Theodicy and Reason
Logic, Metaphysics, and Theology in Leibniz's *Essais de Théodicée* (1710)
edited by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mattia Geretto, and Luigi Perissinotto

Creaturely Action in Leibniz's *Theodicy*

Francesco Piro
(Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italia)

Abstract Paragraphs 381-404 of *Theodicy* contain one of the most systematic discussions of the action of creatures ever provided by Leibniz. Although they expressly reject Bayle's view that creatures are not truly efficient causes of their states, they also have a wider target, namely the 'new Cartesian' tenets such as the continuous creation doctrine. A close scrutiny of these paragraphs casts new light on two main issues in Leibniz's defence of the active power of creatures: first, the relation between the substances and their accidents; second, the consistency of Leibniz's view with the traditional theological doctrine of God's concurrence. Leibniz's solution of these difficulties is philosophically interesting, for it offers both a very refined version of a traditional 'endurantist' view on individual persistence and a robust metaphysics of dispositions and dispositional properties. This metaphysics is also the ground of Leibniz's final doctrine of the relations Nature/Miracle and Nature/Grace.

Keywords Occasionalism. Philosophy of Action. Continuous Creation.

1 Polemizing with Bayle and the 'new Cartesians'

The 'action of the creatures' (from now on: CA) is a fundamental issue of Leibniz's *Theodicy*. Leibniz's basic insights on this topic can be already found in the First Part of the work. Here, the doctrine that creatures can perform their own acts without God's direct co-operation is already rejected (§ 27), as well as the doctrine that God is the only actor (§ 32), and a first definition of creaturely actions is sketched (§ 32).[1] These same topics, however, are widely re-discussed in the Third Part of the *Theodicy*,

1 Cf. *Théodicée*, § 32: «L'*action de la creature* est une modification de la substance qui en coule naturellement, et qui renferme une variation non seulement dans les perfections que Dieu a communiqué à la creature, mais encore dans les limitations qu'elle y apporte d'elle même […]» (GP VI, p. 121).

Philosophica 2
DOI 10.14277/6969-083-9/PHIL-2-4
ISBN [ebook] 978-88-6969-083-9 | ISBN [print] 978-88-6969-084-6 |

through a polemical confrontation with Pierre Bayle's views which occupies more than twenty paragraphs (§ 381-404). One could also say that this discussion is the real conclusion of the work, since what follows – the summary of Laurent Valla's dialogue on free will and its prosecution by Leibniz through the fable with the Palace of the Possible Worlds – can be better seen as its recapitulation.

The Third Part's resumption of the CA issue does not depend exclusively on Leibniz's choice of dedicating a large part of his book to an analytic confutation of Bayle's arguments. In fact, in the context of paragraphs 381-403, Bayle is representative of a wider circulating view, since he claims – as other 'modern authors' had done (§ 381) – that creatures have no causal power and that God is the only real actor. Now, even if such a view (we will call it 'Causal Monism') had been shared by several theologians and philosophers – as Leibniz knows[2] – it is evident that Bayle's 'modern authors' are the 'new Cartesians', i. e. Malebranche and the other upholders of what we usually call 'Occasionalism'.

In relation to those authors, Bayle plays a dual role. He starts from premises which the 'new Cartesians' share, but he draws from them radical and paradoxical conclusions, which even those authors rejected. For instance, he hypothesizes a philosopher who, starting from the 'new Cartesian' doctrines, argues that even our will's acts must depend completely on God as the physical states of affairs do – a conclusion that Malebranche and the other 'new Cartesians' avoided drawing (cf. *Théodicée*, § 399, GP VI, p. 353). This allows Leibniz to occupy a rather comfortable position. He simply rejects Bayle's views, never polemizing directly with Bayle's 'authors'. He makes even room for a paragraph dedicated to praising a passage by Malebranche on creation, with the evident intention of attenuating the possible polemical impact of the previous paragraphs (§ 398). At the same time, the whole discussion is built up to show that Causal Monism leads to intolerable paradoxes, so that one has to admit those views on substances, substantial forms, causal powers, which distinguish Leibniz's metaphysics from the Occasionalists'.

I will dedicate this paper to resume Leibniz's discussion with Bayle in *Theodicy* (§ 381-404), by comparing his replies with the views exposed elsewhere in the book and in his other works. This will allow an interpretation of some hard issues of Leibniz's metaphysics of action. The main points of the discussion are the following:

2 So far as I know, the classical Scholastic upholders of Causal Monism, namely Pierre d'Ailly and Gabriel Biel, are never mentioned by Leibniz. His favourite pre-Occasionalist source of Causal Monism is the Hermetic tradition and, more particularly, Robert Fludd's 'Mosaic Philosophy' (cf. GP IV, p. 509; GP III, p. 532; GP III, p. 581; GP VII, p. 340). This *reductio ad Fluddum* of the Occasionalists is usually joined with the claim that Causal Monism is logically equivalent to Spinoza's Substance Monism.

1. As good scholars usually do, Leibniz starts from a point of agreement between him and Bayle (i.e. and the Occasionalists). As they did, Leibniz rejects the claim that, after the Creation, all that God does (putting miracles aside) is to 'preserve' the created individuals and to let them perform their acts by their own forces. This doctrine had been proposed by Durand de Saint-Pourçain and Pierre Aureoli in the fourteenth Century, with the intention of lessening God's causal involvement in human sins, and still had several upholders at Leibniz's times.[3] Leibniz's objection is that, since the relation existing between a total cause and its immediate effect never changes, it is impossible that creatures become in time more independent from God (§ 385). Therefore, preserving the creatures' existence and action is causally equivalent to creating them anew, as the traditional scholastic doctrine of the 'continued creation' (hereafter CC) had already established.
2. Thereafter, Leibniz begins to confront the consequences that Bayle draws from CC, consequences which would establish the incompatibility between CC and CA. From Bayle's point of view, since creatures cannot act before existing, they could act only 'after' their creation (§ 386). But, since the CC doctrine entails that creation never ceases – Bayle argues – creatures must always remain mere passive instruments of God (§ 387). Leibniz rejects this argument by introducing a distinction between *temporal* and *logical* priority (priority *in ordine rationis*). Since God's acts follow a logical scheme and since *substances* (as individual actors are) must precede their *accidents* (as actions are) in this scheme, the former are produced by God 'before' the latter, even if this happens in a same instant of time (§ 388-391).
3. But Bayle claims also that the created substances can produce none of their accidents. He grounds this claim by considering two alternatives. If there is no 'real distinction' between a substance and its own accidents – a view widely shared among the 'new Cartesians' – then no accident can be produced by a substance, because a substance cannot 'produce' something which is a part of its own being (§ 392). Alternatively, admitting a 'real distinction' between the substances and their accidents, accidents would be quite different things from their substances. Therefore, substances would have to 'create' them, a job which a finite substance cannot do (§ 393). Leibniz replies that there is a 'real distinction' between substances

