

# The Evolution of Conflict-Resolution Tools in the Early Pāṇinian Tradition

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**Abstract** This paper explores certain early developments in the Indian grammatical tradition pertaining to rule conflict. In particular, it studies Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* dealing with conflict resolution and attempts to understand how they were integrated by Patañjali into his *bhāṣya*. It focuses specifically on the usage of the terms *nitya* and *antaraṅga* by Kātyāyana and their subsequent reception by Patañjali. It concludes that Patañjali has, for the first time in the tradition, with his own interpretations of these terms, presented and leveraged them as conflict resolution tools – which Kātyāyana never intended them to be.

**Keywords** Pāṇini. Vyākaraṇa. Sanskrit. Indian Grammatical Tradition. Intellectual History.

**Summary** 1 Summary of the Traditional Approach. – 2 Analysis of the Traditional Approach. – 2.1 Kātyāyana on 1.4.2. – 2.2 Kātyāyana on *nitya*. – 3 Kātyāyana on *antaraṅga-bahirāṅga*. – 4 Summary of Technical Developments. – 5 Style and Attitude. – 6 Concluding Remarks.



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## 1 Summary of the Traditional Approach

When deriving Sanskrit words using Pāṇini's rules, we are often faced with the following question: when two (or more) rules are simultaneously applicable, or put differently, applicable at the same step in a derivation, which of the two (or more) rules should be applied at that step? In other words, in the event of a 'conflict' between two or more rules, which rule wins? Pāṇini has taught us only one rule, which is a *paribhāṣā sūtra* 'metarule', to tackle this problem, namely 1.4.2 *vipratīṣedhe param kāryam*. The traditional interpretation of this rule is as follows: in the event of a conflict between two equally strong / powerful rules, the rule that comes later in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* wins, i.e. should be applied at that step. Let us consider the *Kāśikā*'s explication of 1.4.2:<sup>1</sup>

virodho vipratīṣedhaḥ. yatra dvau prasaṅgāv anyārthāv ekasmin yugapat prāpnutaḥ sa tulyabalavirodho vipratīṣedhaḥ. tasmin vipratīṣedhe param kāryam bhavati. utsargāpavādānityānityāntar āṅgabhiraṅgeṣu tulyabalatā nāstīti nāyam asya yogasya viṣayaḥ, balavataiva tatra bhavitavyam. apravṛttau paryāyeṇa vā pravṛttau prāptāyām vacanam ārabhyate.

Here is my translation of this passage, which represents the traditional interpretation of 1.4.2:

The word *vipratīṣedha* means 'conflict'. When two operations which can be applied at other sites become simultaneously applicable at one [and the same site], this is called a conflict of equal strength or *vipratīṣedha*. In the event of *vipratīṣedha*, the operation that comes later [in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*] prevails. A general rule (*utsarga*) and its exception (*apavāda*), or a *nitya* rule and an *anitya* rule, or an *antaraṅga* and a *bahiraṅga* rule, are not rules of equal strength. These pairs do not fall under the jurisdiction of this rule. In these cases, the stronger rule should be applied. When both rules are unable to apply, or when they are only able to apply alternatively, this rule comes into play.<sup>2</sup>

Before moving further, it is important to explain in simple words the meanings of the pairs, *nitya-anitya* and *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga*. Let us say that there is a conflict between rules A and B. A is called *nitya* with respect to B if A is applicable (both before and) after the ap-

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<sup>1</sup> Where appropriate, I have based my *sūtra* translations in this paper on the translations provided by Katre, Sharma, and Vasu (see bibliography for details).

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise stated all translations are by the Author.

plication of B.<sup>3</sup> B is called *anitya* with respect to A if B is applicable before, but not after the application of A. The *nitya* rule A is stronger than and defeats the *anitya* rule B. The *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* describes *antaraṅga* as follows: *antarmadhye bahiraṅgaśāstrīyanimittas amudāyamadhye' ntarbhūtāny aṅgāni nimittāni yasya tad antaraṅgam*. Kielhorn translates it as follows: “*antaraṅga* is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within (or before) the sum of the causes of a *bahiraṅga* rule”.<sup>4</sup>

The following *paribhāṣā* ‘metarule’, which is one of the hundreds of metarules composed by post-Pāṇinian scholars, and which has been popularised by the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, creates a hierarchy of importance between four tools of rule conflict resolution namely *paratva*, *nityatva*, *antaraṅgatva* and *apavādatva*.<sup>5</sup> *pūrva-para-nitya-antaraṅga-apavādānām uttarottaraṁ baliyaḥ* (Pbh 38, *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*). It teaches that a *nitya sūtra* is stronger than a *para sūtra*; an *antaraṅga sūtra* is stronger than a *nitya sūtra*; and an *apavāda sūtra* is stronger than an *antaraṅga sūtra*. In practical terms this translates into the following procedure.

First try establishing the relationship taught in step *a*:

- a. *apavāda* > *utsarga*: an *apavāda* (exception) *sūtra* is more powerful than, and wins when competing with, an *utsarga* (general rule) *sūtra*.

If and only if this step does not yield the correct result, try establishing the relationship taught in step *b*:

- b. *antaraṅga* > *bahiraṅga*:<sup>6</sup> an *antaraṅga sūtra* is more powerful than, and wins when competing with, a *bahiraṅga sūtra*.

If and only if this step does not yield the correct result, try establishing the relationship taught in step *c*:

- c. *nitya* > *anitya*: a *nitya* rule is more powerful than and wins when competing with an *anitya* rule.

If and only if this step does not yield the correct result, then we conclude that the two rules are equally strong and apply 1.4.2 *vipraṭiṣedhe param kāryam*, which we call step *d* here:

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
<sup>3</sup> See *paribhāṣā* (henceforth Pbh) 117 *ṛtākṛtaprasaṅgī yo vidhiḥ sa nityaḥ, Vyāḍiparibhāṣāpāṭha*.

<sup>4</sup> See Abhyankar’s reprint (second edition) of Kielhorn’s work (1960, 221-2).

<sup>5</sup> It is not clear why the word *pūrva* has been mentioned in the *paribhāṣā*.

<sup>6</sup> Patañjali and Nāgeśa hold the *antaraṅga paribhāṣā* true for both conflict and other situations. See the *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.4.2 (Mbh I.309.24 onwards) and *paribhāṣā* 50 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara, asiddham bahiraṅgam antaraṅge*.

- d. *para* > *pūrva*: a *para sūtra* (a later rule in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s serial order) wins when competing with, a *pūrva sūtra* (which appears before the *para sūtra*).



## 2 Analysis of the Traditional Approach

Let us look at 1.4.2 *vipratishedhe param kāryam* again. Pāṇini does not explain the meaning of *vipratishedha* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The *Kāśikā* claims that *vipratishedha* means *tulyabalavirodha* ‘conflict between two equally powerful rules’. This is a plausible assumption because, in Sanskrit literature, the term has been used to mean the opposition of two courses of action which are equally important, the conflict of two even-matched interests.<sup>7</sup> But which conflicts qualify as *tulyabala* ‘having equal strength’? The *Kāśikā* says that rule pairs which are not *nitya-anitya*, *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga*, *apavāda-utsarga*, are *tulyabala* ‘having equal strength’.

Let us try to understand why the tradition felt the need to come up with these tools. According to the tradition, *para* in 1.4.2 means ‘the rule that appears after the other rule in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*’. Thus, in the case of a conflict (*vipratishedha*) between two rules, the operation prescribed by the later rule should prevail. However, if one assumes that any rule conflict can be called *vipratishedha*, and therefore applies 1.4.2 uniformly to every instance of such a conflict, in many cases, one gets a grammatically incorrect form at the end of the derivation.

Below, I present how I think the current method of solving rule conflict has gradually evolved. Having realised that treating all rule conflicts as *vipratishedha* and applying 1.4.2 uniformly to every instance of such a conflict gives the wrong answer in many cases, the Pāṇinīyas:

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<sup>7</sup> See the entry on *vipratishedha* in Apte’s Sanskrit dictionary.

1. claimed that they found *jñāpakas* ‘hints or clues’ in Pāṇini’s *sūtras* which authorised them to devise new tools like *nityatva*, *antaraṅgatva*, *anavakāśatva* etc., for the purpose of solving rule conflicts;
2. restricted the jurisdiction of rule 1.4.2 by declaring that *vipratīṣedha* implies only *tulyabala* conflicts, i.e. conflicts between equally powerful rules; and
3. declared that rule pairs like *nitya-anitya*, *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga*, and *anavakāśa-sāvakāśa* were to be called *atulyabala* ‘not equally powerful’.

