1 An Overview of Theoretical Approaches to Interaction

Francesca Nani

Summary 1.1 Ethnicity and Other Group Identities: A Matter of Definition. – 1.1.1 The Origin of 'Ethnicity'. – 1.1.2 Ethnicity and Cultural Identity. – 1.1.3 Different Approaches to Ethnicity: Isolationist vs Interactionist, Primordialist vs Instrumentalist. – 1.1.4 Ethnicity and Archaeology: Use and Abuse of a Term. – 1.2 How Societies Remember: Collective, Cultural and Social Memory. – 1.3 Memory, Identity and Material Culture: Between Craft Production and Cognitive Archaeology. – 1.3.1 Towards a Definition of Craft Production and Cognitive Archeology. – 1.3.2 Archaeology and Culture-Historical Approaches. – 1.3.3 Towards a Different Approach. – 1.4 Insularity, Connectivity and Cross-cultural Encounters: What Identities? – 1.4.1 Insularity and Connectivity. – 1.4.2 Cultural Encounters: From Acculturation to Cultural Fusion. – 1.5 Conclusions.

1.1 Ethnicity and Other Group Identities: A Matter of Definition

The concepts of ethnic and cultural identity have been a frequent component of theoretical discussions within the social sciences; however, despite their increasing centrality in archaeological discourse, these concepts continue to be poorly defined and distinguished. For example, S. Sherratt (2005, 27) manifested an "uneasiness" towards the too vague application of the term to refer to different group identities, and A. Leriou (2007a, 25-6) called for a more attentive use of the terminology with which wider processes are described. Using the comprehensive theoretical summaries made by B. Feuer, D. Hu, and

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other scholars,[1] this section discusses the importance and application of these concepts to archaeological contexts.

1.1.1 The Origin of 'Ethnicity'

Despite the fact that the terms 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic' are based on the ancient Greek word ἔθνος, they appeared relatively late in academic discussions, although the latter term had been used since the mid-nineteenth century to refer to "racial" characteristics (Eriksen 1993, 4). According to Sherratt (2005, 30-2), we need to turn to the "semantic history" of the Greek term in order to shed light on the progressive shift of meaning towards its current use. The first appearance of ἔθνος and its plural ἔθνεα is in Homer's works, where they generally mean a 'large number', a 'mass' of either animals or humans. Only in the fifth century does Herodotus (e.g. *Hist.* 5.17-18, 6.43, 7.81, 7.110, 8.73, 9.25) take the first step to associate the term with a 'group of people', using it to define various populations living either at the border of or in the Greek mainland. The use of the term in this sense, however, occurs rather infrequently, and the word is more often encountered as a synonym for 'a loosely organized crowd', in contrast to the organized polis (e.g. Arist. *Pol.* 1326b). In Plato (e.g. *Grg.* 455b) and Xenophon (e.g. *Symp.* 3.6) it is also used as a synonym for 'class' or a more tightly defined grouping based on sex or occupation. From the Hellenistic period, the adjective ἐθνικός appears and the term ἔθνος begins to be used to refer to 'non-Greeks'. In the Septuagint, ἔθνος often indicates non-Jews, while in early Christian and then early Modern periods, it defines those who are "neither Jews nor Christians" (Sherratt 2005, 32).

Ethnicity is centered around the socio-political developments of the twentieth century (Sherratt 2005, 31). Hu (2013, 373) underlines that the appearance of the term 'ethnicity' corresponded to the rise of Nazi and Soviet programs, between World War I and II, when its use was focused on establishing national origins. In this respect, ethnicity was a way to classify human differences and to identify the primordial traits of each nation. After the initial use, the cultural-historical approach, which correlates material culture and people's identities (see below § 1.3.2), dominated the discussion in the academic field of the 1940s and 1950s. From the second half of the twentieth century, the exploitation of 'culture' by Nazi and Fascist regimes, as well as many other colonial empires which used it to support their expansionist goals, led to a growing dissatisfaction and pejorative connotation towards the term and its semantic correlates

1 E.g. Jones 1997; Knapp 2008, 35-8; Feuer 2011; Hu 2013.

in those debates. During the late 1960s and 1970s, there was again a "surge of interest in the phenomenon of ethnicity", when the term and the concept started to be preferred to other terms, such as 'culture' or 'tribe' (Jones 1997, 51-5). Therefore, ethnicity re-emerged as a new, alternative, and "processual" approach which increasingly focused on "the self-definitions of particular ethnic groups in opposition to other groups", overcoming the culture-historical approach in favor of a more social one. Nonetheless, Jones recognized that, in the theoretical framework of ethnicity,

> other factors have been involved, including the meanings which concepts such as race, tribe and ethnicity have accumulated within the context of a number of different functioning ideological discourses, and the increasing salience of ethnicity in the realm of national and international politics. (Jones 1997, 55)

Such ideological connotations and their political uses obviously made discussions on ethnicity and ethnic identity more multi-layered and complex.

1.1.2 Ethnicity and Cultural Identity

Given this history, how have modern scholars approached defining ethnicity and ethnic identity? Building on ideas previously developed by Weber, Hu has recently defined ethnic identity as "a belief in group affinity that is based on subjective beliefs of shared common ancestry drawn from 'similarities of physical type or of customs or both' or 'of memories of colonization and migration'" (Hu 2013, 372; Weber 1978, 389). Similarly, according to Jones:

> ethnic identity [is] the aspect of a person's self-conceptualization which results from identification with a broader group in opposition to others on the basis of perceived cultural differentiation and/or common descent. (1997, xiii)

Therefore, ethnicity represents "an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction" and of which ethnic identity is the "symbolic aspect" (Eriksen 1993, 12; Bentley 1987, 27; Jones 1997, xiii).

In order to define the ethnic identity of a group, it is necessary to consider both the insiders' (emic) idea of membership and the outsiders' (etic) characterization of the same membership (Hu 2013, 373-4). While emic categories are established and make sense only within the specific culture that produces them, etic categories represent

a more extensive range of classification that can be applied outside of a given culture (Parker 2001, 318-22; also Hruby 2010, 197). Since both emic and etic categories are based on cultural attributes, Feuer, following Patterson, looks to group awareness as the root that differentiates cultural and ethnic identity. In this approach, cultural identity defines a cultural group as "any group of people who consciously or *unconsciously* share an identifiable complex of meanings, symbols, values and norms" (Patterson 1975, 309; cf. Feuer 2011, 508; emphasis added). In addition to sharing the meanings, values, etc. that define cultural identity, ethnic groups can only exist when members choose to be part of them and *consciously* consider themselves as members of the group. Moreover, according to J. Yinger (1986, 24-5), the distinctive shared values and feelings of common descent within an ethnic group can be fruitfully used to recognize this group, even when the values and feelings are artificially built as a fictional construct. In summary, modern scholarship seems to consider "self-conscious identification with a particular group of people" (Jones 1997, 123) the defining characteristic that differentiates ethnic groups from cultural groups. We too accept and consider awareness of belonging as a necessary condition when speaking of ethnicity.

1.1.3 Different Approaches to Ethnicity: Isolationist vs Interactionist, Primordialist vs Instrumentalist

The above distinction between cultural and ethnic groups draws heavily on the sociological discourse, and within this field, 'ethnicity' has become a factor considered important to the formation of political communities. In contrast with (or at least more easily than) other group identities, ethnic differences can in fact be politicized to create or enhance the cohesion of groups and to pursue specific interests (Hu 2013, 375; see § 1.3.3 for the role of material culture in this). Hu (375) identifies two common approaches to the integration of cultural differences in the political field: isolationist vs interactionist perspectives and primordial vs instrumental perspectives. The two approaches are often included as a frame of reference in archaeological research, and it is important to briefly introduce them here.

Isolationist vs interactionist approaches consider ethnicity in the context of their relationships with outsider groups. Isolationists maintain that ethnic and cultural identities are created and better preserved when the contact with other groups is lacking or, more realistically, very limited. By contrast, interactionists emphasize the role of interacting with the 'other' in highlighting or creating identities, to the point that Yinger (1986, 22) states that "ethnicities […]

are never singular, but always exist in systems: one ethnicity implies at least one another" (cf. also Hu 2013, 375).

Nowadays, scholars in social sciences tend to prefer the interactionist view and remark that alterity is a necessary condition for the development of ethnic or cultural identity. Ethnic identity in particular has been connected to the necessity of creating or maintaining boundaries, with ethnicity considered a self-defining system based on a we/they opposition (Jones 1997, 64). In a more intermediate perspective, it is in the encounter with the 'other' that identity is more clearly established, because different forces focus on what is 'us' and what stands 'outside of us'. Therefore, cross-cultural interactions play a vital role in constituting ethnic and cultural identities and, without their inputs, social systems tend to be weaker (see below).

Primordial vs instrumental perspectives on ethnicity and ethnic identity are more controversial. The debate revolves around the question of whether ethnicity is rooted in deep, basic, and irreducible features to which individuals are attached (language, religion, etc.), or if it can be acquired through a combination of variables, representing symbols used by people towards specific ends. As a general definition, primordialists focus on emotions, on an "ineffable and unaccountable" (Jones 1997, 63-8) sense of belonging acquired at birth, and on the power of particular symbols of ethnicity. It is the "deep-seated need for rootedness" that "gives rise to communal sentiments that generate ethnic groupings" and provide emotional support (Bentley 1987, 26). In the instrumental perspective on the other hand, people are drawn to create groups that defend their common interest and use ethnicity as an instrument to pursue their collective goal.

