to Arabic nouns after the vowel case mark.<sup>27</sup> In Persian one can identify several markers of indefiniteness, but it is the suffix *-ī* of indefiniteness (*yā-yi tankīr*) that best corresponds to the uses of the Arabic *tanwīn*. For this reason, the core of this section considers the semantic and pragmatic import of nouns followed by the suffixed marker *-ī*. Persian manuals leave little space for different indefiniteness markers, which in Persian include *čand* ‘some’, *harki*, *har kas-ī ki* ‘all those who, everyone who, who’ and other words built on *har* ‘every’.

Sometimes the speaker is unable to refer to the predicand in a definite manner. All the strategies and constructions for definiteness (the use of a proper name, of a demonstrative, of a possessive construction...) are out of the speaker’s power or would not fit. The same happens if the addressee does not know (*‘adam-i ‘ilm*) who (or what) precisely the referent is. Also, the speaker may avoid a definite predicand because he does not want the addressee to identify the referent. In brief, different conditions force the speaker to resort to indefiniteness.

The import of the indefinite noun varies, as the following examples from the manuals will show. First, the indefinite noun can refer to a single unidentified person or thing (*fard-i ḡayr-i mu‘ayyan*). The situation in which a noun is followed by the suffix *-ī* to refer to one unidentified referent is called *ifrād* ‘isolation of a single item, singling someone or something out’. For example, in the utterance below, the predicand *bulbul-ī* ‘a nightingale’ refers to one single nightingale whose identity is not known:

<sup>26</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 117. Ḥāfīz 1983, 870, *ḡazal* 427, v. 8. Adapted from Avery 2007, 516.

<sup>27</sup> See the examples discussed in al-Taftāzānī 1911, 88-90; Simon 1993, 123-7; Blankinship 2019, 67-71.

*bulbul-ī barg-i gul-ī ḥwašrang dar minqār dāšt*<sup>28</sup>

A nightingale had in its beak a rose-petal of beautiful colour.

Second, indefiniteness can indicate a type, a category or a species (*naw'iyat*, *bayān-i ifrād-i naw'*). Unlike the previous example, not a single item within a group but a particular class is meant. According to Zāhidī, this occurs, for example, in the indefinite reference in the saying *har dard-ī dawā'-ī dārad*, which translates the Arabic *li-kulli dā'in dawā'un*<sup>29</sup> 'Every disease has a cure' or 'For each type of disease, there is a type of medicine'. Another example Zāhidī gives is *ta'ammul-ī* '(a) careful consideration' in:

*tīr az kamān ču raft nayāyad ba šast bāz  
pas wāğib-ast dar hama kār-ī ta'ammul-ī*<sup>30</sup>

When the arrow is shot from the bow, it will never return to the thumb ring.

Therefore, careful consideration is required in every task.

Third, an indefinite predicand may also express respect (*ta'zīm*) or contempt (*taḥqīr*, *ḥwārdāšt*). For example, *mard-ī* 'a man' expresses high esteem as it takes the sense of 'a great man, a unique man, a real man' in the line:

*mard-ī az ḥwiš birūn āyad u kār-ī bikunad*<sup>31</sup>

A man comes out from himself, and into action.

In contrast, the indefinite marker below adds a sense of contempt in *ḥām-ī* 'an immature (person or thing)':

*agar ān šarāb ḥām ast u gar īn ḥarīf puḥta  
ba hazār bār bihtar zi hazār puḥta ḥām-ī*<sup>32</sup>

**28** Quoted in Šamīsā 1994, 79. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 174, *ğazal* 79, v. 1. Avery 2007, 119.

**29** Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 72.

**30** Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 72. Sa'dī 1941, 79. In this line both *ta'ammul-ī* '(a) careful consideration' and *dar hama kār-ī* 'in every task' are indefinite. The first is also the predicand of the utterance and appears here as an example of *tankīr-i musnad ilayh*.

**31** Quoted in Ārzū 2002, 111 (though with a slightly different reading). Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 384, *ğazal* 184, v. 7. Avery 2007, 244. I preferred here to exceptionally quote an example taken from the eighteenth-century treatise by Ārzū instead of those given by authors of the last century.

