

Bridging the Gulf. Naupaktos 'Cross-Borderised'

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Abstract This article retraces Naupaktos' history from the Archaic to the Roman periods, challenging the traditional view that its historical significance was solely a product of its strategic geographic location at the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf (which was, moreover, constrained by political factors rendering alternative options preferable), and shifting the focus to its border position between different political communities (*poleis* and *koina*) and to the agency that transformed this border position into an advantage ('cross-borderisation').

Keywords Borders. Federalism. Federal states. Koina. Military alliances. Lokrians. Achaians. Aitolians. Messenians. Athenians.

Summary 1 Naupaktos, Place and Peoples. – 2 Archaic and Early-Classical Naupaktos. Real and Imaginary. – 3 Fifth-Century Naupaktos: Military Strategy and Multi-Ethnic Growth. – 4 Naupaktos on the Border between Competing Federal States. – 5 Some Tentative Conclusions.

1 Naupaktos, Place and Peoples

Despite its supra-regional vocation, Naupaktos is usually regarded as the most important city in western Lokris,¹ with a small but fortified harbour in a strategic position at the entrance to a highly connected and connecting area such as the Corinthian Gulf.² The city was situated on a promontory of the great Rhigani massif, which rises straight up to the sea. In addition to six funerary *pithoi* from the Geometric period, possibly dating back as far as the ninth century,³ rescue work has produced remains of Archaic and Classical/Early Hellenistic burials, providing evidence of especially Classical-Early Hellenistic activity (mostly black figure and red figure *lekythoi*, probably of Attic manufacture, and Corinthian pottery).⁴ Fortifications associated with the ancient city are reported by Thucydides (3.102.2-4), who suggests that while the walls did not encircle the entire settlement, they were nonetheless extensive;⁵ traces of them have been unearthed, but remain difficult to interpret, since an overall synthesis providing chronological classification is still lacking.⁶ According to the ancient sources, the site controlled a harbour located close to the settlement;⁷ ashlar blocks incorporated in medieval fortifications by the later harbour may suggest that the ancient harbour area would have been bounded by the circuit wall (one has to admit, however, that the builders may simply have reused ancient building material collected elsewhere).⁸ Remains of the ancient harbour include three limestone mooring posts in the form of perforated boulders embedded

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¹ Strab. 9.4.7 is the most frequently cited passage in relation to the Lokrian identity of the city. For its hybrid identity, see below.

² As already stressed by Lolling 1989, 447. Cf. Morgan 1988; Freitag 2000; Morgan 2003, 213-22; Bonnier 2014, 67-8, 112, 194; 2016; Loy 2023, esp. 136, 276.

³ Chatzivasilou 2020, 6.

⁴ *ADelt* 28 (1973) Chr. 391-3; Saranti 2018, 136-40; and below.

⁵ Cf. Gomme 1962, 363 *ad* 3.75.1, 411 *ad* 3.102.4; Lerat 1952a, 89.

⁶ Rousset 2004, 396.

⁷ Cf. Thuc. 2.92.1; 92.3; 4.76 (which do not always explicitly mention a harbour but nevertheless refer to the harbouring of ships) with Lerat 1952a, 89; Saranti 2016, 43-4. Cf. also below, 111, 116.

⁸ See esp. Blackman 1973, 121-2; Lehmann 1963, 65ff.; Hale 1996, 343; Bonnier 2014, 194; Saranti 2012; 2016, 44.

in the outer side of the eastern medieval breakwater, at an average height of 0.80-1.00 m;⁹ two more posts of similar form were noted by David Blackman on the western breakwater, one of which was demolished in the 1960s.¹⁰ The modern harbour of Naupaktos is small and 'incapable of receiving even the larger sort of boats which navigate the gulf'.¹¹ Thus, sediments transported by the rivers have reduced its size and potential as a harbour; this does not come as a surprise, since Naupaktos belongs to the type 'harbours in river mouths',¹² which are affected by considerable changes in their appearance over time. Yet, according to ancient sources (e.g., Thuc. 2.91.1; 92.3), the harbour was not large even in ancient times and was mainly reserved for warships: from a military point of view, this meant that it was not the largest fleets that had the best chance of success, but rather the admiral who was best able to exploit the winds.¹³ Be that as it may, the same sources clearly indicate its perceived importance, well beyond the period in which it was probably most heavily tooled up, namely the Peloponnesian War,¹⁴ both in itself and with regard to the shipbuilding-potential of the city.¹⁵ The etymology of the place name itself was interpreted as the result of the combination of 'ναύς' with 'πηκτός' in its Doric spelling (Apollod. 2.8; Paus. 10.38.10; Strab., 9.4.7),¹⁶ while Livy (27.30.11) testifies to the strategic value which a fleet that is moored there can have even in the framework of dynamics that involve Hellenistic superpowers.¹⁷

The aim of this article is to briefly retrace the history of Naupaktos from the perspective of the various peoples who contributed to the historical significance of the city. Assuming (but not conceding) that all nodes may be considered ports in a metaphorical sense,¹⁸ so to speak, are all ports nodes? It will be shown in this article that it was

9 Pritchett 1995, 66ff.; Saranti 2016, 53 and fig. 5. Foteini Saranti also reports that during the investigation of the area in the summer of 2014 they found an unknown ancient inscription written on a stone which might date back to the fifth BC or even earlier but does not add any details: see also Saranti 2018, 424.

10 Blackman 1973, 121-2; 1982, 203.

11 Thus already Leake 1835, 2: 608.

12 I am referring to Chiara Mauro's classification (2019), see esp. 39 and fn. 109.

13 Freitag 2000, 74-6 (with discussion and literature); Saranti 2016, 54. On the alleged proximity, to the harbour, of a temple in honour of Apollo, see Freitag 2000, 94, who rightly dismisses this assumption as an incorrect interpretation of Thuc. 2.91.

14 Hale 1996, 342; Simosi 2009, 171; Baika 2013, 233; Saranti 2016, 47. On Naupaktos during the Peloponnesian War see below.

15 See, e.g., Paus. 4.26.1.

16 Lerat 1952b, 6; Freitag 2000, 67 and fn. 337; Saranti 2016, 43.

17 In this passage Livy refers to the presence of a Roman fleet there during the so-called First Makedonian War.

18 Horden, Purcell 2000, 392-3.

not only its strategic position that made Naupaktos an important node, but also the importance it acquired thanks to the agencies of those who frequented, occupied, besieged, or even just passed through it: it served as a node in numerous historical phases, but through agencies that differed from time to time.¹⁹ Naupaktos was situated at the borders of many political entities and their zones of influence, but various peoples transformed this border position into an advantage, implementing its potential for interconnection by activating connections favourable to themselves. That way, Naupaktos became cross-borderised.

2 Archaic and Early-Classical Naupaktos. Real and Imaginary

Ancient sources repeatedly display the belief that Naupaktos was connected to various geographical contexts from its very origins.

According to Pseudo-Skymnos (vv. 478-9),²⁰ Naupaktos was founded by Temenos, the Heraklid to whom Argos is assigned, while Ephoros, clearly not followed by Pseudo-Skymnos on this point,²¹ reports that Temenos used Naupaktos as a shipyard during his conquest of the Peloponnese (frg. 121; cf. also Apollod. 2.8.2; Paus. 5.3.6).²² An ingredient of these stories is the desire to establish a

19 Reger 2013; 2016, 25.

20 Πρὸς τῷ Ῥίῳ κείται δὲ Ναύπακτος πόλις, ἣν Δωριεῖς κτίζουσιν οἱ σὺν Τημένῳ. Ἐπειτ' ἀπ' Αἰτωλῶν παροικοῦσιν Λοκροί, οὓς Ὀζόλας καλοῦσ', ἀποίκους γενομένους ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς Εὐβοίαν Λοκρῶν ἐστραμμένων. (The city of Naupaktos lies near Rhion, and was founded by Dorians with Temenos. After the Aitolians are the Lokrians who live alongside them, those who are called the Ozolians, having been settled from the Lokrians who are turned toward Euboea; transl. by D.W. Roller). See Korenjak 2003, 89. Cf. also Polyae. *Strat.* 1.9: with Bruchmann 1893, 11; Gogos 1993, 55ff.; Jacoby *ad* 121 (Komm. II C, 71); Parmeggiani 2011, 187 fn. 121 (vs. Melber 1885, 424 followed by Schettino 1998, 100-1).