The instrumental view appeared as a response to the failure of the primordial approach to address the "dynamic and fluid nature of ethnicity in varied social and historical contexts" (Jones 1997, 74).[2] Instead, instrumental views focus on the organizational features of ethnicity which is regarded

> as constituting the shared beliefs and practices that provide a group with the boundary maintenance and organizational dimensions necessary to maintain, and compete for, socio-economic resources. (74)

The main flaw of the instrumental approach is the risk of over-deterministic explanations of ethnicity coming "into existence in order

2 However, the primordial approach can be regarded as fundamental to some aspects of ethnicity. For example, de Vos's (1982, 17) definition of ethnicity as "a sense of feeling of continuity with the past, a feeling that is maintained as an essential part of one's self-definition" emphasises one aspect that is particularly poignant in the archaeological debate.

to serve the purposes of interest groups", although "there are many examples which patently contradict such an argument" (77). Essentially, instrumental views inadequately consider the psychological and human variables in the definition of ethnicity, since the instrumental approach is often too rationally directed to maximizing self-interest. If we do not consider the role of 'culture', it might become difficult to distinguish ethnic identity from other collective types of identity (77-9).

Bentley (1987, 24-6 with refs) and Jones (1997, 65-72 with refs) have pointed out that despite the two perspectives often being presented as dichotomous, they share a few premises and several critical gaps and are better considered as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. For this reason, they have suggested alternative theoretical approaches. These address an aspect that both instrumental and primordial approaches seem to ignore: "how people recognize commonalities of interest or sentiment underlying claims to a common identity".[3] Bentley suggests drawing from Bourdieu's theory of practice, specifically his *habitus* (see below), in order to overcome the dichotomy between instrumental and primordial approaches. He states:

> Rooted in preconscious patterns of practice that are not susceptible to conscious apprehension or alteration, ethnic identities implicate, in a phenomenological sense, who people are [...] At the same time, the idea of habitus accounts for ethnic-group formation and coordinated ethnic action without having to assume that ethnic identities represent either artifice or the product of some psychologically improbable process of unconscious interest aggregation. (Bentley 1987, 48)

Similarly, Jones (1997, 60) recognizes Barth's book entitled *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) as the "turning point" in identifying ethnic groups as "self-defining systems" and, based on her previous discussion on different approaches, she defines ethnic groups as "culturally ascribed identity groups, which are based on the expression of a real or assumed shared culture and common descent" (Jones 1997, 84). In the end, Jones recognizes that Barth's dissertation argument

> counteracts the idea that ethnicity constitutes the basic, underlying essence or character of a group of people which persists through time and can be traced back to a unique origin. Instead, [she] argue[s] that ethnic identity is based on shifting, situational, subjective identifications of self and others, which are rooted in

3 Jones 1997, 83; cf. also Bentley 1987, 48-50 and more recently Feuer 2011, 508-9; Hu 2013, 376.

> ongoing daily practice and historical experience, but also subject to transformation and discontinuity. (Jones 1997, 13)

Based on these two final definitions, ethnic identity has gained some important traits: it possesses a "situational", not fixed character and it is rooted in "ongoing daily practices and historical experience" (Jones 1997, 13). However, it should be noted that the distinction between cultural and ethnic identity is clear mainly from a sociological perspective, which considers cultural identity as a sub-category of ethnicity. Cultural anthropologists regard cultural and ethnic identity more as a continuum that connects people to their past and future and provides a sense of historical continuity and embeddedness in a community. Similarly, psychological studies use ethnic and cultural identity as interchangeable concepts, since they define cultural identity as

> that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his[/her] knowledge of his[/her] membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership. (Kim 2007, 240-1)

This definition contradicts the demarcation previously drawn between cultural and ethnic identity, by assigning to cultural identity a self-awareness of belonging that is usually thought to be essential for the recognition of ethnic identity.

1.1.4 Ethnicity and Archaeology: Use and Abuse of a Term

Since the differences between the theoretical definitions of cultural and ethnic identities are somewhat unclear and identifying ethnic affiliation in the archaeological record is also difficult, Feuer, as well as other scholars, albeit aware of a theoretical distinction between cultural and ethnic identity, often prefer to generically refer to "ethnic *or* cultural identity" (Feuer 2011, 514-15, emphasis added). On the contrary, according to Clarke (2003, 205-7) "ethnicity assumes a degree of cultural identity that is not only self-defining but also defined from the outside", thus reflecting the sociological perspective that more clearly distinguishes ethnic from cultural identity. For Clarke (2003, 205-7), cultural identity is associated to a generic "group identity, specifically the combination of distinct cultural homogeneity", while ethnic identity is regarded as also "usually dependent upon a degree of social complexity" in addition to the distinct cultural homogeneity. The overall confusion that seems to dominate the archaeological field in the use of ethnic identity and its application to a "certain, somewhat vaguely defined (or 'intuitive') level of

group identity" (Sherratt 2005, 27) have led Sherratt, followed by Leriou (2007a, 37) and an increasing number of scholars, to completely reject the use of both 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic identity' (cf. also Knapp 2007, 40; 2008, 31; 2021, 38-40).

Considering the political, often racial and generally problematic nature of the terms connected to ethnicity, many archaeologists have even preferred some less "perplexing" and "politically charged" substitutes, such as "group identity" (Clarke 2003, 207; Sherratt 2005, 36), "social identity" (Knapp 2008, 31-2), or "cultural identity" (Leriou 2007a, 36). Leriou proposes "cultural group", which she uses to "define the producers and/or consumers of a particular culture". This definition seems sufficiently specific while at the same time still devoid of the "inherently political and value-laden connotations" that, according to Sherratt (2005, 27), should make archaeologists and ancient historians "particularly cautious about how [they] deploy [ethnicity] in relation to the physical or textual record". On the other hand, group identity, although less politically laden than ethnicity, can still be politically manipulated and at the same time is also overly generic as it can encompass other forms of identity based on gender, social role, age, etc. For example, B. Knapp correctly remarks that it is possible for individuals to retain more than one identity at the same time, expressing their belonging to different groups (Knapp 2008, 33; cf. also Hu 2013, 375). For this reason, he prefers to adopt "social identity" as a more suited – and broader – term than 'ethnicity'. More specifically, Knapp defines social identity as "the knowledge, value and significance attached to membership in a social group" and as "an individual's internalization of a group's shared norms and values", which is a process that is always in progress (Knapp 2008, 31-2). Eriksen (1993, 12) similarly addresses social identity, but his definition focuses on the emergence of identity through the development of social relationships between members of a group (cf. also Hall 1997, 30). However, for both of these approaches it is necessary to stress that 'social' can also imply an organized group, in which case identity can also be linked with political objectives.

More pronounced differences do exist between Knapp's and Eriksen's approaches. Specifically, unlike Knapp, Eriksen considers social identity as a broad term that encompasses different identities of which individuals dispose in the social arena, including ethnicity. In this case, when not clearly defined, 'social identity' risks to become a substitute of group identity rather than of 'ethnicity'. On the other hand, when used according to Knapp's definition, social identity can be an appropriate substitute for ethnic identity in archaeology, especially because it can be connected to social memory (see below). Similarly, Knapp's 'cultural identity' might be more appropriate in archaeology as it highlights the individual's awareness or sense of belonging to a (social) group on the basis of shared cultural frameworks.

Having defined the most relevant terms revolving around a group's identities, we can now examine how these identities are created, transmitted and, most importantly for archaeological studies, intertwined with material culture.

1.2 How Societies Remember: Collective, Cultural and Social Memory

Archaeology is strongly indebted to works that highlight the ways and extent to which the identity of social groups is related to shared memories. The title of this section draws from P. Connerton's influential 1989 essay, in which he examines how societies can create and transmit memory (Connerton 1989). Together with M. Halbwachs, Connerton is one of the main contributors to the debate about "collective memory" and the role of memory in the construction of a society's identity. This debate involves the fields of sociology, philosophy, and anthropology: here only a brief introduction can be offered.

The expression "collective memory" was coined by Halbwachs in the posthumous essay *La mémoire collective*, where he entitled the first chapter "Mémoire collective et mémoire individuelle" (1950). As underlined by N. Russell (2006, 792-6), although the idea was somehow present throughout European history since Augustin and Thomas Aquinas' philosophical reflections, Halbwachs introduced the new and compelling point that an individual's personal memory is strictly correlated to the experiences and memories of the group to which he belongs. Moreover, similar to how an individual's memories are formed, past experiences of a group create a shared 'collective' memory. As memories of past experiences contribute to the formation of an individual's own identity and own self-narration, a social group builds its own identity through the collective memory of its experiences (Connerton 1989, 22). As stated above, societies as "self-interpreting communities" create narratives of themselves in order to distinguish themselves from other societies (12). J. Assmann then related 'collective memory' to 'cultural identity', defining the concept of "cultural memory" as

> a collective concept for all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that obtains [*sic*.] through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation. (Assmann, Czaplicka 1995, 126)

Connerton and Assmann, therefore, underline the importance of this type of memory in constructing the "semantic code" collectively shared by a society which provides a framework for individuals to classify, build, and store their experiences (Connerton 1989, 27-8).

Connerton names this framework the "mental map" or "schema" of a society. Assmann names it "concretion of identity" and considers it one of the main characteristics of cultural memory since it "preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity" (Assmann, Czaplicka 1995, 130). Regardless of terminology, the focus is on the fact that through this shared framework, unique for every group, societies define themselves in a positive ('we are those who do/are this') or negative ('we are those who do not do/are not this') way. In other words, this shared framework generated by cultural memory in Connerton and Assmann's theories has an important role in a society's self-awareness and self-definition. Based on the preceding section of this chapter, social memory can thus be considered one of the most basic constituents of any cultural identity.