3 Among the contemporary followers of Durand and Aureoli, Leibniz cites the capuchin Louis Béreur de Dole, the German philosopher Nicholas Taurellus, the French philosopher François Bernier and the Calvinist theologian David Derodon (cf. *Théodicée*, § 27, § 381, § 382). On his relations with these neo-Durandian authors, see Piro 2011a.

and their accidents (§ 391, § 393), but this doesn't mean that substances have to 'create' their accidents, since accidents are only 'changes of the limits' inhering to their substances (§ 394-5). Another argument by Bayle gives Leibniz the occasion of resuming his doctrine of substantial forms, which helps him to clear up the whole issue (§ 396-397). After quoting favourably Malebranche (§ 398) and examining also Bayle's doubts on free will (§ 399), Leibniz concludes that «simple substances are the true immediate cause of all their internal actions and passions […] They have any others if not which they produce» (§ 400).

4. Finally, Bayle observes that men are unable to know the causes of their psychological inner states – both 'ideas' and 'volitions' – and are therefore unable to rule them (§ 401-402). Leibniz replies that there are not only conscious actions, but also actions led by an unconscious program, as animals' instinctual behaviours show (§ 403). However, he also insists that it is possible for a human being to acquire control of her/his own will, at least in the long run and through indirect ways (§ 404).

Point 4 shows how deep the differences are between the notion of 'action' as conceived by a Cartesian author as Bayle and as conceived by Leibniz. From Bayle's point of view, action requires the actor's awareness and knowledge. On the contrary, Leibniz sees action as a general property of all his 'individual substances' or 'monads', including those which are not self-conscious. However, this is a point of minor metaphysical importance with regard to those touched in the former paragraphs. Therefore, I will only comment on points 1, 2 and 3.

2 The Compatibility Between Continued Creation and Creaturely Action (points 1 and 2)

As we have seen, Leibniz leaves no room for a distinction between 'creation' and 'conservation' as kinds of divine actions. Does this conclusion involve that God literally 'creates' the individual creatures at each instant, 'reproducing' them through time?

Some scholars suggest that words such as 'reproduction' or 'new creation' should be taken in a metaphorical sense, since a literal interpretation of them would seem inconsistent with Leibniz's usual anti-Occasionalist claims (cf. Jalabert 1947, pp. 167-171). And indeed, in the *Theodicy*, Leibniz seems to accept this interpretation of CC just for the sake of the argument (see § 388: «Let us assume that the creature is produced anew at each instant […]»). Nevertheless, there are many other passages representing our world as a succession of states of affairs which are *separately*

created by God.[4] Therefore, a 'strong' reading of CC must have at least some elements of truth on its side.

I would suggest that this element of truth is the fact that different temporal states may be only *contingently* connected. It is not metaphysically necessary that the temporal state of affairs *b* follows the temporal state of affairs *a* and, therefore, one can claim that the existence of *b* is the effect of a *particular* act of will by God. Of course, from Leibniz's point of view, even this particular act of will was already included in God's eternal choice of letting exist our world, a choice which extends to all the facts which were and will be instantiated. But since such choice is grounded on God's intellect and this intellect necessitates only 'morally' God's will, *not-b* remains metaphysically possible. So to say, the succession of states of affairs in our world can be seen as the execution of a fully planned but complex performance. Every phase of the performance follows the previous ones according to a rule, but the execution of a single phase depends on the actor's actual will of continuing the whole performance.

Now, Leibniz's adherence to such a strong version of CC seems to generate just the two main difficulties highlighted by Bayle. On one hand, it becomes hard to establish the dependence of actions on their agents, if everything is produced by God. Moreover, it becomes hard also to trace a real difference between substances and their accidents, if it is not literally true that the former are permanent and the latter change. How could Leibniz reject these consequences starting from his interpretation of CC?

First of all, one should note that it is hard to establish whether, from Leibniz's point of view, these difficulties are two different issues or simply one. Leibniz's 'individual substances' or 'monads' have no other accidents (or 'modifications', as Leibniz usually says) than their own 'perceptions' and 'appetites'. On the other hand, perceptions and appetites are even the only 'operations' performed by them, since Leibniz's metaphysics forbids any external action by an individual substance on another one. Therefore, one can easily conclude that, as Leibniz himself claims, 'substantiality' and 'activity' are to be seen as quite *reciprocal* metaphysical properties, so that one cannot have the former without having the latter and vice versa (*De ipsa natura, sive de vi insita actionibusque Creaturarum*, 1698, § 9, GP IV, p. 509). If substances are permanent (in some sense), it is just because they are able to rule their own modifications (in some way).

However, I would suggest prudence here, since there are cases in which the equivalence between substantiality and activity fails. Such a case is

4 See Leibniz's letter to Princess Sophie 1705: «[…] la multitude des états momentanés est l'amas d'une infinité d'éclats de la Divinité, dont chacun à chaque instant est une création ou reproduction des toutes choses» (GP VII, p. 564); and *Monadologie*, § 47: «[...] les monades créés ou derivatives sont des productions et naissent, pour ainsi dire, par des Fulgurations continuelles de la Divinité de moment à moment» (GP VI, p. 614) .

that of the 'extraordinary aids' (*concours extraordinaires*) given by God to some human beings who did not deserve them (St. Paul being the typical example of this possibility). Now, let us suppose that an individual substance *S* receives an extraordinary aid by God. This aid (through the resulting *S*'s accidents) must be contained in *S*'s complete concept, otherwise *S* could not be a substance. But, on the other side, this does not mean that such *S*'s accidents flow from *S*'s 'nature' or 'power' and, therefore, it would be hard to classify them as 'actions' performed by *S*.[5] Therefore, even if this case is a rather problematical one – as we will see later – it suggests that 'substantiality' and 'activity' are not *necessarily* equivalent even if they are surely equivalent in the bounds of the 'Kingdom of Nature'.

This can help us understand why Leibniz, in his first reply to Bayle (§ 388), grounds his attempted accommodation between CC and CA on *two* different conditions. A first condition is that (a) the accidents of a substance must always express the basic properties of their substance.[6] This would seem already enough in order to establish what Leibniz needs, that is, that substances come before their accidents '*in ordine rationis*' and that the latter cannot be instantiated without re-instantiating the former (*Théodicée*, § 388-389, GP VI, p. 346).[7] What Leibniz claims is that God never instantiates a bare state of affairs *m*, but always states of affairs including a substance *S* and an accident *m* (I will call such states of affairs: *S*/*m*). Of course, more complex states of affairs will need a multitude of substances S_1, S_2, S_3..., and of modifications m_1, m_2, m_3... (and all the created substances and the related accidents if we consider the world's state at a given time *t*).