This allowed them to exclude the *atulyabala* rule pairs, namely *nitya-anitya*, *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* etc., from the jurisdiction of 1.4.2, thereby containing the problems caused by their interpretation of 1.4.2 to a smaller number of cases. Gradually, the Pāṇinīyas also constructed the hierarchy taught in *paribhāṣā* 38 of *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* above to determine which tool takes precedence over which other tools.

However, these post-Pāṇinian tools are not without flaws, to compensate for which umpteen other *paribhāṣās* have been written by Pāṇinīyas. Many of these *paribhāṣās* address very specific cases<sup>8</sup> or even single examples of conflict, thereby defeating the entire purpose of writing metarules, which is to arrive at broad generalisations that can govern the application of and interactions between the whole body of rules. And even after this, the Pāṇinīyas are not able to solve every case of conflict correctly: every time they falter, they find one tortuous explanation or the other to justify that ‘exception’.

Apart from these factors, the fact that Pāṇini has not taught us anything about what constitutes a *tulyabala* conflict, what *nitya*, *antaraṅga* etc. are suggests that Pāṇini did not intend for us to use these methods to deal with the challenges we face when deriving Sanskrit forms using his rules. However, here we will focus not on trying to solve these issues,<sup>9</sup> but on understanding how those tools that are thought to have ‘always’ been a part of the traditional method for conflict resolution evolved with the passage of time.

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<sup>8</sup> For example, consider Pbh 52 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, *antaraṅgān api vidhīn bahiraṅgo lug bādhatē* ‘A *bahiraṅga* rule teaching LUK deletion defeats an *antaraṅga* rule [in case of conflict]’, which is an exception of Pbh 50 *antaraṅge bahiraṅgam asid-dham* ‘An *antaraṅga* rule treats a *bahiraṅga* rule as suspended’.

<sup>9</sup> For more on this topic, please see my recently concluded dissertation on this topic (Rajpopat 2022).

## 2.1 Kātyāyana on 1.4.2

Since Kātyāyana is the first scholar to have commented on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, we cannot study the evolution of conflict resolution tools without examining some of his *vārttikas*. To begin with, we know that Kātyāyana interprets the term *para* in 1.4.2 as the rule which comes later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s serial order.

For example, consider 3.1.67 *sārvadhātuke yak* which teaches that affix *yaK* occurs after a verbal root when a *sārvadhātuka* affix which denotes *bhāva* or *karman* follows. Consider vt. 4 (Mbh II.59.1) on this rule: *vipratīṣedhād dhi śapo baliyastvam* 'Given the *vipratīṣedha* [between *yaK* (cf. 3.1.67 *sārvadhātuke yak*) and *ŚaP* (cf. 3.1.68 *kartari śap*)], *ŚaP* is more powerful [and wins, because it is *para*, i.e. taught later in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*]'.<sup>10</sup>

One key repercussion of Kātyāyana's belief that *para* in 1.4.2 stands for 'the rule that comes later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s serial order' must have been that he likely got numerous incorrect forms at the end of derivations where he solved conflicts using his interpretation of 1.4.2. Perhaps it is to avoid these undesirable outcomes - wherever possible - that he decided to reduce the jurisdiction of 1.4.2. For example, in vt. 1 on 1.4.2, he defines *vipratīṣedha* in a way that allows him to exclude *anavakāśa-sāvakāśa* pairs<sup>11</sup> from the jurisdiction of 1.4.2: *dvau prasaṅgāv anyārthāv ekasmin sa vipratīṣedhaḥ* (1)<sup>12</sup> '[When] two rules [which are] applicable elsewhere [become applicable] to the same place, this [is called] *vipratīṣedha*'. Thus, a conflict between two *sāvakāśa* rules (i.e. rules which are applicable elsewhere) is called *vipratīṣedha*.

In vt. 2 on 1.4.2, he says: *ekasmin yugapat asambhavāt pūrvaparaprāpter ubhayaprasaṅgaḥ* '[Given the] impossibility [of] co-application at one [i.e. the same step, there arises] the undesirable scenario of both *pūrvā* and *para* being applicable'. In vt. 5, Kātyāyana says: *apratipattir vobhayos tulyabalatvāt* 'Or [maybe this results in] the failure of both [rules] to apply because of [their] equal strength'. In vt. 6 he says: *tatra pratipattiyartham etad vacanam* 'So, this [*sūtra*] has been formulated in order to instruct us about this [i.e., the decision regarding which rule should apply]'. From vts. 1, 2, 5 and 6 on 1.4.2, we can conclude that, according to Kātyāyana, the conflict between two *sāvakāśa* rules is called *vipratīṣedha*, and that these two

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<sup>10</sup> Note that this *vārttika* (vt.) makes an incorrect statement. There is no conflict at all here: *yaK* is added to verbal roots followed by *sārvadhātuka* affixes denoting *bhāva* 'action' or *karman* 'object' whereas *ŚaP* is added when the *sārvadhātuka* affix denotes *kartṛ* 'agent'. In fact, we come across many such errors in Kātyāyana's *vārttikas*.

<sup>11</sup> An *anavakāśa* rule is one which is not applicable elsewhere whereas a *sāvakāśa* rule is one which is applicable elsewhere.

<sup>12</sup> Mbh I.304.10-305.3.

rules are treated as *tulyabala* ‘of equal strength’. Note that this is the only occasion on which Kātyāyana uses the term *tulyabala*. Patañjali too uses the word *tulyabala* only once - when commenting on vt. 5 on 1.4.2.<sup>13</sup>

Before proceeding, it is noteworthy that Kātyāyana considers *anavakāśa* rules to be *apavādas* ‘exceptions’ to *sāvakāśa* rules, which he treats as *utsargas* ‘general rules’. This becomes clear from the following *vārttika* on 4.3.156 *kṛitavat parimāṇāt* (which teaches the addition of the *taddhita* affix *aÑ* to different syntactically related nominal stems): vt. 5 *vānavakāśatvād apavādo mayat* ‘Or, by virtue of not applying elsewhere, *mayat* is an exception (and thus wins)’. So, we can safely conclude that he excludes *anavakāśa-sāvakāśa* and therefore, *apavāda-utsarga* pairs from the ambit of *vipratīṣedha*. In the same vein, it would not be wrong to say that *anavakāśatva* and *apavādatva* are conflict resolution tools explicitly used by Kātyāyana.

## 2.2 Kātyāyana on *nitya*

The role of Kātyāyana in the evolution of the Pāṇinian tradition is paramount: Patañjali weaves his commentary around Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas*, not Pāṇini’s *sūtras*. And the rest of the tradition looks to Patañjali for topics to discuss, opinions on various issues and generally speaking, intellectual inspiration and guidance. So, if it had not been for Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas*, perhaps a broad spectrum of ideas that are now central to traditional literature would not have occurred to Patañjali, his successors, and for that matter, us. The tradition would have proceeded on an altogether different trajectory, for better or worse. Yet, for someone who has made such a valuable contribution, Kātyāyana today receives little recognition: the largest share of praise is apportioned to Patañjali, who is accredited with everything from shedding light on *sūtra* syntax (topics like *anuvṛtti* ‘continuation’ and *yogavibhāga* ‘splitting of Pāṇinian *sūtras* into two’) to demonstrating the workings of Pāṇini’s derivational mechanism. Patañjali’s work dominates the discourse to the extent that his interpretations of, and comments on, Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas* are assumed to be tantamount to, and even allowed to eclipse, the actual meaning and import of those *vārttikas*.

To avoid making unjustified assumptions, when studying the evolution of the *nitya* tool, we must attempt to look at each occurrence of the term *nitya* in Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas* without allowing Patañjali’s comments to influence this inquiry. The term *nitya* features many

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<sup>13</sup> It must be stated, though, that this passage is reproduced verbatim by Patañjali in his comments on vt. 3 on 6.1.85 *antādivac ca* (Mbh III.59.20-60.6).

times in Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* (see Pathak, Chitrao 1935), and so do words formed using it, such as *nityagrahaṇānarthakya*, *nityatva*, *nitya-nimittatva*, *nityapūrvārtha*, *nityapratyayatva*, *nityapravṛtta*, *nityavacana*, *nityasādatva*, *nityasāmbandha*, *nityasamāsa*, *nityasamāsavacana*, *nityasamāsārtha*, *nityādiṣṭatva* and *nityārtha*. Of these, *nityasamāsa*, *nityasamāsavacana* and *nityasamāsārtha* deal with a type of compound which has nothing to do with *nitya* as a conflict resolution tool. We shall look at the rest to ascertain the contexts in which *nitya* is used.