L. Girella, P. Pavúk and M. Pieniąże, following Assmann, have recently defined "cultural memory" as the

> distribution throughout society of what the individuals believe, feel, and know about the past, but it is also a past made of artifacts and traditions forming the ties that bind members together. (2019, 523)

With their definition, they highlight that the link between individual and collective memory lies in the experience and relationships of a single person, which over time bind "personal and experiential memories" so that they "develop into more referential and collective ones" (523). In this regard, it is also appropriate to use the terms "social" or "socio-cultural" memory (e.g. Voskos, Knapp 2008, 661) in order to recognize not only the relationship to an individual's 'culture' (for the term see below) but also the place that memory holds in the society as a whole.

Now a problem seems to arise. If cultural memory primarily stems from the experiences of individuals, how can it somehow orient their actions? Alternatively, if the individual acts according to a pre-ordered framework, how are changes and innovations possible? According to C. Tilley (1982, 26-7), to overcome this apparent contradiction, it is necessary to concentrate on the relationship between the individual and their superstructures in terms of "dialectic structuralism".[4] Structuralism, of which A. Giddens and P. Bourdieu are the main theorists, focuses on the interactions between individual actions and social structures, finding in human agency the connection and the

4 "Structuralist in the sense that a consideration of social structures plays a central part in the analysis, and dialectical in the emphasis it places on the relationship between structures and the activities of individuals and groups situated within social formations" (Tilley 1982, 26).

key to escape deterministic views where the individual has no power of choice. More specifically, Giddens' (1976; 1979; 1984) structuration is the process through which individual and society reciprocally reshape one another, by the individual's reproduction of practices learnt through socialization and constantly re-enacted in the same society. This idea is similar to Bourdieu's (1984) *habitus,* implying both a "structuring structure" and a "structured structure" (also Jones 1997, 89). In Tilley's methodological approach, the same notion is expressed as follows: "the results of individual actions form society which, in turn, reacts back and shapes individual actions" (Tilley 1982, 27).

Although Bourdieu himself was criticized for apparently expressing a deterministic view (Jones 1997, 89), in the archaeological debate, a structuralist approach such as Tilley's and other followers of Bourdieu's practice theory aided in balancing the deterministic-processual view of powerless people who are captured in plots outside of their control. On the contrary, practice theory draws attention to the agency of individuals and, in particular, to the intentionality of actions (Tilley 1982, 29). Specifically, to emphasize the role of agency in the construction of social structures, R.A. Joyce and J. Lopiparo define "structured agency" as

> exercized in sequences of practices that recapitulate and transform prior actions, sequences that we can recognize as structures at scales from the individual technical practice to the collective coordinated experience of long-enduring landscapes. (2005, 365)

Over the long term, through the structuration of society, this agency leads to traditions, which in Pauketat's (2001, 2-3) dynamic and open view are "practice(s) brought from the past into the present". Through this, the discussion has returned to the idea of "cultural construction", with tradition playing an important role (3).

Therefore, whether labeled collective, cultural, or social memory, all of these paradigms recognize the importance of repeated and transmitted practices that can be called 'tradition', and they consider memory as providing a specific sense of identity and belonging to an individual. The individual's actions, at the same time and in a reciprocal relationship, contribute to reshaping and/or transmitting cultural memory to future generations, who, through its incorporation, develop their cultural identity. Thus, for the archaeologists the fundamental question is: in societies of the past, where can we detect individual agency and how can we recognize a dialectically related cultural identity? One of the possible answers lies within a society's material culture. In fact, 'things' can be considered as "embodied behaviors" (Ardesia 2016, 275, after Leroi-Gourhan 1971) or "embodied ideologies" (Tilley 1982, 32) that have an active role among the society which produced and used them.

From here, we can appreciate the utility of studies that focus on material culture, craft production and, ultimately, the importance of understanding the relationship between repeated actions/practices and a society's cultural memory.

1.3 Memory, Identity and Material Culture: Between Craft Production and Cognitive Archaeology

1.3.1 Towards a Definition of Craft Production and Cognitive Archeology

In her definition of craft production, C.L. Costin states that the objectives of archaeological studies of craft production are

> (1) to describe the production system in terms of its technology, human agents, and organizing principles; (2) to explain why historically specific production systems have developed; and (3) to identify and explain cross-cultural regularities and variability in craft production systems and their role in general social evolution. (2005, 1034)

Many studies of craft production choose to focus on the first point, that is the technological aspect, with less attention paid to the social issues of production. However, as the aim of archaeology is "to study the relationships between men and things, and the relationships between men *through* things" (Giannichedda 2006, 238, Author's transl.), in the following discussion craft production and technology are broadly considered within the context of human societies and their political developments. In this way, the archaeology of craft production is one of the many possible approaches to the study of the past, one that focuses on those 'things' of everyday use that are important products of human labor (Giannichedda 2006, 30-5) and are a significant part of what has been called 'material culture'.

In 1923, V.G. Childe provided a definition of material culture that has widely influenced different fields and continues to do so today. In the first chapter of his *What Happened in History*, Childe states:

> even the student of material culture has to study a society as a cooperative organization for producing means to satisfy its needs, for reproducing itself and for producing new needs. (1923, 17)

Since there is a plurality of human societies, each of them with its own traditions, there should also be a plurality of material cultures. This is the reason why archaeologists can distinguish different types

of objects of the same function, showing differences that depend on the variability of social traditions. On this basis, the term 'culture' is defined by Childe (19) as "the totality of recognized types current simultaneously in a given area". Therefore, while introducing the concept of material culture itself, Childe had already strongly highlighted the relationship between objects, techniques, and society and his legacy has been important for all the scholars seeking a human centered approach to craft production.

Conversely, some processual archaeologists stressed the external (e.g. natural and environmental) constraints to human agency and presented a more deterministic approach. For example, D. Clarke's notion of "technocomplex" suggested that different cultures can independently reach the same "equilibrium" as "a widely diffused and interlinked response to common factors in environment, economy and technology" (Clarke, Chapman 1978, 495). In a marked contrast to the idea that technology is strongly linked to a particular society and context, a 'technocomplex' gathers together cultural systems because they share similar material and technological substructures, hence it represents a larger group, as opposed to one single cultural group (328-9). Although Clarke does not rule out the possibility of a certain variability in the cultural groups that converge in the same technocomplex, external factors (i.e. the environment or the economy) act as constraints within which other human sociocultural variables are forced to develop (329-33). However, regardless of the determinism of this view, Clarke's theory remains highly influential and will play an important role in other parts of this section.

In the analysis of production techniques, the risk of excessive determinism is enhanced by the active role played by natural environments in determining which actions are permitted on given raw materials. A. Leroi-Gourhan (1971, 15) himself, considered by many scholars the founder of craft production archaeology, was often accused of being extremely deterministic, as, for example, when he openly stated that "technological determinism is as strong as the zoological one" (Author's transl.). Nonetheless, he explained the tension between natural determination and human variability in terms of *tendance* (trends) and *fait* (facts). *Trends* are like universal statements and depend on physical limitations of materials or needs of use; *facts* are the concrete application of trends in life. Even if a trend can appear 'natural' and 'logically' unavoidable, in human history not everything has been predetermined by nature and every application of a general trend is unique due to the existence of multiple and complex variables (27-9). As suggested by Clarke, many techniques can be understood as similar responses to similar problems. However, each of these techniques still has peculiarities that can be thoroughly explained only in their individual and particular socio-cultural framework. Techniques as *facts* are the product of a

compromise, in a specific time and place, among the physical characteristics of available materials, technical skills, commercial and use needs, and social conventions. This means that techniques and objects are related with societies, because only within the society that makes and uses them are objects provided with meanings and fully understood. Similar to previously mentioned structuration theories, material culture

> structures and is structured by the perception of actors of their social world and may be a powerful means of legitimating the existing social world. It has a dual effect, as both a creation and a creator of social practice. (Tilley 1982, 32)

In substance, by emphasizing again human agency and human choices, and by considering artifacts as "solid behaviors" (Ardesia 2016, 275), it is possible to avoid determinism. Not only do objects materialize specific values of a society, but they also represent the "string of repeated actions that are learned, transmitted and transformed" (Mills, Walkers 2008, 13). Embodied in the objects, those actions that contain the agency of the present craftsman together with the agency of all the past ones are somehow stratified and "fossilized" (Ardesia 2016, 276).

Returning to Clarke's work, he states that artifacts encode information "about the orientation of a culture's *precepta*, information about the actions integrated in their fabrication, information about their intent" (Clarke 1971, 120), and that

> material culture constitutes an information subsystem of patterned constellations of artifacts which outline the behavior patterns of a social cultural system and embody that system's technology. (Clarke, Chapman 1978, 129)

Derived from Clarke's theory and widely reproduced, the 'triangle of material culture' effectively shows how objects, actions, and meanings are interlinked and stresses that people confer meanings to both the object and the actions needed to produce that object **[fig. 1.1]**.

Meanings and thoughts are a favored research field in cognitive archaeology. Defined in C. Renfrew's (1994, 3) words as "the study of past ways of thought as inferred from material remains", cognitive archaeology may constitute a reaction to the attention of processual archaeology on the economic and functional aspects of societies. In other words, from this perspective the focus of material culture studies can return from outside people to people themselves.