But there is another condition introduced by Leibniz, namely: (b) that God instantiates the state of affairs *S*/*m* just because the former state of *S* (*S*/*l*) «demanded» that God create *S*/*m*. As Leibniz writes, «God produces the creature in conformity with the exigency of the preceding instants, according to the laws of his wisdom».[8] Reserving the enigmatic concept of 'exigency' for a later discussion, this condition seems to be more helpful for establishing what kinds of accidents can also be actions. In the case of some 'supernatural aid', such a condition could not be satisfied, since the instantiation of *S*/*m* would include some discontinuities with regard to *S*/*l*.

5 This case is widely discussed in Leibniz's *Discourse of Metaphysics*, 1686, § 16 (A VI, 4, p. 1555).

6 «[...] la creature prise en elle même, avec sa nature et ses proprietés necessaires, est anterieure à ses affections accidentelles et à ses actions» (*Théodicée*, § 388, GP VI, p. 346) .

7 'Natural priority' is a typical Aristotelian and Scholastic notion which Leibniz often discusses in his logical papers, for instance *Quid sit prius natura*, 1679 (A VI, 4, p. 180).

8 *Théodicée*, § 388: «[...] Dieu produit la creature conformement à l'exigence des instans precedens, suivant les loix de sa sagesse» (GP VI, p. 346). I adopt the English translation by E.M. Huggard now available at: `http:\\www.gutenberg.org` (2016-05-29).

What Leibniz is proposing here is what we could call a 'syntactic' criterion of action, a concept which sums up his views on substances' immanent causality: *l*, *m*, *n*, are actions performed by *S*, if and only if they can be seen as phases or moments of a logically consistent development which we could call *SA* («substance's state of activity»).[9] This criterion excludes the possibility of purely episodic actions.

Leibniz's conclusion is clear. Adopting the syntactic view of action, there is no inconsistency between CC and CA. It is quite possible and even morally necessary that God creates successively *S/l*, *S/m*, *S/n*, letting *S* always preserve its *SA* state. On the other side, *SA*'s inner consistency is a formal property which cannot empower *l* to produce *m* or *m* to produce *n*, without God's concurrence.

This way of conciliating CC and CA eliminates not only the distinction between creation and conservation (against Durand and Aureoli), but also the distinction between creation, conservation and «God's physical concurrence» to His creatures' actions.[10] This economy of God's interventions is evidently an additional advantage, from Leibniz's point of view.[11] Considering what he writes on this topic, one could formulate the relations between these three concepts as follows:

> For each natural (non miraculous) modification *m* of an individual substance *S*, only one intervention by God is required, but this intervention supports all the following accounts: (i) *m* is the effect of the act through which God 'reproduces' the whole substance *S*, instantiating *S/m* after *S/l* (and before *S/n*) [= reproduction]; (ii) *m* is a moment or a phase of *S*'s substantial activity (*SA*) and God instantiates *S/m* in order to preserve *S* in its state *SA* [= conservation]; (iii) *m* is the effect of *S*'s effort of performing *m* after *l* and God only helps *S* to achieve this effort [= concurrence].

9 As we will see, the state of activity of a substance (SA) is due to the presence of a substantial form or entelechy (SF). But Leibniz sometimes introduces the former independently from the latter: «J'accorde en quelque façon le premier point, que Dieu produit continuellement tout ce qui est reel dans les creatures. Mais je tiens qu'en le faisant, il produit aussi continuellement ou conserve en nous cette energie ou activité qui selon moy fait la nature de la substance et la source de ses modifications [...]» (GP IV, p. 588).

10 This is an original view, since Schoolmen usually distinguished God's concurrence by creation and conservation. See for instance, Suarez 1866, disp. XXII, p. 801: «De prima causa et alia ejus actione, quae est cooperatio, seu concursus in causis secundis». This unification of God's interventions has been correctly highlighted by McDonough 2007, even if through an interpretation of Leibniz's doctrine of continued creation perhaps less literal than mine.

11 This is a constant element in Leibniz's philosophical theology: «In hac porro productione rerum continua consistit concursus Dei in creaturis» (A VI, 4, p. 2319); «Dieu, concourant à nos actions ordinairement ne fait que suivre les loix qu'il a establies, c'est à dire il conserve et produit naturellement notre estre» (*Discours de métaphysique*, § 30, A VI, 4, p. 1575).

Let's come now to the difficulties coming from this accommodation CC/CA.

First of all, it is not clear whether and how a) the basic condition that *S*'s accidents must express *S*'s essence and b) the other condition that there must be a consistent succession between the accidents *l*, *m*, *n*..., are related. One can suppose that they must be connected in some way, since the bare presence of a consistent development would not be meaningful for the solution of the CA issue, if the *development itself* would not express something which is intrinsic to *S*'s nature. But this claim cannot be properly grounded neither through the instantiation-relation subsisting between *S*'s basic properties and *S*'s single accidents nor through the 'exigential' relations subsisting between the accidents *l*, *m*, *n* themselves. Something more is needed, as we will see in later paragraphs.

The second and major difficulty arises from the fact that Leibniz's reply seems to modify substantially the conditions posed by Bayle for creatures' action. From Bayle's point of view, action has an *existential* dependence on its agent. The agent must exist *before* he acts, since causation implies that the existence of the effect depends on the existence of the cause. According to Leibniz, *S/m* depends on *S/l*, but *S/l* cannot exist anymore at the appearance of *S/m*. Therefore, there can be no existential dependence here and – as suggested by a recent scholar, Sukjae Lee – we would have to conclude that *S/l* could be better seen as the *reason* for God's production of *S/m* than as its *cause*. Consequently, what Leibniz ought to affirm is that Causal Monism is true, but – nevertheless – the concepts of the individual substances give to God the reasons for His acts or, if one prefers to use a more classical language, the individual substances are the formal and final causes of their individual stories but God is the only efficient cause of everything (cf. Lee 2004, 2011).

Sukjae Lee's account is clearly consistent with many of Leibniz's views on God as 'First Cause' and the creatures as 'secondary causes'. But it diminishes too much Leibniz's opposition to Occasionalism and might end up making this opposition philosophically weak. The central point of Leibniz's anti-Occasionalism is the claim that our world is not a mere succession of states of affairs ruled by general laws and that such a world would be a 'perpetual miracle'. From Leibniz's point of view, a true account of our world needs individuals with inner forces and real actions. But, if Leibniz shared a causal monistic view with his adversaries, his alternative to them would be contentless. There would be no truthmakers for our statements on creaturely actions and the whole controversy on CA would become merely theological. Leibniz's assumptions on CA would become a mere way of *interpreting* the world, grounded on theological persuasions, and not a tool for the *explanation* of some facts of the world itself.

