e-ISSN 2723-9640

JoLMA
Vol. 5 — Special issue — October 2024

The Grammar of the Ordinary

Valérie Aucouturier
UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles, Belgium

Abstract In this paper I explore what it means to take ordinary language as the raw material of philosophy. To do so, I contrast what I call 'grammar' or the grammatical approach, which is characteristic of L. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and 'ordinary language philosophy' (OLP) as J.L. Austin understood it. I show that, while 'standard' OLP tends to focus on 'historical situations' understood as virtually plausible stagings of our actual uses of concepts, and thus contrasts 'normal' and 'parasitic' uses of language; the grammarian focuses on the logical possibilities of language through the invention of fictitious language-games. The latter thus extends the 'ordinary' up to the abnormal and the extraordinary and rather contrasts it with mere apparent uses that are no uses of language at all.

Keywords Wittgenstein. Austin. Grammar. Ordinary Language. Ordinary Language Philosophy. Use.

Edizioni Ca'Foscari

Submitted 2024-02-12
Published 2024-10-14

Open access

Citation Aucouturier, Valérie (2024). "The Grammar of the Ordinary". *JoLMA*, 5, Special issue 23-36.

DOI 10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2024/03/002

1 Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy

The author of the *Philosophical Investigations* is nowadays commonly presented as an 'ordinary language philosopher'. 'Ordinary language philosophy' (from now on OLP) was, and still sometimes is, a rather pejorative label used by its enemies (Warnock 1998) and was meant to designate a philosophical trend that reached its peak, in the 1930's-1960's, mostly at Oxford University, but also in Cambridge, where Wittgenstein held a chair. Famous figures representing this trend were, for instance, J.L. Austin, G.E.M Anscombe, G. Ryle, N. Malcolm, P.F. Strawson, etc. and are so numerous nowadays that they cannot all be mentioned: A. Baz, S. Cavell, C. Diamond, J. Floyd, S. Laugier, C. Travis, etc. Amongst these people, Avner Baz (2012) is an important explicit advocate of OLP against its critics.

However, as Warnock (1998) and others (Mac Cumhaill, Wiseman 2022, 168-9) rightly noted, although ordinary language philosophers from Oxford (such as Ryle and Austin) were largely influenced by Wittgenstein's ideas, Wittgenstein himself and the Wittgensteinians (among which Elizabeth Anscombe) claimed to be doing something different from OLP:

> Among 'Oxford philosophers' [Wittgenstein] was, well before the publication of *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953, the most esteemed and influential of contemporaries; on the other hand he lived and worked, somewhat reclusively, in Cambridge rather than Oxford, and also (less trivially) himself regarded Oxford as 'a philosophical desert', the meagre fruits of which were to him utterly distasteful. […] Thus it came about that, while Wittgenstein was always conspicuous among those arraigned as 'ordinary language philosophers', he himself would furiously have disclaimed any kinship with the other targets of that critical fire. (Warnock 1998)

It is indisputable that, in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein himself extensively refers to the "ordinary" (e.g. PI, I, §§ 60, 93, 98, 132, 156, 412, 600), "ordinary language" (e.g. PI, I, §§ 19, 243, 402, 436, 494), "ordinary sense" (PI, I, §§ 39, 256, 344, 418, 420, 536, 615), and so on. But it is also indisputable that there were and still are various ways of inheriting Wittgenstein and that these ways have an important philosophical relevance. This is somehow illustrated in the way Elizabeth Anscombe deals with the issue of sensation (Anscombe 1981a, 11-14) and defends Wittgensteinian "grammar" against "ordinary language philosophy" illustrated by the work of J.L. Austin (1964). In this paper, I explore some of the philosophical differences that characterise this Oxbridge dispute over what it means to start doing philosophy within ordinary language. What does it mean to take 'ordinary language' as a kind of authority to address or consider philosophical issues?