There is not enough space here for an in-depth theoretical discussion on cognitive archaeology, whose research field is certainly not limited to the manufacturing of objects (Renfrew, Zubrow 1994).



Figure 1.1
Material culture's triangle according to Clarke's theorization (after Ardesia 2016, 275 fig. 15.2)

However, within cognitive archaeology, it is important to mention the processes through which technological knowledge is acquired and transmitted, and how cultural values are embedded in these processes. Craft production studies can reconstruct a single *chaîne opératoire* by recognizing the different actions needed to produce an object, because those actions are the result of a specialized process, involving a specific set of knowledge and skills. In the same manner that Connerton (1989, 21-5) distinguished various meanings for the verb 'to remember' that address different types of memory, many scholars have defined multiple meanings for the verb 'to know' in order to indicate specific types of knowledge. For example, concerning actions, Tilley (1982, 31) distinguishes between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. The knowledge expressed by 'knowing that' is a

> propositional knowledge which can be discursively formulated, so that the actor would be able to tell us his reasons for a particular pattern of behavior [*sic*.].

The knowledge expressed by 'knowing how' is a

> knowledge which an actor possesses but cannot put into propositional form in that he [/she] is unaware of the principles upon which he [/she] is acting. This does not mean his [/her] action is unintentional. (31)

The expression 'know-how' has spread into many languages to define the technical knowledge required to make things, and Ryle (1949, 30-4) underlined that 'know-how' is primarily based on practice. Repetition and imitation, but not mandatory knowledge, are some of the characteristics of technical knowledge. It has often been remarked that mastery of this type of knowledge, when technique becomes

habit,[5] leads to a sort of automatic gesture. However, this does not mean that technical knowledge precludes the agent's awareness of what they are doing and their chance to modify the process. Gestures can be considered a "motor faculty know-how" resulting from the application of conceptual know-how where even the "motor idiosyncrasies" are linked to individual agency (34; Karlin, Julien 1994, 158-9).

If know-how is mostly learned through practice and example, it is clear why the archaeology of craft production has been interested in the process of apprenticeship. Here, craft production and cognitive studies almost collide. M.-N. Chamoux (2010, 145-9) refers to an ethnological example about the various possibilities for know-how transmission based on the scalar distribution of know-how in a society. Studying the Nahua village of Cuacuila in Eastern Mexico, she observed that know-how exists as knowledge that can be: shared by all the members of the community, shared by specific groups defined by broad categories such as age or sex, shared by reduced groups of individuals, or held solely by one individual. Hence, general know-hows can be transmitted through "impregnation" (150-2; Karlin, Julien 1994, 152), which includes a passive phase of continuous observation of the action followed by an active phase of attempts to reproduce those actions. By contrast, more specialized know-hows (e.g. embroidery) or general know-hows that cannot be observed for the time necessary for impregnation, will need a master teaching young apprentices the correct sequence of actions to perform (Chamoux 2010, 152-9).

Obviously, for the apprentice to acquire the correct technique through progressive steps, each know-how has a specific learning process. In this respect, it is important to highlight the following concepts:

- A know-how itself is a product of a tradition of tests, trials and failures slowly evolving through the stratified actions of generations of crafters. It is learned from practice and experience, acquired through the horizontal interactions between crafters and the vertical interactions between masters and apprentices. As a consequence, the technical knowledge to produce objects can be by itself considered a product of a society's unique material culture.
- Learning a technique is a vital social action that involves not only the master and their apprentice(s) but also the history of the master and their whole community, whose specific needs, knowledges, and beliefs are embodied both in the object and in its making process.
- Despite the tendency to be conservative due to their relationship with cultural memory, techniques allow the appearance of

5 Many anthropologists have remarked how crafters, when asked about their technique, cannot explain it verbally and instead prefer to directly show how a product is made (e.g. Chamoux 2010, 144).

> innovation thanks to the role of individual agency. As in other fields of social practice, craft-makers can decide when and how deeply the traditional technique requires modification, according to specific inputs and/or needs. A dynamic balance can be found between tradition and innovation.

1.3.2 Archaeology and Culture-Historical Approaches

Craft production and cognitive archaeology demonstrate that there are parts of 'cultural narratives' embedded within material culture and crafting techniques. This provides material culture and crafting techniques with identitarian values and might trigger the shift from a 'material culture assemblage' to an 'ethnic or cultural marker assemblage'. Since Childe's theorization of culture, many archaeologists have acknowledged its potential for developing a methodology that attaches people to the array of objects, buildings, and other traces of the archaeological past. This correlation of people to objects that is at the heart of the culture-historical approach created a backlash in archaeological discussions, with criticism and reevaluation focused around the disputed notion that 'pots equal people'.[6] As noted by Jones (1997, 15-24), the culture-historical approach led to abuses in the interpretation of archaeological data by scholars who sought to justify political or colonial claims.

As mentioned above, a critical turning point in the debate over ethnic identity was the introduction of Barth's (1969) instrumental perspective. According to this new perspective, ethnic identity should be examined in terms of the relations and ideological boundaries which societies define for themselves, instead of focusing on cultural markers (1969; Jones 1997, 72-3; Voskos, Knapp 2008, 662). In archaeological debate, the discussion on ethnic identities then became focused on which aspects of society are markers of identity. From this discussion arose the suggestion to abandon the concept of 'ethnic identity' in archaeology (see above) and a limited consensus on what can be considered an ethnic or cultural marker (what Knapp 2008, 33 identifies as "the archaeological dilemma"). However, more importantly, it became clear that

> it is essential that archaeologists do not assume that the etic ('objective') criteria – such as recurrent artifact assemblages – we use to define archaeological culture coincide with a people's own self image and self definition. (Stone 1995, 10)

6 Merrillees 1975, 37; Stone 1995, 10; for a discussion cf. Voskos, Knapp 2008, 661-2; Knapp 2008, 38-44.

1.3.3 Towards a Different Approach

Our "century-old obsession with pottery as a reliable indicator of ethnic groups" (Sherratt 2005, 35) is not only an overly simplistic approach to ethnic and/or cultural identity but has also perpetuated the notion that

> foreign elements within the area identified as occupied by specific groups are generally viewed as the result of colonization, invasion or migration. (Leriou 2007a, 22)

This is possibly the most influential, and most problematic, side-effect of the culture-historical approach, which ironically led archaeologists to forget the peculiar diachronic, vertical dimension of cultural identity, in favor of a spatial and horizontal view (Bernardini 2005, 47). By often focusing on a single class of objects, or at best on a limited number of classes, and by overemphasizing the detectable breaks in a given tradition, archaeologists have developed theories of migrations, colonizations and invasions that have strongly influenced the contemporary history of various areas. As Leriou (2007b, 1) points out, the culture-historical approach remains the dominant attitude towards ancient material culture because it can be used to "boost the pride, morale, self-determination and cohesion of ethnic groups"; therefore, it is particularly important for "people whose national unity and collective rights are threatened by other, more powerful nations or serious internal division". Cypriot archaeology provides a prime example of the role played by the political background and agenda of researchers in dictating interpretations. It also shows how the "complicated relation of contemporary politics with the principle of archaeology" has influenced the current archaeological narrative (an insightful review of it is in Leriou 2007b, 3-27; also Voskos, Knapp 2008, 662; Fisher 2006, 83).

This recent debate has shown that the undeniable role of material culture in the definition of identities is played in an arena of constant renegotiation through objects and symbols. The identitarian values that are associated with objects are complex, intertwined and can thus only be understood in their wider context, which includes both the present and the past of a society.[7] Unfortunately, since contextualizing many aspects of past societies is often unattainable in archaeological studies, it can be extremely difficult to interpret material culture and techniques as markers of cultural identity. This does not imply that we can reject the practice completely though, since we

7 Stone 1995, 12; Sherratt 2005; Bernardini 2005; Knapp 2008, 380-2; Leriou 2011, 258.

would then be restricted to just the presentation of data and would have to abandon any possibility of broader interpretations. In their contributions, none of the authors mentioned above suggest rejecting the study of past societies through material culture. Their criticism instead is strictly directed towards culture-historical approaches that frequently utilize weak associations between the cultural identity of human groups and a limited number of objects (generally pottery) to develop wide narratives. Instead, as much as possible, we need to seek an interpretation that considers material culture as a whole and within its wider geographical, socio-political and economic environments (Stone 1995, 16). As this and the previous sections have shown, multiple group and individual identities structure and are structured by the interaction between humans and material culture. In order to decipher a society's cultural identity, it is necessary to consider how all these variables intertwine.

1.4 Insularity, Connectivity and Cross-cultural Encounters: What Identities?

1.4.1 Insularity and Connectivity

Before examining models of cultural encounters and how they lead to the renegotiation of group identities, which is the most important part of this theoretical chapter, it is necessary to discuss two other aspects that have played a key role in Cyprus' Pre- and Protohistory: insularity and connectivity. Both of these concepts provide a necessary, yet not sufficient, context for the study of Cypriot identities, and they cannot be ignored when putting material culture into perspective.

As obvious as it might sound, from a mere geographic point of view, the first and most important trait of Cyprus is that it is an island. This remark might seem to be superfluous, but it is paramount to considering how insularity has contributed to Cyprus' cultural identities. This section provides a preliminary definition for an island, explains how Mediterranean islands interrelate with other lands and people, and finally discusses the role the sea and insularity play in shaping identities.