Moreover, Leibniz's replies to Bayle show that he had in mind a more robust view of CA. These replies claim explicitly that individual substances are the «true immediate causes of all their actions and inner passions»

(§ 400) and that they *produce* their modifications (§ 395, § 399, § 400). Now, 'production' is exactly what an efficient cause does. It is quite possible that Leibniz uses here this word, rather uncommon in his writings, just because Bayle does. But the question is whether he is entitled to do it or not.

In order to simplify the whole issue, I propose here a definition of CA summing up § 388-390:

> [CA_1] if God creates *S/m* at time *t*, *m* is an action by *S*, if and only if both these conditions are met: (a) *m* is an instantiation of *S*'s basic properties and (b) God was motivated to create *m* because *S*'s previous state *l* demanded *m*'s creation.

And I propose here a definition of CA summing up what Leibniz claims in § 395 and § 399-400:

> [CA_2] God creates *S* and *S* produces the accident *m*, so that *S* is the 'immediate cause' of *m*.

To be precise, there are even other paragraphs that only claim that *S* 'co-operates' with God to the production of its own state *m* (cf. *Théodicée*, § 391-2, GP VI, p. 347).[12] But even this 'moderate' version of CA_2 gives to *S* a real causal role which could not seem inferable from CA_1. Therefore, we must ask ourselves on which grounds CA_2 is established. Let us see whether the rest of Leibniz's replies helps us clarify this point.

3 Substances and Accidents (point 3)

The strongest points maintained by Bayle are those which reject that substances can 'produce' their accidents. They force Leibniz to claim that:

1. There is a real distinction between an individual substance *S* and its accidents *l*, *m*, *n*... Therefore *S* can 'produce' them.
2. Nevertheless, *S* does not 'create' *l*, *m*, *n*, because those accidents are not complete entities, but only 'changes of its own limits' by the substance *S*.

It is not clear whether these two claims are mutally consistent, nor whether they give a real contribution to justify Leibniz's use of the word 'production'. Let us consider them separately.

12 Both paragraphs insist that there is a *co-production* of the substance's states by God and the substance itself («I see nothing to prevent the creature's co-operation with God for the production of any other thing; the second causes co-operate in the production of that which is limited»).

3.1 Real Distinction

Most of the 'new Cartesians' rejected the Scholastic doctrine that there is a 'real distinction' between a substance and its accidents. According to them, accidents are no more than *modes*, that is, particular aspects of their substance, having no independent conditions of existence and explanation with respect to their substance(s). Starting from these premises, Bayle argues that no created substance can produce its own accidents, since creatures do not have the power of producing themselves.

Leibniz's reply focuses on the consequences that the no-real-distinction assumption involves (§ 393). Let us suppose that there is no real distinction between *S* and *m* (we could represent this possibility by writing *Sm* instead of *S/m*). It becomes necessary that *Sl*, *Sm*, *Sn* are different individuals. Therefore, even if *Sl*, *Sm*, *Sn*, are instantiated the one after the other in time, we have no reason to establish that they are the same individual and not several ephemeral individuals. Briefly, if substances and accidents have no real distinction between them, the re-identification of individuals through time fails and, therefore, there will be no created *substances* in the world. And this is obviously a kind of 'Spinozism'.

Leibniz has good reasons to raise this objection. His claim that anti-realism concerning accidents leads to eliminate enduring substances was shared (but with an enthusiastic support to this consequence) by a recent upholder of Causal Monism, namely by Georges Villiers, duke of Buckingham, cited and discussed in *Theodicy*, § 32. Starting from a nominalistic account of accidents («Accident […] is only a Word, whereby we express the several ways of what is in a Body, or matter, that is before us»), Buckingham argued: «I conceive that nothing can be properly said to endure, any longer that it remains just the same; for in the instant any part of it is changed, that thing as it was before, is no more in being […]» (Villiers [1685] 1985, p. 115).

This is not Spinozism, but rather a kind of 'presentism', as contemporary philosophers would call it (cf. Benovsky 2006, chs. 1-2). Nevertheless, it is clear that the principle that «individuals are not enduring things (that is, are not substances)» could not be approved by Leibniz. But how could he reject Buckingham's argument?

It is hard to suppose that Leibniz could admit any kind of realism about accidents. In a note composed by him in 1688-89 on Buckingham's *Discourse*, he came to the opposite conclusion that one must be a nominalist with regard to accidents «at least for prudence (*saltem per provisionem*)» (A VI, 4, pp. 994-996). It is hard to imagine Leibniz's system with the accidents moving from a substance to another or with individual substances having different accidents from those they have.

Therefore, what could save Leibniz from Buckingham's conclusions is not realism about accidents, but another kind of realism, namely realism

about substantial forms. Besides, it is not accidental that Leibniz, taking the opportunity from another passage by Bayle, introduces his substantial forms in the course of his reply (§ 396-397).

Leibniz's substantial forms or 'entelechies' or 'active virtues' (let's call them plainly *SF*) could seem to be only reifications of what, in the former paragraph, I called *SA*, that is, the substance's condition of activity.[13] And, indeed, *SF*s seem to be nothing more than a physical embodiment of the developmental law (*lex seriei*) ruling *S*'s modifications. One can doubt whether such metamorphosis of a complex property into a physical object is a philosophically correct step, but Leibniz had some reasons for this. If one wishes to avoid Buckingham's conclusion, one must find some information-preserving device which grants the continuity between *S/l* and *S/m*. Therefore, a 'simple substance' *S* must be also an *organized* individual and *S*'s organization must be *physically* instantiated at each phase of *S*'s existence.

In other words, substances can be re-identified through time by the persistence of the same organization. More exactly, being their *SF*s co-instantiated with them, Leibniz's individual substances are always present as *wholes* and this is what makes the difference from the accidents they have. This is an original way of seeing the difference between substances and accidents. To Leibniz, *S* is a true 'enduring' substance, if and *only* if the rule of connection subsisting between *S*'s 'temporal parts' (as contemporary philosophers would call them) *S/l*, *S/m*, *S/n*, is always co-instantiated with *S* itself. This condition respected, *S* will always be present as a *whole*, even being intrinsically connected to its accidents *l*, *m*, *n*.

This is enough for Buckingham. But, in my opinion, insofar as it reduces Bayle to Buckingham, Leibniz's reply does not really face Bayle's particular objection. In fact, the French philosopher argued that substances cannot 'produce' their accidents, if the existence of these latter is a necessary consequence of the existence of the former. Leibniz's replies do not touch this subject.