**32** Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 128. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 934-5, *ğazal* 459, v. 2. Adapted from Avery 2007, 553.



If that wine is immature, but this comrade mature,  
One immature is a thousand times better than a thousand mature!

Fourth, indefiniteness possibly hints at the amount of something. The *-ī* suffix indicates that the quantity or the number of things is either small (*taqlīl*) or large (*takṭīr*). It is stated, therefore, that the same marker can convey opposite meanings, such as ‘any, a few of’ and ‘many, a multitude of’. According to Āq-Iwlī, an example of indefiniteness to mean a small quantity is *ġam-ī* ‘a grief, any grief’ in:

*rūz-ī agar ġam-ī rasad-at tangdil ma bāš*<sup>33</sup>

If one day any grief hits you, do not pine away!

Conversely, the word *qaṭra-yī* ‘a drop, many a drop, many drops’ exemplifies plenitude in:

*zi abr afkanad qaṭra-yī sūy-i yamm*<sup>34</sup>

From the cloud, He casts a drop towards the ocean.

Consider also *sayl-ī* ‘a flood’ in:

*tu guftī k-az sitīġ-i kūh sayl-ī  
furūd ārad hamī aḥġār-i ṣad mann*<sup>35</sup>

You would have said that from the crest of the mountain a flood  
Carried down a hundred *mann* of stones.

This line is given in different manuals to exemplify distinct categories. Āhanī (1978, 49) holds that the indefiniteness of *sayl-ī* applies to type (‘a sort of flood’), while Kazzāzī (1991, 129) considers the indefiniteness to give a sense of plenitude (‘an entire flood’). Here, as elsewhere, Persian scholars have different viewpoints.

**33** Quoted in Āq-Iwlī n.d., 77.

**34** Quoted in Zāhidī 1967, 75. Sa’dī 1937a, 3. Clarke 1879, 5.

**35** Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 129. Manūčihri 1947, 58, *qaṣīda* 30, v. 18.

#### 4.5 Emphasis (*ta'kīd*)

Operations on the predicand include tools for *ta'kīd* 'emphasis, reinforcement'. Relevant markers are repetition (*tikrār*) and words such as *hama* 'all', *har* 'every, each', *ḥwad* 'self' or the like. Their primary goal is to make a firm statement (*taqrīr wa taṭbīt*). Repetitions are particularly effective in serving this purpose. In the example *ḥudā ḥudā birahānad tu-rā z-andūhān*<sup>36</sup> 'God, God frees you from afflictions', the recurrence of the word *ḥudā* 'God' aims at reinforcing the statement. Repetition in this case nearly acquires the sense of 'indeed'.

Emphasis markers are also in use in afterthoughts and repair mechanisms. They serve to avoid possible misunderstandings or to react to an incorrect opinion of the addressee. In particular, emphasis is significant in preventing a figurative misinterpretation of a literal expression. The science of meanings has a label for this situation and calls it *daf'-i tawahhum-i maḡāz* 'to discard the hypothesis of figurative expression'. Idioms and metaphors are so pervading in language that sometimes the speaker needs to clarify how to intend his words. In the following line, the expression *man u tu* 'you and I' should be taken literally (and not idiomatically 'all of us, everyone'). To suggest the intended meaning, Sa'dī adds *har du* 'both, the two (of us)':

*man u tu har du ḥwāḡatāšān-īm*  
*banda-yi bārgāh-i sulṭān-īm*<sup>37</sup>

You and I are both slaves,  
Servants at the sultan's court.

Emphasis also serves to rebuke those who believe that the utterance has been negligently formulated (*raf'-i tawahhum-i sahw*). It may also suggest that the statement does not contain any hyperbole. For instance, assuming that the predicand is a collective noun or a plural, one may wonder whether the predicand is used appropriately. For this purpose, a dedicated syntagma with a quantifier is in use. For example, in *gulhā-yi bāḡ hama šikufta and*<sup>38</sup> 'The roses of the garden, all, are in bloom' the quantifier *hama* follows the predicand. Emphasis clarifies that the predicand comprehends the whole elements subsumed under the predicand *gulhā-yi bāḡ* 'the roses of the garden'. The emphasis marker clarifies that the predicative relationship is literally valid, and that the utterance contains no lapses or exaggeration.