At the beginning of the 2000s, C. Broodbank (2000a, 1-34) invited Bronze Age Aegean archaeologists to adopt a more marked "island archaeology perspective" and reviewed previous conceptions of both insularity and islands. Interestingly, however, he concludes his theoretical chapter without providing an exact definition of 'island' on account of the multiple ways in which insularity can be experienced. Instead, he suggests researchers "make a virtue of the multiple layers

and ambiguities within insularity" and remain aware of "the degree to which insularity is culturally constructed, open to multiple meanings in a given context, historically contingent and therefore liable to change" (18). The most important distinction to be made is between "analytical islands", whose pre-modern inhabitants unlikely considered themselves as islanders, and "perceived islands whose insularity was readily experienced by their occupants". There also exist "matchbox continents", that are islands which are large enough to act, under some circumstances, as "land-masses in their own right" (16), but this category is less important for our discussion.

A second point that clearly emerges from Broodbank's analysis is that the traditional view of island populations as representing secluded, 'pure' entities that become corrupted and eventually die out with external contacts is based on relatively recent examples of encounters between Western explorers (or colonizers?) and remote islands. This view is profoundly biased by several preconceptions (e.g. the romanticization of the 'noble savage') and is deeply misleading as well. Not only has it been proven that not all contacts result in a disaster, but anthropologists now also recognize that there are virtually no such "pristine communities" and that most of the islands have been "altered" from an alleged pure, indigenous state by simply existing (8-14). Currently, insularity is conceived as a 'fuzzy' category in which the sea and sea-faring culture play a key role in defining its perception, with insularity being "a changeable attribute and one that can operate at least on certain levels as a social strategy or way of thinking" (17-18). Following Broodbank's seminal contribution, other scholars have remarked that island inhabitants often decide whether to adopt or reject innovations, whether to enhance or diminish their 'isolation'. It is more likely that island societies consciously negotiate cross-cultural interactions under their own terms, and they create specific island identities in order to distinguish themselves from other 'neighbors'.[8] In addition to their "physical existence", islands are "also made and remade by people" (33).

However, by definition, islands are portions of land surrounded by the sea, which not only defines their geographic boundary, but also contributes to their insularity.[9] The undeniable geographic border created by the sea firmly delineates an island, effectively dividing people and contributing to their isolation. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, a border formed by the sea can actually be weaker and more permeable than borders formed by other natural

8 Broodbank 2000a, 20; Clarke 2003, 213; Knapp 2007, 44, 51; Leriou 2011, 251.

9 The definition of islands can also be metaphorically applied to inland areas, where access is restricted by borders that are difficult to cross.

or even cultural variables. For example, in the Mediterranean, where the sea can be crossed by vessels, this 'border' can also serve as a great connector, with travel by sea preferable and faster than travel by land (Knapp 2007, 46; Leriou 2011, 251-2). This double nature of the sea led Knapp to define "the island paradox", which he explains as follows:

> although they [i.e. islands] serve as essentializing metaphors for singularity and isolation, more often than not they are intricately linked into much broader social, cultural and politico-economic networks. (2008, 20)

Since the publication of P. Horden and N. Purcell's (2000) essay, *The Corrupting Sea*, the concept of connectivity has spread into the archaeological debate, and the Mediterranean has been increasingly viewed as an entity at the same time discrete and homogeneous (Panagiotopoulos 2011, 31-2). Connectivity can be defined as

> the various ways in which microregions cohere, both internally and also one with another, in aggregates that may range in size from small clusters to something approaching the entire Mediterranean. (Horden, Purcell 2000, 123)

This idea had been implicit in Bronze Age Aegean studies since the criticisms raised to thalassocracy (e.g. Braudel 1972; Knapp 1993), but Horden and Purcell (2000) were the first to explicitly elaborate on the idea, providing a formal background and drawing attention to some important features of Mediterranean connectivity. One of the most important is intervisibility, or the role a "mariner's line of sight" plays in expressing and conceiving unity, and where the "visual ordering of geography" contributes to the interaction of individuals. Broodbank (2000a, 38-43) also noted that only a limited number of areas of the Mediterranean Sea are completely out of sight of the land, and in particular, Cyprus and the Aegean enjoyed a high intervisibility both among islands and mainland, and with the coasts of the Levant and Western Anatolia. Thus,

> the lines of visibility that bind places across the Mediterranean Sea create […] a distinctive maritime milieu – a milieu that dominates pockets of the land world with which it comes in contact. (Horden, Purcell 2000, 125-7)

As part of more extensive networks, and mostly due to coastwise navigation, islands and peninsulas are part of an "inside-out geography", in which a territory is perceived from its maritime approaches and "distance is, in effect, inverted: places linked by the sea are

always close, while neighbors on land may, in terms of interaction, be quite 'distant'" (133).

Although scholars, especially historians, frequently focus on the commercial/economic aspect of Mediterranean networks, connectivity is neither limited to nor synonymous with trade. Indeed, any movement of people, no matter the size, scale, or reason of travel, should be counted, including for example groups involved in warfare, piracy, pilgrimages, etc. (154-7). In the study of Pre- and Protohistory, connections and movements of people have been one of the main topics of discussion. Unfortunately, biased views have also arisen, where specific periods of Mediterranean history have been considered as devoid of connectivity merely because many movements were overlooked due to a lack of archaeological evidence (151-72). Since the sea can unite as well as divide, Bronze Age scholars are well aware that islands can be isolated, but they are also "at the same time strikingly exposed to interaction" (Knapp 2007, 47). Panagiotopoulos (2011, 34-5), underlining that the focus of Bronze Age Aegean connectivity has to be placed "on the region in terms of space and on the states or elites in terms of social context", criticized the title of Horden and Purcell's essay for presenting a negative view of the sea. Instead, he stressed the importance of the sea in prehistoric socio-cultural interactions. Knappett (2018, 975), while considering connectivity and mobility, has recently called for a distinction between the terms, with connectivity "a property of the environment" and mobility a "property of people". Through this distinction, Knappett considers connectivity as "potential", meaning that in a seascape many possible movements of people are allowed. By contrast, mobility is the actualization of the potential, meaning the actual movements that are mostly revealed by material data. A further step in Knappett's view is highlighting that models of connectivity networks can be developed from a theoretical approach, but they need to be compared with models of mobility drawn from material networks that attest to actual mobility. The two approaches to network analysis should be combined to address the varied and complex interactions that are evident based on archaeological examination of the material record (976).

Indeed, the distribution and variability in archaeological evidence in the Aegean has stirred a debate between two opposed positions, colonization or migration. The next section will focus on the modes of cross-cultural interactions and on various models to interpret identities from these encounters. In this section, colonization, migration, connectivity and mobility are the models considered to try and answer the question: how did contact between different cultures begin? Cyprus is an interesting case study for the approaches that have been applied to explain different pivotal phases. On the one hand, there are scholars supporting colonization, either from Anatolia or

from the 'Mycenaean' mainland, respectively occurring in the Early Bronze Age and Late Bronze Age-Early Iron Age.[10] On the other hand, migration has been promoted as a view because it "empower[s] indigenous people at the expense of imperial or colonial regimes".[11]

Refusing such an antithetical conception of migration and colonization, Leriou (2011, 258-9) and Bernardini (2005, 46) have pointed out that both entail a view based on antagonistic ethnic groups and a notion of a clear cultural, or better yet ethnic, separation between natives and newcomers. Conversely, neither theory considers the reciprocity of exchange (see below) and, more remarkably, small-scale, frequent movements distributed through time in the background of apparently culturally homogeneous periods. Bernardini (34-6), from an anthropological perspective, highlights the value of an individual's or a small group's decisions and of patterns of movements and behaviors during migrations, and he requests that researchers carefully reconsider the major moments in European Pre- and Protohistory that are generally interpreted as the sudden arrival of large, culturally compact groups. Some of these 'major' movements can arguably be better explained by the frequent movements of small groups diachronically distributed over a long period of time (34-6). Moving from a similar criticism, with regard to the alleged Sea People/Philistine migration of the Levant, Knapp (2021) has recently revised the main positions in light of both the most updated archaeological data and the most recent migration theories. Not only does he comment on the existence of different types and ways of migrations and the variability of the groups involved (6-10), but he also clearly underlines that "Mediterranean prehistory and protohistory encompass a very broad spectrum of mobility" (54) that includes but is not limited to migration. On this basis, Knapp rejects traditional and "monolithical" interpretations of large-scale migrations in favor of a more nuanced and varied explanation for the changes in the Late Bronze Age-Early Iron Age Levantine coast (67-70).

In conclusion, connectivity is a relevant model to consider when attempting to interpret people's mobility in the Bronze Age Aegean. There exists a continuum of communication, of small- and large-scale movements, of "background noise" from coastwise contacts that collectively binds apparently distant regions and contributes to the exchange of people, goods and cultures (Horden, Purcell 2000, 172). In the end, connectivity can lead to the settling of individuals or groups of people in a different land, but the presence of 'foreign' elements in a territory's material culture does not need to imply large,

10 E.g. Catling 1994; Iacovou 1999; Karagheorghis 2000b; 2002, 84-113.

11 Voskos, Knapp 2008, 660; for further bibliography on the two approaches cf. Fischer 2006, 81-3; Knapp 2008, 249-58; Leriou 2007b; Leriou 2011, 258.

organized migrations or colonizations. Migration should not necessarily be rejected as an explanatory model, but it does need to be supported by solid data and scholars should not forget the other types of movements that the Mediterranean Sea could allow. By contrast, connectivity and insularity play an influential role in defining islanders' identities, by prompting groups to enhance or weaken cultural boundaries, according to specific social strategies. In an interconnected environment that might allow human mobility to various degrees, islanders choose the level of insularity they want to maintain, and this is reflected in various ways in their sociocultural identities (Knapp 2007, 49-51; Leriou 2011, 254, 261).