21 Cf. Jacoby *ad* I: "Ps. Skymn. 478 πρὸς τῷ Ῥίῳ κείται δὲ Ναύπακτος πόλις, ἣν Δωριεῖς κτίζουσιν οἱ σὺν Τημένῳ kann hier die abweichende ansicht nicht als variante aus E direkt haben. denn für ihn ist Naupaktos aetolisch, was es 338 geworden ist; für E lokrisch"; see, however, Parmeggiani 2011, 187 for a more nuanced picture.

22 Strab. 9.4.7 (Steph. Byz., s.v. Ναύπακτος [v 22 Billerbeck]): Ναύπακτος· πόλις δ' ἔσχον (sc. οἱ Ἑσπέριοι Λοκροί) Ἀμφισσάν τε καὶ Ναύπακτον, ὧν ἡ Ναύπακτος συμμένει τοῦ Ἀντιρρίου πλησίον· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ναυπηγίας τῆς ἐκεῖ γενομένης, εἴτε τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἐκεῖ ναυπηγησάμενων τὸν στόλον, εἴθ' ὥς φησιν Ἐφωρος, Λοκρῶν ἔτι πρότερον παρασκευασάντων. ἔστι δὲ νῦν Αἰτωλῶν Φιλίππου προσκρίναντος (Naupaktos: [The Western Lokrians] held the cities of Amphissa and Naupaktos, of which Naupaktos still exists, close to Antirrion. It was named after the naupēgia (i.e., 'shipbuilding') which took place there, whether it was because the Heraclids constructed their fleet there or, as Ephoros says, because the Lokrians outfitted ships there even earlier. At any rate, the Aitolians now hold the city since Philip adjudged it theirs; transl. by Parker 2011). Yet Ephoros also believed that the Herakleidai reached the Peloponnese by land (see F 16): it is for this reason that he is then compelled to ascribe the name naupegia

connection between the Argives and Naupaktos, which also emerges from Aeschylus' *Suppliants* (262ff.),²³ where the future Argive king (the third one in the kings' list), Apis,²⁴ is said to have migrated from Naupaktos to Argos. Some have read this as an actual passage of the Dorians through Naupaktos in their descent into the Peloponnese; Eduard Meyer noted that it lies somewhat off the trajectory, far to the west.²⁵ What is really at stake here is the desire for a connection between Naupaktos and Argos (and the Herakleidai), a perspective that does not imply the denial of historical contacts with this or other Peloponnesian cities and people. In this regard, Corinth in particular plays a leading role: material culture has led some scholars to believe that Naupaktos became quasi-Corinthian during the eighth century, when Corinth needed to secure the passage into the gulf.²⁶ This idea was correctly dismissed,²⁷ yet fifth-century Corinthian pottery discovered through rescue work within the cemeteries of the ancient settlement points to access to materials circulating in the gulf²⁸ and needs to be taken into account. The same is true for a brief passage to be found in Thucydides, who presents Molykreion as a Corinthian colony (3.102.2).²⁹ One suspects that there are two dynamics to be observed: on the one hand, the undeniable Corinthian presence; on the other, the existence of local workshops whose history cannot be explained solely in the light of the Corinthian influence. In any case, Naupaktos was able to project itself, in reality and in the imaginary, beyond the Peloponnese. By participating alongside other western Lokrians in the foundation of Keos, the city had its share in Greek colonisation, according to an excerpt from Heraklides (Heraclid.

to the Lokrians' construction of ships there at an even earlier time (Jacoby *ad* F 121; Parker *BNJ ad* F 121; Parker *BNJ ad* F 16). Cf. also Polyb., 12.12a with comment of Lerat 1952b, 14-15 (who, however, recalls 12.12b), Walbank 1957-1969, 2: 351-2 *ad l.* and Freitag 2000, 67, 68 fn. 340 (with discussion and further literature); Korenjak 2003, 89; Luraghi 2008, 48. See also Bekker 1814, 305-31.

23 Which does not imply, as Trowbridge and Oldfather (1935, col. 1983) maintain, that it is Apis that Ephorus has in mind: cf. Parmeggiani 2011, 187 fn. 121.

24 Koiv 2003, 316 with sources and, more recently, Nenci 2021, 192-4 with sources, literature and brief discussion.

25 Meyer 1954, 233.

26 Bursian 1862, 147.

27 Trowbridge, Oldfather 1935.

28 One small Corinthian *kylix*, one late Corinthian *pyxis* and 40 black figure *lekythoi* from different burials. See *ADelt* 28 (1973) Chr, 391; P. 1054; pl. 346d; *ADelt* 28 (1973) Chr, 391; P. 1055; pl. 346b; *ADelt* 28 (1973) Chr: 391-392; P. 1057-1079; pl. 347-348; *ADelt* 28 (1973) Chr, 392; P. 1080-1084; pl. 348; *ADelt* 28 (1973) Chr, 392-393; P. 1089-1090; *ADelt* 28 (1973) Chr, 393; P. 1091-1101; pl. 349. See Schwartz 2001; Bonnier 2014, 68; 2016, 76 with discussion.

29 Gomme 1962, 411 *ad* 3.102.2; Lerat 1952b, 26; Hornblower 1991, 365 *ad* 2.84.4 and Antonetti 2010, 168 with further literature.

Lemb. Exc. Pol. 26 Dilts = Arist. frg. 611, 26 Rose³⁾). This information can be connected to some inscriptions found at Kartheia in Keos dating back to the last quarter of the third century BC and referring to a *philia* (see esp. IG XII 5.526 + Add. 319, l. 1) between the Aitolian Naupaktos and the Aitolians, on the one hand, and Keos on the other; Keos is conferred the Aitolian *isopoliteia* through Naupaktos (IG XII 5.527.B, ll. 6-7), while the cities of Keos appear to have been united in a *sympoliteia*.³⁰

What seems to be certain is that Naupaktos found itself in a position to preserve and consolidate its Lokrian identity over time, and it did so not only from the perspective of the Ozolian Lokrians but from a pan-Lokrian perspective. This is how the colonial reinforcement testified to by a famous inscription (found near Galaxidi) seems to be interpreted,³¹ an action that started from the Hypoknemidians (l. 1: Λορρόν τὸν ἡυποκναμίδιον), hence from the eastern Lokrians, yet also involved the Ozolians in various ways, and was precisely aimed at reinforcing the population of Naupaktos.³² Its chronology is uncertain. Based on letter forms, Jeffery proposed a date between 500 and 475 BC. Some scholars tend to lower this chronology but agree that the enterprise must have occurred before the establishment of Messenians at Naupaktos by the Athenians between 460 and 455 BC (Thuc. 1.103.3).³³ To this, we must add that it was most probably in

30 IG XII 5.526 (+ Add. 319, decree of the Aitolians): l. 1: τὰν φιλίαν, 527 (decree of the Naupaktians), 532 (+ Add. 321, decree of the Keians), 539 (decree of the Keians). See Lerat 1952b, 18; Funke 2015, 103-5; Saba 2020, 179-83, no. 41; Müller, Priol 2025, 233-4; Franchi, forthcoming (all with discussion and further literature). On the *sympoliteia* see Jones 1987, 202; Buraselis 2015, 366-70, both with sources.