I do not mean that Leibniz had no possible answer and that he really saw *m* or *n* as *necessarily* flowing from *S*'s existence or as *necessarily* entailed in *S*'s concept. But – I would suggest – Leibniz's reasons for excluding such a necessity depend on his assumptions concerning God's CC and not on those concerning creatures' CA. If *m* is not a *necessary* consequence of *S*'s *SF*, it is just because a Leibnitian *SF* does not cause the *states* but only the

13 Leibniz sometimes admits that his entelechy is nothing more than a condition or a state, namely what we called SA: «L'Entelechie d'Aristote, qui a fait tant de bruit, n'est autre chose que la force ou activité, c'est à dire un Etat dont l'action suit naturellement si rien l'empeche» (*Letter to Remond*, 1715, GP III, p. 657).

tendencies of its substance.[14] As a letter to Des Bosses clearly shows, this latter concept is quite synonymous with that of 'exigency' and therefore the *SF*s' doctrine does not change Leibniz's account of causation and is not enough to justify the shift from CA_1 to CA_2.[15]

What we can conclude is that the 'exigencies' inherent to *S/l* or *S/m* always arise from *S* taken as an organized whole and not from some particular feature of *l* or *m*. This is an important element, but we have no way of using it, without focusing on what 'exigencies' or 'tendencies' can be from a metaphysical point of view.

3.2 'Changing one's own limits': Leibniz's Dispositionalism

One of the most original aspects of Leibniz's philosophy is its account of virtual states. According to Leibniz, already the *possibilia* subsisting in God's intellect have a tendency to exist (*exigentia*, *conatus*), and – for each of them – this tendency is proportional to its simplicity and ability of co-existing with the other *possibilia*. This doctrine is usually interpreted as a way of establishing the rationality of God's choice, with the 'effort of existing' by the *possibilia* taken as a metaphor expressing the motivational force that those *possibilia* have in God's mind. This is probably the easiest way of giving an account of this issue.[16]

But it would be harder to give a similar account for Leibniz's doctrine of dispositional properties, i.e. of what we commonly call 'powers'. As it is well known, Occasionalists claimed that creatures' causal powers can be reduced to non-dispositional properties joined with the contingent laws that God gave to Nature.[17] If an individual *S* has a (non-dispositional) property *m* and there is a general law which makes *m* the 'occasional cause' of *n*, then *S* has also the 'power' of doing *n*.

14 An interpretation correctly highlighting the importance of substantial forms in Leibniz's account of causality, but goes a bit too far, is: Bobro, Clatterbaugh 1996.

15 See Leibniz's letter to Des Bosses, February 2, 1706: «[...] in virtute activae arbitror esse quondam actionis atque adeo concursus ad actionem divini *exigentiam* (ut vestri loquuntur) quamvis resistibilem» (GP II, p. 295). The incidental remark «ut vestri loquuntur» reveals that Leibniz considered the word 'exigency' as typical of Jesuit theologians, as confirmed by Ramelow 1997 and Knebel 2000.

16 See at least *De veritatibus primis* (A VI, 4, pp. 1442-1443), *De ratione cur haec existant potius quam alia* (A VI, 4, pp. 1634-1636), *De rerum originatione radicali* (GP VII, pp. 302-308), *Twenty-four Metaphysical Propositions* (GP VII, pp. 289-291). But this 'striving possibles' doctrine is widely repeated by Leibniz.

17 See Malebranche's analysis of powers in the *XV Eclaircissement* added to his *Recherche de la Vérité*, now in Malebranche 1976, pp. 215ff.

Leibniz's account of powers is quite different. First of all, basic dispositions do not depend on laws, but directly on their substances' 'natures'. A nature is not a mere sum of essential predicates. It includes also the 'natural predicates', as Leibniz calls them. A 'natural predicate' is that predicate that one may legitimately expect that a thing has if it is not impeded to. For instance, it is natural for light 'to proceed in straight line', if (and only if) light always behaves in this way when nothing interferes with this behaviour.[18]

Consider that, if these natural properties supervene on the essential properties (I suppose mainly on their combination), they must be the same in all possible worlds. There are possible worlds in which light *never* proceeds in a straight line: for instance, worlds in which all spaces through which light passes have very thick atmospheres. But, even in these particular worlds, light will *tend* to go in a straight line.

Briefly, natural properties are independent from God's will. Probably, there are even dispositions which depend on the particular arrangement of our world and, therefore, on 'God's decrees'. However, the independence of the basic natural properties with respect to God's will is clearly stated by *Theodicy*, § 383. Quoting Descartes who claims that a creature existing in this moment cannot cause its own existence in the following moment, Leibniz remarks that creatures have at least a 'natural' propensity to last:

> The Cartesians […] say that «the moments of time having no necessary connection with one another, it does not follow that because I am at this moment I shall exist at the moment which shall follow, if the same cause which gives me being for this moment does not also give it to me for the instant following». One may answer that in fact it does not follow *of necessity* that, because I am, I shall be; but this follows *naturally*, nevertheless, that is, of itself, *per se*, if nothing prevents it. It is the distinction that can be drawn between the essential and the natural. For the same movement endures naturally unless some new cause prevents it or changes it, because the reason which makes it cease at this instant, if it is no new reason, would have already made it cease sooner. (*Théodicée*, § 383, GP VI, p. 342)[19]

In other words, there is a kind of 'existential inertia' which makes more easily explainable – and therefore more naturally probable – that individual substances last.

18 The most important passage on this topic is *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain*, IV, 9, § 1 (A VI, 6, pp. 433-434), but it appears also in the debates with the Occasionalists (GP IV, pp. 582, 592), in *Théodicée*, § 355 (GP VI, p. 326 and § 383, GP VI, p. 342). See Piro 2011b.

19 The argument of the Cartesians is a paraphrase of that introduced by Descartes in his *Principes de philosophie*, I, § 21 (AT IX/b, p. 34).

The claim that the manifestation of a natural property is more probable than its contrary explains Leibniz's attitude to see tendencies at work even when they are not fully manifested. A compressed elastic body cannot extend because of an external cause, but its tendency to do so is quite real and has effects on the surrounding bodies. In fact, in Leibniz's system, it is even necessary that there are no completely un-manifested tendencies, since the Principle of Sufficient Reason would not admit a matter of fact with no consequences. Therefore, statements about tendencies are grounded on some real facts of our world, that is, these facts are the truth-makers for Leibniz's concept of creaturely action. One has to admit that such statements have a complex way of referring to our world, since the claim that a given body *x* 'tends to *y*' at the instant *t* mentions a state of affairs *y* which is not instantiated in our world (at least at the moment *t*), but only in some other possible world. But Leibniz admits this complexity by his usual statement that tendencies are something in-between potency and act.