1.4.2 Cultural Encounters: From Acculturation to Cultural Fusion

The previous sections have shown that cultural and ethnic groups select the "narratives that give [their] members a sense of community" (Girella, Pavúk, Pieniążiek 2019, 523), and that in this process social memory and material culture contribute to form and implement identity. Identity is also influenced by encounters with other groups, and as just examined, there are multiple modalities with which this can happen in insular environments. Now we turn from the discussion on identity development within a group to the approaches that address the modes of interaction between groups with different identities.

Aegean Bronze Age cross-cultural interactions have often been explained with theories that consider how cultural and ethnic identities can be renegotiated in situations that imply significant interactions with outsiders. Feuer (2011, 519) mentions acculturation, creolization, syncretism, hybridization, transculturation, emulation, and assimilation as the main processes intimately associated with ethnicity and cultural identity. Among these, in archaeology emulation and assimilation are commonly regarded as phases, means, or outcomes of acculturation and have been subjected to intensive study for a long time. On the other hand, creolization and hybridization have been considered problematic approaches borrowed from post-colonialism to identify new traditions born from the mix of two cultures, with creolization particularly used in contexts of asymmetrical power (Jung 2009, 81 with further bibliography). As noted by Jung (82), given that these approaches derive from (post-)colonialist studies, their use is more acceptable in contexts where the presence of 'colonies' is proven, while a more cautious use is necessary when dealing with other cross-cultural situations of the ancient world. Other scholars have stressed the risk of reviving the notions of purity vs impurity of a given culture and the potential racist implications that can rise from the use of terms like 'pure' vs 'hybrid' (see below and van Pelt 2013).

Taking these criticisms into account, in this section acculturation is considered a broad concept that can to some extent encompass different interactions, and therefore it can most notably be employed as a more neutral term to indicate any sort of cross-cultural contact. Then, the discussion is expanded to include a number of other frequently used terms that have been employed in the analysis of Cypriot interactions with the Aegean and the Levant.

1.4.2.1 Acculturation

The following definition of acculturation was originally provided in 1936 by R. Redfield, R. Linton, and M.J. Herskovits and is still considered seminal for both anthropological and socio-psychological studies:

> acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups […]. Acculturation is to be distinguished from *culture change*, of which it is but one aspect, and *assimilation*, which is at times a phase of acculturation. (Redfield, Linton, Herskovits 1936, 149)

J.W. Berry, one of the main contemporary proponents of acculturation theories, considers the term comprehensively and refers to "the process of cultural and psychological change that results following the meeting between cultures" (Sam, Berry 2010, 472). In particular, Berry highlights the mutuality of the process of acculturation that is seen in Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits' definition, and he emphasizes the difference they trace with assimilation. Assimilation is to be regarded as a (non-essential) phase rather than a synonym for acculturation (Berry 2008, 330). From this distinction between assimilation and acculturation, he develops his theory of four main acculturation strategies, which have become the predominant framework in the analysis of cross-cultural interactions in acculturation studies (Brown, Zagefka 2011, 132, with further bibliography and a summary of other relevant theoretical approaches). Berry basically conceives the process in terms of two orthogonal dimensions corresponding to two different attitudes, (a) towards one's own group and (b) towards other groups **[fig. 1.2]**. One axis represents the desire for "maintenance of one's heritage and cultural identity", while the other represents the desire for "seeking relationship with other groups" (Berry 2008, 331). Depending on how these two oriented axes interrelate, Berry defines his four acculturation strategies, which can be used to understand interactions from the point of view of both the dominant culture and the non-dominant culture.



Figure 1.2 Acculturation strategies in ethnocultural group and in the larger society (after Berry 2010, 477 fig. 2)

At the opposite extremes in Berry's theories, there is "integration", when maintenance of cultural identity as well as participation with the other group are equally on the highest value of the respective axis, and there is "marginalization", when both maintenance of cultural identity and participation with the other group are low on the axes. Between these extremes, the two other possible strategies are "assimilation", when maintenance of cultural identity is low and participation with the other group is high, and "separation", when maintenance of cultural identity is high and participation with the other group is low (331-2). It is necessary to note that Berry recognizes that an important component to the success of any one of these strategies, especially integration, depends on their acceptance among the dominant cultural-ethnic group and that disagreements between the two groups can lead to conflicts.[12]

If acculturation strategies explain *how* people acculturate, the related concept of cultural adaptation explains *how well* people acculturate, or, according to Sam and Berry (2010, 472-8), it considers the "individual psychological well-being and how individuals manage socio-culturally". Remarking on the distinction between psychological adaptation and sociocultural adaptation, which represent two separate but interrelated aspects, the two scholars identify three perspectives for examining adaptation processes in contemporary studies: affective, which focuses on the emotional aspects of acculturation

12 Society's expectations of acculturating groups are the specific focus of Interactive Acculturation Models (IAM) and related theories (cf. Berry 2008, 332; Sam, Berry 2010, 477; Brown, Zagefka 2011, 132-3, all with previous bibliography).

(e.g. psychological stress and well-being); behavioral, mainly directed to cultural learning processes; and cognitive, which "is concerned with how people perceive and think about themselves and others in the face of intercultural encounters". The cognitive perspective is, thus, the most focused on identities (474-5).

The most used theoretical framework for cultural adaptation was proposed by Y. Kim, who defines cultural adaptation as

> the dynamic process by which individuals, upon relocating to new, unfamiliar, or changed cultural environments, establish (or re-establish) and maintain relatively stable, reciprocal, and functional relationships with those environments. (2001, 31)

She considers together the psychological stress and the cultural learning processes, as well as the eventual creation of identities, and remarks that acculturation also implies a process of "deculturation" (Kim 2008, 363). With this she means that, in order to integrate into the new culture, something of the individual's old cultural identity must be abandoned. This process is stressful for the individual who is constantly challenged to adapt to a new situation, and according to Kim (363-4),[13] adaptation's ultimate goal is the complete assimilation in the new culture (also Croucher, Kramer 2017, 97-8). However, as complete assimilation has been proven impossible to obtain, Kim argues that the intercultural personhood is a more realistic outcome in which the new identity is born from a "dynamic and integrative transformation" of the two conflictual cultural identities. She also stresses how this identity is not simply an addition of two elements to create a "multicultural", "syncretistic", or "hybrid" identity, but a product greater than the single parts of which it is composed (Kim 2008, 364).

Berry and Kim's approaches are widespread, but some aspects have been recently reconsidered, such as the focus on the individual rather than on the group (e.g. Brown, Zagefka 2011, 139-40) and the limited attention paid to the dynamism of acculturation as a multidirectional process that influences both groups. This lack of a multidirectional perspective that considers the group together with the individual on both sides of the encounter represents S. Croucher and E. Kramer's (2017) main criticism to Kim and Berry's theories. Croucher and Kramer notice how, according to Kim and Berry, "change happens almost exclusively on the part of the minority or newcomer", while in reality, it is impossible for the dominant culture to not be affected by the interaction with minority groups (2017, 101-2). Based

13 According to other scholars, in particular Berry and his colleagues, integration is the most successful adaptation strategy (Sam, Berry 2010, 478-9; Berry 2008, 334-6).

on this assumption, Croucher and Kramer offer an alternative theoretical framework called "Cultural Fusion Theory", where

> newcomers to a culture continually build upon their knowledge base/repertoire and fuse/integrate their previous cultural knowledge with newly acquired cultural knowledge. (98)

More precisely, in Kramer's more recent definition, fusion is

> the blending of differences that leads to outcomes that are different from composite ingredients (synergistic results). With regards to cultural fusion, this process involves multiple information flows, not just two cultures meeting and forming a third, 'hybrid' culture. (Kramer 2019, 14)

1.4.2.2 Acculturation Processes

In both Kim's and Kramer's theorizations, there are echoes of a wider debate on acculturation processes that has produced an incredibly vast array of terms to define cross-cultural encounters. In M. Kraidy's words,

> this rich vocabulary reflects the historical, geographical, and linguistic diversity of cases of cultural mixture, and mirrors the myriad approaches used to understand it. (2005, 2)

From the often-unclear distinction between assimilation and acculturation, to the sometimes too naïve use of increasingly problematic terms such as 'mestizaje' and 'creolization', it is important that archaeology engages with this debate and at least places the terms it borrows from other disciplines into historical context in order to avoid misleading narratives of the past. The following discussion is a very cursory attempt to do so.

As mentioned above, the archaeological debate too often overlooks Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits' disclaimer that acculturation and assimilation are two distinct phenomena. While introducing his own interpretation of acculturation as a mode of cultural interaction, B. Stone also remarks that in the archaeological research "assimilation is often confused with acculturation, but assimilation is a much more thorough process" as

> [a]ssimilation involves more than the adoption of material culture; the thought patterns underlying the 'veneer' of similar material cultures are shared when assimilation has occurred. (1995, 7-9)

In fact, as shown above, these two concepts arguably work on different degrees of scale. According to Berry, Kim, and the other psycho- and sociological approaches, acculturation can, but does not necessarily have to, encompass assimilation, since assimilation is one of the modes of cultural adaptation in acculturation processes, namely the one that leads to an almost complete abandonment of one's own native cultural identity **[fig. 1.2]**. Despite a number of different interpretations, recent archaeological debate is beginning to incorporate the ongoing research of sociocultural studies on acculturation and acculturation strategies.