31 IG IX,1² 3.718 (Syll.³ 47; Meiggs - Lewis, *GHI*, no. 20; Koerner, *Gesetzestexte*, no. 49; van Effenterre - Ruzé, *Nomima*, no. 43). Literature is enormous; see at least Lerat 1952b, 142; Buck 1955, 57; Gschnitzer 1958, 56-60; Lotze 1959, 56; Ehrenberg 1961, 18; Graham 1964, 40-60; Asheri 1967, 343-58; Larsen 1968, 48-57; Werner 1971, 53-8; Gauthier 1972, 351-6; van Compernelle 1976, 352 and fn. 68; Maffi 1986, 69-82; Jeffery 1990, 106; Daverio Rocchi 2015, 76; Blok 2018, 90; Giangiulio 2018, 285. Among the various sources that attest to the early perception of Naupaktos as a Lokrian settlement, Meiggs - Lewis, *GHI*, no. 13, inscribed on a bronze plaque in an East Lokrian script and dating back to the second half of the sixth century BC, cannot be counted with certainty, as its place of discovery is uncertain (Naupaktos or Psoriani in Aitolia?). See Meiggs - Lewis, *GHI*, no. 13; also Lerat 1952a, 53-4.

32 On this point (and on the mention of the Opuntians, e.g., at l. 11 or 13-14), see Gschnitzer 1958, 56-7 ff.; Larsen 1967, 50 ff.; Körner 1993, 182; Beck 1999, 53-62; Nielsen 2000, 112-15.

33 Cf. also Isocr. 12.94; Diod. Sic. 14.34.2; Paus. 6.2.10. See Lerat 1952a, 86, 93; Graham 1964, 41-2, 45-6, 230-2; Asheri 1967; Salmon 1984, 261; Badian 1993, 163-70; Pritchett 1995, 62ff.; Freitag 2000, 71; Daverio Rocchi 2000, 752-4; Matthaiou, Mastrokostas 2000-03, 452; Domínguez Monedero 2013, 457; Fragoulaki 2013, 203-4.

the area of Naupaktos³⁴ that the Pappadakis bronze (*IG IX*, 1².3.609)³⁵ was found where a law is reported which is written in an Ozolian alphabet, according to Jeffery. This has been dated to the last quarter of the sixth century BC,³⁶ although some scholars prefer a later date.³⁷ As the first lines state, the law deals with the allocation of land on the plains of Hylia and Liskaria (both otherwise unknown locations), as well as with provisions relating to inheritance and other issues not relevant to our topic. Whether or not it belonged to Naupaktos, this inscription provides for recolonisation in the event of a threat and thus well complements the picture given by the previous inscription. In fact, it alludes perhaps to another process of internal colonisation of certain territories (ll. 7-9; 16; 18-19).³⁸ It is not clear whether the possible additional settlers are to be Lokrians or of another origin. There are two options. Either we emphasise the strength of the connection between Naupaktos and the Hypoknemidians, or – in a more cautious vein, the option I favour – we recognise once again Naupaktos' remarkable permeability to contacts from outside the *polis* itself and its potential in terms of connectivity: even if Thucydides' account (1.103) that Naupaktos belonged to the Ozolians until the Messenians settled there is correct, it is also true that the city's influence extended beyond the borders of the Ozolians as early as the Archaic period. It is precisely this potential for connectivity that has been identified as one of the factors explaining the absence of coins minted in Naupaktos, as well as the fact that the only find of coins dating back to the Archaic/Classical periods consists of a single hoard of silver coins found in a silver box from the wall of a house demolished in 1936 (*IGCH* no. 19, Naupaktos 1936) and consists of ten staters apparently minted in Elis (they show similarities with fifth-century stateres of Elis featuring the eagle and thunderbolt of Zeus), unfortunately now lost.³⁹ As a harbour city, Naupaktos was characterised by (and allowed) transactions in coinages from other cities and by forms of multiple money.⁴⁰

34 The place of discovery is discussed by Hansen 1987, 89-90. See also below, Gschnitzer 1991; Link 1991; Freitag 2000, 69-70 with discussion.

35 Meiggs - Lewis, *GHI*, no. 13; van Effenterre - Ruzé, *Nomima*, no. 44; Koerner, *Gesetzestexte*, nos 47-48. Literature is very extensive; see esp. Vatin 1963; Virgilio 1980; Maffi 1987; Gschnitzer 1991; Link 1991; Gehrke 1993, 56ff.; Beck 1999, 53-62; Zunino 2007; Daverio Rocchi 2015, 192; Zurbach 2015; Favi 2016.

36 *LSAG* no. 105.

37 Klaffenbach *ad l.*; Koerner, *Gesetzestexte*, *ad* nos 47-48 (both ca. 500 BC); Vatin 1963, 16 (460-450 BC).

38 Körner 1993, 162-9.

39 Kroll 2016, 68 (see also 67) and fig. 2.

40 Kroll 2016, 67 and 71; for the concept of multiple-money, Descat 2001.

3 Fifth-Century Naupaktos: Military Strategy and Multi-Ethnic Growth

This vocation for interconnectivity is notoriously exploited to the full by the Athenians. According to Diodorus (11.80), fifty Athenian ships entered the Gulf of Corinth to cut off the withdrawal of the Spartans from Boiotia in the summer of 457. Such a manoeuvre is considered to some extent pivotal to the settlement of the Messenians led by the Athenians (Thuc. 1.103),⁴¹ which occurred shortly before the campaign of Tolmides, according to Thucydides, but at the same time, in the framework of the same campaign, according to Diodorus (11.84.7)⁴² and maybe Ephoros. Given that the *Suppliants* in many respects represent developments in Athenian domestic and foreign policy with particular reference to the Athenian-Argive alliance, it is tempting to connect this Athenian interest in Naupaktos to the passage of Aeschylus' tragedy referring to the fact that Apis came to Argos from Naupaktos. Is it an indirect way of emphasising the legitimacy of Athens' claims on Naupaktos, expressed through the medium of Sparta's historical enemy, Argos, which like the Messenians was potentially a strategic interlocutor in a key anti-Spartan role?

In any case, Naupaktos was well-positioned as a naval base, given its excellent harbour and location on the north side of the gulf close to its narrowest junction with the south coast. This would have been especially beneficial to Athenian interests in the area following the break with Sparta in the sixties or fifties of the fifth c. BC (Thuc. 1.102.4) and explains the pro-Athenian inclination of the Messenians.⁴³ Following a lengthy uprising by the Lakonian and Messenian helots of Sparta (joined by *perioikoi*) who had camped out on Mount Ithome in Messenia, an accord was achieved, supported, according to Thucydides (1.103.2), by the authority of "an old oracle", permitting the suppliant Messenians at Ithome to depart from the Peloponnese on condition that they would not return. They were settled by the Athenians in Naupaktos, which had been a Lokrian city before (νεωστὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων),⁴⁴ and hence are referred to, in literary sources, as "Messenians in Naupaktos" (Μεσσηνῖοι

⁴¹ See also Paus. 4.24.7-25.1; 4.33. 2 and below, fn. 42.

⁴² See also schol. Aischin. 2.75; Paus. 1.27. 5; Plut. *Vit. Per.* 19; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.3. Cf. Lerat 1952b, 34; Gomme 1956, 304 *ad l.*; Salmon 1984, 261; Hornblower 1991, 160-1 *ad* 1.102.3; Lewis 1992, 117-18, 501; Badian 1993; Parker 1993; Pritchett 1995, 75 ff.; Figueira 1999, 217-18; Freitag 2000, 71; Matthaïou, Mastrokostas 2000-03, 448; Antonetti 2010, 167; Matthaïou 2011, 50; Kallet 2016, 1 and fn. 5.

⁴³ See Fantasia 2010, 156.

⁴⁴ See comment of Lerat 1952b: 30 and 34 as well as, more recently, Badian 1993 and Fantasia 2010, 142.