2 Clean Tools

To understand the difference between the grammarian and the ordinary language philosopher, let us begin with a quote by Austin on ordinary language as a starting point. The "method" of OLP, Austin writes, considers that to "proceed from 'ordinary language'" is to "examin[e] *what we should say when*, and so why and what we should mean by it" (Austin 1979a, 181). Namely, it consists in *imagining* situations (185) and in stating "what words we should use in what situations" (182). I will turn later to the issue of "imagining situations". But first, let us remind a famous quote where Austin advocates why ordinary language should be the "first word":

> First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can relook at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon – the most favoured alternative method. (Austin 1979a, 181-2)

According to this passage, there are three aspects of ordinary language which legitimate the method of OLP. First, we, as competent speakers, ought to be clear about what we mean by the words we use; and we must fight the philosophical tendency to let ourselves fall into the traps of language, for instance by an "artificially induced linguistic uprooting" (Bouveresse 1971, 41). This echoes Wittgenstein: "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (PI, I, § 123). Being lost in language is the first disease of philosophy. This is one of the reasons why philosophy requires conceptual clarification. The first claim suggests that, as competent speakers, we should know and be able to recognise proper uses from uses that are not just improper but that should be revealed as being no uses at all. This recognition, Austin argues, will shed light on "the realities we use the words to talk about" (Austin 1979a, 182).

The second claim, that "words are not facts or things", points to the need to reconsider the way, in philosophy, we tend to articulate language and the world. It echoes Wittgenstein's remarks about the need to fight our tendency to conflate the words with the things they stand for (PI, I, § 38). OLP is needed to distinguish conceptual issues from empirical issues. Actually, later on in his paper on excuses, Austin points to what he calls "the myth of the verb" and reminds us that doings and actions are not ready-made entities that we simply label (Austin 1979a, 178).

Third, and, as we shall see most importantly, this is precisely because words are not facts or things that they can evolve in time, new uses appear, and old uses disappear. We will address this aspect below.

Anyone familiar with Wittgenstein's 'second' philosophy will admit the close kinship between Austin's and Wittgenstein's approaches to philosophy. But, as Wittgenstein himself recommends, we should draw our attention toward the small yet somewhat crucial differences between them. These differences will reveal crucial because of their consequences regarding the scope of OLP (understood here in the broad sense, as a generic term for both Wittgensteinians, Austinians and others in the same trend of philosophy).

3 Actual and Fictitious Uses

Language is the starting point of philosophy. It is the starting point for disentangling our philosophical perplexities, "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI, I, § 309) or "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday usage" (PI, I, § 116). It is the starting point to explore how uses of language, language games exhibit the workings of our ordinary practices, actions and categorisations. Over this matter, there seems to be an agreement between (let us call them respectively) the 'grammarian' and the 'ordinary language philosopher'. The purpose of philosophy is not to propose a theory of language (Anscombe 2011), but to *describe* our uses of language in order to avoid its traps. Description of meaning rather than explanation is the method: "We must do away with all explanation, and *description* alone must take its place" (PI, I, § 109).

But if ordinary language is the object of description, we ought to be clear about what this object is. Now, the first and most obvious discordance between the grammarian and the ordinary language philosopher seems to rest on their understanding of language use as a raw material for philosophy. In the above-quoted passage, Austin explicitly refers to "our common stock of words" as the philosopher's raw material. And he suggests, against the 'armchair philosopher' that this raw material is somewhat 'empirical' or at least the result of some historical evolution of language. Whether or not this is faithful to Austin's philosophy as a whole, in this passage, he seems to be considering that OLP takes meanings and uses as some special sort of historical data, which have been fixed and will evolve in history.

By contrast, the 'grammarian' will rather consider that, although uses are part of our "natural history" (PI, I, § 25, 415), although remarks on language uses "are really remarks on the natural history of human beings" (PI, I, § 415), grammar is transhistorical and transcultural. Grammar does not reflect a state of language at some time and place, it is rather a mean of comparison (PI, I, § 130) between uses. Grammar does not account for the historicity of language, or for the state of logic and language at a time. Grammar is meant to grasp some aspects of language uses that bound meaning and allow us to point and grasp transhistorical and transcultural differences between uses and language games.

