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Aristotle and Inner Awareness

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Abstract Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have focused on the idea that conscious experience includes an experience of the self, whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an experience as of a pink cube, she is not just aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a pinkish, cubic way in this case); she is also aware of the fact that it is presented to her. According to Victor Caston, Aristotle defended an interesting version of this view in *De Anima*, later developed in different directions by many other philosophers – outside current research in the Analytic tradition, particularly in Phenomenology and the Heidelberg school. My goal in this paper is to locate Aristotle's views, as interpreted by Caston, in the context of the current debate, and to offer some considerations in favour of a view like Aristotle's, also following Caston.

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1 Introduction

Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have focused on the idea that conscious experience includes an experience of the self, whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an experience as of a pink cube, she is not just aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a pinkish, cubic way in this case); she is also aware of the fact that it is presented to *her*. According to Victor Caston, Aristotle defended an interesting version of this view in *De Anima*, later developed in different directions by many other philosophers – outside current research in the Analytic tradition, particularly in Phenomenology and the Heidelberg school. My goal in this paper is to locate Aristotle's views, as interpreted by Caston, in the context of the current debate, and to offer some considerations in favour of a view like Aristotle's, also following Caston. In the first section I'll introduce the topic, in the second I introduce the most common current views on it, in a scale going from the more deflationary to the more robust, locating Aristotle's view as interpreted by Caston at the committal end. In the third I offer some considerations in support of it, distinguishing two varieties.

2 The Subjective Character of Phenomenal Consciousness

Some topics addressed in philosophy are, we might assume, 'natural kinds' endowed with relatively hidden, to that extent objective 'real essences', worth theorising about.[1] Phenomenal consciousness and the features of conscious experiences we are aware of when in a phenomenally conscious state, *qualia*, are a good case in point.[2] It is often a crucial part of whatever illumination philosophy can provide in addressing its topics to agree on a minimal characterisation, making sure we are all on the same page in engaging them.[3] Such a charac-

1 Here I don't use 'natural' in opposition to 'social', but rather to refer to properties and kinds in Lewis' (1983) 'sparse' (as opposed to 'abundant') sense. Natural kinds in this sense might well be 'social constructs', definable by social rules. 'Natural' properties and kinds are those that play substantive explanatory roles, and hence have a 'hidden nature' which only reveals itself after theorising. This might just be philosophical, armchair-like; but it should be unifiable with empirical theorising along standard lines.

2 Cf. Shea 2012 for elaboration and justification. Caston 2002, 759 argues that Aristotle was discussing phenomenal consciousness.

3 Cf. the illuminating discussion Taylor 2018, §§ 2-4 provides as a prelude to his minimal characterisation of another traditional philosophical topic, indeterminacy.

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terisation should only use uncontroversial notions, and it should be neutral among the different accounts of the topic that can be provided – including the sceptical view that rejects the just stated ontological assumption, contending instead that the phenomenon is a 'grue-like' one, lacking any objective explanatory nature.

A possible strategy for the consciousness case is suggested by Hill's "meta-problem of consciousness" proposal (Hill 2009, 19-22; cf. Kriegel 2015, 52-3, Chalmers 2018): phenomenally conscious states are conditions such as pains, orgasms, colours or tastes, which *it is reasonable to think of* as properly graspable only from the perspective of the conscious subject, so that *prima facie* compelling arguments like Kripke's (1980) 'no conceivability error' or Jackson's (1986) 'Mary's acquired knowledge' have been advanced to argue for their irreducibility to the physical. A more traditional strategy in contemporary analytic philosophy uses Nagel's (1974) 'what it is like' characterisation: *qualia* are features of experiences such that *there is something it is like* for a subject in virtue of having them. Snowdon (2010) has examples indicating that the phrase can be used without connotations suggestive of phenomenal states and their features, which is in part what motivates the alternative meta-problem characterisation. Stoljar (2016) provides a detailed semantic analysis, arguing that Nagel's phrase has, at least pragmatically, the required intimations:

> 'what it is like'-sentences express relations of a certain kind – I call them *affective* relations – that hold between individuals and events; to a first approximation, an affective relation holds between an individual and an event just in case the individual is affected in a particular kind of way by the event. In many contexts, but not in all, the affective relations expressed by 'what it is like'-sentences will be of a certain special kind I call *experiential* relations […] an experiential relation holds between an individual and an event just in case the individual feels a certain way in virtue of the event. (Stoljar 2016, 1162)