οἱ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ).⁴⁵ Already a place of arrivals and departures, an intermediate stop for crucial expeditions, and the target of colonial reinforcements, Naupaktos further increased its multi-ethnic nature and its potential for liminality now. The very designation Μεσσηνιοὶ οἱ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ may distinguish them from their kinsmen in Messenia, represent their ethnic identity as a diasporic group in Naupaktos⁴⁶ and express the Messenians' desire to maintain a strong sense of identity in their new community coexisting with the Naupaktians.⁴⁷ A formal arrangement of uncertain date, regulating the cohabitation of Messenians and Naupaktians under the protection of Athena Polias (SEG 51.642: a sympoliteia?), provides evidence for the simultaneous distinction and cooperation between the two ethnic communities,⁴⁸ as might the fragmentary, chronologically problematic dedication of 'the Messenians and the Naupaktians' found in Delphi (SEG 32.550, l. 1: [Μ]εσσανίῳ[ι καὶ Ναυπάκτιοι] ἀνέθ[εσαν]), if the restoration Ναυπάκτιοι is correct.⁴⁹

Through the so-called 'First Peloponnesian War', the Athenians' settlement of the Messenians at Naupaktos is closely linked to their own animosity toward the Spartans and thus offers significant backdrop to the Peloponnesian War itself.⁵⁰ Despite losing land gained in Achaia and Central Greece during the Thirty Years' Peace, it is clear that the Athenians continued to maintain control over Naupaktos, whose closeness to Corinth constituted a further reason for the Athenians to be interested in Naupaktos itself.⁵¹ In 431 BC, Sparta and Athens went to war, with the majority of western (and central) Greece siding with Sparta. The Ambrakiots, Leukadians, Phokians, Lokrians (or better, some Lokrian cities),⁵² and Anaktorians

⁴⁵ Thuc. 2.9.4; Diod. Sic. 12.60.1.

⁴⁶ Luraghi 2008, 193-4. Cf. Figueira 1999, 220; Thein 2014, 285; Kallet 2016, 17, 32.

⁴⁷ Luraghi 2001; Luraghi 2002; Fantasia 2006, 71; Kallet 2016, 16-7.

⁴⁸ Matthaiou, Mastrokostas 2000-03 (*ed. princeps*) (proposing a different chronology: see esp. 448, 453 and below); Mastrokostas 1964, Chron. 295; Matthaiou 1983, 84; Hornblower 1991, 161; Lewis 1992, 118; Pritchett 1995, 69ff.; Luraghi 2008, 193 (agreed upon in the Fifties?).

⁴⁹ [Μ]εσσανίῳ[ι καὶ Ναυπάκτιοι] ἀνέθ[εσαν] | [ἄ]πὸ Καλ[υδωνίων δεκάταν τ]ῶν Ἀπ[ολων]. See Luraghi 2008, 193; Kallet 2016, 34; Palagia 2016, 77

⁵⁰ Their partnership with the Spartans had come to an abrupt end in the Sixties of the fifth century BC (see Gomme 1945, 298-301; Hornblower 1991, 156-8 *ad* 1.101.2 with literature and discussion), when Kimon and his forces had gone to Messenia at their invitation to help with the siege, as recorded in Thuc. 1.102.3.

⁵¹ Kallet 2016, 19.

⁵² The Lokrians are listed on the side of the Spartans in Thucydides' well-known list of the allies of the two warring powers (2.9). The issue is that the phrase 'Lokrians' is generic, making it unclear if it refers to all Lokrians, just those in the east, or only those in the west. Diodorus gives us a hint when he describes the Spartans' Lokrian allies as being in front of Euboea (12.42.4) and "the Amphissians of the rest" (Λοκροὶ

were all allies of Sparta (Thuc. 1.118.2-3; cf. 2.54). However, as was to be expected, "most of the Akarnanians" and "the Messenians in Naupaktos," (Μεσσηνιοὶ οἱ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ) became allies of the Athenians (Thuc. 2.9.4; Diod. Sic. 12.48.1; 60.1; cf. also Thuc. 7.57.8).⁵³

In order to counter the threats that the Athenians posed to Sparta and its surrounding region, the Spartans saw Naupaktos as an essential naval base from which to conduct expeditions throughout the Peloponnese. This was in addition to protecting Corinth and other significant allies. The allies were determined to drive Athens out of the area and, if possible, take control of Naupaktos from a larger regional and Peloponnesian standpoint. For the Athenians, Naupaktos and its naval station would play a vital role in launching ships for operations in the Gulf and beyond as well as controlling traffic entering and leaving the Gulf, especially ships leaving Corinth to the southeast.⁵⁴ The Messenian Naupaktians' almost obvious hostility to Sparta was fit for the purpose.

Early in the conflict, there are accounts of the first time Naupaktos was used as a naval station and the Messenians' direct advisory role at Naupaktos for the Athenians during the Athenian western land campaigns. While winter was setting in 430 BC, the Athenian general Phormio brought a squadron of twenty ships to Naupaktos, with the intention of monitoring movements into and out of Corinth and the gulf (Thuc. 2.69).⁵⁵ The Ambrakiots were at odds with the Akarnanians

τῶν μὲν πρὸς Εὐβοίαν ἐστραμμένων οἱ πλείους, τῶν δ' ἄλλων Ἀμφισσεῖς, transl. by C.H. Oldfather). However, this Diodorean material is not conclusive because Amphissa notoriously holds a unique position in the conflict between the Phokians, Delphians, and Lokrians, which has been referred to as a "Sonderstellung" (Bauer 1907, 41; Lerat 1952b, 57). The most likely scenario, according to Lerat, is that the Ozolian Lokrians are not allied as a whole at this point, i.e., at the start of the conflict, but that they are allied collectively with the Athenians starting in 425 (Thuc. 3.95.3). The Eastern Lokrians, on the other hand, may still have been Spartan allies; see Hornblower 1991, 511 *ad* 3.96.1. Demosthenes' intention to march "against the Boeotians by way of Ozolian Lokris to Kytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right until he descended to the Phokians, whom he could force to join him if their ancient friendship for Athens did not, as he anticipated, at once decide them to do so" (Thuc. 3.95) may allow us to infer this: however, it must be acknowledged that the two cases are similar but not completely comparable: Thucydides describes a friendship that is ancient in the case of the Phokians (although its antiquity is not that long, cf. Franchi 2022; 2023), but it is relatively recent and "not very staunch" in the case of the Western Lokrians (see Gomme 1962, 403-4 *ad* 3.95.1 [quotation from 403]; Hornblower 1991, 511 *ad* 3.96.1). See Franchi 2022; 2023.

53 See Kallet 2016, 15. Interestingly, however, there is no mention of the Naupaktians' personal allegiance or participation in literary sources. We hear about Messenians from Naupaktos, not the Naupaktians, when recounting conflicts in the region that involve Naupaktos or when allies are called upon. Nonetheless, the Naupaktians' involvement in the Archidamian War is very plausible according to Kallet 2016, 21.