One must also remark that Leibniz is not a radical Dispositionalist. He is clearly persuaded that dispositional properties arise from non-dispositional properties. This applies also to the individual substances' modifications. For each *state* (= perception), there must be a connected *tendency* (= appetite). A simple monad's appetite can be even called *percepturitio*, since its only content is a next perception.[20] All this makes it hard to attribute a precise metaphysical concept of Leibniz's 'tendencies'. They cannot be complete states of affairs, otherwise they would be 'states'. But they cannot be mere ideas or notions. Therefore, they must have some kind of adverbial reality: *S* is in the state *m* 'tendentially to *n*'. However, what is important is the fact that the tendency to *n* arising on the state *m* depends on the whole nature and story of the individual substance *S*. So to say, Leibniz's individual substances not only *have* modifications but *react* to their own modifications.

Since no created substance has a causal power towards others, *S*'s dispositions can be directed only to *S*'s internal development. *S*'s 'active' powers are just those dispositions which allow *S* to become more 'perfect' in its own way of being. At the contrary, *S*'s 'passive' dispositions are those who derive from the metaphysical 'limitations' of the creatures and from their necessity to 'harmonize' reciprocally. The sum of these passive dispositions is what Leibniz calls 'Primary Matter' (= *PM*). The 'Primary

20 See Leibniz's letter to Christian Wolff of Summer 1706: «quaecumque in Anima universim concipere licet, ad duo possint revocari: expressionem praesentis externorum status, Animae convenientem secundum corpus suum; et tendentiam ad novam expressionem quae tendentiam corporum (seu rerum externarum) ad statum futurum repraesentat, verbo *perceptionem* et *percepturitionem*. Nam ut in externis, ita et in anima duo sunt: *status* et *tendentia* ad alium statum» (Leibniz, Wolff 1860, pp. 56-57).

Matter' of the substance *S* contributes with *S*'s *SF* to explain *S*'s actual modifications. At a first sight, it is hard to understand how non-extended beings, as Leibniz's simple individual substances are, can have a 'matter'. In fact, Leibniz's notion of 'matter' depends quite on his metaphysics of immanent activity and refers only to these passive dispositions which individual substances receive by their own nature and which explain their mutual dependence. Of course, *PM* is also an important part of Leibniz's account of organic bodies (cf. Phemister 2005, pp. 31-56). But, in a general way, *each* action performed by an individual substance arises both by its *SF* and its *PM*. Individual substances cannot manifest their own active powers without manifesting their own passive powers and *vice versa*.

All this allows, in my opinion, to give an account of the central passage of Leibniz's replies to Bayle:

> As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does not see that one needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to form a square or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the movement of the soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion a statue by removing a few pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure in relief, by changing, decreasing or increasing a piece of wax? The production of modifications has never been called *creation*, and it is an abuse of terms to scare the world thus. God produces substances from nothing, and the substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits. (*Théodicée* § 395, GP VI, p. 351)

This is the most extended explanation of his CA_2 offered by Leibniz in his replies to Bayle. But what does it exactly mean?

I would suggest to decompose this paragraph into three claims: (i) individual substances' modifications are nothing else than manifestations of their substances' power(s), needing therefore no *creation*; (ii) substances' powers have structural limitations and this determines a range of possible 'limits', i.e. of combinations between one substance's active and passive dispositions; (iii) single modifications arise through the shift from one possible combination to another. My interpretation of the word 'limit' is hypothetical, but I ground it on Leibniz's passages using the word 'limits' for the particular determinations that the acting substances receive through the external obstacles and aids.[21]

21 See *De primae philosophiae emendatione et de notione substantiae* 1694, GP IV, p. 470: «[…] substantiam creatam ab alia substantia creata non ipsam vim agendi, sed praeexistentis jam nisus sui, sive virtutis agendi, limites tantummodo ac determinationem accipere», but even a previous letter to Seckendorf 1693, A I, 9, p. 233: «numquam creaturam a creatura perfectionem producere, sed tantum efficere aliquid circa limites perfectionis a Deo datae in creaturae positos, auctis vel minutis impedimentis».

Let's come again now to the fundamental question: can Leibniz reasonably argue that the individual substances 'produce' their own modifications? At his point, we can try to give an answer to it. *Insofar as* one can see the relation subsisting between an individual with particular powers and these powers' manifestations as a producer/produced relation, Leibniz's metaphysics holds this claim. I would suggest therefore that Leibniz's CA_2 is mainly grounded on a dispositionalist interpretation of the word 'production'. From this dispositionalist point of view, it is quite correct to state that each substance is the 'immediate cause' of its modifications. But, considering these same modifications as states of affairs of our world, the perspective changes and CA's 'moderate' formulation is to be preferred: substances cause directly only substances' *tendencies*, substances' tendencies give God the reasons for His production of their next *states*.[22]

This could seem too complicated for a good metaphysics. But one must remark that Leibniz had good reasons for his attempt of combining a nomic and a dispositional account of substances' immanent activity. If immanent activity means immanent *causation*, i.e. causal links between different phases of a same individual, one cannot give an account of it without starting from Nature's laws and from God's commitment to their observance. But, if immanent activity means also individuals expressing themselves and their own 'nature' by their own modifications, we need evidently even a dispositional account of it. In few words, without the dispositional account, we would have no bridge between Leibniz's metaphysical view of immanent activity and the traditional meanings of the words deriving from the Latin *agere*. One must add that the traditional meanings that Leibniz's dispositional account allows him to recover are not just those which we associate with the word 'production'.

4 Conclusions: Action and Sin

The main issue in the discussion between Leibniz and Bayle is – obviously – that of sin. According to Bayle, it is rationally impossible to deny God's causal involvement in human sins. How could Leibniz avoid the same conclusion?

In my opinion, Leibniz wished to avoid *two* possible conclusions. One is that God is the cause of sin. In this case, Leibniz could easily appeal to the Neoplatonist and Augustinian principle that Evil is a lack of perfection and

22 Lee remarks that Leibniz sees «creaturely causation [...] as a type of causation that is radically different from efficient, productive causation» (2011, p. 600). I would suggest that powers supervening on formal and material properties give us a kind of causality which is robust enough to justify Leibniz's use of the word 'production' even for creaturely action.

has its source in creatures' limitations. But a second possible wrong conclusion would have been that *nobody* is the 'author of sin', since limitations cannot explain any positive state of affairs and there is no need of finding an author for what is not real.[23] This double commitment is reflected by the following passage:

> The limitations and imperfections arise therein through the nature of the subject, which sets bounds to God's production; this is the consequence of the original imperfection of creatures. Vice and crime, on the other hand, arise there through the free inward operation of the creature, in so far as this can occur within the instant, repetition afterwards rendering it discernible. (*Théodicée*, § 388, GP VI, p. 346)

But is it possible to justify this conclusion? Accepting the sinner's productive role, one comes to difficulties with the CC doctrine. Starting from the CC doctrine, it is hard to justify the sinner's productive role.[24] I suggest that a dispositional account can avoid both these risks.