As Stoljar points out, Nagel's characterisation has suggested to many "a reflexive or self-representational theory, according to which an individual is in a conscious state if the individual represents or is aware of (in some sense) their being in that state" (2016, 1162); he quotes a crisp statement of the suggestion by Levine (2007, 514):

> the very phrase that serves to canonically express the notion of the phenomenal – 'what it's like for x to …' – explicitly refers to the phenomenal state in question being 'for' the subject. The way I would put it […] is: Phenomenal states/properties are not merely instantiated in the subject, but are experienced by the subject.

> Experience is more than mere instantiation, and part of what that 'more' involves is some kind of access.[4]

Similarly, in a classical paper trying to isolate the phenomenal character of conscious states, Block (1995, 235) suggests that phenomenal states "often seem to have a 'me-ishness' about them, the phenomenal state often represents the state as 'a state of me'".[5] Stoljar, however, persuasively shows that, on his quoted analysis, no reflexivity is entailed by Nagel's minimal characterisation: it just follows from S being in a phenomenally conscious state that S *feels some way* by being in it, which *prima facie* doesn't require that S *represents* or be *aware* of the state, or of herself being in that state.[6] The question, as he grants, is whether there are good reasons to think that this 'feeling some way' common to phenomenal states is such that the individuals in them are 'in some sense' aware of their being in them – and what that sense is. Debates whether this is so, and how it should be understood if so, have proliferated in the past decade in the analytic tradition. As Caston (2002) persuasively shows, they have a long pedigree, going back to Aristotle.[7]

Conscious states have distinctive features, distinguishable in them or across them, those 'ways' their subjects 'feel' by being in them. These are *qualia* in the primary sense if this notion, and their study has occupied philosophers for the past decades. Beyond such *determinates*, the current issue concerns a *determinable* common to all paradigmatic phenomenally conscious states. This would thereby have claims to be considered the essence of consciousness, or a crucial feature thereof (Zahavi, Kriegel 2016, 50); to that extent, our topic overlaps with the main target of philosophical theories of consciousness (Smith 2020, § 3; Siewert 2021, § 7). Gallagher and Zahavi (2021, § 1) put it thus:

> There is something it is like to taste chocolate, and this is different from what it is like to remember what it is like to taste chocolate, or to smell vanilla, to run, to stand still, to feel envious, nervous, depressed or happy, or to entertain an abstract belief. All of these different experiences are, however, also characterised by their distinct first-personal character. The what-it-is-likeness of phenomenal episodes is properly speaking a what-it-is-like-*for-me*-ness. This

4 But cf. Levine 2019 for his more nuanced recent position, which grants, I think, Stoljar's objection.

5 Cf. also Rosenthal 1986, 344-5.

6 Cf. Stoljar 2021, § 6 for a summary of his objection to the alleged reflexive implications of Nagel's phrase. Cf. also Byrne 2004, 214-16; Siewert 2013, 238-41; Guillot 2017, 35.

7 Cf. Frank 2004 and Zahavi 2005 for other strands in the history of the notion.

> for-me-ness doesn't refer to a specific experiential quality like sour or soft, rather it refers to the distinct first-personal givenness of experience. It refers to the fact that the experiences I am living through are given differently (but not necessarily better) to me than to anybody else.[8]

In their introduction to a recent journal issue on our topic, Farrell and McClelland put thus the intended contrast:

> When we perceptually experience the sunset we have an outer awareness of the scene before us but we also have an inner awareness of that very experience, or of something associated with it. (Farrell, McClelland 2017, 2)[9]

Many different terms have been used to capture the notion, from Block's 'me-ishness' and Kriegel's 'inner awareness' to Gallagher and Zahavi's 'for-me-ness' and 'mineness'.[10] Borrowing from the phenomenological school (which, as he shows, intensively discussed the topic), Zahavi (2005) used the descriptively accurate 'pre-reflective self-awareness'. Here I'll mostly use Levine's (2001, 6-7) also evocative but less unwieldy terminology, contrasting 'qualitative character' and '*qualia*' with 'subjective character' and 'subjectivity'.