The *Philosophical Investigations* "are anything but a collection of meticulous, detailed observations on how our language actually works" (Bouveresse 1971, 31). This is the reason why it allows for the possibility to invent and grasp new or fictitious uses.

> Whenever we make up "ideal languages" it is not in order to replace our ordinary language by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone's mind by thinking that he has got hold of the exact use of a common word. That is also why our method is not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but rather deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd appearance. (BB, 28)

> We are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history – since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. (PI, II, xii)

Grammar is what gets revealed, by contrast, when we imagine new or limit language games, rather than merely explore "what we should say when" in actual, nevertheless imagined, contexts. In other words, grammar concerns as much old, foreign and non-existing uses of language, as actual uses, provided we can make sense of these uses, i.e. imagine at least a situation or a language game in which they would make sense. Grammar exhibits *logical possibilities* of meaning.

> Although at no point does he wish to deny the influence of linguistic change on the birth and evolution of the philosophical problematic, [Wittgenstein] clearly believes that philosophy, as a therapy, is possible and necessary independently of any history of our language and our forms of life, because what threatens us most seriously, from a philosophical point of view, is not the oblivion of this history, of the history of our linguistic usage, but the oblivion of *current*, familiar usage. (Bouveresse 1971, 58)

This abstraction of grammar from (even present) history of language marks a difference with Austin's interest for realistic (and even real) examples. Our ability to circulate between language games (and possibly between languages) and to make sense of far-reaching conceptual systems is reflected in grammar.

4 Countless Uses?

The job of OLP, according to Austin, is somehow more modest. It is to describe (some uses among) a finite, however numerous, number of admitted uses:

> I think we should not despair too easily and talk, as people are apt to do, about the infinite uses of language. Philosophers will do this when they have listed as many, let us say, as seventeen; but even if there were something like ten thousand uses of language, surely we could list them all in time. (Austin 1979b, 234)

These considerations may suggest one way of reading the modality of "should" in Austin's "what we should say when" (Austin 1979a, 181) – rather than e.g. 'what we *could* say when' – as a rather strong philosophical stance toward the method of OLP: actual possible uses supposedly draw the bounds of sense. There is a normative aspect in this "should" that would bound the domain of what we can do with words.

On the contrary the grammarian allows for indefinitely many uses, which can be the expression of the possibility of indefinitely many forms of life, whether actual or fictional, to the extent that "to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" (PI, I, § 19):

> There are *countless* kinds; countless different kinds of use of all the things we call "signs", "words", "sentences". And this diversity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (PI, I, § 23)

The "diversity of the tools of language" is *infinite* for Wittgenstein. Philosophy's job is not to make an inventory of existing uses. Philosophy ought to work with this diversity, to create and explore language games until it bumps against the limits of language (PI, I, § 119).

5 Ordinary as Opposed to What?

Consequently, there appears to be a difference regarding the ways the grammarian and the ordinary language philosopher understand the idea that "ordinary language is all right" (BB, 28) as it stands and can therefore work as a starting point or be the "first word" (Austin 1979a, 185) to provide an understanding of meaning and of human interests and practices. This difference can be exhibited by asking: what is the 'ordinary' (use) both Wittgenstein and Austin appeal to and as opposed to what (to what 'standard' or 'norm') is it 'ordinary'? As opposed to 'extra-ordinary'? 'Abnormal'? 'Non-standard'? 'Stretched uses'?

Austin does not invite philosophers to create or imagine new language games or unnatural situations. He seems rather suspicious about this. However, he invites philosophers to imagine *actual* (realistic) situations where our words are or would be at play and confront these 'normal' and 'ordinary' situations to the misuses of philosophy which are often symptomatic of the philosopher's tendency to focus on abnormal cases and take them as central to the understanding of a concept. This is what happens, for instance, when *sense-data* philosophers (see Ayer 1940) jump from the possibility of using 'see' in an abnormal situation, say of illusion, to the idea that what we do directly perceive in any case is not what is there to be seen but mere *sense-data* (Austin 1964). From this perspective, Austin enquires central, 'normal', 'ordinary uses' of words as opposed to 'parasitic uses' (Austin 1962, 104) or 'stretched uses' (Austin 1964, 15, 91).