54 Kallet 2016, 23 with fn. 18.

55 See also Diod. Sic. 12.37.1. Comment by Lerat 1952b, 37.

during this time, and they wanted to break away from Athens; they planned a combined land and naval campaign in the hope of taking Naupaktos. For that purpose, they requested Spartan assistance.⁵⁶ Together with a few ships and a thousand hoplites, the Spartan general Knemos landed (2.80.4), but Phormio managed to prevail (2.83.5-84);⁵⁷ he prevailed again when Brasidas, Timokrates and Lykophron were dispatched by the Spartans to Knemos as advisors (2.85-2.92).⁵⁸ On this occasion as well, the Athenians' strategic interest in the region becomes apparent. According to Thucydides (2.84.4), after prevailing over Knemos, the Athenians and their allies erected a *tropaion* and dedicated a ship within the sanctuary of Poseidon at Rhion. If Pausanias is correct, Phormio's exploits are also commemorated in the Portico of the Athenians at Delphi, which he reports was built out of the spoils they took in their war against the Peloponnesians and their allies, and where a dedication is located commemorating these sea-battles and referring to a sacrifice offered to Theseus and Poseidon at Cape Rhion. Pausanias specifies that « the inscription refers to Phormio, son of Asopichos, and to his achievements » (Paus. 10.11.6).⁵⁹ Furthermore, as noted by Jessica Piccinini, it is likely that a fragmentary fifth-century-BC dedicatory inscription, found within the temenos at Dodona, also refers to an Athenian naval victory over the members of the Peloponnesian League, most probably the one at Cape Rhion.⁶⁰

What followed was his mission to Akarnania (which also involved Messenians of Naupaktos) and his return to Naupaktos, from where he then sailed home in the spring of 428 BC (2.103). In the summer of 428, it was Phormio's son, Asopios, who set sail with 12 triremes towards Naupaktos and then continued along the Aitolian and Akarnanian coast. Once the actions he had planned were completed (and Asopios had fallen: Thuc. 3.7), the Athenian ships withdrew again to Naupaktos. From there, they set sail again, led by Nikostratos, in the summer of 427, on a campaign to Kerkyra, which could also count on reinforcements from Naupaktos (3.69; 75-6; Thucydides does not inform us about the return to Naupaktos at the end of the mission).⁶¹ Yet, from our perspective, the matter becomes interesting when the Aitolians (and the Aitolian-Spartan alliance) came into play. While Demosthenes was preparing a major allied campaign against the Corinthian colony

⁵⁶ Fantasia 2017, 60.

⁵⁷ Cf. also Diod. Sic. 12.48. See Salmon 1994, 308-11; Freitag 2000, 72 fn. 360 and 73; Kallet 2016.

⁵⁸ On this campaign see esp. Lerat 1952b, 38.

⁵⁹ Hornblower 1991, 370; Fantasia 2003, 552-3; Piccinini 2017, 145; Fantasia 2017, 60 fn. 191.

⁶⁰ Piccinini 2017, 144-5.

⁶¹ See Lerat 1952a, 38-9; Freitag 2000, 77-8 with further literature.

Leukas, the Messenians persuaded him to change plans and attack the Aitolians, assuring him that the operation would be easy (3.94.3).⁶² The campaign turned into a disaster: afraid of the Athenians' reaction, Demosthenes did not dare return to Athens and instead remained at Naupaktos (3.98.5). But this very Aitolian success created an opening for the enemy: encouraged by their victory, the Aitolians called in Peloponnesian support. Soon after, an army of three thousand allied hoplites, led by the Spartan generals Eurylochos, Makarios, and Menedaios, advanced against the city (3.100.2).⁶³ Eurylochos infiltrated Naupaktian territory with the Aitolians, wreaking destruction on the land (Thuc. 3.102.2), but Demosthenes successfully defended the city by persuading the Akarnanians to provide a thousand hoplites (102.3-4). The Aitolians and Spartans withdrew to Kalydon and other nearby Aitolian locations (3.102.5-6).⁶⁴

However, this Thucydidean passage is interesting for many other reasons as well. A few Lokrian *poleis*, including Oiantheia, supported Eurylochos, as he planned to step in at the head of the Spartans (while Naupaktos was allied to the Athenians).⁶⁵ At this point, being close to the Spartans also meant being close to the Aitolians, long-time rivals of the Naupaktians (as Thucydides emphasises in 3.94.3). The cooperation between the Spartans, Aitolians, and Lokrians is not surprising, nor is it that the Aitolians who lived in the area of eastern Aitolia bordering the Lokrian cities clearly had a common goal with the Lokrians: keeping Naupaktos in check. As a whole (i.e., including the three parties of the Spartans, Aitolians, and West Lokrians) and in its potentially more limited binary arrangement, this constellation would be nothing new.⁶⁶ In this specific case, however, we find the Akarnanians, who were themselves enemies of the Aitolians, next to the Athenians on the other side. In the winter of 426/5 BC, the Akarnanians invited Demosthenes to take command against the Ambrakiots, who were later reinforced by Peloponnesian troops (3.106). The enemy had invaded Olpai and threatened Amphiloichian Argos (3.105).⁶⁷ Demosthenes, the Athenian

⁶² See also Bommeljé 1988, 298; Freitag 2000, 70 fn. 347; Antonetti 2010, 168; Kallet 2016, 26. On the Spartan-Aitolian axis more generally, think also of the inscription first published and edited by Peek 1974, unfortunately difficult to date. Cf. Cartledge 1976; 1978; Kelly 1978; Cozzoli 1985; Sordi 1991; Landucci Gattinoni 2004, 109-10.

⁶³ Rosivach 1985; Freitag 2000, 79; Funke 2015, 88; Kallet 2016, 26-7.

⁶⁴ Fantasia 2017, 61.

⁶⁵ Considering that the sources describe so many unusual circumstances (such as Amphisso and Naupaktos), it does not seem appropriate to envision a unique Ozolian front (see Lerat 1952a, 39). According to Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian invasion of Lokris Ozolia (3.101), the Ozolian cities at this point appeared to have independent foreign policies: see Franchi 2025, 51-3.

⁶⁶ See Franchi 2025.

⁶⁷ See Gomme 1962, 416 *ad* 3.105.1.

general, arrived with 200 Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian archers (Thuc. 3.107.1-4).⁶⁸ Since the Peloponnesians outnumbered his forces, Demosthenes devised an ambush. This stratagem proved decisive: the hidden troops struck first and were mainly responsible for the rout of the Spartan and Peloponnesian army, killing many of them, including the Spartan commander Eurylochos (3.108). After a truce, however, the conflict resumed. On this occasion, Thucydides explicitly refers to the usefulness of involving the Messenians of Naupaktos, who spoke the Doric dialect and could confuse the Ambrakiot enemies (3.112.4). When the victory of the Athenian-Akarnanian alliance brought the campaign to an end, the twenty Athenian ships headed for Naupaktos (3.114.2).

There is another aspect of the aforementioned constellations of alliances that becomes significant in relation to the interconnectivity of Naupaktos and its projections beyond the Gulf of Corinth. The Spartan-Aitolian-Lokrian alliance, on the one hand, and the Athenian-Akarnanian-Naupaktos one, on the other, both leverage the anti-Spartan sentiment for the Messenians of Naupaktos and the anti-Aitolian sentiment for the non-Messenians of Naupaktos. The Messenians and the Naupaktians therefore found themselves aligned in the same alliance for reasons that went beyond the coexistence imposed by their geographical location and had to do with their respective histories. Indeed, over the long term interconnections and political alliances shape and sometimes reinforce one another in a dynamic of mutual influence, making alliances both a cause and a consequence of connectivity. As has been rightly observed, fighting side by side in the first years of the Peloponnesian War let them grow strong ties. A joint dedication at Olympia (*I.Olympia* 259)⁶⁹ dating back to the Peloponnesian War is telling in this regard.⁷⁰ Whether the monument commemorated the victory of 425 against the Spartans at Sphakteria (as stated by a later Messenian tradition reported in Paus. 5.26.1),⁷¹ a campaign in Akarnania including the capture of Oiniadai for which Pausanias is our only source (Paus. 4.25.4; 5.26.,1),⁷² the

68 On these archers, see Gomme 1962, 420 *ad* 3.107. 4 with literature and discussion.

69 Μεσσανῖοι καὶ Ναυπάκτιοι ἀνέθεν Διὶ | Ὀλυμπίῳ δεκάταν ἀπὸ τῶν πολέμιων. | Παιώνιος ἐποίησε Μενδαῖος | καὶ τὰ κρωτήρια ποιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ναὸν ἐνικά (IG IX I².3.656; Meiggs - Lewis, *GHI*, no. 74) (The Messenians and Naupaktians offered [this] to Olympian Zeus as a tenth of the booty captured from their foes. Paionios of Mende created it, having won the competition to craft the acroteria on the temple; author's translation).