3 Views about Subjective Character

We should distinguish *subjective character* from *introspection*, by which I will understand a conscious judgment about features of one's mental life. Let us consider a perceptual state, visually experiencing a pink cube in front of one. We could introspect the perceptual state and its features, its perceptual mode (thus discriminating it from, say, a visual imagining with the same content), the pinkishness in it, whether the length of the cube edges appears to be smaller than the distance at which the cube appears to be, and so on. This introspective attitude would be a further conscious state. The subjective character of the perceptual state is supposed to be a feature that it has, whether or not it becomes the target of introspective reflection. It is also a feature that, by being conscious, the introspective state itself has, even if it itself is not the target of a further, second-order introspection.

8 Cf. the feature of conscious experience that Merlo 2021, following James, calls 'feltness', and the ontological problem of other minds he develops on its basis.

9 They borrow the term 'inner awareness' from Kriegel 2009; Boner et al. 2019.

10 This is just a small sample; cf. Byrne 2004, § 3; Guillot 2017, 25.

On a deflationary view, subjectivity is a feature of phenomenal experiences that, by itself, doesn't make a distinctive additional contribution to phenomenal character, to what it is like for its subject to have that conscious experience:

> The for-me-ness of experience still admits of two crucially different interpretations. According to a deflationary interpretation, it consists simply in the experience *occurring* in someone (a 'me'). On this view, for-me-ness is a non-experiential aspect of mental life – a merely metaphysical fact, so to speak, not a phenomenological fact. The idea is that we ought to resist a no-ownership view according to which experiences can occur as free-floating unowned entities. Just as horse-riding presupposes the existence of a horse, experiencing presupposes a subject of experience. In contrast, a non-deflationary interpretation construes for-me-ness as an experiential aspect of mental life, a bona fide *phenomenal* dimension of consciousness. On this view, to say that an experience is *for me* is precisely to say something more than that it is *in me*. (Zahavi, Kriegel 2016, 36)

Minimally understood, thus, subjective character consists in the ontological fact that phenomenally conscious experiences are not 'free-floating' eventualities like raining or lightning but require a subject – which does appear to be implied by Nagel's characterisation –, plus the epistemological fact that they are available for introspection. Robustly understood however, as Howell and Thompson (2017, 106) put it, subjective character should make some contribution to the overall phenomenal character of a conscious state, and it should in some way present the subject of that state.[11] One might be sceptical about this robust view, sticking to the deflationary take by claiming that it is only through introspection that we gain a conscious awareness of ourselves:[12]

> Being possessed of the first-person conceptual capacity always, or at least for the most part, puts one in a *position* to know immediately about one's own conscious mental life as one's own. This 'privileged' position is exploited if and when the capacity for reflec-

11 Or just the state itself – see below.

12 Stoljar 2021 offers a thorough examination of extant arguments for robust accounts of subjectivity and questions them all, in support of a minimalism like the one that Shear and Howell, Thompson advance in the quotes that follow. Stoljar 2018 has a good account of the relation between phenomenal states and introspection consistent with sceptical views. See Siewert 2013, 250 and Giustina 2022 for some responses to his arguments in support of more robust views, and see § 4 below for my own critical take on Stoljar's points.

> tive self-consciousness is exercised. But it does not follow from the ever present *availability* of taking up a distinctively first-personal relation to one's own conscious experience that there is an *actual* consciousness of oneself that, *experientially*, always accompanies one's conscious experience of the world. (Schear 2009, 98)

> Despite the fact that experiences on the unreflective level don't have mineness, we can gain a sense of mineness in reflection… In reflection we lay claim to our experiences, and the mineness is a product – not a condition of – that attitude. (Howell, Thompson 2017, 120)[13]

Hume's famous incapacity to find himself in experience provides a phenomenological motivation for the deflationary position. Here is an often-quoted passage to that effect from Sartre, reminiscent of Moore's also often quoted passage on the transparency of experience:

> When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no *I*. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc. I am then plunged into the world of objects […] but *me*, I have disappeared […] There is no place for me on this level. And this is not a matter of chance, due to a momentary lapse of attention, but happens because of the very structure of consciousness. (Sartre 1957, 48-9)