First of all, we must eliminate some false problems. Leibniz usually affirms that individual substances have their inner forces and can acquire by themselves some kind of natural perfection. Nevertheless, Leibniz's theological account of sin assumes that all 'being, perfection, force' we have comes *directly* from God (*Théodicée*, § 30, GP VI, p. 130). Are these two claims consistent with one another? They are, if one considers more carefully Leibniz's *SF* doctrine. As we have seen, the *SF*s arise from their substances' 'active' dispositions but (i) there would be no creaturely active disposition at all, without an *original* 'communication of perfection' by God to his creatures;[25] (ii) furthermore, as we have seen, the *SF*s produce only tendencies which become efficacious through God's concurrence. It is therefore possible that, when speaking as theologians and not as natural philosophers, we consider the *SF*s as they were only tools of the divine self-communication, confirming in this way the traditional doctrine that all perfection is produced by God.

Therefore, when Leibniz points out that only creatures' 'limitations' arise directly by their nature and that creatures' perfections are produced directly by God, we are not obliged to see these theological insights as

23 This risk is clearly seen by the young Leibniz. See *Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes*, 1671 (A VI, 1, pp. 544-545) and *L'auteur du peché*, 1673 (A VI, 3, pp. 150-151).

24 Favourable to the causal role of the sinner are – with different reasons – Sleigh 1990, pp. 183-185 and Rateau 2008, pp. 564-570. My interpretation is closer to Rateau's, whose account of sin is consistent with Concurrentism even preserving creatures' causal role.

25 Leibniz's definition of creaturely action in *Théodicée*, § 32, confirms this point, claiming that the action of the creature is a modification of the substance «containing a variation [...] in the perfections that God has communicated to the creature» (GP VI, p. 121).

inconsistent with Leibniz's ordinary view of immanent activity as always ruled by the substances' *SF*s and *PM*.

Let's come at the other basic element of Leibniz's scenario, namely creatures' 'limitations'. It is evident that, if 'limitation' means only an absence of properties, a limitation cannot explain much. But imperfect dispositions supervening on the whole essence of a limited substance do explain something. If I affirm that, even if endowed with reason, many human beings are not able to use reason correctly and constantly, this statement establishes only a 'limitation'. But, if we combine this statement with other statements on human properties and dispositions, we can infer that such people are likely inclined to give their consent to superstitious or irrational beliefs.

Of course, sin is more than a propensity. From Leibniz's Augustinian point of view, sin is a constant *tendency* to do what is morally wrong. But it is rather easy to explain the rise of such tendencies from our natural dispositions in the light of the doctrine of the continuous increase of minimal variations sketched by Leibniz in *Théodicée*, § 388. God creates *S/m* and *S/m*'s instantiation involves necessarily – in virtue of *S*'s natural and acquired dispositions – a tendency which is less perfect with regard to other possible ones (let's say: a tendency to n_0 rather than n_1). Since God cannot change this tendency without a miracle, S/n_0 will be instantiated by Him and – if nothing changes – S/n_0 will let arise another and more remarkable imperfect tendency and so on.

Leibniz usually represents this possibility through an analogy between creatures' 'limitations' and some material properties of a body – the weight of a ship or the physical form of a feather – which can lessen the speed of such body, when pushed by an external force (cf. *Théodicée*, § 30, GP VI, p. 40).[26] The analogy is clear: the external force is God, the degree of speed is the degree of perfection, the material property means those non-dispositional properties (or those combinations of basic properties) which give reason of the dispositional ones. In the case of the example with the ship, we have also the dispositional property itself: that is, the 'natural inertia' of the mass, discovered – in Leibniz's opinion – by Kepler. The manifestation of this dispositional property is 'resistance'. A heavier body resists to an external force more than a lighter body and therefore the same external force will confer to the two bodies two different degrees of speed.

This example is used by Leibniz with the intention of clarifying the relation between passive dispositions and causality. 'Inertia' is a dispositional property and it causes real effects. On the other side, this is still not enough for claiming that this disposition is an active one. In Leibniz's

26 The example of the feather is in *De libertate, fato, gratia Dei* (A VI, 4, p. 1605): «Si magna vi plumulam ego percutiam, etsi valde perfecta sit actio mea, plumulae tamen actio orta ex percussione erit valde imperfecta et debilis, quoniam ex ipsius natura, quae magni impetus capax non est, limitatio procedit».

account, mass has not the power «to lessen this speed, having once received it, since that would be action, but to moderate by its receptivity the effect of the impression» (*Théodicée*, § 30, GP VI, p. 40). In other words, inertia is not a real force and the 'resistance' is not the action of an efficient cause. Of course, one can say that «the quantity of mass lessens the body's speed», but it is only a way of speaking, not the description of a 'lessening action' existing as such.

Of course, Leibniz is not claiming that inertia has no effect at all, but he is clearly pointing out that such effects are not just the kind of effects that we usually associate to an efficient cause. 'Inertia' – according to Leibniz's physical views – really influences the body's reactions to the external impulsion of motion. And this is all Leibniz needs in order to give a causal role to passive dispositions. If we apply this same logic to the case of the author of sin we must see this passage of Leibniz's *Theodicy* as implicitly polemical towards those theologians who saw human resistance to God's grace as a positive act performed by our will: Molinists, for instance. From Leibniz's point of view, resistance to God's grace cannot be a real act, but only a tendency. Since the increasing of this tendency is made possible just by those endowments which allow men to organize their activity, namely by the 'free operations' such as deliberation and choice, Leibniz argues that there is an author of the sin, namely the sinner himself. But this conclusion cannot hide the deep determinism of this explanation of sin. Once given the 'limitations' due to one's nature and biography, all follows as a natural consequence. Leibniz can discharge God only at the price of considering the sin as a direct consequence of individuals' 'natures'. Probably, he saw this solution as the least costly.

Let's come to some conclusions. Historically considered, Leibniz's metaphysics of action can be seen as an imposing attempt of interpreting action from a purely 'syntactic' point of view. All the episodic features of action are sacrificed to the assumption that one is always in a 'condition of activity' and this condition is expressed at its best when its single phases are ruled by a simple law. This is a rather uncommon perspective on action, having its model in *performances* more than in *production*. Aristotle's ethics of habits and the Stoic doctrine of 'constance' anticipated some features of this concept of action, but Leibniz was the first philosopher to give it an essential metaphysical role and, furthermore, the first to try to connect it with natural sciences, for instance with biology.