The grammatical philosopher, on the other hand, takes any use as a use in its own right, provided "language has not gone on holidays" (PI, § 38), i.e. provided it is actually a determined use we can account for. For Wittgenstein, language is, first of all, a logical space where we can explore and invent language uses. For Austin, language is a finite set of uses that evolves through history and circumstances.

This difference sheds light on the reason why Austin prefers the phrase "linguistic phenomenology" rather than "analysis of language" (Austin 1979a, 182) to characterise his own method. Austin takes ordinary language as some special sort of data for philosophers to investigate the possibilities of meaning. This is the reason why he considers OLP not to be another kind of armchair philosophy but a genuine "field work". Ordinary language, Austin says, is "a good site for *field work* in philosophy" (183). The ordinary language philosopher does not invent new concepts that he thinks would best fit reality without even going outside and looking at the world. The ordinary language philosopher takes a certain state of language as its raw matter and enquires into its uses, tries to disentangle them, thus shedding light on reality. Therefore, Austin does not hesitate to start his enquiry with the dictionary (186-7). According to Austin's conception of OLP, the current state of language is indeed a result of its evolution through history. Language is good as it stands because it rests on "the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men" (185).

Of course, to a great extent the grammarian and the ordinary language philosopher are very close. They agree that philosophy should abandon the quest for essences "and get down to the dainty and the dumpy" (183), and "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use", "in the language where it is at home" (PI, I, § 116), "back to the rough ground" (PI, I, § 107). But for the one the ordinary is embodied in a "historical situation", whereas for the other the ordinary goes beyond historicity to characterise a certain 'form of life'.

If one proceeds with the assumption that some substantial difference can be identified between Wittgenstein and Austin in their understanding of the ordinary, one can conclude from this section that, from Austin's perspective, the 'ordinary' is akin to 'normal uses' and their instantiation in virtually possible situations. Whereas the 'ordinary', from Wittgenstein's perspective, can take various aspects. It can amount to the description of rather familiar and central uses of language. But extended or marginal uses are no less part of the grammar (meaning) of our concepts. This is the reason why, according to Wittgenstein, we can imagine improbable or 'abnormal' or 'extraordinary' situations *within* grammar. The default of philosophy, when it bumps its head against the limits of language, is not to invent eccentric uses of language, but to lose track of uses tout court and get lost in its own language.

6 Historical Situations and Natural History

Now that I have sketched these differences, I would like to briefly explore their consequences for my initial question concerning the relevance and scope of ordinary language philosophy (in the broad sense).

Whereas OLP excludes some uses of language, for Wittgenstein any possible use (even one that has never been actualised or that instantiate an alternative 'natural history') is a use, whether it is an actual, past or invented use, as long as we can make sense of it, i.e. as long as we can imagine a situation (even an unlikely situation) where it would make sense.

On the other hand, for Austin, non-actual or unlikely situations have limited authority in OLP. Austin is confident that, at least to some extent, we would say similar things in similar *historical* situations (i.e. whether actual or not but which instantiate some existing use of a phrase), granted that the situation has been described fully enough:

> The more we imagine the situation in detail, with a background of story […] the less we find we disagree about what we should say. (Austin 1979a, 184)

And disagreement over 'what we should say when' does not constitute a counterexample but a further opportunity to clarify our uses:

> A disagreement as to what we should say is not to be shied off, but to be pounced upon: for the explanation of it can hardly fail to be illuminating. (Austin 1979a, 184)

We may sum up this difference by saying that the starting point of OLP according to Austin are actual (or virtually actual) uses of language, considered in a historical situation, whereas for Wittgenstein it is the "form of life", understood as the point wherefrom a logical space is shaped. This logical space is bounded by local language games. To understand a use of language, we need to picture the world or reality where this use makes sense. This is obvious in the following remark:

> I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different, people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). Rather: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him. (PI, II, xii, § 366)

Elizabeth Anscombe (1981b) has commented extensively on this quote in her paper on linguistic idealism. There is a parallel mistake against which both Austin and Wittgenstein are fighting. The mistake consists in thinking that we are bound to chose between saying that either words are (or ought to tend to be) faithful representations of reality, or reality is shaped by words (which would somehow magically create what they are meant to represent). But words are neither things we pick up or discover in our environment, nor are they arbitrary productions of our imagination.