70 See Palagia 2016 for a detailed study of this statue.

71 Most probably an invented local oral tradition, as rightly observed by Maddoli, Saladino 1995, 346 *ad* l.; see also Luraghi 2008, 191 fn. 67.

72 On this campaign, see Freitag 1996b; Fantasia 2006, 64, 73; 2010; Antonetti 2010, 167 fn. 21; Freitag 2015, 71. See also Thuc. 1.111.2-3, Diod. Sic. 11.85.2 and 88.2 as well as Plut. *Vit. Per.* 19.2-4, who ascribe similar expeditions to Perikles.

campaign of 426/25 BC (reported in Thuc. 3.105-114)⁷³ or all of them, as most scholars believe,⁷⁴ it bears witness to a strong collaboration between Messenians and Naupaktians.⁷⁵ The above-mentioned treaty between Messenians and Naupaktians (*SEG* 32.550) reinforces this view, if Matthaïou's hypothesis about the chronology of the document is right and the agreement goes back to the twenties.⁷⁶

After the very first years of the Peloponnesian War, Naupaktos no longer played a crucial role, both because the Peloponnesians gave up their attempts at weakening Athens in that area and because Corinth had in turn been neutralised in the north-west, meaning that Athens no longer had any particular interest in investing in the Gulf of Corinth.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the Messenians of Naupaktos continued to play a role outside Naupaktos. Although it is doubtful that the Messenians on the pirate ship assisting Demosthenes (4.9.1)⁷⁸ were from Naupaktos,⁷⁹ this is certain for the Messenians keeping up the fortification at Pylos, which harmed Spartan interests in the area and contributed to the raids (4.41.2). It is not by chance that one requirement for the Spartans to sign the Peace of Nikias was to demolish the fort of Pylos (Thuc. 5.18.7).⁸⁰ However, the Athenians refused to give up Pylos, when the Spartans failed to return Amphipolis in Thrace, which had surrendered to Brasidas in 424 BC (Thuc. 4.106), as promised under the terms of the peace. They probably did not need to convince the Messenians in Naupaktos to run the garrison in Pylos. They did so

73 On these campaigns, see, e.g., Fantasia 2017, 64.

74 See Roehl, *IGA* 82 no. 348; Lerat 1952b, 35-6; Meiggs, Lewis 1969, 223-4; Luraghi 2008, 191 (right after the Peace of Nikias, maybe to commemorate the victory at Pylos?; see also Figueira 1999, 215, and Whitley 2006, who link the monument to Sphakteria, due to the plural "enemies"). Palagia 2016, 82 argues that the monument "cannot be dated more precisely than between 425 and 410". Cf. also Kallet 2016, 35 and Tronchin 2022 with further literature and discussion.

75 Kallet 2016, 32 and fn. 60 on 38. The words 'καὶ Ναυπάκτιοι' should be integrated between '[Μ]εσσηνίοι' and 'ἀνέθ[εσαν]' also in *F.Delphes* III 4.1, a high triangular marble pillar with three pieces of inscribed stone at the base (Jacquemin, Laroche 1982, esp. 196-9; 2016) dating back to the period prior to the Thirty Years' Peace (Luraghi 2008, 188) or in any case prior to the Peloponnesian War (Jacquemin, Laroche 1982, 199, 204; 2016, 97-8). Kallet (2016, 34-5) points out that the early period of this same war cannot be ruled out. If the integration were correct, the inscription would reinforce the hypothesis of a distinct but not oppositional identity.

76 See also Lerat 1952b, 36; and more generally above, fn. 48.

77 Kallet 2016, 28-9.

78 See Hornblower 1996, 162: *ad* 4.9.1.: the "thirty-oar" mentioned by Thucydides is most probably a small boat used by pirates.

79 Thucydides does not explicitly say it. *Contra* Freitag 2000, 81, while Gomme 1973, 444-5 *ad* 9.1 is more cautious.

80 See Steup *ad l.* In the fifty-year alliance that the Athenians also signed, they had to guarantee support in the event of a helot uprising (Thuc. 5.23.4).

from the summer of 425 to 408 BC with very little respite (Thuc. 5.35.6-7; 56.2-3).⁸¹ Naupaktos and the Athenian contingents stationed there played a leading role in the summer of 425 (Thuc. 4, 49, for a campaign against Anaktorion), in the summer of the following year (Thuc. 4.76-7; 89; 101.3-4, for a campaign in Boiotia⁸²), and in the naval battle of Erineos in 413 BC (Thuc. 7.31).⁸³ Messenians from Pylos and Naupaktos both accompanied Demosthenes on his massive reinforcement trip to Sicily in 413 (Thuc. 7.57.7; cf. also 7.19 and Polyaeus, *Strat.* 5.13.1 about the Corinthians' concerns that ships might sail from Naupaktos to Sicily), and afterwards took part in the campaign against the Spartan party in Kerkyra in 410 BC (Diod. Sic. 13.48).⁸⁴ Their delay in evacuating Naupaktos following the Athenian defeat in 404 (Diod. Sic. 14.34.2-3)⁸⁵ is not surprising. Once the fight was over, the Spartans had to drive them out.

4 Naupaktos on the Border between Competing Federal States

According to Diodorus and Pausanias, the Spartans drove the Messenians out of Naupaktos (Diod. Sic. 14.34; 14.78.5; 15.66.5; Paus. 4.26) after the Peloponnesian War and returned the city to the Lokrians (Paus., 10.38.10).⁸⁶ The Athenians probably never lost hope of regaining control of Naupaktos, and we can imagine that this hope grew stronger during the period when the anti-Spartan axis with the Thebans, Corinthians and Argives was formed that would lead to the Corinthian War. It may have been during this period – although the hypothesis must remain tentative – that the tradition preserved by Pseudo-Skymnos took shape, assigning Naupaktos an important role in the story of the Argive Temenos. Again, as in the case of the passage from the *Suppliants*, an alliance between Athens and Sparta's Peloponnesian enemies that revisited Peloponnesian myths to indirectly express their own aims on Naupaktos? At the same time, Naupaktos' role in the saga of the Herakleidai may also be due to the emerging Messenian identity.

In the fourth century, Naupaktos' extra-regional projections intensified, and it is perhaps in light of this that we can interpret the increased variety

⁸¹ Although, it must be admitted, in these paragraphs Thucydides does not explicitly state that the Messenians in question are from Naupaktos.

⁸² See Gomme 1973, 572 *ad* 4.101.3 on the identification of Demosthenes' ships.

⁸³ Lerat 1952a, 41; Freitag 2000, 82-5.

⁸⁴ Kallet 2016, 31 provides a useful overview.

⁸⁵ Cf. also Paus. 4.26.2; 10.38.10. See Antonetti 2010, 172.

⁸⁶ McKechnie 1989, 46.

of coinage circulating there: the hoard of silver coins of various periods minted by the Phokians, the Athenians and others discovered near the base of the cult statue of the small temple at Molykreion in the hills above Naupaktos in 2014 are telling in this regard.⁸⁷

At a moment that is hardly clear (394? or after 389),⁸⁸ the Achaiaans possibly took control of Naupaktos, as well as of Kalydon, and retained it until Epaminondas took the city away from them in 367 (Diod. Sic. 15.75.2),⁸⁹ maybe to return it to the Lokrians,⁹⁰ who, however, increasingly came under the influence of the Aitolians from the second half of the fourth century onwards.⁹¹ Sometime in the middle of the fourth century, the Achaiaans managed to control the city again: as far as we know, at least since 341 BC, when Demosthenes recalled in his *Third Philippic* that Philip promised the *Achaian* Naupaktos to the Aitolians (9.34),⁹² and indeed, according to an account by Theopompus (frg. 235a-b) – which is unfortunately preserved in a fragmentary and incomplete state—the Achaiaans were present, although it is unclear in what capacity,⁹³ when Philip seized Naupaktos.⁹⁴ The city had a special connection with the Macedonian

⁸⁷ Touratsoglou 2015, 62, 64; Kaltsas, Moustaka 2016, 141; Kroll 2016, 73.