Most occurrences of *nitya* in the *vārttikas*, both as a stand-alone stem and as a member of compounds, are those meant to indicate that something is not *vaikalpika* 'optional', but *nitya* 'always takes place'. On many of these occasions, *nitya* is used to prescribe the suspension of optionality, that is, to block the *anuvṛtti* 'continuation' of terms like *vā*, *vibhāṣā* and *anyatarasyām* – which instruct us to follow the given instruction optionally – into the present *vārttika*. Let us look at Kātyāyana's first two *vārttikas* on 3.1.11:

3.1.11 *kartuḥ kyañ salopaś ca (vā supaḥ upamānād ācāre)*

'Affix *Kyañ* optionally occurs to denote *ācāra* after a *pada* which ends in a *sUP* and denotes an agent serving as an *upamāna*; in addition, the final -s of the nominal stem (*prātipadika*) is replaced with *LOPA*'.

Vt. 1 *salopo vā*

'The replacement of -s with *LOPA* is optional [in the said situation]'.

Vt. 2 *ojo'psarasor nityam.*

'[But when -s is at the end of stems] *ojas* and *apsaras* [then the replacement of -s with *LOPA*] always [takes place]'.

Here the word *nitya* is used to disallow the optionality associated with -s deletion in the given situation for words *ojas* and *apsaras*. On most other occasions, in either philosophical or ordinary grammatical discussion, Kātyāyana simply uses *nitya* as it is used in common speech – as a noun/adjective or adverb – that is, to mean 'constant, permanent, permanently existent, always, everywhere, eternally etc'. And Patañjali too uses the word *nitya* in the same sense in his commentary on these *vārttikas*. Note that the meaning of *nitya* in all the cases mentioned so far is roughly the same, regardless of whether it is used to perform a specific technical function in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (i.e. suspend optionality) or as a word from everyday Sanskrit.

Now let us turn to the two specific instances of the use of the word *nitya* by Kātyāyana on which Patañjali glosses *nitya* as: *krte'pi*



*prāpnoty akṛte'pi prāpnoti*<sup>14</sup> '[Even when the other rule] has been applied, [this rule] is applicable, [and even when the other rule] has not been applied, [this rule] is applicable'. This is what is conventionally called the *nitya* tool for rule conflict resolution by Patañjali and his successors in the tradition. Put differently, when two rules A and B are in conflict with each other, if A remains applicable at that place both before and after the application of B, but B is not applicable after the application of A, then A is called *nitya* and B *anitya*, and the *nitya* rule A defeats the *anitya* rule B. In modern theoretical linguistics, we call this unidirectional blocking. Since Patañjali interprets the word *nitya* used in these two *vārttikas* as a conflict resolution tool, we must study them.

Let us first look at vt. 4 on 1.3.60 *śadeḥ śitaḥ*<sup>15</sup> in which Kātyāyana uses the term *nitya* and where Patañjali interprets this word *nitya* as a conflict resolution tool. Before we go to vt. 4, let us first look at vt. 3 to get some context. Vt. 3 does not discuss 1.3.60, but instead talks about another rule (1.3.17 *ner viśaḥ*) which also deals with *ātmanepada* suffixes:

Vt. 3 *upasargapūrvaniyame'dvyavāya upasamkhyānam*

'It should be added that if it is taught [that a root takes *ātmanepada* suffixes] when it is preceded by a preverb (1.3.17 *ner viśaḥ*), [this holds true also when the augment] *aṬ* is interposed [between *ni* and *viś*] (6.4.71 *luṅlanlṛṅṣv aḍ udāttah*).<sup>16</sup>

The rule that this *vārttika* refers to is:

1.3.17 *ner viśaḥ*

'An *ātmanepada* affix occurs after *viś* 'to enter' when it is preceded by the preverb *ni*'.

An example of what 1.3.17 teaches is *niviśate* (*LAṬ*, third person singular). An example of what vt. 3 teaches is *nyaviśata* (*LAN*, third person singular). Now, in vt. 4, Kātyāyana suggests that the derivation may not proceed as desired if vt. 3 is not stated:

Vt. 4 *nityatvāl lādeśasya ātmanepade'dāgama iti cedaṭo'pi nityanimittatvād ātmanepadābhāvaḥ*.

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<sup>14</sup> Patañjali's statements on both are very close paraphrases of this form.

<sup>15</sup> 'An *ātmanepada* affix occurs after *śadLR* 'to cut' when it is to be used with an item marked with *Ś*'.

<sup>16</sup> 'Augment *aṬ*, concurrently marked *udātta*, is introduced to an *aṅga* when affixes *LUN*, *LAN* and *LRṅ* follow'.

‘If [one argues that] the augment *aT* can be [introduced] when *ātmanepada* endings occur [after the *dhātu*] because the substitution of *la* suffixes is *nitya* (i.e., it always takes place), [one can object to this saying that] *ātmanepada* endings cannot occur because the augment *aT* also has a *nityanimitta* ‘permanent cause’.

On this *vārttika*, Patañjali remarks:

*nityattvāl lādeśasyātmanepada evāḍāgama iti cedevamucyate. aḍapi nityanimittaḥ. kṛte’pi lādeśe prāpnoty akṛte’pi prāpnoti. aḍo nityanimittatvād ātmanepadasyābhāvaḥ.*

‘If it is said in this way that the augment *aT* can be [introduced] when *ātmanepada* endings occur [after the *dhātu*] because the substitution of *la* suffixes is *nitya*, [it is objected that] the augment *aT* also has a *nitya* cause. [The augment *aT*] is [introduced] anyway, whether the substitution of *la* occurs or does not occur. Since the cause of *aT* is *nitya*, *ātmanepada* endings will not occur’.

Vt. 5 *tatra upasaṁkhyānam*

‘And so that addition (vt. 3) must be made’.

Kātyāyana, in vt. 5, concludes that vt. 3 must be formulated to deal with the issue raised in vt. 4. Note that, in his comments on vt. 4, Patañjali simply paraphrases everything Kātyāyana says, except he interprets *nitya* as a conflict resolution tool: *aḍ api nityanimittaḥ. kṛte’pi lādeśe prāpnoty akṛte’pi prāpnoti.*

Kātyāyana is aware that, in *nir + viś + LAN̄*, the presence of *LAN̄* to the right of *viś* will always trigger the application of the rule 6.4.71 *luṅlaṅṛṅṣv aḍ udāttah*, thereby introducing the augment *aT*. Thus, he calls the augment, *nityanimitta* ‘having a regularly occurring cause’, i.e. *LAN̄*.

Kātyāyana uses the word *aḍvyavāya* ‘the interposition *aT*’ in vt. 3. This implies that Kātyāyana seems to assume that augment *aT* does not become an integral part of root *viś*, but instead occurs as an independent morpheme or a separate item between *nir* and *viś*.

In *nir + aT + viś + LAN̄*, *viś* is never immediately preceded by *nir*, and so 1.3.17 *nerviśaḥ*, which mandates the substitution of *lakāras* with *ātmanepada* endings when *viś* is preceded by *nir*, is unable to apply. Thus, Kātyāyana has composed vt. 3 allowing *nir + viś* to take *ātmanepada* endings even when *aT* intervenes between *nir* and *viś*.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> However, in my opinion, augments become part of the morpheme they are attached to, unlike affixes which are separate items. And thus, *viś* should still be considered to lie immediately after *ni* even when the augment *aT* has been attached to *viś*. So, Kātyāyana’s assumption, as stated in vt. 4, is unfounded and vt. 3 need not be stated. This is not central to the argument being made though.

And my contention is that, when Kātyāyana states that  $a\bar{T}$  is *nitya-nimitta*, he simply means that whenever the cause of  $a\bar{T}$ , namely  $LAN$ , is present, the augment  $a\bar{T}$  will also be present, but he does not use *nitya* here as a conflict resolution tool. This is simply because there is no evidence to be found in the aforementioned *vārttikas* to warrant Patañjali's interpretation of *nitya* as a conflict resolution tool.