> The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. (Moore 1903, 450)

It is worth noticing that neither Moore nor Sartre embraced the sceptical position that the texts suggest. Moore assumes in the quoted passage that 'the other element' is there nonetheless, appearances notwithstanding, and Sartre takes pre-reflective self-consciousness to be an essential ingredient of the 'structure of consciousness'. But some theorists of consciousness rely on the intuitive impressions that Sartre and Moore helpfully describe. 'First-order' representational theories along the lines of those developed by Dretske or Tye are influential views that stress those intuitions. These views accept a notion that has become recently somehow controversial, for which Block (2015) offers compelling considerations; namely, that there are unconscious states with representational features, perhaps the very

13 Cf. however Howell 2019 for a slightly less deflationary view.

same had by conscious states.[14] What makes the difference? Similarly, and as Gallagher and Zahavi suggest in the quotation in § 2, what distinguishes for me my own phenomenal experiences from those I ascribe to others, perhaps in the same mood and with the same content? Consistent with the deflationary view of consciousness just outlined, first-order theorists invoke in response dispositional or functional features; thus, for instance, Tye (2002, 62) speaks of phenomenally conscious states being "poised", standing "ready and available to make a direct impact on beliefs and/or desires".

Other philosophers have argued for more robust views of subjectivity that posit occurrent phenomenal features.[15] As already suggested, a main reason in favour of them is that, unlike their deflationary counterparts, robust views afford an evidential grounding for introspective judgments targeting conscious states. I'll consider first representationalist views. Perhaps the best known are the 'higher-order' theories developed by Armstrong, Carruthers, Lycan or Rosenthal, on which the conscious character of a state is fixed by a concurrent higher-order awareness of it, a perception or a further thought – to prevent a regress, ultimately unconscious. According to Caston's interpretation (2002, 773-5), Aristotle seriously considered this higher-order state view, and rejected it mostly on account of a regress argument. Aristotle apparently didn't confront the manoeuvre of allowing that the conscious-making higher-order state be non-conscious; however, as Caston (2002, 779-81) points out, these contemporary higher-order accounts still face very serious objections.[16] On Kriegel's (2009) alternative view, subjectivity consists in the fact that phenomenally conscious states *peripherally* represent themselves, in addition to whatever other representational features they may have.[17] These views are very close to Aristotle's the way Caston (2002) interpret it; on that view, the representational state accounting for subjectivity is a different *type* of state than its target, but, unlike in higher-order theories, they are one and the same *token*. Zahavi (2018, 706-8) presents his view along similar lines. On his account, conscious states primarily present themselves, and also thereby the subject bearing that conscious state.

14 Cf. also Quilty-Dunn 2018.

15 The dispositions posited by deflationary accounts are of course themselves occurrent properties, but the explanatory features in them (the introspecting) are merely iffy.

16 Siewert 2013; Stoljar 2017 and Williford 2019 discuss whether contemporary higher-order views really avoid a regress. Weisberg 2019 offers a recent defence of the Higher-Thought account of subjectivity, confronting objections like Caston's.

17 O'Conaill 2019 defends a related view, on which the relevant self-representational feature of conscious states is claimed to be a generic kind of *mode*, like the mode distinguishing conscious visual perceptual states from conscious visual imaginings, but with a more general character.

On all these representationalist robust views on subjectivity, subjects are the entities to whom these self-representings or self-manifestings of conscious states occur, but they are not what is primarily represented or manifested; these are instead the states themselves. These views are compatible with *phenomenism*, which some of those philosophers also endorse – the view that conscious states have essential intrinsic features beyond their representational ones, which don't supervene on them. Such 'mental paint' (Block 2003) affords an alternative, non-representationalist account of subjectivity, in terms of real (as opposed to merely intentional) relations of *familiarity* or *acquaintance* between the subject and those features (Duncan 2021). In Schear's (2009, 96) happy turn of phrase, subjective character turns out to be on those views "a kind of implicit acquaintance with oneself, or background self-familiarity". This is Williford's (2015) view; subjectivity, the self-presentation of the conscious state is not an intentional relation but a real one, an acquaintance relation. Duncan (2018; 2019) argues for a more committal acquaintance view on which we are not just acquainted with our conscious states, but also with ourselves, and also with our bearing or ownership relation to them. All these views then allow that the features of first-order phenomenally conscious states with which their subjects are acquainted by being in them, or which the states self-represent, come to constitute the contents of conscious introspective second-order states targeting them (Chalmers 2010; Gertler 2012).