⁸⁸ Larsen 1953, 806ff.; Lerat 1952a, 39; 1952b, 44-5. In 389, upon Agesilaos' return from an expedition to Akarnania, the Aitolians hoped that he would help them get back Naupaktos (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.14), but the Spartans were allies of the Achaiaans would therefore give it to the Achaiaans (see also Funke 2015, 90).

⁸⁹ "Epameinondas, the Theban, entered the Peloponnese with an army, won over the Achaeans and some cities besides, and liberated Dyme, Naupactus, and Calydon, which were held by a garrison of the Achaeans." (Ἐπαμεινώνδας δ' ὁ Θηβαῖος μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐμβάλων εἰς Πελοπόννησον τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τινὰς ἄλλας πόλεις προσηγάγετο, Δύμην δὲ καὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ Καλυδῶνα φρουρουμένην ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν ἡλευθέρωσεν). Cf. also Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.14 with comment by Freitag 2000, 86 and Funke 2015, 90. See also Lerat 1952b, 56-7; Bommeljé 1988; Merker 1989; Landucci Gattinoni 2004; Antonetti 2010, 165 fn. 11 and Biagetti in this volume.

⁹⁰ Merker 1989, 305; Beck 1997, 48.

⁹¹ Oldfather 1926 (c. 1207) went so far as to assume an Aitolian phase of Naupaktos in the middle of the fourth century building on Unger's dating of Pseudo-Scylax's *Periplus* (see its Aitolian list of cities: 35) to 347 (Unger 1874, 29-45).

⁹² Lerat 1952b, 49: maybe during the Sacred War, when the Achaiaans found themselves in a favourable position to seize Naupaktos as allies of the Phokians.

⁹³ See Fantasia 2017, 90-91 fn. 63.

⁹⁴ See also Strab. 9.4.7; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56a-b; Dem. *Or.* 9.34. Cf. Dubois 1885, 33; Momigliano 1934, 144, 158 and 162; Schäfer 1859, 483 (= 1886², 559 fn. 2); Jacoby 1926-30 *ad* Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 235 a (= Suda s.v. Φρουρήσεις ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ [φ 742 Adler]) and b; Flacelière 1937, 42; Lerat 1952a, 54-5, 86-93; 1952b, 993; Fabre 1965, 360; Ellis 1976, 196-7; Hammond, Griffith 1979, 508-9; Corsten 1999, 150-1; Marcotte 1986, 170; Freitag 2000, 87; 2005, 86-8; Grainger 1999, 42-4, 87; Landucci Gattinoni 2004, 11-12; Rousset 2004; Antonetti 2010, 164; Rzepka 2004; Shipley 2011, 116-17 *ad* Pseudo-Scyl. 35; Shipley 2017 *ad* Pseudo-Scyl. 35. Some modern scholars have interpreted Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 235 a (*ap.* Suda s.v. Φρουρήσεις ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ [φ 742 Adler]) and b (*ap.* Zen. 6.33) which came in two different variants as a confirmation of Philip's assignment of Naupaktos to the Aitolians, see however the remarks of Bosworth 1976

kings. This is suggested both by the hoard of silver coins from Molykreion mentioned above, which also contains three posthumous tetradrachms of Alexander the Great,⁹⁵ and even more by subsequent events: Naupaktos was controlled by the Aitolians throughout the third century BC⁹⁶ and is still Aitolian at the time of the famous peace treaty of 217 between the Aitolians, the Achaians and Philip V (appointed by Philip V, Kleonikos of Naupaktos, proxenos of the Achaians, participated in the negotiations: Polyb. 5.102.4 and 7.104.1-105.2).⁹⁷ It is interesting to note, with Buraselis, that it was precisely its geographical proximity to the Achaians, proponents of this spirit of cooperation on the part of the Greek cities towards Macedonia, that made it a suitable place for negotiations in many respects.⁹⁸ Once again, Naupaktos became the site of military operations during the First Macedonian War: in 211 BC, Valerius Laevinus arrived from Oiniadai and Nasos to organise an expedition against Antikyra (Liv. 26.26); in 209, still in the context of the First Macedonian War, we find the Roman fleet stationed at Naupaktos (Liv. 27.30.11), and it was at Naupaktos that the Romans encountered the Aitolians in the period following the Peace of Phoinike in 200 (Polyb. 16.27.1-5), and again in 199 BC (Liv. 31.29-32). Beyond its strategic role in military operations and negotiations, Naupaktos' name resonated far beyond Lokris, and its inhabitants were active far beyond the region.⁹⁹

Klaffenbach believed that Naupaktos was no longer Aitolian in 201 and 182 (*IG IX* 1², XXXII and XLIII), the years to which two different decrees of proxenia conferred by the Aitolians on an individual from Naupaktos are dated, but the idea that *koina* only conferred proxenia on communities not belonging to them has been disproved (*IG IX* 1².30 and *Syll.*³ 585, fn. 64).¹⁰⁰ According to Polybios (16.27.4), the Aitolians met or held assemblies in Naupaktos in 193 (Liv. 35.12), in 191 (with Antiochos; 36.11.5-7) and in 190 (37.4.4-7). The city seems

(followed by Gullath 1982, 131-3 and Mendels 1984, 135-6 as well as Grainger 1999, 41-53) and the general discussion in Landucci Gattinoni 2004, 111-20). See also Bommeljé 1988, 310; Merker 1989, 308-11; Sordi 1997, 103, fn. 61; Freitag 2000, 87-8; Scholten 2000, 13-14; Damigos 2016, 114; Fantasia 2017, 90 fn. 63; Franchi 2025, 56.

95 Kaltsas, Moustaka 2016, 141.

96 *Syll.*³ 380; 412; *IG IX* 1².3.632, 635, 638, 639; *IG IX* 1².1.17.A, l. 52; 618; 625a; *IG XI* 4.692; *IG XII* 5.526 (+ Add. 319); 527; 532; 539; Polyb., 4.16.9 with comment of Lerat 1952b, 70 (Naupaktos is the location of negotiations between the Illyrian Skerdilaidas and the Aitolians); 5.95.11; Liv. 26.24.1; 28.1; Paus., 6.16.2; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.16.18. Cf. Dubois 1885, 33; Lerat 1952a, 86-93; 1952b, 993; Klaffenbach in *IG IX* 1².3, XX.

97 Cabanes 1976, 262.

98 Buraselis 2016, 111.

99 See *IG IX* 1.228 (Drymaia); *IG VII*.2224 (Thisbe); *IG XI* 4.692 and *IG XI* 4.837 (Delos); *I. Magnesia* 28 (Magnesia on the Maeander).

100 Funke 2015, 104 with reference to the Aitolians; Mack 2015, 209-10.

to have remained an Aitolian one even in the following decades.¹⁰¹ It should also be noted that at some point – the exact time is unclear, but it may date back quite far – the Aitolians must have fostered the belief that Naupaktos had been Aitolian territory since the time of Meleager, a belief reported by John Tzetzes (*Allegoriae in Iliadem* 9.103-5 with comment by Funke 2015, 91 fn. 13).

The fact that it was still perceived as an important city with a memorable past during the Roman Imperial age is evidenced by the story concerning the correct location of Hesiod's bones, disputed between Naupaktos and Orchomenos (Paus. 10.38.3-4; Plut. *Conv. Sept. Sap.* 19 [Mor. 162e-f]; *Cert. Hom. Hes.*, 350-7; cf. also Paus. 9.31.6),¹⁰² as well as by the *Songs* of Naupaktos, a collection of *epe* described by Pausanias (10.38.11) as a narrative of female exploits.¹⁰³

5 Some Tentative Conclusions

The events discussed so far are well known and are well understood in light of one fact: Naupaktos and its harbour had a strategic location.¹⁰⁴

And yet, we know very well that often the strategic potential of a location does not fully emerge unless activated by the agency of the people involved. Not only that. It is the agency of the different actors involved that determines the forms in which that potential is activated. Precisely, this seems what has happened in the case of Naupaktos.