Now let us consider the other *vārttika* wherein Kātyāyana uses the word *nitya* and while commenting on which Patañjali interprets this word as a conflict resolution tool, namely vt. 1 on 1.2.6:

1.2.6 *indhibhavatibhyām ca (liṭ kit)*

'A  $LIT$  affix which occurs after verbal roots *indh* 'to kindle' and *bhū* 'to be, become' also is treated as though marked with  $K$ '.

On this *sūtra*, Patañjali says:

*kimartham idam ucyate. indheḥ samyogārtham vacanam bhavateḥ pidartham. ayam yogah śakyo avaktum. katham.*

'Why has this been said? [This] statement [has been made] because of the conjunct of *indh* [and those suffixes placed after] *bhu* which are marked by  $P$ . [This] may be left unsaid. How?'

Then he introduces Kātyāyana's *vārttika*:

Vt. 1 *indheś chandoviṣayatvād bhuvo vuko nityatvāt tābhyām kidvacanānarthakyam.*

'Because *indh* [belongs to] the domain of Veda [and because the augment]  $vUK$  added to *bhū* is *nitya*, [the statement that the suffix] after them [should be treated as if] marked with  $K$  is redundant'.

On this Patañjali says:

*indheś chandoviṣayo liṭ. na hy antareṇa cchanda indher anantaro liḍ labhyaḥ. āmā bhāṣāyām bhavitavyam. bhuvo vuko nityatvāt. bhavater api nityo vuk. kṛte'pi prāpnoty akṛte'pi. tābhyām kidvacanānarthakyam. tābhyām indhibhavatibhyām kidvacanānarthakyam.*

' $LIT$  'perfect affixes' [occur after the root] *indh* only in the Vedas. For, outside the Veda, we do not find  $LIT$  placed immediately after *indh*. In ordinary speech, *ām* should be affixed [to *indh*] (3.1.36 *ijādeś ca gurumatonṛcchaḥ*). Because of the *nitya* nature of  $vUK$  (6.4.88 *bhuvo vuk luṅ liṭoḥ*) after *bhū*, the augment  $vUK$  added after *bhū* is *nitya*. It occurs if [*guṇa*] (7.3.84 *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ*) / [*vṛddhi*] (7.2.115 *aco ṅṅiti*) is performed [and] also if [*guṇa* / *vṛddhi*] is not performed. [Thus,] pre-

scribing *kitva* [of the suffix] after them is redundant. Prescribing *kitva* [of the suffix] after *indh* / *bhū* is redundant’.

*Indh* ‘to kindle’ is a 7th class *ātmanepada* root. If one wishes to derive, for example, the third person singular Vedic *LIT* form of *indh*, *LIT* would be replaced by *ta*. Before introducing Kātyāyana’s *vārttika*, Patañjali says *indheḥ saṁyogārthaṁ vacanam*. He means that in *indh* + *ta*, given the *saṁyoga* ‘conjunct’ at the end of *indh*, the rule 1.2.5 cannot be used to make the suffix *ta*, *kidvad* ‘behaving as if it were marked with *K*’:

1.2.5 *asāmyogāl liṭ kit (apit)*

‘A *LIT* affix not originally marked with *P* is treated as marked with *K* when it occurs after roots which do not terminate in a conjunct’.

Hence, the need for the *sūtra* 1.2.6. This *kitvadbhāva* ‘state of behaving as if marked with *K*’ is required for the replacement of the penultimate *n* of *indh* with *LOPA* by 6.4.24:

6.4.24 *aniditām hala upadhāyāḥ kṛiti (nalopaḥ)*.

‘The penultimate *n* of an *aṅga* which ends in a consonant and does not contain *I* as a marker is replaced with *LOPA* when an affix marked with *K* or *Ṇ* follows’.

This justifies the need for the presence of the verb *indh* in 1.2.6 *indhibhavatibhyām ca*. In his *vārttika*, Kātyāyana also says that, since the reduplicated perfect of *indh* is only found in the Veda, the *sūtra* enjoining of *kitvadbhāva* for *LIT* substitutes after *indh* is futile.<sup>18</sup> In the case of the *laukika* ‘colloquial’ form, *ām*, prevailing over other operations (derivational details not discussed here), is introduced between *indh* and *LIT* from an early stage in the derivation, thereby disallowing the trigger of any operation on *indh* that could be caused by *LIT*:

3.1.36 *ijādeś ca guromatonṛcchaḥ. (ām amantrē liṭi)*

‘Affix *ām* occurs after a verbal root which begins with *iC* ‘any vowel except *a*’, and contains a *guru* vowel (1.4.11 *saṁyoge guru*, 1.4.12 *dīrgham ca*), except *ṛcch* ‘to go’, provided *LIT* follows, and the usage is not from the *mantra* part of the Vedic’.

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<sup>18</sup> But since Pāṇini accounts for both Vedic and non-Vedic usages, Kātyāyana’s dismissal of the need to write a *sūtra* that justifies a Vedic form is unacceptable. But this is beside the point here.

<b><i>bhū</i> - <i>LIT</i> forms</b>	<b>Singular</b>	<b>Dual</b>	<b>Plural</b>
3rd	<i>Babhūva</i>	<i>Babhūvatuḥ</i>	<i>Babhūvuḥ</i>
2nd	<i>Babhūvitha</i>	<i>Babhūvathuḥ</i>	<i>Babhūva</i>
1st	<i>Babhūva</i>	<i>Babhūviva</i>	<i>Babhūvima</i>

Now, let us look at what Kātyāyana and Patañjali say about *bhū*. Patañjali, before quoting the *vārttika*, says: *bhavater pidartham vacanam*. He means that, while the *LIT* suffixes which are not marked with *P*, i.e. dual and plural suffixes, added to *bhū* ‘to be’ can be treated as *marked with K* thanks to 1.2.5 (see above), 1.2.5 is not applicable to suffixes marked with *P*, i.e. singular suffixes, and this rule has been composed so that suffixes marked with *P* can be treated as suffixes marked with *K*. This *kitva* is required to block the *vṛddhi* (7.2.115 *aco ṅṅiti*) or *guṇa* (7.3.84 *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ*) of the root vowel of *bhū* in all its perfect forms by 1.1.5 *kniti ca* (*na iko guṇavṛddhi*).

On the other hand, in his first *vārttika* on 1.2.6, Kātyāyana says that treating the *LIT* suffixes after *bhū* as marked with *K*, which is done to block *guṇa/vṛddhi*, is also redundant, because there arises no occasion to perform *guṇa/vṛddhi*, thanks to the *nityatva* of *vUK*. The rule that teaches the addition of augment *vUK* is:

6.4.88 *bhuvo vuk luṅliṭoḥ (aṅgasya aci)*

‘Augment *vUK* is introduced to an *aṅga*, namely *bhū*, when a *LUN* or *LIT* affix beginning with a vowel follows’.

Here, Patañjali comments: *bhavater api nityo vuk. kṛte’pi prāpnoty akṛte’pi*. He means that, since *vUK* can be attached both before and after *guṇa/vṛddhi*, and since vice-versa is not true, *vUK* is *nitya* and *guṇa/vṛddhi*, *anitya*. He interprets the word *nitya* as a tool for resolving conflict between the addition of augment *vUK* (6.4.88) and *guṇa/vṛddhi*. But is this conclusion warranted? Consider all nine forms (three persons and three numbers) of *bhū* + *LIT*. In each of them, we notice the presence of *vUK* taught by 6.4.88 *bhuvo vuk luṅ liṭoḥ (aci)*.