<sup>36</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 134.

<sup>37</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 134. Sa'dī 1937b, 82. Thackston 2008, 70.

<sup>38</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 135.

#### 4.6 Attribute (*ṣifat, waṣf*)

The operation of adding a qualification is called *waṣf* ‘description’. An attribute (*ṣifat*) qualifies the predicand, but its value may vary. The science of meanings identifies three. First, by describing one of its intrinsic qualities, the attribute reveals the predicand’s true nature (*kaṣf-i ḥaqīqat*) and places emphasis (*ta’kīd*) on it. For example, *sūzān* ‘burning’ in *ātaš-i sūzān* ‘burning fire’<sup>39</sup> expresses an inherent quality of fire. The same happens in the following line with the qualities Ḥāfiẓ attributes to gypsies (*lūliyān*):

*fiḡān k-īn lūliyān-i šūḥ-i šīrīnkār-i šahrāšūb*  
*čūnān burdand ṣabr az dil ki turkān ḥwān-i yaḡmā rā*<sup>40</sup>

Alas that these saucy, jesting, city-ravishing gypsies  
 Should, as Turks do [on] the spoil’s feast, pillage patience from  
 the heart.

Second, the attribute specifies the scope of the predicand. It allows for a kind of contrastive focus called *taḥṣīṣ* ‘particularisation, specialisation, exclusive assignment’ in the science of meanings. In other words, the attribute delineates the referent to which the judgement expressed in the utterance applies and excludes the others. The attribute for *taḥṣīṣ* is mainly in use after an indefinite noun. See, for example, how *dānā* ‘wise’ modifies the indefinite noun *lāḡar-ī* ‘a skinny man’ to restrict the number of persons to which the predicand *lāḡar-ī* could apply:

*ān šanīdī ki lāḡar-ī dānā*  
*guft rūz-ī ba ablah-ī farbih*<sup>41</sup>

Haven’t you heard that a skinny wise man  
 Once said to a fat fool...

Finally, qualities with positive semantic orientation may express praise (*madḥ*), while negative ones may express blame (*ḡamm*). The following line features an attribute, *farruḥsirišt* ‘of happy nature’, in praise of one of the mythical kings of Iran:

<sup>39</sup> Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 132.

<sup>40</sup> Quoted in Aḥmadniżād 2003, 133. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 22, *ḡazal* 3, v. 3. Adapted from Avery 2007, 21.

<sup>41</sup> Quoted in Raḡā’ī 1961, 75 and Aḥmadniżād 2003, 132. Sa’dī 1937b, 15. Adapted from Thackston 2008, 13.

šanīdam ki Ğamšīd-i farruḥsirišt  
ba sarčašma-ī bar ba sang-ī nibišt<sup>42</sup>

I heard that King Jamshīd of happy nature  
Wrote on a stone, at a fountain head...

#### 4.7 Permutative (*badal*)

The *badal* ‘permutative, interchange, substitution’ is a particular kind of apposition. According to the science of meanings, there is *badal* when the speaker adds one or more words to restore the proper sense of the predicand. In those instances, the utterance is affected by *ibdāl-i musnad ilayh* ‘permutation of the predicand’ or *āwardan-i badal bar musnad ilayh* ‘placing a permutative on the predicand’. The purpose of having a *badal* in apposition is to utter a more incisive affirmation (*ziyādat-i taqrīr*) of the judgement expressed.