Naupaktos is located at a crucial junction, but for some Greeks it is not the only option. There are alternatives more attractive to some Aitolian settlements as for example Oiantheia, now identified with modern Vitrinitsa, which according to Pausanias (10.38.9) borders with Naupaktos (ὁμοροῦσά ἐστι Ναύπακτος) and in a strategic location, too. As I have shown elsewhere,¹⁰⁵ Oiantheia is faster to reach from crucial Aitolian centres such as Kallipolis-Steno and Aigion-Strouza, important for the exchange with the hinterland, than Naupaktos (7-8 h versus 14 h). Furthermore, to get to Naupaktos, one needs to ford the Mornos River, which is far from easy;¹⁰⁶ and indeed, Oiantheia is among the Lokrian centres explicitly mentioned by Thucydides among those taking part in the Spartan expedition urged on by the Aitolians themselves, and it is also from Oiantheia

¹⁰¹ Larsen 1967, 422ff. See Strab., 9.4.7; Plin. *HN* 4.6.

¹⁰² Freitag 2000, 68-9; Chatzivasilou 2020.

¹⁰³ West 2003, 3.

¹⁰⁴ Larsen 1952a, 66, 69; Lehmann 1967, 16.

¹⁰⁵ Franchi 2025.

¹⁰⁶ Gomme 1962, 408 *ad* 3.97.1, 411 *ad* 3.102.2.

that, centuries later, the Aitolians set sail against the Achaian Aigeira during the Social War (Polyb. 4.57.2, 219 BC), although Naupaktos had not been in Athenian control for a long time. Projecting power towards the Achaian centres beyond the Gulf of Corinth seems almost easier from Oiantheia than from Naupaktos.

In short, Naupaktos' strategic geographic position is not enough to make it the port of choice for all, certainly not for the Aitolians nor for all those political-military situations in which the importance of the north-south axis prevailed in the relationship between the Aitolians and other Greeks or Macedonians active in Central Greece on the one hand and the Achaians on the other. In these cases, it is not Naupaktos as a place that has made it a hub of considerable importance over the centuries; it is the people who have cross-borderised it.

Cross-borderisation is a phenomenon that often occurs in history: when people activate social or economic interactions in order to enhance the potential of a border location the latter becomes, through this very activation, a relevant hub, at least for two reasons: first, because it is an advantageous form for those who activate its potential; second, because the network node involved is on a border (i.e., there is something specific and maybe even different with networking). Cross-borderisation transforms a potentially (though not necessarily) unfavourable condition such as a border location into a favourable one and also enhances potentially favourable conditions such as ports.

As far as I know, the concept is new in ancient history,¹⁰⁷ but very familiar to those who study borders in the contemporary age, particularly in studies on the European Union and its European groupings of territorial cooperation (EGTC). EGTCs are groupings of areas featuring strong informal cross-border cooperation (CBC) aimed at consolidating and enhancing this very CBC through institutionalisation. These areas might be contiguous but also spatially dispersed, and, moreover, they form the periphery of a political community, being on its borders, but through CBC they benefit from this very position, being able to intensify contacts with those beyond the border: immediately beyond, or far beyond.

Obviously, the comparison with ancient Greece cannot be made without mediation. To begin with, ancient Greek history only knows informal, non-institutionalised forms of CBC. Nevertheless, by avoiding comparing the incomparable on the one hand, but valuing the very idea of CBC on the other, this perspective can be

107 Conversely, analyses of cross-border interactions have become increasingly frequent, yet without highlighting the mechanisms through which they become advantageous for the individuals inhabiting these zones (that is, actual cross-borderisation): cf. Lucas 2019, esp. 242.

useful, especially when it comes to framing the phenomenon of cross-borderisation.

In fact, Naupaktos is in a border zone, both in a literal sense, between Aitolians, Lokrians and Achaïans, depending on the historical period,¹⁰⁸ and in a figurative sense, as a border not between regions referencing suprapoleic political entities but between *poleis*, that is between their colliding zones of influence: thus Athens, Corinth, the Hypoknemidians and more generally speaking the Lokrians, the Achaïans, the Aitolians.

This border location is by no means a disadvantage. And not only because Naupaktos overlooks the Gulf of Corinth and therefore its location can be considered strategic (we have seen that there were other settlements in locations that were at least as strategic). This location is not a disadvantage because various peoples have turned it into an advantage.

The brief overview of its history outlined in the previous pages has shown that Naupaktos was clearly important to the Lokrians, both the Ozolians and the Hypoknemidians, as both the inscription found at Chaleion and the Pappadakis bronze demonstrate in different forms and to different degrees. This is also somewhat supported by the fact that the inscriptions discovered in Delphi and Olympia examined above mention separately the Messenians and the Naupaktians, i.e. the Messenians of Naupaktos and the Lokrians of Naupaktos, who, while collaborating, maintained distinct identities. We might go so far as to say, perhaps, that the Naupaktians provide for the maintenance of the Lokrian component of the identity of the inhabitants of this settlement. An awareness of this Lokrian identity seems to be preserved by Herakleides Lembos and Aristoteles. To some extent the Lokrian identity was thus assured, although it must be said that the stories about the genealogies of the eponymous hero of the Lokrians Lokros, rich in toponyms, never mention Naupaktos. The interest of the Athenians dated back at least to the fifth century BC. In this case, the choice of Naupaktos was certainly due to its potential for Mediterranean projection towards Sicily and Magna Graecia, and the city was clearly preferable to other coastal towns in Lokris. But there is more to it than that. The Athenians showed their presence in the Gulf of Corinth in various anti-Spartan actions, and above all they settled the rebel Messenians there. This Athenian agency in an anti-Spartan and progressively also anti-Aitolian key (think of the framework of

108 Cf. Pseudo-Scylax; Dion. Kalliph. with comment of Lerat 1952b, 60-61; 1952a, 75. Given that it is not very likely that regions and ethnic groups were divided by continuous linear borders, it is more appropriate to identify border areas that only acquire linear precision in certain sections (see Franchi 2024 with previous bibliography). In this sense, Naupaktos was situated in a border area, both with respect to the Aitolians and the Achaïans

alliances during the Peloponnesian War) also had a backlash: the configuration and consolidation of an axis between Aitolian-Spartans and other Lokrian cities on the coast, including Oiantheia, precisely in an anti-Naupaktos key. And this at least until 425, when, according to Thucydides, the (Ozolian) Lokrians, hitherto disjointed in their policy of alliances, formalised their support for the Athenians.

So far, in short, Naupaktos was networked and cross-borderised in Lokrian and Athenian terms.

After the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the border position was optimised and turned into an opportunity by other parties. Clearly, the Achaians were also involved, for all the reasons already listed by Claudio Biagetti in this volume. Epaminondas would bring the Lokrians back into play, thereby preparing the ground for an Aitolian takeover. At that point, Naupaktos was, one might say, cross-borderised by the Achaians but, above all, by the Aitolians, and in an anti-Aitolian and anti-Achaian role respectively. After all, in addition to overlooking the sea and providing a strategic landing place for ships, Naupaktos was located on the border between the areas controlled by the Aitolians and Achaians and, as such, lent itself to being functionalised by one against the other and the other way around. The protagonists here were not the nodes of a network or the borders between *ethne*, but those who dwelled in them, crossed them, and turned them into opportunities, far beyond the possibilities offered by the strategic position, which was activated in its own favour and thus precluded to others.

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