As I have shown above (cf. Kātyāyana’s use of the term *aḍvyavāya*), Kātyāyana thinks that augments are separate from the item to which they are added. Thus, he does not see *vUK* as a part of *bhū*. According to Kātyāyana, the step at which *vUK* is added looks like this: *bhū* + *vUK* (treated as a distinct morpheme) + *LIT*. To cause the *guṇa/vṛddhi* of the *ū* of *bhū*, *LIT* needs to be immediately after *bhū*. But *vUK*, which is an item unto itself, acts as an obstruction, thereby obstructing *LIT* from causing the *guṇa/vṛddhi* of *bhū*. Since *vUK* appears in each of the nine *LIT* forms of *bhū* - as can be corroborated by looking at the paradigm above - Kātyāyana says that *vUK* is *nitya* ‘always present’, and so it never allows *LIT* to cause the *guṇa/vṛddhi* of *bhū*. Therefore, he concludes that trying to block the *guṇa/vṛddhi* of *bhū*

by treating *LIT* as marked with *K* (cf. 1.1.5 *knīti ca*) in 1.2.6 is unnecessary because there never arises an occasion for such *guṇa/vrddhi* to occur in the first place. It is in this sense that he says: *bhuvo vuko nityatvāt kidvacanānarthakyaṃ*. Having studied these two crucial *vārttikas*, I have inferred that, contrary to Patañjali's interpretation, Kātyāyana does not use *nitya* in the sense of a rule conflict resolution tool, but simply as a word of day-to-day language, to mean 'always, always existent, permanent' etc. This leads us to the conclusion that the *nitya* tool for conflict resolution is effectively Patañjali's inadvertent invention resulting from a misinterpretation of Kātyāyana's words.

Before moving forward, let me discuss a *vārttika* that corroborates my conclusion. Consider vt. 11 on 7.1.96 *striyām ca*<sup>19</sup> which reads:

*numaciratṛjvadbhāvebhyo nuṭ (pūrvavipratīṣiddham)*  
'[in cases of conflict] the attachment of the augment *nUT*<sup>20</sup> (which is taught by a preceding rule in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*) takes precedence over (the following processes which are taught by rules that come later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*'s serial order): 1) attachment of augment *nUM*,<sup>21</sup> 2) replacement with *r* when followed by a vowel,<sup>22</sup> or 3) *trC*-like treatment'.<sup>23</sup>

Let us derive the genitive plural of the masculine stem *kroṣṭu* 'jackal' by adding suffix *ām* to it. Here, two competing rules become applicable to two different operands respectively at once:

7.1.97 *vibhāṣā tṛtīyādiṣv aci*  
'The *aṅga*, *kroṣṭu*, is treated as if ending in affix *trC*, only optionally, when a vowel initial nominal ending of *tṛtīyā* triplet 'instrumental' or any of the following triplets namely dative, ablative, genitive or locative follows'.

7.1.54 *hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ*  
'Augment *nUT* is introduced to affix *ām* when it occurs after an *aṅga* which ends in a short vowel (*hrasvānta*), or in a form which is termed *nadī* (*nadyanta*), or else, ends in the feminine affix *āP* (*ābanta*)'.

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19 'The *aṅga*, *kroṣṭu* is also treated as if ending in affix *trC*, when the denotation is feminine'.

20 7.1.54 *hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ*.

21 7.1.73 *iko'ci vibhaktau*.

22 7.2.100 *aci ra rtaḥ*.

23 7.1.95 *tṛjvat kroṣṭuḥ* and the following *sūtras* such as 7.1.97 *vibhāṣā tṛtīyādiṣv aci*.

$kroṣṭu + ām$   
 $\uparrow \quad \uparrow$   
 7.1.97    7.1.54

Following the traditional interpretation of 1.4.2 *vipratishedhe param kāryam*, if we chose 7.1.97, which comes later in the serial order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, we get the wrong answer \**kroṣṭṛnām*.<sup>24</sup> Thus, Kātyāyana has composed the above *vārttika* which states that 7.1.54, despite being the *pūrvā sūtra*, ought to win the conflict so as to give the correct answer *kroṣṭūnām* (6.4.3 *nāmi*).

There is no evidence to support the claim that *pūrvavipratishedha* is a tool for rule conflict resolution. Instead, it seems to simply be a label given to all those cases of *vipratishedha* where the application of the Pāṇinian rule 1.4.2 – as understood by Kātyāyana – gives the wrong answer.

Note that 7.1.97 does not block 7.1.54, but 7.1.54 does block 7.1.97. Since this is a case of unidirectional blocking, this is the classic opportunity to use Patañjali’s conflict resolution tool, *nityatva*. The *nitya* rule, i.e. the rule that unidirectionally blocks the other rule, wins. This means that 7.1.54 applies and we get the correct answer *kroṣṭūnām*.

Now the question arises: if Kātyāyana had regarded *nityatva* as a conflict resolution tool, why would he include this example, which can be solved using the *nityatva* tool, in the *pūrvavipratishedham vārttika* mentioned above? This only goes on to show yet again that Kātyāyana has uniformly and consistently used the term *nitya* just as it is used in ordinary speech, that is, to mean ‘always, permanent, constantly occurring’ etc., and not as a conflict resolution tool.

On this *vārttika*, Kaiyaṭa, in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* titled *Pradīpa*, tries to argue that 7.1.54 is not *nitya*,<sup>25</sup> thanks to the *sannipātaparibhāṣā* which is Pbh 85 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara: sannipātalakṣaṇo vidhir animittam tadvighātasya*. Kielhorn<sup>26</sup> translates it as follows: “(That which is taught in) a rule (the application of) which is occasioned by the combination (of two things), does not become the cause of the destruction of that (combination)”. Thus, according to this *paribhāṣā*, since *nUṬ* addition is occasioned by the combination of the *aṅga* ending in *r* and the affix beginning in a vowel, *nUṬ* addition cannot be allowed to disrupt this combination, so it

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<sup>24</sup> By applying 7.1.97, 7.1.54 and finally, 6.4.3 *nāmi*, in that order.

<sup>25</sup> *Ṭṛjvadbhāvaḥ kṛte nuty anajāditvān na prāpnotīty anityo, nuḍāgamo’pi kṛte ṭṛjvadbhāve sannipātaparibhāṣayā na prāpnotīty anityaḥ* (see p. 91, part 6, Caukhambā’s publication (1987-88) of the *Mahābhāṣya* with Kaiyaṭa’s *Pradīpa* and Nāgeśa’s *Uddyota*).

<sup>26</sup> See Abhyankar 1960, 410.

cannot be treated as *nitya* and does not take place. But by this logic, the tradition should never use the *nitya* tool in the first place because it always disrupts such combinations. Hence, I think the *sannipāta* argument is unacceptable.

Therefore, our conclusion that Kātyāyana did not intend for *nitya* to be used as a conflict resolution tool still holds true, notwithstanding the so-called *sannipāta* argument of Kaiyaṭa. Note that what we looked at was only one of multiple *pūrvavipratīṣiddha vārttikas* written by Kātyāyana on different Pāṇinian rules. Patañjali's comments on all these *vārttikas* are mostly the same. Before moving forward, it would be instructive for us to inspect them. Consider what he says, for example about vt. 10 (which we need not discuss here) on the same rule, i.e. 7.1.96: *na vaktavyaḥ. iṣṭavācī paraśabdah. vipratīṣedhe param yadiṣṭam tadbhavati* '[This] should not be said. The word *para* means desirable. In [the event of] *vipratīṣedha*, the *para*, i.e. desirable [rule] applies'. He implies that we should apply whichever rule we like as long as it helps us get the grammatically correct form at the end of the derivation. He makes similar comments on 1.4.2 as well, which we will not repeat here – to avoid being redundant.

On the one hand, by interpreting *para* as desirable, Patañjali implies that there is no need to worry about which rule should apply where, as long as we find a way to apply a certain permutation of 'desirable' rules that can help us derive the correct form. On the other hand, in complete contradiction with this suggestion, he invents new conflict resolution tools like *nitya*. What Patañjali wants to actually achieve, only he knows. But are we being too harsh to Patañjali when we criticise him for these reasons? Yes, we are. This is because, it is likely that, throughout the *Mahābhāṣya*, Patañjali is in dialogue with his pupils; so some of these statements might have been produced by one speaker and certain others by another. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the *Mahābhāṣya* does frequently confuse its reader, especially one looking for consistency in the logic employed to defend certain positions it takes.

### 3 Kātyāyana on *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga*

Having examined how Kātyāyana uses the term *nitya*, now let us consider what he has to say about *antaraṅga* and/or *bahiraṅga*. Kātyāyana uses *antaraṅga* thrice as a stand-alone stem, twice as a part of the compound *antaraṅgabaliyastva*, and thrice as a part of the compound *antaraṅgalakṣaṇatva*. Its antonym *bahiraṅga* too is used on many occasions by Kātyāyana. However, he does not define the terms *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga*.



Let us look at vt. 7 on 6.1.135 *suṭ kāt pūrvaḥ*:<sup>27</sup>

Vt. 7 *avipratīṣedho hi bahiraṅgalakṣaṇatvāt*

‘This cannot be a case of *vipratīṣedha*, because of the *bahiraṅga* nature (of *sUṬ*)’.