As an approach to human agency, Leibniz's doctrine is clearly alternative to the doctrine of free will as a faculty of producing episodic decisions, as his continuous blames against the contemporary 'Molinists' prove. It is less easy to classify his point of view in relation to the present-day ones. It would seem to lie somewhere between 'soft determinism' and 'agent's causality', a philosophical position Leibniz could have been attracted to by his view of action as expressing an agent taken as a whole. If a present-

day philosopher wanted to explore this kind of territory, Leibniz could be a good Vergil to her/him.

Finally, Leibniz's metaphysics of action is clearly dependent on his theology and this dependence is structural. This does not mean, however, that Leibniz's doctrine of action always reproduces traditional theological views. At the contrary, Leibniz's interpretation of the Christian dogmas is often creative, as we have seen. There are even cases in which we notice his difficulty to make sense of them. For instance, as we have already seen, Leibniz's *Discourse of metaphysics* (1686) admitted the possibility of 'extraordinary aids' (or 'private miracles') given by God to some individual sinners. But, in the philosopher's later writings, we do not find any attempt to clarify this possibility. One may suppose that, once stated the mutual implication between substantiality and autonomy, it became harder and harder to give a philosophical justification of the usual view of the efficacious grace as a gift that completely changes the mind of its receiver.

In a general way, Leibniz's philosophical theology is an attempt to balance two different principles: (i) Nature depends completely on God's omnipotent will; (ii) Natural facts have to be explained through Nature itself. There are some cases in which we find no accommodation between these two exigencies. For instance, there are two quite different Leibnitian accounts concerning the ways by which the 'sensitive soul' that we have before our birth becomes later a 'rational soul'. One of these accounts includes a direct intervention by God: since a 'sensitive soul' cannot become rational without receiving quite new properties, this change needs a true 'trans-creation' of our soul. This account is clearly preferred in *Théodicée*, § 91 (GP VI, p. 153; cf. the contemporary letters to Des Bosses, GP II, pp. 371, 389). However, some pages later (*Théodicée*, § 397, GP VI, p. 361), Leibniz affirms plainly that it is better not to introduce unnecessary miracles in the course of nature and comes to the conclusion that the 'seeds' of our organic bodies can also explain our later intellectual growth.[27]

In a similar way, it is hard to see whether the philosopher had a consistent doctrine of the relations between Grace and Nature. As we have seen, he admitted that God may furnish 'extraordinary' helps to some individuals, i. e. that there are some laws of the Kingdom of Grace which are quite independent from those of the Kingdom of Nature. But Leibniz's more mature works insist that there must be also some kind of «harmony between the Kingdom of Nature and the Kingdom of Grace». This means that God's Grace works mainly through natural ways, for instance

27 Leibniz starts by affirming his wish of «dispense with miracles in the generating of man, as in that of the other animals».

through those 'mechanical devices' (*voies machinales*) which connect virtue with happiness and vice with punishment (*Monadology*, § 88-9). The two views are not incompatible, but the second one involves a strong propensity to reduce the number of God's public or private miracles.

These obscure points of Leibniz's philosophical theology let us see how hard it could be for him to find a balanced account of the relations between God and the world. But this does not mean that his main *metaphysical* doctrines are inconsistent. On the contrary, what I have tried to show in this paper is just that Leibniz's metaphysical attempt to conciliate CC and CA, even if based on very refined and particular philosophical assumptions, is consistent and even interesting. In my opinion, Leibniz attributes to the creatures a metaphysically grounded autonomy, i.e. something more than that conceptual or explanatory autonomy that his doctrine of the 'complete concepts' explicitly grants. On the contrary, the consistence of Leibniz's doctrine of action with his intention of preserving the traditional Augustinian 'orthodox' theological doctrines can be doubted. But this is another issue.

Bibliography

Benovsky, Jiri (2006). *Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds*. Heusenstamm: Ontos.

Bobro, Marc; Clatterbaugh, Kenneth C. (1996). «Unpacking the Monads». *The Monist*, 79, pp. 410-425.

Jalabert, Jacques (1947). *La théorie leibnizienne de la substance*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Knebel, Sven K. (2000). *Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Das System des moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik 1500-1700*. Hamburg: Meiner.

Lee, Sukjae (2004). «Leibniz on Divine Concurrence». *Philosophical Review*, 113, pp. 203-246.

Lee, Sukjae (2011). «Leibniz on What God and Creatures Cause». In: Breger, Herbert et al. (Hrsg.), *Natur und Subjekt. IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress*, vol. 2. Hannover: G.W. Leibniz Gesellschaft, pp. 591-601.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm; Wolff, Christian (1860). *Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff*. Ed. by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt. Halle: Schmidt.

Malebranche, Nicolas (1976). *Oeuvres*, vol. 3. Paris: Vrin.

McDonough, Jeffrey (2007). «Leibniz: Creation and Conservation and Concurrence». *Leibniz Review*, 17, pp. 31-60.

Phemister, Pauline (2005). *Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz's Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Piro, Francesco (2011a). «L'action des créatures et le concours de Dieu chez Leibniz: entre trans-creationistes et durandiens». In: Rateau, Paul (éd.), *Lectures et interprétations des Essais de théodicée de G.W. Leibniz*. Stuttgart: Steiner, pp. 79-96.

Piro, Francesco (2011b). «Natural Predicates: Properties and Dispositions in Leibniz's Later Writings». In: Breger, Herbert et al. (Hrsg.), *Natur und Subjekt. IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress*, vol. 3. Hannover: G.W. Leibniz Gesellschaft, pp. 841-849.

Ramelow, Tilman (1997). *Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl: Die Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen Antonio Perez S.J. (1599-1649) und G.W. Leibniz*. Leiden; New York; Koeln: Brill.

Rateau, Paul (2008). *La question du mal chez Leibniz: Fondements et elaboration de la Théodicée*. Paris: Honoré Champion.

Sleigh, Robert C. Jr. (1990). *Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary to Their Correspondence*. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.

Suarez, Francisco [1597] (1866). *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. *Opera Omnia*, vol. 25. Paris: Vivès.

Villiers, Georges, duke of Buckingham [1685] (1985). «A Short Discourse on the Reasonableness of Men's Having a Religion or Worship of God». In: Phipps, Christine (ed.), *Buckingham: Public and Private Man. The Prose, Poems and Commonplace Books of George Villiers, second duke of Buckingham*. New York; London: Garland.