There are different kinds of *badal* according to traditional grammar, but the most frequent in the Persian science of meanings is the *badal-i kull az kull* (also called *badal al-kull min al-kull*) ‘permutative of the whole for the whole, full substitution’. It is a situation in which a noun and the following apposition refer to the same person or thing. Both identify a unique referent whose identity, it seems, was clear since the beginning. For example, in *Ḥāfiẓ šā‘ir-i bulandpāya-yi irānī* ‘Ḥāfiẓ, the great Iranian poet...’ the apposition immediately following the name of Ḥāfiẓ is a *badal*.<sup>43</sup> One more example occurs in the following line, where the apposition *duḥt-i Afrāsiyāb* ‘Afrasyab’s daughter’ follows at short distance *Manīẓa* ‘Manizheh’:

*Manīẓa man-am duḥt-i Afrāsiyāb*<sup>44</sup>

I am Manizheh, Afrasyab’s daughter...

Though Persian manuals generally consider only the permutative of the whole for the whole, Arabic grammarians had identified four types of *badal*. The difference among the four types depends on the relation between the predicand and its permutative.<sup>45</sup> The *badal-i ġuz az kull* ‘permutative of the part for the whole’ refers to synecdoche and the

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in Aḥmadniẓād 2003, 133. Sa’dī 1937a, 29. Clarke 1897, 57

<sup>43</sup> The example is taken from the Sokhan dictionary (Anwarī 2003, 2: 866, s.v. “*badal*”).

<sup>44</sup> Quoted in Raġā‘ī 1961, 79. Firdawsī 1988-2008, 3: 373, v. 940. Davis 2016, 359. In this example, however, the *badal* follows a nominal element in the utterance, and not specifically the predicand.

<sup>45</sup> On the Arabic taxonomy of *badal*, see Kouloughli 2007, 81 and Simon 1993, 120-1.

*badal-i ištīmāl* ‘permutative of something complementary’ refers to metonymy. There is also the permutative to correct a slip of the tongue (*badal-i ḡalaṭ*), but it is deemed inappropriate in the science of meanings. A few Persian scholars, among them Raḡā’ī (1961, 78-9) and Āhanī (1978, 54-5), have tried to find Persian examples corresponding to each of the four types of Arabic permutative. Seemingly, their effort was not entirely rewarding as it is generally not followed by later scholars.

#### 4.8 Explanatory Apposition (*‘atf-i bayān*)

In the same way as the category of *badal*, also the notion of *‘atf-i bayān* (literally, ‘explicative coordinating’) derives from the Arabic grammatical tradition. In the science of meanings, it defines a particular kind of apposition that helps to better identify the predicand. Such explanatory apposition consists in the addition of a noun to the predicand to restrict and better elucidate who (or what) the intended referent is. Persian manuals provide few instances of *‘atf-i bayān*. The purpose of *‘atf-i bayān*, they say, is to clarify (*iḏāḥ*) the predicand. One example is the personal name Nu‘mān in:

*Šāh Nu‘mān az ān miyān bar ḥāst*<sup>46</sup>

King Nu‘mān rose from among...

The predicand *šāh* ‘King’ in this context, it seems, was too vague and possibly could have had multiple references. So, the apposition Nu‘mān answers the question, which King among the many kings is intended here? The predicand and the explanatory apposition are two different ways to refer to the same person or thing, but the noun in apposition that follows is better known than what it followed. In most cases, explanatory apposition means a proper noun in close apposition, which suggests that possibly intonation and suprasegmental features also play a part in the distinction.<sup>47</sup>

#### 4.9 Linkers (*‘atf*)

The section on the use of linkers after the predicand (*‘atf-i musnad ilayh*) mainly deals with conjunctive and adverbial linkers that connect nouns or noun phrases. Several goals justify joining together

<sup>46</sup> Quoted in Āhanī 1960, 101. Niẓāmi 1956, 682, *Haft paykar*.

<sup>47</sup> For a comparison between Arabic *badal* and *‘atf-i bayān* in terms of loose and close apposition and the role of suprasegmental criteria, see Sartori 2022.

two predicands, and the linking word is responsible for the nuance of meaning the utterance takes. Manuals review a list of linkers and offer specialised meanings for each, which I will summarise below.