Whilst assimilation and acculturation have reached rather stable definitions and many disciplines now can more easily borrow the terms, there is still heated debate surrounding 'creolization', 'hybridization', and a number of other closely related terms. Almost all of these terms have recently been questioned due to their original connection to (post-)colonial studies. This is especially true for 'creolization', initially a linguistic concept derived from 'creole' that stems from the Portuguese *crioulo* or the Spanish *criollo*, with the general connotation of "someone born in the country" in the contexts of European colonial possessions (Kraidy 2005, 56). Thus, in sociolinguistic studies, the term 'creoles' came to define

> new vernaculars that emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from non-standard varieties of European languages in (sub)tropical plantation settlement colonies around the Atlantic, in the Indian Ocean, and in the Pacific. (Mufwene 2008, 176)

Creoles' genesis can be complex and influenced by a number of factors that usually differentiate them from pidgin languages (176-83). However, much of the current debate over creole and pidgin languages concerns the question of whether they really are a separate language or dialects. As Mufwene underlines:

> These questions are tied to the ideology of language purity, akin to that of racial purity, inherited from the nineteenth-century European societies, which treated people 'of mixed races' as 'unnatural', 'anomalies' or 'inferior', and 'mixed languages' as aberrations. (175)

In such a complex discussion, any derivative use and borrowing of the term outside its linguistic context can only be more problematic, especially if used as a synonym of 'hybridization' (see below) or to indicate the simple mixing of elements of cultures (e.g. Ben Shlomo, Shai, Maeir 2004, 20). Not only should creolization only refer to a particular case of hybridization at best, but the undeniable connection with colonization and the implication of asymmetrical power

relationships entailed in the very term should also discourage archaeologists from its inconsiderate use (Hitchcock 2011, 272).

The less archaeologically popular 'syncretism' and '*mestizaje*' can be connected to the same (post-)colonial background. According to Kraidy (2005, 49), from a rather neutral meaning referring to "the fusion of divergent ideas" applied in particular to the study of "interreligious borrowing and intrareligious fusion", the concept of syncretism began to carry negative connotations in Catholicism. It was used to indicate the contamination of church doctrines by outside elements in new colonized territories. Postcolonial attempts to relocate syncretism and save it from "its charged history and pejorative connotation" encountered a limited interest, especially in Latin America where *mestizaje* was widely adopted instead (49-50). Challenged by the need to create new national identities, decolonized Latin American countries opted for a "foundational theme" that defined their population as hybrids of both the indigenous population and the descendants of Spanish colonists. However, as many scholars have pointed out, *mestizaje* not only "contains residual imperial relations" and is often a "deeply racialized discourse", but it has also been recognized as "in effect a tool for bleaching all but the most benign practices that gave precolonial natives their identities" (51-4). Once more, the original burden of these terms calls for extreme caution in applying them to non-colonial contexts, and indeed in this case for trying to find a more suited substitute.

1.4.2.3 Hybridization

The word 'hybrid' has already made its appearance in this chapter multiple times, indirectly proving that it is one of the most frequent terms in cross-cultural discussion. In archaeology, 'hybridization' has been the preferred alternative to assimilation or acculturation models (e.g. Knapp 2008, 54-9, 108; Voskos, Knapp 2008, 661, 677), and the term has enjoyed wide popularity as an apparently more neutral option (e.g. Kraidy 2005). Its popularity is probably due to the fact that hybridity "has a broader meaning that often encompasses the objects and processes captured by equivalent terms such as 'creolization', '*mestizaje*' and 'syncretism'", and it refers now "mostly to culture but retains residual meanings related to the three interconnected realms of race, language, and ethnicity" (Kraidy 2005, 1). On the other hand, its polysemic nature that favored its wide adoption has led to a "watering down of its explanatory power" (Hitchcock 2011, 277) and, according to some, has made it "controversial", "politically charged" and "conceptually unstable" (Kraidy 2005, 2, 47), which caused strong criticism of its use in the archaeological discussion.

It is, thus, first necessary to define hybridization in order to evaluate its adoption in the archaeological debate. 'Hybrid' was invented in the nineteenth century from a Latin word that was used to refer to "the offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar" (Hitchcock 2011, 272). Therefore, "hybridity began as a biological concept associated with the cross-breeding of animals and plants" (272), but it was then expanded to classify virtually any product of mixtures or blending (Kraidy 2005, 1). In particular, it emerged in the context of interracial contact in overseas colonies, and it is deeply rooted in racialist theories, according to which the mixing of human races would produce a hybrid, i.e. a contamination or a degeneration of the white European race (48). This original connotation led to an initial rejection of the term, while later postcolonial studies reversed and 're-popularized' the term to understand cultural contacts. For example, H. Bhabha (1994) celebrates hybridity as a resistance to the imperial ideology by the colonized, whose identity strikes back, a process that "undermines the authority of colonial representation because it brings to light the ambivalence of colonial discourse" (Kraidy 2005, 57-8, with a discussion on various postcolonial positions). Although influential, apart from a few exceptions (e.g. Knapp 2008), Bhabha's view had little echo in archaeology, while other postcolonial approaches were more successful. Many of them define hybridization as the processes of negotiation that take place mostly in "contact zones produced by colonialism" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin 2007, 108) and the resulting production of "*new* social and material creations […] that demonstrate their own unity and coherence" and are not merely the sum of the two cultural groups (Knapp 2008, 58, emphasis added; cf. also Voskos, Knapp 2008, 661).

B. Knapp especially has been a proponent of hybridization as an innovative approach to the interpretation of cultural contact situations in the Bronze Age Aegean. In addition to emphasizing the need to reject top-down and monodirectional views of acculturation processes, he has repeatedly stressed individual agency, the multiplicity and diversity of social agents, and the ongoing process and fluidity of identities (Knapp 2008, 106, 264-5; Voskos, Knapp 2008, 679). Indeed, such a view of hybridization, or better of "hybridization practices", is broader than its common use (cf. Hitchcock 2011, 273) and Knapp acutely underlines many important key points that have been highlighted also in the most recent cross-cultural theories. Building on the postcolonial reappropriation of hybridization in a positive light, Knapp offers one of the most complex perspectives on hybridization (see below). However, despite the postcolonial revival, some archaeologists have rejected the use of hybridization on the basis of its previously mentioned 'controversial' nature.

1.4.2.4 The Discussion on Hybridization and Other Approaches

Three main arguments have been presented against 'hybrid' on both a semantic and ideological level. First, as some scholars have pointed out, hybrid is a term that "can be appropriated by anyone to mean practically anything" (Gomez-Peña 1996, 12-13) and

> when a concept means so many different things to so many different people in so many different fields and so many different contexts, it ceases to have any meaning whatsoever. (Kraidy 2005, 66)

Therefore, archaeologists should not be tempted to use the term without contextualizing its theoretical background, nor should they adapt the term for their interpretations. To do otherwise risks enlarging the possible meanings, contributing to the confusion, and weakening the concept.

A second important issue is expressed by Stockhammer's (2013, 12) poignant reflection that "it takes two to tango", which means that "'hybridity' cannot exist without 'purity', nor 'international' without 'nation states'". According to him, despite trying to remove the notion of purity because of its deep-rooted history of xenophobic and racial discourse, hybridization supporters are actually reintroducing it in the discussion because "if we discuss hybridity, we have to define what we understand to be pure" (12; cf. also Young 1995, 24-6). From this semantic history, it is clear the term is indeed deeply connected to the colonial view. Born out of a biological and racial background, the concept of hybridity has often been used in the interest of dominant sectors and, most of all, it has been used "as a framework for studying and defining postcolonial nations and cultures" with a "particular geopolitical directionality" (Toumson 1998, 64; Kraidy 2005, 67-8). In contemporary debates outside archaeology, hybridity often continues to hide new imperialistic claims and is used to mask dominant actions in unequal power relationships (what Kraidy 2005, 72-96 has called "corporate transculturalism"). At the very least, then, archaeology should be aware of the risk of bringing along the idea of colonization and asymmetrical power relationships through the unthoughtful use of 'hybridization'.

Finally, from a merely epistemological point of view, hybrid is

> what falls between the analytical categories defined by us […] it is 'in-between' our categories; it comprises myriad features that remain unclassified; it is the accidental remainder that does not fit into the arbitrarily classified. (Stockhammer 2013, 13)

Essentially, hybrids are all those "unique objects with singular features or uncommon combinations of features" that remain outside our

classes: it is an epistemological stratagem to classify what we cannot classify (14). It is a mistake to assume that what is a class for us has always been a "meaningful category" for past human beings, as there is a risk of forgetting the dynamic and creative process that led to the creation of the 'hybrid', as well as the agency of individuals (14-15; Panagiotopoulos 2012, 56).[14] According to Stockhammer (2013, 16-22), it is more appropriate for hybrid objects to be thought of as entangled objects with different degrees of entanglement that provide possibilities for archaeologists to detect the process through which an object is appropriated and eventually transformed into something that "can be taken as a representative of a new taxonomic entity".