4 Some Considerations for Robust Views of Subjective Character

Contemporary work supportive of deflationism such as Stoljar's (2018; 2021) is truly sophisticated; it deploys a good portion of the full theoretical panoply afforded by contemporary philosophy. I cannot provide here compelling support for a more robust view like Aristotle's on Caston's account, which I think we should uphold. But I'll point to what I take to be crucial considerations that can be developed for that purpose.

As said, the Gallagher and Zahavi quotation in § 2 point to that effect towards epistemic asymmetries in how rational beings like us are in a position to know their own conscious mental attitudes, in contrast to their unconscious ones or those of others. Stoljar (2021, §§ 11-12) articulates them as his arguments 7 and 8 for the robust representational view of subjectivity apparently embraced by Aristotle, or the *acquaintance* variant. Rational beings cannot be "self-blind", as Shoemaker (2009, 36) famously puts it; inner awareness might be thought to afford the required evidentiary basis.

To explain the impossibility of self-blindness otherwise, consistent with his scepticism about subjectivity, Stoljar (2018) relies on Broome's (2013) weak conception of rationality, on which being rational just has to do with coherence relations among mental states. For instance, it is rationally required for one to will the means if one wills the ends and believes the means are needed for the ends; it is rationally required to intend to F if one believes that one's reasons require one to F. In our case, Stoljar (2018, 405) contends, the rational impossibility of self-blindness just comes to there being a rational requirement for one to believe that one is in a conscious state when one is in it and certain conditions obtain (having the required concepts to form the belief, attending to the state, etc.).

Now, many of us find Broome's conception of rationality too weak (Lord 2018, ch. 1); the problem with Stoljar's proposal is just a manifestation of that. Rational requirements like the one that Stoljar posits don't look like just brute facts; it seems that we should and can provide illuminating explanations for them based on the constitutive natures of the relevant mental attitudes, willing, believing, intending and so on. This doesn't need to be a *reductive* explanation. Inferential relations (which, as Stoljar and Broome assume, don't relate merely contents but contents together with the types of mental attitudes intending them) are themselves mental activity types, with specific natures. But philosophical accounts of willing, believing, intending and so on should contribute to make better sense of the means-end and enkratic inferential requirement mentioned above. The same applies to our case.

More robust theories like the 'higher-order' representationalist theories fill up this explanatory void of deflationism. But as we saw, these accounts also face very serious objections. For our purposes, the most serious among those that Caston (2002, 779-81) nicely summarises is that they make inner awareness a too extrinsic affair. On them, even in central cases (say, a very painful toothache that fully occupies one's attention) the higher-order attitude that makes it conscious might be hallucinatory. The opposite intuition is nicely captured by H.H. Price in this famous passage:

> When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection; perhaps I am even the victim of some hallucination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly present to my consciousness. What the red patch is, whether a substance, or a state of a substance, or an event, whether it is physical or psychical or neither,

> are questions that we may doubt about. But that something is red and round then and there I cannot doubt. (Price 1932, 3)

Price is here emphasising the main reason to question the alleged datum of transparency and to embrace Moore's 'other element'. He nicely captures what to me is the purest form of the intuitive phenomenological datum for subjectivity: while the deteriorated condition of my tooth that we may take my toothache to represent may well fail to be there alongside my painful experience, the pain itself that I feel cannot fail to exist; it is there, present, as much a part of the actual world as me and my current experience are. The same applies of course to the cubical pinkish field I experience when I take myself to see the Sellarsian pink cube. Stoljar's (2021, § 13) Argument 9, which articulates this point, is to my mind the strongest one for the more committal account of inner awareness that Aristotle, on Caston's interpretation, or the acquaintance variant go for. For Argument 9 Stoljar enlists quotations from Chalmers' work, in which he makes what I take to be Price's point in terms familiar from Peacocke's (1983) distinction between *sensational* and *representational* properties of experiences, and Block's (2003) claims for 'mental paint' – say, blurry visual experiences, or coming to attend to the variable features of visual experiences when the represented features (size, colour, and so on) on which we normally focus our attention are kept identical by perceptual constancy mechanism. I take Price's quotation to zoom on the crucial datum.[18]