Coordination by *wa* ‘and’ (also pronounced *w-*, *u* or *wu*) helps create a detailed list of predicands in a concise manner (*tafṣīl-i musnad ilayh ba iḥtiṣār*). In other words, the conjunction helps enumerate several persons or things in connection with the same predicate. For example, a sequence of sentences like *Bahrām ba bāzār raft* ‘Bahrām went to the market’ and *Zayd ba bāzār raft* ‘Zayd went to the market’ is shortened into *Bahrām wa Zayd ba bāzār raftand* ‘Bahrām and Zayd went to the market’. While shortening the utterance, coordination often requires a series of adjustments for the grammar rules to be respected.<sup>48</sup> Thus, the use of conjunctive linkers in Persian is not only a matter of conciseness (*iḥtiṣār* ‘shortening, using a few words’) but also of changing the sentence structure. In the line below, a chain of four coordinated animate subjects linked by *u* requires a third-person plural verb (i.e. *tazwīr mīkunand* ‘(they) practice deceit’):

*may dih ki šayḥ u Ḥāfiẓ u muftiyy u muḥtasib  
čūn nīk bingarī hama tazwīr mīkunand*<sup>49</sup>

Give wine because the Shaikh and Hāfiẓ and the Mufti and the  
Censor of Morals,  
When you look closely, all practice deceit.

Manuals briefly discuss the effect of adverbial linkers like *pas* ‘so, then’ and *ba’d az ān* ‘after that’. Those connectives provide valuable elements to place the actions in chronological order. In addition to brevity and detail, they attribute the same action to different predicands at different times (*tafṣīl-i musnad ba iḥtiṣār*).

Adverbial linkers may also contradict an alleged error of judgement of the listener (*ištibāh bar gardāndan-i šinawanda*). Negative and adversative adverbs in Persian suitable for the purpose are *na* ‘not’ in positive sentences and *walī* ‘but’ in negative sentences. For example, compare *na* in both lines below:

<sup>48</sup> Subject-verb agreement in Persian is quite complex. When the subject denotes a plurality, the agreement depends on many factors including the distinction between animate and inanimate plurals. On the effect of number and animacy on subject-verb agreement in Persian, see Lazard 1963, 455-60 and Lazard 1992, 178-9.

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 136 (with slight variation). Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 406-7, *ġazal* 195, v. 9. Adapted from Avery 2007, 255.

*īnki tu dārī qiyāmat ast na qāmat*  
*w-īn na tabassum ki mu'ǧiz ast u karāmat*<sup>50</sup>

What you have is the Day of Resurrection, not a tall figure!  
 Also, this is not a smile, for it is a prodigy and a miracle!

Linkers may also underline that the speaker had diverted from the utterance's original judgement (*šarf-i ḥukm*). Among the adverbs that can mark afterthoughts, *balki* (also, *ki*) 'but, instead, on the contrary' occurs to correct a tongue slip or to signal a change of communicative strategy. The speaker uses it to alter and take distance from the judgement he had previously uttered. For example, in the line above, *ki mu'ǧiz ast* 'for it is a prodigy' is used in the same sense as *balki mu'ǧiz ast* 'instead, it is a prodigy'.<sup>51</sup>

The last linker to be examined is *yā* 'or'. It has different goals: it offers mutually exclusive options where one excludes the other (*taḥyīr* 'option', as in *yā nikūgūy bāš yā abkam*<sup>52</sup> 'either speak a good word or remain silent'), it presents options where one does not exclude the other (*ibāḥa* 'permissibility', as in *šigār yā kibār* 'whether young or old'),<sup>53</sup> or it delineates exhaustive subdivisions (*taqsim* 'division', as in *har lafz-i mufrad yā kullī buwad yā ǧuz*)<sup>54</sup> 'Every simple expression is either universal or particular'). When the speaker is uncertain about the identity of the predicand (*šakk-i mutakallim* 'speaker's doubt') or intends to create doubts in the addressee's mind (*taškīk*), he will use the dedicated Persian conjunctive linker *yā*. For example, *Nāšir rā dīdam yā Maṣūr rā*<sup>55</sup> 'Did I see Nāšir, or did I see Maṣūr?'. Compare:

*yak laḥza būd ān yā šab-ī k-az 'umr-i mā tārāǧ šud*<sup>56</sup>

Was it a moment or a night that was stolen from our lives?