> This dubious companionship between an ethereal extra-linguistic reality, presumed to be stable, and an inconstant linguistic associate, which has its own life and avatars, is in a sense responsible for all philosophical perplexities. (Bouveresse 1971, 58)

Reality exercises empirical constraints on language, but still concepts are made by us for our practical purposes. Of course, we could claim that describing colours properly would imply to provide an infinite range of words for shades of colours (or even an infinite range of words for shades of red, of blue, etc.), until we reach a virtually unreachable adequate description of the spectrum of colours. But such a fantasy proves to be forgetful of the fact that our descriptions have contextual and practical purposes: sometimes we need to distinguish some varieties of red, sometimes 'red' is enough. "We can introduce as many new distinctions as we like, but we cannot set ourselves the goal of introducing them *all*" (Bouveresse 1971, 59). That "essence is expressed in grammar" (PI, § 371) only means that "grammar imposes certain forms of description on us, but we cannot, despite our best efforts, exhibit any 'reality' that would justify them and make all others impossible" (Bouveresse 1971, 48).

Austin and Wittgenstein seem to have distinct understandings of the role of "historical situations" (Austin 1979a, 186) and "natural history" (PI, I, § 25): a "historical situation" being rather a virtually actual situation given the state of our present uses of language and "natural history" being rather an anthropological variable that helps us realise the contingent articulation between our form(s) of life and our linguistic practices. However, both understandings converge toward some sort of what Cora Diamond calls a "realistic spirit" (Diamond 1995), i.e. the idea that the contingency of ordinary uses has nothing to do with plain arbitrariness, but is rather constrained by our form(s) of life and our environment.

7 Practices

This distinction between historical situations and imagined situations or logical spaces, between actual uses and forms of life, reveals several difficulties OLP (in the broad sense) may face.

First, a difficulty with Austin's insistence on 'normal' versus 'parasitic' uses within some actual state of language, is that it may lead to undermine or hierarchise the variety of uses instead of enlightening their intertwinements (Anscombe 1981a). Is not there a kind of arbitrariness, in our philosophical remarks, at least to the extent that they are necessarily localised in history and even in a certain social class and language register?

On the other hand, if we consider the a-historical perspective of the grammarian, we may wonder whether she will not fall in the trap that OLP is made to avoid, namely, forget where it speaks from and essentialise grammar and raise philosophical remarks to a transcendental level. In other words, the risk is to fall down the parallel mistake, which would be to overestimate the scope of what we can say in philosophy. Too much localisation of our starting point threatens to lead to triviality, whereas too few localisations of our starting point threatens to lead to exaggerated generality.

I do not think these difficulties are overwhelming or insurmountable, as many advocates of OLP have shown.[1] Although there is no room here to do them justice, let me conclude by suggesting that the key to these difficulties is to be found in a philosophy of action (Aucouturier, forthcoming): something both Wittgenstein and Austin clearly saw.

Indeed, Austin and Wittgenstein both agree that considering ordinary language to be "the first word" soon leads to question the traditional view of language as mainly aiming at truly representing states of affairs. One of the great ideas they have in common is the idea that philosophers should focus more on the various things we *do* with words, the various functions words can have, rather than being obsessed with the question of truth.

> Certainly […] ordinary language is *not* the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember it is the *first* word. [footnote: And forget, for once and for a while, that other curious question 'Is it true?' May we?] (Austin 1979a, 185)

If the main function of language is not to adequately represent the world, but rather to serve our indefinitely various practical purposes in given circumstances, we should not think of the evolutions of language as a succession of attempts to best represent states of affairs.