We do not need to look into the derivational context in which this has been stated. But this *vārttika* shows that Kātyāyana thinks that *vipratīṣedha*, whatever it means, cannot exist between an *antaraṅga* rule and a *bahiraṅga* rule, whatever the two terms mean. In principle, there are two possibilities. One, that the tradition is correct, and that by teaching such a *vārttika*, Kātyāyana is simply suggesting that *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* pairs are not of equal strength and thus are excluded from the domain of *vipratīṣedha* ‘conflict between rule pairs of equal strength’. But the other possibility is that he simply means that there is no *vipratīṣedha* ‘conflict’ between *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* rule pairs. We will explore this second possibility further below. For now, suffice it to say that for two reasons the second one is more plausible. One, because Occam’s razor or the principle of parsimony. And two, because Kātyāyana does not say anything about *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* not being *tulyabala* ‘of equal strength’ in his *vārttikas*.

Now let us look at a *vārttika* where Kātyāyana uses the term *antaraṅga* to get some clarity on what he means by *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* and what, according to him, the relationship of these terms is, if any, with 1.4.2. On 1.4.2 *vipratīṣedhe param kāryam*, Kātyāyana’s vt. 8 says *antaraṅgam ca*. This *vārttika* does not seem to be directly related to any of the preceding *vārttikas* on 1.4.2, so we shall simply treat it as an independent *vārttika* on 1.4.2. Patañjali does not say anything new on it and simply paraphrases it as follows: *antaraṅgam ca balīyo bhavatīti vaktavyam*. Kātyāyana then illustrates the usefulness of stating *vārttika* 8 in the following *vārttika*:

Vt. 9 *prayojanam yaṅekādeṣettvottvāni guṇavrddhidvirvacanāḷlo pasvarebhyaḥ*

Note that Kātyāyana uses the ablative plural form for one set of operations, whereas he uses the nominative plural form for the other set. This is how he consistently suggests that one set (in the nominative) takes precedence over the other (in the ablative) in all his *vārttikas*. So, he means that those mentioned in the nominative are *antaraṅga* and they take precedence over the *bahiraṅga* ones mentioned in the ablative. We can translate the *vārttika* as follows:

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<sup>27</sup> ‘Augment *sUṬ* is introduced before *K*’.

‘The purpose (of the previous *vārttika* is:) [the *antaraṅga* operations] *yaN*, *ekādeśa*, *ittva* and *uttva* [prevail] over [each of the *bahiraṅga* operations] *guṇa*, *vṛddhi*, *dvirvacana*, *allopa* and *svara*’.

Let us consider some of Patañjali’s arguments on vt. 9 on 1.4.2:

*guṇād yaṇādeśaḥ. syonaḥ syonā. guṇas ca prāpnoti yaṇādeśas ca. paratvād guṇaḥ syāt. yaṇādeśo bhavaty antaraṅgataḥ.*

‘The substitution [of vowels *iK*] with consonants *yaN* (*yaṇādeśa*) prevails over *guṇa*, (e.g.) *syonaḥ*, *syonā*. [The rule teaching] *guṇa* is applicable, and [the rule teaching] substitution [of *iK*] with *yaN* is also applicable. Because of the *para* [tool, that is, by applying 1.4.2], *guṇa* would prevail, but due to the *antaraṅga* [tool], *yaṇādeśa* occurs’.

The sentence *guṇas ca prāpnoti yaṇādeśas ca*, and the mention of the *para* tool here indicate that Patañjali does indeed treat the interaction between *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* as a conflict, and also uses *antaraṅga* as a tool to resolve such conflict. Consider another excerpt from Patañjali’s comments on vt. 9:

*dvirvacanād yaṇādeśaḥ. dudyūṣati susyūṣati. dvirvacanaṁ ca prāpnoti yaṇādeśas ca. nityatvāt dvirvacana syāt. yaṇādeśo bhavaty antaraṅgataḥ.*

‘The substitution [of vowels *iK*] with consonants *yaN* (*yaṇādeśa*) prevails over reduplication, (e.g.) *dudyūṣati*, *susyūṣati*. [The rule teaching] reduplication is applicable, and [the rule teaching] substitution [of *iK*] with *yaN* is also applicable. Because of the *nitya* [tool], reduplication would prevail, but due to the *antaraṅga* [tool], *yaṇādeśa* occurs’.

Here too, the sentence *dvirvacanaṁ ca prāpnoti yaṇādeśas ca* and the mention of the *nitya* tool show that Patañjali uses *antaraṅga* as a tool to solve rule conflict. In both these examples, Patañjali compares the outcomes from using *para*, *nitya* and *antaraṅga* as tools for rule conflict resolution, in order to demonstrate the superiority of *antaraṅga* as a conflict resolution tool.

But is Patañjali’s interpretation of vts. 8 and 9 on 1.4.2 correct? Let us discuss some of the derivations mentioned above to answer this question. Let us first follow Patañjali’s method to derive the form *dudyūṣati* ‘desires to shine’. We start by adding the desiderative affix *saN* to the root *div* ‘to shine’ by 3.1.7 *dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ*

*saṁānakartṛkād icchāyām vā.*<sup>28</sup> Thereafter, by 6.4.19 *chvoḥ śūḍ anuṅāsike ca*,<sup>29</sup> we get *diū + saN*. Here, according to Patañjali, two rules are simultaneously applicable:

$$\{d \quad [i] \} \quad \bar{u} \quad + \quad saN$$

6.1.77 *iko yaṅ aci*<sup>30</sup> is applicable to *i* while 6.1.9 *sanyaṅoḥ*<sup>31</sup> is applicable to *di*. Notice that the cause of application of 6.1.77 (i.e.,  $\bar{u}$ ) lies to the left of the cause of application of 6.1.9 (i.e., *saN*). Patañjali says that 6.1.77 is *antaraṅga* and thus wins, thereby giving: *dyū + saN*. Thereafter, 6.1.9 applies and we get *dyūdyū + saN*. After applying other rules, we get the correct form *dudyūṣati*.

Before going forward, let us use this example to speculate about how Kātyāyana might have defined *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga*. Note that the cause of application of 6.1.77, namely  $\bar{u}$ , lies inside (*antar*) the *aṅga diū*, while the cause of application of 6.1.9, namely *saN*, lies outside (*bahir*) it. Thus, the term *antaraṅga* could stand for *aṅgasya antaḥ* and the term *bahiraṅga* for *aṅgād bahiḥ*.

Now, here is what I think Kātyāyana actually meant. 6.1.9 *sanyaṅoḥ*<sup>32</sup> teaches that a verbal base ending in *saN* or *yaN*, which has not undergone reduplication, is reduplicated.<sup>33</sup> Note that *diū + saN* is not a verbal base ending in *saN*, but instead two separate items, namely *diū* and *saN*. So, 6.1.9, the so-called *bahiraṅga* rule, is not yet applicable here. However, 6.1.77 is applicable here, and on applying it, we get *dyū + saN*. Now, since no other rules can be applied here, we can fuse the two items *dyū* and *saN* into a single item *dyūṣa*, which we can call a verbal base ending in *saN*. Therefore, 6.1.9 applies here and we get *dyūdyūṣa*. After applying other rules, we get the correct verbal base *dudyūṣa* (and the correct final form *dudyūṣati*).

In sum, I think Kātyāyana simply means that the *bahiraṅga* rule is not applicable, and thus cannot be applied, before the *antaraṅga*

<sup>28</sup> ‘The affix *saN* is optionally introduced after a verbal stem, the action denoted by which is the object of a verbal stem expressing desire and provided both actions have the same agent’.

<sup>29</sup> ‘*ch* and *v* are replaced with *ś* and *ūTH*, respectively, when an affix beginning with a nasal, or affix *KvI*, or one beginning with *jhaL*, i.e. a non-nasal stop or a fricative, and marked with *K* or *N̄*, follows’.

<sup>30</sup> ‘*iK* (*i, u, r, ḷ*) is replaced with *yaN* (*y, v, r, ḷ*) when *aC* (any vowel) follows’.


<sup>31</sup> If we interpret *sanyaṅoḥ* as locative, as I think Patañjali does in this case, then this rule teaches that a verbal base which has not undergone reduplication is reduplicated when followed by *saN* or *yaN*. Note that the whole base does not undergo reduplication. Instead, only one syllable does. See 6.1.1 *ekāco dve prathamasya* and 6.1.2 *aḷāder dvitīyasya*.