**50** Quoted in Zāhidi 1967, 82. Sa'dī 1939, 77, *ǧazal* 143t, [v. 1]. Apparently, the example considers the predicate and not the predicand. I argue that the example was introduced here because the linker connects two nominals, and nominals are mainly addressed in the chapter on the states of the predicand. The same can be said for some of the examples that will follow in this section.

**51** On *balki*, see also the examples in §§ 4.3.4 and 7.5.

**52** Quoted in Riḍāniẓād 1988, 144. Sanā'ī 1950, 311.

**53** The word *ibāḥa* is also a legal term. It stands for the principle according to which something is permissible unless otherwise explicitly prohibited. That is, more than one option is lawful. The term is in use if, for instance, the verdict admits to or not to commit an act. See Schacht, *EP*<sup>2</sup>, s.v. "*ibāḥa*".

**54** Quoted in Riḍāniẓād 1988, 144 and credited to Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna).

**55** Quoted in Riḍāniẓād 1988, 143.

**56** Quoted in Riḍāniẓād 1988, 144. Sa'dī 1939, 9, *ǧazal* 14t, [v. 2].

### 4.10 Preposing (*taqdīm*) and Postposing (*ta'ḥīr*)

The section on *taqdīm* ‘preposing, giving precedence, placing something before something else’ and *ta'ḥīr* ‘postposing, delaying (something), placing something after something else’ deals with word order, with a special focus on the place of the predicand with respect to the predicate.<sup>57</sup> The unmarked word order in Persian is subject-object-verb (SOV). In the majority of instances, then, the predicand precedes the predicate, while in others it follows. Utterances in the standard word order such as *Bahrām mīniwīsad* ‘Bahrām writes’ are examples of preposing the predicand to the predicate (*taqdīm-i musnad ilayh bar musnad*), while inversions of the kind *dānā-st kas-ī ki* ‘Wise is he who...’ are examples of postposing the predicand to the predicate (*ta'ḥīr-i musnad ilayh bar musnad*).

The predicand generally precedes the predicate in what constitutes the standard (*aṣl*) word order of the utterance. The reason why the predicand should precede the predicate, Persian manuals report, is that the most important thing is to mention (*dīkr*) the predicand. And, usually, there is no reason to deviate (*muqtaḍā-yi 'udūl*) from such a standard. Manuals agree that the standard flow of information dictates that the topic should precede what is going to be said about the topic. However, where a change in word order occurs, postposing the predicand (*ta'ḥīr-i musnad ilayh*) may add emphasis (*ta'kīd*), drive focus on something important (*ihtimām*), or catch somebody’s attention (*ǧalb-i tawaǧǧuh*). Examples of postposing the predicand to the predicate, however, are often considered under a separate section about preposing the predicate to the predicand (see § 5.2). The two operations are actually the same in Persian, as will be shown below.

Knowledge of the Arabic model explains the approach of the Persian manuals and the reasons for this unnecessary duplication. The operations of *taqdīm* and *ta'ḥīr* in Arabic refer to different ways of placing the predicand before or after the predicate. Since different standards apply to Arabic nominal (noun-initial) and verbal (verb-initial) sentences, Arabic knows two typical orders: predicand + nominal predicate (e.g. *Zayd kātib* ‘Zayd (is) a writer’) and verbal predicate + predicand (e.g. *kataba Zayd* ‘Zayd wrote’). In addition, it is possible to invert the place of the predicand and the predicate with-

<sup>57</sup> An alternative translation for the word *taqdīm* in relation to word order is ‘anteposition’ (see, for example, Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 128). I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention. I borrow ‘preposing’ and ‘postposing’ from Yishai Peled’s study of word order patterns in written Arabic (Peled 2009). Other possible translations of *taqdīm* and *ta'ḥīr* include ‘pre-position’ and ‘post-position’, ‘forward placement’ and ‘backward placement’ (van Gelder 2008, 649-50), ‘pre-positioning’ and ‘post-positioning’ (Harb 2020, 219-23), or even ‘fronting’ and ‘backing’ (‘fronted’ and ‘backed’ in Dickins 2009, 911). The original terms *taqdīm* and *ta'ḥīr*, however, do not necessarily imply a movement transformation (on this point, see Peled 2009).