A number of other alternatives for hybridization have arisen from these criticisms. Looking back at the sociolinguistic field where 'creolization' was born, L. Hitchcock preferred the term "koineization", which

> is characterized by mixing, leveling and simplification of a mix of dialects over the course of several generations and is often found in areas where there is a sudden in-migration, followed by the establishment of a permanent community. (2011, 276)

In linguistic terms, the definition of "koineization" (Tuten 2008, 185) showcases two other key elements: first, koineization exists between dialects of the same language or "mutually intelligible varieties of language"; and second, it "is often found in new towns, frontier regions and *colonies*" (emphasis added). Two issues arise from this definition. If we want to transport this concept into the space where cross-cultural encounters occur, we need to assume some sort of 'cultural proximity' that would enable the creation of a *koine*. How, then, can it be determined where and to what extent cultures can be considered 'close', 'mutually intelligible', or, drawing from linguistics, 'dialects'? The very concept of cultural identity is such a slippery and hard-to-define thought that, in our opinion, it is a demanding task for archaeologists. Moreover, after rejecting 'hybridization' and 'creolization' because of their connections to the colonial debate, with 'koineization' Hitchcock has suggested another term that is possibly linked to the modern concept of colonies, although in a lighter way. However, Hitchcock's koineization is presented as a complementary element to her main alternative model of transculturation. Contrary to koineization, which remains an isolated suggestion, transculturation has been frequently used as an alternative to 'hybridization' (cf. also Kraidy 2005; Panagiotopoulos 2011).

14 Notably, in the case of Aegean people on Cyprus, Voskos and Knapp (2008, 678) question the Aegeans' consciousness of their 'Aegean' identity at the beginning, and especially after "two or three generations of intermarriage", and how this actually impacts their will to create hybrid objects.

In his search for a new and sustainable approach to hybridity, Kraidy moves from Said's musical counterpoint, in which multiple voices play at the same time resulting in an ordered polyphony, towards adopting a transcultural approach. In particular, he remarks that "the prefix 'trans-' suggests moving through spaces and across borders, not merely between points" (Kraidy 2005, 13-14). Therefore, transculturation can be defined, quoting Martìnez-Echazàbal, as a "process whereby both parts of the cultural equation are modified and give way to a new socio-cultural conglomerate", being "thus different from both acculturation and assimilation" (Martìnez-Echazàbal 1998 in Kraidy 2005, 53). Applied to archaeology, Panagiotopoulos (2011, 36) stresses the 'trans-' prefix and conceives it in a looser way as "nothing other than being in contact and understanding the culture of otherness by transcending racial, ethnic, religious and cultural barriers". The attention is drawn on the "conscious choice of moving across social systems whose cultural features are fundamentally different" and the "diffusion of initial cultural identities as individuals cross the borders of different cultures and assimilate them". In doing so, Panagiotopoulos highlights the agency of individuals and their "capacity to free themselves from their own culture, and acquire several cultural identities" as opposed to the role of elites sharing one intercultural, or "international", lifestyle (36). Similarly, Hitchcock concludes that

> a transcultural approach to the study of shifting identities at the end of the Bronze Age favors the multivocal, intertwined, the complex, the experiential and the contextualized over the dualistic or monocausal explanations of previous approaches. (2011, 278)

Therefore, returning to Kramer's cultural fusion theory, according to which cultural identities are renegotiated in any direct or indirect encounter with the 'other' in a complex and fluid process, it is now clear that his approach is only the latest in a debate that has been ongoing for the past half a century and more. Nonetheless, it offers new possible perspectives, that had not been supported by organic theorization. At first, it was introduced as an open and dynamic system in which newcomers to a culture do not choose to undergo the process of 'deculturation', but instead retain their initial cultural identity and fuse it with the new dominant one in a product that fits the cultural landscape (Croucher, Kramer 2017).

More recently, cultural fusion has been expanded by Kramer (2019, 7-8) to overcome even the duality of 'newcomer' and 'dominant culture'. According to his definition, cross-cultural contacts can involve more than two cultural groups (a 'minority' and a 'dominant' one) and fusion is a process of integration of alterities coming from countless channels that constantly retransforms the environment in

which they engage (1-3). Contrary to Kim, Kramer's cultural fusion theory does not consider differences inside the society as threats to the system's balance that need to be contrasted as much as possible. Instead, differences represent a positive stimulus for the constant renegotiation of a society's own identity in a continuous flow of change to and from "semi-stable mutation(s)" (3). Variety is considered a strengthening value for societies, since it increases their ability to adapt and thus survive, whereas alterity is a key element in the definition of identities. In this perspective, adaptation has neither a preconceived direction nor a final goal, and assimilation, seen as the loss of one's uniqueness and elimination of differences, disrupts the need for communication and weakens the system (4, 9-12).

In cultural fusion theory, the interplay of old and new behaviors and memories is the base for the re-creation of identities in societies (7). In this view, Kramer was to some extent preceded by Knapp's peculiar view of hybridization and by transculturation theorists, since all of them see cultural identities as fluid, mixed processes continuously moving across borders (Kraidy 2005, 14).[15] Cultural fusion represents just another, new approach to cross-cultural interactions that offers an alternative to more mainstream acculturation theories by including one or more cultural groups in the creation process of more complex societies, not limiting the interaction to two groups. At the same time, cultural fusion emphasizes that processes of cultural interactions are multidirectional and underlines that reciprocity of transformations occurs in all communities involved. In fact, while originally present in the above-mentioned Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits' definition, later theorizations of acculturation have neglected reciprocity in favor of a mostly unidirectional relationship between a submissive and a dominant culture. Finally, cultural fusion theory is of particular interest for the archaeological debate since it also underlines the role played by different types of cultural media and products in cross-cultural interactions, of any sort. In this respect, cultural fusion theory suggests that the process of fusion can involve also cultures that have only been in contact *indirectly* through media or any aspect of material culture (Kramer 2019, 31-3).

To conclude, although brief and hardly exhaustive, this sub-section has hopefully highlighted that cultural identities are inevitably negotiated in cross-cultural encounters. Moreover, it has suggested that all groups involved in these encounters take part in and are affected by cross-cultural interactions. While newcomers to a 'host' culture develop a newly fitted 'intercultural identity', people from the so-called host culture are also challenged by the encounter with the

15 Other features of cultural fusion that have been partially anticipated by Knapp (2008) are the role of material culture in mediating identities and the possibility of interactions that involve more than two cultural identities.

newcomers and eventually undergo some form of change. Eventually, the complex terminological discussion should not distract from these key traits that need to be remembered when studying ancient cross-cultural interactions. On the other hand, by examining the complex assemblage of terms that can be used to define these encounters, the section may also help raise awareness of the terms we use in our discussions. As previously mentioned about the 'ethnicity' debate, value-laden terms borrowed from other fields risk not only introducing into the archaeological narration concepts that are at best anachronistic, but also biasing the interpretation of the past with a contemporary perspective.

1.5 Conclusions

This chapter has focused on the mechanisms that contribute to the forging of identities, especially cultural ones, first inside the group, then when different cultural groups interact. A second focus, which is important from the archaeological perspective, has been on how these resulting identities are connected to material culture and crafting techniques.

After a brief review of the debate on ethnic and cultural identities, cultural identity emerged as a less politically charged term and it was defined as the aspect of identity that encodes one's sense of belonging to a group on the basis of shared culture (§ 1.1).

In § 1.2, it was then argued that cultural identity is strictly related to its self-representation, which is implemented through the shared memories of its members. Social memories are at the same time inherited from the past and constantly recreated in a communal framework. Every society, thus, needs to perpetuate those elements that are considered relevant to reaffirm and strengthen identity and/or to remodel it according to the changes that are collectively perceived as necessary.

In § 1.3, reference to craft production and cognitive archaeology has shown how material culture and the technical knowledge necessary to make material culture are strongly related to societies. This means that material culture and technology shape and are contemporaneously shaped by societies. Objects and techniques, as the embodiment of human agency, can also be considered part of those "narratives that give [a cultural group's] members a sense of community" (Girella, Pavúk, Pieniążiek 2019, 523) and that contribute to the creation of the self-representation or socio-cultural identity of a society. At the same time, the risks of a too simplistic view that equals material culture associations to cultural identities have been pointed out. The rejection of culture-historical approaches leads to consideration of the complex and intertwined context in which identities

and material culture interact in order to correctly interpret the traces of past societies.

Taking this into account, to contextualize Cypriot material culture, § 1.4 first considered how "sea and land combine to create islandscapes, which are seldom congruent with unitary islands" and how "insularity […] is a form of social identity, and a cultural strategy that islanders manipulated" even to the point of becoming "a resistant identity" (Broodbank 2000a, 33). Then, given the role of the sea as both a unifier and a divider, connectivity and mobility have been preferred as preliminary frameworks for interpreting Bronze Age Aegean archaeological data. Issues of colonization or migration should be submitted only after a careful examination of all the available data and not inferred *a priori*. This is especially true as

> Cyprus' geopolitical profile as well as its market potential […] resulted from both its insularity and its connectivity within the eastern Mediterranean (Knapp 2007, 49)

and mobility of goods and people played a key role in a large part of its (pre-)history.

Finally, the last and longest part of § 1.4 has focused on the mechanisms that regulate cross-cultural encounters and the renegotiation of identities that take place when cultural groups interact. From the myriad of terms and approaches, our suggestion is to prefer those models that most enhance the multidirectional, reciprocal relationship between cultures, acknowledging the complex, fluid and ever-changing nature of cultural identities. On the contrary, attention is required to the use of terms that have political connotations and that imply asymmetric power relations. The explanatory model we are applying to understand our data cannot be a pre-interpretation of the data themselves. That said, since the Cypriot Late Bronze Age is generally characterized by a low degree of insularity and, conversely, by a high degree of connectivity (e.g. Leriou 2011, 263), marked also by a considerable quantity of imported objects, it is worth considering cultural fusion theory's spotlight on the ability of 'things' to contribute to cultural encounters as much as people.