<sup>32</sup> I think Kātyāyana interprets *sanyaṅoḥ* as genitive.

<sup>33</sup> The whole base does not undergo reduplication. Instead, only one syllable does. See 6.1.1 *ekāco dve prathamasya* and 6.1.2 *aḷāder dvitīyasya*.

rule is applied. As a matter of fact, he prescribes a certain order of rule application at best. Consider another example.

Let us use Patañjali's method to derive the form *dyaukāmi* 'male offspring of *dyukāma*'. We start by adding the *taddhita* affix *iÑ* to the *bahuvrīhi* compound made up of *div* and *kāma* by 4.1.95 *ata iÑ* (which teaches that the *taddhita* affix *iÑ* occurs to denote an offspring after a syntactically related nominal stem which ends in *a*). After replacing the inflectional affixes inside the compound with *LUK* by 2.4.71 *supo dhātuprātipadikayoḥ*,<sup>34</sup> we get *div + kāma + iÑ*. Here, by 6.1.131 *diva ut* (which teaches that the final sound of the *pada* *div* is replaced with *uT*), we get *diu + kāma + iÑ*. At this stage, according to Patañjali, two rules are simultaneously applicable:



Patañjali says that 6.1.77 is *antaraṅga* and thus wins. The derivation proceeds as follows: *diu + kāma + iÑ* → *dyu + kāma + iÑ* (6.1.77) → *dyau + kāma + iÑ* (7.2.117) → *dyaukāmi* (6.4.148 *yasyeti ca*).<sup>35</sup>

But I think Kātyāyana views this derivation differently. His goal is to derive a word that means: *dyukāmasya apatyam pumān* 'male offspring of *dyukāma*'. Since we are talking about *dyukāma*'s offspring, and not (*div + kāma*)'s offspring, the derivation should start with *dyukāma* and not with *div + kāma*. Thus, we have: *dyukāma + Nas + iÑ*. *Nas* is replaced with *LUK* by 2.4.71 *supo dhātuprātipadikayoḥ* and we get *dyukāma + iÑ*. After applying other rules, we get the correct answer, *dyaukāmi*. In sum, Kātyāyana is simply telling us: 7.2.117 is not applicable before 6.1.77 has applied. But this is not a case of conflict.

To conclude, when Kātyāyana says *antaraṅgam ca* in vt. 8 on 1.4.2, he simply means *antaraṅgam ca kāryam*. Thereafter, in the follow-

<sup>34</sup> 'A *suP* is replaced with *LUK* when it occurs inside a *dhātu* 'verbal base' or a *prātipadika* 'nominal base'.

<sup>35</sup> 'The final *i* or *a* of a *bha* item is replaced with *LOPA* when it is followed by *ī* or a *taddhita* affix'.

ing *vārttikas*, he lists the cases where *antaraṅga* rules need to be applied for their *bahiraṅga* counterparts to become applicable. I think that because he did not see the relationship between *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* rules as one involving conflict, he did not see *antaraṅga* as a conflict resolution tool.

#### 4 Summary of Technical Developments

Having studied Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* dealing with a number of terms that are now used as conflict resolution tools, let us summarise our findings. As stated earlier, while Kātyāyana does use *tulyabala* 'equal strength' in the context of *vipratīṣedha*, and while he excludes *anavakāśa-sāvakāśa* pairs from the ambit of *vipratīṣedha* and thereby from the jurisdiction of 1.4.2, he does not explicitly discuss *nitya-anitya* and *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* in the context of *tulyabala*.

Most importantly, even though Kātyāyana does use *anavakāśa* 'without scope (to apply elsewhere)' and *apavāda* 'exception' as conflict resolution tools, he does not use *nitya* and *antaraṅga* as conflict resolution tools. We have seen that this changes in the *Mahābhāṣya* where both *nitya* and *antaraṅga* are explicitly interpreted as conflict resolution tools by Patañjali. Later scholars follow Patañjali's approach to these two terms.

What both Kātyāyana and Patañjali have in common is that they do not use the term *tulyabala* in the context of *nitya* and *antaraṅga*. This changes, as we have seen above, in the *Kāśikā*, wherein Jayāditya and Vāmana, writing in the seventh century AD, categorically classify *nitya-anitya* and *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* pairs as not *tulyabala*, in their comments on 1.4.2. However, they do not teach us a hierarchy of preference for these tools. A proper hierarchy becomes available in the twelfth century with the writing of the *paribhāṣā* text called *Paribhāṣāpāṭha* by *Puruṣottamadeva*. This very *paribhāṣā* reappears as Pbh 38 of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, which we have discussed above: *pūrva-para-nitya-antaraṅga-apavādānām uttarottaram balīyaḥ* 'a *para sūtra* is stronger than a *pūrva sūtra*, a *nitya sūtra* is stronger than a *para sūtra*; an *antaraṅga sūtra* is stronger than a *nitya sūtra*; and an *apavāda sūtra* is stronger than an *antaraṅga sūtra*'.

In sum, the relationships between *tulyabala*, *vipratīṣedha*, *nitya*, *antaraṅga*, *para*, *apavāda* etc. were fully and concretely established by the twelfth century.

## 5 Style and Attitude

Finally, having discussed some of Kātyāyana's *vārttikas*, we must also consider his style and attitude towards Pāṇini's grammar. Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* are often a medium for him to share all kinds of thoughts with fellow grammarians - not just the 'correct' ones. Very often, we find him use *na vā* 'or rather not' and *ca* 'and' in a series of consecutive *vārttikas* to discuss alternative or even contradicting possibilities and explanations. Let me give an example relevant to the topic of rule conflict. Consider vts. 3, 4 and 5 on 7.1.6 *śīno ruṭ*<sup>36</sup> (Mbh III.243.12-21).

Vt. 3 *jhādeśād āḍ leṭi*

[It must be stated that, contrary to 1.4.2, the introduction of] *āṬ*, [which is taught by the *pūrva* rule 3.4.94 *leṭo'dātau*<sup>37</sup> wins against] the substitution of *jh* [which is taught by the *para* rule 7.1.5 *ātmanepadeṣv anataḥ*].<sup>38</sup>

Vt. 4 *na vā nityatvād āṭaḥ*

'Or rather [this does] not [need to be stated] because [the rule teaching] *āṬ* is *nitya* [and thus defeats the other rule which is *anitya*].

Vt. 5 *antaraṅgalakṣaṇatvāc ca*

'And [also] because [the rule teaching] *āṬ* is *antaraṅga* [and thus defeats the other rule which is *bahiraṅga*].

This style of discussing multiple possibilities without striving to always be correct, is very much akin to Patañjali's style, which also involves a discussion about the pros and cons of various perspectives. In both Kātyāyana's and Patañjali's work, we find no rigidity or urgency to establish the truth. Instead, their work is characterised by curiosity and a willingness to critically examine a motley of ideas.

Patañjali, who seems to be in conversation with other discussants, presumably his pupils, throughout the *Mahābhāṣya*, often takes the liberty to end the conversation without reaching any concrete conclusion or expressing his final opinion on the topic at hand. Consider, for example, his comments about 1.4.1 *ā kaḍārād ekā samjñā* 'up

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<sup>36</sup> 'An *aṬ* which replaces a *jh* which is the initial sound of an affix preceded by *śīN*, takes the augment *rUṬ*'.

<sup>37</sup> 'Augments *aṬ* and *āṬ* are introduced, in turn (*pariyāyeṇa*), to affixes which replace *LEṬ*'.

<sup>38</sup> 'A *jh* which is the initial sound of an *ātmanepada* affix preceded by a verbal base that does not end in *a* is replaced with *at*'.

to 2.2.38 *kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*, each item can take only one *saṃjñā*, i.e. terminological designation'. He suggests that Pāṇini has taught two different versions of 1.4.1 to his pupils:

*katham tv etat sūtram paḥitavyam. kim ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñeti. āhosvit prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam iti. kutah punar ayam sandehah. ubhayathā hy ācāryeṇa śiṣyāḥ sūtram pratipāditāḥ. kecid ākaḍārād ekā saṃjñeti. kecid prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam iti. kaś cātra viśeṣah. tatraikasamjñādhikāre tadvacanam (vt. 2)*

*tatraikasamjñādhikāre tadvaktavyam. kim. ekā saṃjñā bhavātīti. nanu ca yasyāpi paramkāryatvam tenāpi paragrahaṇam kartavyam. parārtham mama bhaviṣyati. vipratīśedhe ca iti. mamāpi tarhy ekagrahaṇam parārtham bhaviṣyati. sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau iti.<sup>39</sup>*

“But how should this rule be read? Is it *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā*<sup>40</sup> or *prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam*?<sup>41</sup> But how [does] this doubt [arise]? Because the students have been taught this rule in both ways by the teacher. Some [have been taught] *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā* [and] some *prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam*. And what is the difference [between these alternative readings] here?