in the clause to obtain two different non-typical word orders. Secondary studies on the Arabic linguistic tradition variously describe *taqdīm* and *ta'ḥīr* as 'displacement' (Bohas, Guillaume, Kouloughli 1990, 127), 'option of inversion' (Peled 2010, 170), 'change of word order' (Versteegh 1997, 16). The core of the Arabic discussion is posed in terms of how certain sequences do or do not distance the utterance from the standard (*aṣl*), and why should they be used. Taking all possible shifts into account, the Arabic science of meanings identifies four situations of preposing and postposing the predicand and the predicate with one another, two of which are unmarked whereas the other two are marked.<sup>58</sup>

Persian knows only two options, the unmarked preposing of the predicand to the predicate (*taqdīm-i musnad ilayh bar musnad*, identical to the *ta'ḥīr-i musnad bar musnad ilayh*) or the marked preposing of the predicate to the predicand (*taqdīm-i musnad bar musnad ilayh*, or *ta'ḥīr-i musnad ilayh bar musnad*). Due to the shift in the number of possibilities, from four in Arabic to two in Persian, operations labelled with the same name in the two languages may identify different conditions in terms of markedness.

Persian authors are aware of the typological differences between Arabic and Persian. However, the difference can cause some difficulties in designing manuals. Some authors put all the discussion of the different ways of preposing and postposing in one place. Others keep separate sections. An interesting example is how Kazzāzī (1991, 141-5) discusses the preposing of the predicand (*taqdīm-i musnad ilayh*) in his manual. As expected, he suggests that preposing the predicand is *hanġār* 'the standard', which I assume to be the equivalent of *aṣl* in Kazzāzī's terminology. In addition, he claims that preposing the predicand also fits aesthetic merits. He then goes on to list effects that ultimately correspond to those that the Arabic model attribute to marked word order.<sup>59</sup> So there is an interesting shift, because an unmarked word order in Persian is given secondary meanings similar to those obtained by a marked order in another language. I will give below some examples this author offers, though I will follow the Arabic terminology given in the bilingual manuals rather than reporting Kazzāzī's peculiar terminology.

According to Kazzāzī, one of the goals of preposing the predicand is to communicate the comment (*ḥabar*) with a better outcome in the mind of the hearer (*tamakkun dar dīhn-i sāmi'*). The more ap-

<sup>58</sup> The unmarked preposing the predicand to the predicate and the marked postposing the predicand to the predicate are treated at this point in the Arabic model, whereas the remaining two, that is the unmarked preposing the predicate to the predicand and the marked postposing the predicate to the predicand, are matters of the chapter on the states of the predicate. See al-Taftāzānī 1911, 106-27, 183-90.

<sup>59</sup> See al-Taftāzānī 1911, 106-7. See also Simon 1993, 128-33 and 175-86.

peeling the topic is, the more the utterance sticks in the listener's mind. In this case, an interesting topic draws attention to the comment which follows and ensures the addressee's attention. Such an example occurs in the following line, which begins with the predicand and *māh-i ḥwaršīdnumāy-aš* 'his sun-revealing moon, his moon-like face shining like the sun':

*māh-i ḥwaršīdnumāy-aš zi pas-i parda-yi zulf  
āftāb-ī-st ki dar pīš saḥāb-ī dārad*<sup>60</sup>

His sun-revealing moon from behind the veil of the curling lock  
Is a sun that has a cloud in front.

Another example is wishing and eliciting joy (*ta'ḡīl-i masarrat*) or misfortune (*masā'a*) in the form of a good omen (*tafā'ul*) or a bad one (*taṭayyur*):

*ḡamāl-i baḥt zi rūy-i zaḡfar niqāb andāḥt  
kamāl-i 'adl ba faryād-i dādḥwāh rasīd*<sup>61</sup>

The bounty of luck has thrown the veil off the face of victory.  
The acme of justice has answered the army of seekers of redress.