Stoljar's (2021) response to arguments 7, 8, and 9 is just that skeptics have alternative explanations for the data; in the latter case, I take it, they should be debunking, 'Quining' (in Dennett's (1988) sense) considerations, perhaps along the lines of Williamson's (1996) influential 'anti-luminosity' argument, or those of Dennett himself. I agree with Stoljar that a full argument for one of the robust views, be it Aristotle's self-representationalism or the acquaintance view, should be abductive and take into consideration the proper explanation of many further data. I also think that such an argument can be made; I have mentioned some strands of it. Other significant considerations I cannot go into here have to do with the proper account of the 'indexical' character of first-personal, *de se* thoughts, including of course introspective thoughts.

I'll close by addressing the following question: is there a reason to choose between the two robust theories I have outlined, the

18 My view and my considerations are very similar, if not identical, to Lowe's (1986; 2008); Lowe 2008, 69 reproduces the Price's datum of presence I am emphasising. On both our accounts, by the way, Price's sense data are 'red and round' only in a metonymical extended sense; with Peacocke 1983, properly speaking we should say that they are *red*' and *round*'.

self-representationalism of Kriegel, Zahavi and Aristotle's on Caston interpretation, on the one hand, and the acquaintance view of Duncan, Gertler and Williford, which I also support? As suggested above, I understand that a main motivation for sceptical positions like Stoljar's comes from familiar and well-motivated worries that a robust view on phenomenal consciousness might lead to anti-naturalist views, cf. Pelczar (2019) for a good recent representative. Such views either give rise to 'veil of perception' epistemic worries or, worse, take the external objects represented in perceptual experiences to be, as Pelczar contends, just ungrounded dispositions to produce conscious experiences. Views of this kind presuppose the representational view of inner awareness because states representing 'external' objects are on them epistemically, and perhaps ontologically grounded on states presenting inner features.

As I have argued, the acquaintance view doesn't require anything of the sort. If we assume some sort of epistemological foundationalism, it can be the form of 'dogmatism' advocated by Pollock (2001) and Pryor (2000), on which the epistemically foundational representations already are endowed with external content. As Lowe (1986, 2008) has it, the acquaintance view of subjectivity requires that, ontologically, awareness of external object be mediated by awareness of internal features of our conscious experiences. But it doesn't require epistemological mediation. As on Sellars' (1963) view, *qualia* proper (the features of conscious states we are acquainted with in inner awareness by being in them) are theoretical entities, whose character (whether events or particulars, types or tokens), as Price intimates in the quotation above, we learn about on the basis of the explanatory roles we ascribe them. A view along these lines, as I have argued, allows for the limitations in our knowledge of *qualia* proper on which Williamson (1996) bases his anti-luminosity considerations; prevents serious objections in the vicinity of Wittgenstein's Private Language argument; and, in principle at least, may be compatible with naturalism. Of course, only to the extent that we can deal with the 'hard problem' of consciousness in the straightforward way that a robust view on inner awareness requires.

This is not a knock-down argument for the acquaintance view, because even if anti-naturalist views require the self-representation version, some self-representational view might also be compatible with naturalism; as Caston emphasises, it is hard to think that Aristotle would have thought otherwise. But the big-picture issues I have outlined point towards what I take to be true main consideration for the acquaintance view. To wit, that it is difficult to justify the view that our relation with the direct items of awareness is intentional or representational – as opposed to just a real relation, even if one difficult to fit into a naturalist world view. This cannot be motivated on phenomenological grounds; and, to motivate it on theoretical

grounds, we would need an account of the nature of intentionality or representation I for one find it difficult to envisage.

I want to conclude by quoting from Caston on how to approach the history of philosophy:

> the history of philosophy performs a valuable service when it examines the systematic connections between positions not causal ones. It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish genuine causal influences. But even if one could, they could never be as interesting as the limits and possibilities of the systematic concerns themselves. (Caston 2002, 804)

I hope I have at least made clear the extent to which Caston's excellent article meets the standard he sets for himself here.

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