In that section where one name applies, the statement of that [must be made]. (vt. 2)

In that section where one name applies, that should be stated. What [should be stated]? That only one *saṃjñā* applies [per item]. However, one who [believes that] the following rule [prevails] has to include the word *para* too. It will [serve] another [purpose] for me later [that is, by continuation, in] *vipratīśedhe ca*. For me too then, the mention of *eka* will [serve] another [purpose], in *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*.”<sup>42</sup>

Note that there is no evidence that Kātyāyana was aware of these two versions. Vt. 2 *tatraikasamjñādhikāre tadvacanam* (Mbh I.296.15) has been written in context of the first *vārttika*, and not in the context of these supposedly different versions of 1.4.1 (and 1.4.2). The

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<sup>39</sup> Mbh I.296.11-18.

<sup>40</sup> ‘Up to 2.2.38 *kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*, each item can take only one *saṃjñā*’.

<sup>41</sup> ‘Up to 2.2.38 *kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*, the rule that comes later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*’s serial order prevails’.

<sup>42</sup> In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*’s serial order, 1.2.64 *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau* comes before 1.4.1 *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā*. So, one may wonder how Patañjali would be able to continue *ekā* from 1.4.1 into 1.2.64 by *anuvṛtti*. I want to clarify here that Patañjali is proposing to reorder the rules such that *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā* comes before *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*, so that he may be able to continue *ekā* from the former into the latter by *anuvṛtti*. I do not see how doing this would be justified or useful.

first *vārttika* reads: *anyatra samjñāsamāveśān niyamārtham vacanam* ‘Because names co-apply elsewhere, the statement is for the sake of making a restriction’ (Mbh I.296.3). And so, the second *vārttika* continues to discuss this topic: *tatraikasamjñādikāre tadvacanam* ‘In that section where one name applies, the statement of that [must be made]’. As is peculiar of Patañjali, he skilfully weaves Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas* into his own discourse. But it must be borne in mind that, as far as we know, the idea of two different versions of 1.4.1 (and 1.4.2) is Patañjali’s alone.

Throughout the rest of his comments on Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas* on 1.4.1, Patañjali keeps discussing whether one should read 1.4.1 as *ā kaḍārād ekā samjñā* or as *prāk kaḍārāt param kāryam* using various *sūtras* discussed by Kātyāyana in his *vārttikas* – never mind the fact that, as I have stated above, Kātyāyana does not give us any reason to think that he was aware of these two supposed versions of 1.4.1. In the end, Patañjali characteristically ends the discussion abruptly without telling us which version one must finally accept.

In sum, even though there are differences – as I have shown above – in the perspectives of Kātyāyana and Patañjali, such open-ended discussion, speculation, and investigation are characteristic of the writings of both these scholars. This changed gradually as the tradition evolved, but this paper focuses only on the early tradition, and mainly on Kātyāyana. Thus, we will neither dwell on later developments nor review any primary or secondary literature on this subject. Nevertheless, I will briefly present how the tradition evolved in later years in my view.

As shown above, the *Kāśikā* presents a more concrete and established version of the conflict resolution mechanism, one which has a much narrower scope for disagreement and dialogue than did those of Kātyāyana and Patañjali. The *paribhāṣā* treatises written over many centuries thereafter too exhibit this behaviour. Not only do they contain highly focused *paribhāṣās* teaching conflict resolution tools such as *nitya*, *antarāṅga*, *apavāda* etc. discussed above, but they also contain dozens of *paribhāṣās* teaching exceptions to these tools.

The flexibility of ideas, free thinking, willingness to consider a wide variety of possibilities and alternatives, which, as stated earlier, are so characteristic of the early tradition, i.e. Kātyāyana’s and Patañjali’s work, came to be replaced by a willing acceptance of rigid, ossified, established, and widely-accepted ‘facts’ and ‘truths’ in the later tradition – in particular, in *paribhāṣā* literature. It is noteworthy that many of these *paribhāṣās* are *anitya* ‘not always applicable’ by the tradition’s own admission!

While the *Kaumudī* texts did revolutionize the way in which Pāṇini’s grammar is taught and learnt, they made the practice of performing Pāṇinian derivations more rigid. They did this by shifting the focus of the tradition from the comprehensive functioning of the



Pāṇinian machine to the many individual products of the machine, namely, individual derivations of various forms. Over time, students of the *Kaumudī* got so familiar with these derivations that now, they do not have to and, consequently, do not, stop at most steps of the derivation to ask themselves: which rules are applicable at this step? Which of these rules should I apply? And why? And if pupils do apply conflict resolution tools of their own accord and end up getting the wrong form, they are not encouraged by their teachers to ask why. Instead, they are advised to consult the *Kaumudī* texts to ‘correct’ themselves, i.e. to memorise the explanation offered by their authors.

Why this gradual loss of flexibility and open-endedness? I think that the tendency to worship Pāṇini-Kātyāyana-Patañjali as the *trimuni/munitraya* ‘three saints’ was in part responsible for this change. The tradition brims with verses such as: *vākyakāraṃ vararucim bhāṣyakāraṃ patañjalim pāṇinim sūtrakāraṃ ca praṇātosmi munitrayam* ‘I bow to the three saints, namely Pāṇini, who wrote the *sūtras*, Kātyāyana, who wrote the *vārttikas*, and Patañjali, who wrote the *bhāṣya*’. When one worships a scholar, it becomes difficult for one to disagree with that scholar.

Secondly, even amongst the three *munis*, Patañjali’s word superseded Kātyāyana’s and Kātyāyana’s word superseded Pāṇini’s, right from the time of Kaiyaṭa, who famously stated: *yathottaram hi munitrayasya prāmāṇyam*<sup>43</sup> ‘Among the three *munis*, the authority of later *muni* supersedes that of his predecessor(s)’.<sup>44</sup> Thus, Patañjali became the most important person in the tradition, surpassing Pāṇini himself, whose work he had set out to expound on. Subsequently, unlike Kātyāyana and Patañjali, who were willing to consider a wide variety of ideas and to occasionally disagree with Pāṇini himself, later scholars preferred to toe *Bhagavān* ‘Lord’ Patañjali’s line. This also kept them from developing new perspectives about Pāṇini’s *sūtras* without being unduly influenced by Patañjali’s writings. In effect, even though Patañjali wrote his commentary with a very open mind, without insisting of strict conventions, his ideas got codified into a systematic, established, and orthodox paradigm that came to be disproportionately respected and enthusiastically internalised by later scholars.

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<sup>43</sup> Another popular version of this, also written by Kaiyaṭa is: *uttarottaram muninām prāmāṇyam*.

<sup>44</sup> See *Pradīpa* on *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.1.29.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

There is no evidence to support the idea that Pāṇini intended for or expected us to make interventions in the functioning of his grammar by adding new components or layers to it. Based on his style, one can only infer that he likely produced this grammar so that students of Sanskrit could better understand its structure and in order to present a unique theoretical framework of linguistic analysis. In fact, today's linguists have much to learn from Pāṇini's work.

But the tradition, starting with Kātyāyana, not only simplified Pāṇini's rules by rewording them and providing examples, but also added new ideas, opinions, tools, and metarules to Pāṇini's existing framework, often interfering with it in very significant ways. In other words, Kātyāyana, Patañjali etc. attempted to improve the grammar – to fix its supposed flaws and to foist on it their own understanding of it through their contributions.

It is hoped that this paper will provide a fillip to further investigation into what Pāṇini actual teaches, as opposed to what later scholars, especially Kātyāyana, the first to comment on his rules, would have us believe. The same can be done by treating Kātyāyana as an original author and Patañjali as an interpreter of his *vārttikas*. This will enable us to better understand not only how Pāṇini's grammar actually functions but also how the tradition has evolved intellectually over the centuries.

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