For Austin, as well as Wittgenstein, language serve our interests and must be understood in relation to what interests us. "Concepts are the expression of our interest and direct our interest" (PI, I, § 570). Therefore, the evolution of language can be understood on the ground of the evolution of practical human interests in accordance with a given situation. If ordinary language is indeed the 'first word', Austin reminds us, it certainly is not the last word:

> If a distinction works well for practical purposes in ordinary life […], then there is sure to be something in it, it will not mark nothing: yet this is likely enough to be not the best way of arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual than the ordinary. (Austin 1979a, 185)

Indeed, the set of situations we may imagine is not given or closed. For Austin, being confronted to new situations and/or interests, for Wittgenstein, imagining radically new, yet unimagined situations, opens and extends the logical space. Now the mere difference seems to be that, for Austin, it is when confronted to an unheard-of situation

1 See e.g. Diamond 1995; Cavell 2000; Baz 2012; Laugier 2013.

that language – understood as some sort of historical data – gets modified; for Wittgenstein, we can still imagine unheard-of situations and new language game. This does not entail these new language game will become actual ones. This just reveals the current workings of language. Historical situations may call for the need of new language games, but philosophy itself is not primarily interested in these language games, simply in what makes them logically possible (and meaningful).

So, although Austin focuses on the actuality of language-uses when Wittgenstein insists on the potentialities of language to draw the bounds of sense from within ordinary language, both philosophers agree on the necessity of thinking language in continuity with what we *do*. Language is part of our practices, and this is the reason why philosophy needs to focus on what we do with word.

This does not call for a theory of language (Anscombe 2011), but for a special attention to the question: how did we come to 'learn' the use of this word or concept? What sort of form of life do we need to share in order to be able to use a word or phrase – i.e. with a shared meaning? And the answer is not to be found in the objectivity of a phenomenal world, but in the regularity of what we do with words in a given context and environment.

References

Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981a). "The Intentionality of Sensation. A Grammatical Feature". Anscombe, G.E.M., *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 3-20.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981b). "The Question of Linguistic Idealism". Anscombe, G.E.M., *From Parmenide to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 112-33.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (2011). "A Theory of Language". Geach, M.; Gormally, L. (eds), *From Plato to Wittgenstein*. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 193-203.
Aucouturier, V. (forthcoming). "Wittgenstein, Meaning and Action". Cahill, K.M. (ed.), *Wittgenstein on Practice: Back to the Rough Ground*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Austin, J.L. (1962). *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Austin, J.L. (1964). *Sense and Sensibilia*. Edited by G.J. Warnock. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Austin, J.L. (1979a). "A Plea for Excuses". Austin, J.L., *Philosophical Papers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175-204.
Austin, J.L. (1979b). "Performative Utterances". Austin, J.L., *Philosophical Papers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175-204.
Ayer, A.J. (1940). *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*. New York: Macmillan.
Baz, A. (2012). *When Words Are Called For.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bouveresse, J. (1971). "Langage ordinaire et philosophie". *Langages*, 6(21), 35-70. Numéro thématique *Philosophie du langage*.
Cavell, S. (2000). *Must We Mean What We Say?* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Diamond, C. (1995). *The Realistic Spirit. Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Flew, A. (1954). "Philosophy and Language". *Philosophical Quarterly*, IV, 21-36.
Gellner, E.A. (1959). *Words and Things: A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology*. London: Gollancz.
Laugier, S. (2013). *Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy*. Transl. by D. Ginsburg. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Mac Cumhaill, C.; Wiseman, R. (2022). *Metaphysical Animals. How Four Women Brought Philosophy Back to Life*. London: Penguin.
Ryle, G. (1964). "Ordinary Language". Chappell, V.C. (ed.), *Ordinary Language*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 24-40.
Travis, C. (2001). *The Uses of Sense. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Warnock, G. (1998). s.v. "Ordinary Language Philosophy, School of". *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/ordinary-language-philosophy-school-of/v-1.
Wittgenstein, L. (1965). *The Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford: Blackwell. [BB]
Wittgenstein, L. (2009). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. [PI]
Xenakis, J. (1959). "Ordinary Language Philosophy: Language, Logic and Philosophy". *Synthese*, 11(3), 294-306.

e-ISSN 2723-9640