The third goal appears when one pretends that the predicand is always at the forefront of one's thoughts or finds it particularly pleasing. For instance, when the predicand is the beloved, the poet cherishes that name and always places it before the predicate.

Finally, the speaker wants to express respect (*ta'ẓīm*), contempt (*taḥqīr*) or blessing (*tabarruk*) towards the predicand by way of preposing it. For example, the name of God should occupy a prominent position at the beginning of the utterance and never be postposed. This is due to reasons of respect. Moreover, a predicand whose semantic orientation is negative is placed to the front to debase it further, and this may turn the whole utterance into a reproach. An example of this is the syntagma *zāhid-i ḥām* 'the raw ascetic' in:

*zāhid-i ḥām ki inkār-i may u ḡām kunad  
puḥta gardad ču nazar bar may-i ḥām andāzad*<sup>62</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 142. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 256, *ḡazal* 120, v. 3. Adapted from Avery 2007, 166.

<sup>61</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 144. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 490, *ḡazal* 237, v. 2. Avery 2007, 302.

<sup>62</sup> Quoted in Kazzāzī 1991, 144. Ḥāfiẓ 1983, 308, *ḡazal* 146, v. 6. Adapted from Avery 2007, 199.

The raw ascetic who disallows cup and wine  
Gets cooked when on new wine he casts an eye.

In the examples above, the alleged nuances of meaning do not strictly depend on word order. It is not the order of elements that expresses respect, blame or any other effects. Rather, if the aim is to induce one of these feelings, it is desirable to open the utterance with something that connotes it, which is usually the predicand.

Examples of postposing the predicand (*ta'ḥīr-i musnad ilayh*), as mentioned above, will be considered in § 5.2.

#### 4.11 Reference Switching (*iltifāt*)

The section on the predicand ends with some final considerations on features unified by being departures from the norm. One of the tacit assumptions of the science of meanings that has emerged so far is that a basic meaning sets the standard for measuring deviations. We have also seen how the distance between the expected pattern and the uttered expression in one context allows for additional meaning. There are many ways in which the speaker departs from what is expected, or, to say it with the *ma'ānī* terminology, goes 'against the outward requirements of the situation' (*ḥilāf-i muqtadā-yi ḥāl*). The science of meanings distinguishes then faulty deviations from meaning-enhancing deviations.

In addition, some sorts of deviations are perceived to be eloquent by themselves. One peculiar example is the so-called *iltifāt* 'turning towards another, reference switching', which consists of a sudden grammatical shift or apostrophe. Usually, *iltifāt* occurs when the speaker switches from the first, second, or third person to another while the referent remains the same.<sup>63</sup> It is a change in person while referring to the same entity. For example, in the following line, the poet Sa'dī speaks about himself in the first person in the beginning. Then, he turns to the third person towards the end, while still referring to himself:

*čūnān bigiryam az īn pas ki mard bitwānād  
dar āb-i dīda-yi Sa'dī šināwarī āmūḥt*<sup>64</sup>

I cry so much henceforth that man can  
Learn how to swim in the tears of Sa'dī's eyes.

<sup>63</sup> On *iltifāt* in Arabic, see Abdel Haleem 1992; Blankinship 2019, 41-61; Harb 2020, 241-3. On *iltifāt* in Persian, see Gladwin 1801, 56-8.

<sup>64</sup> Quoted in Āhanī 1978, 65 (with some variation). Sa'dī 1939, 18, *ğazal* 32**ṭb**, [v. 13].

The *iltifāt* seems to be an exception in the science of meanings. Unlike the other examples of deviations from the norm seen so far, this grammatical shift, apparently, does not relate to a particular context-sensitive need. Manuals that mention the device do not list additional meanings for it. Devices like this conveying nuance may be considered poetic licence. These entered the science of meanings and fall under stylistics rather than pragmatics.