Rivista | JoLMA
Fascicolo | 5 | 2 | 2024
Articolo | Error Theories of Absence Causation Are Not (Yet) Adequately Motivated
Error Theories of Absence Causation Are Not (Yet) Adequately Motivated
Abstract
In this paper I consider the merits and motivations for eliminativist error theories of absence causation, such as those offered by Beebee, Varzi, and Mumford. According to such views, there is no causation by absence. Here I argue that, despite offering an alternative picture of the practice of citing absences as causes, these views are inadequately motivated. I consider and reject a range of arguments for error-theoretic approaches, including appeals to ontological economy, physicalism and the causal closure of the physical, as well as Mumford’s recent appeal to soft Parmenideanism. I also argue that the arguments in the literature which aim to show that causation by absence is conceptually problematic are less forceful than they might initially appear. The result is that there is no compelling reason yet why we should reject absence causation.
Presentato: 23 Luglio 2024 | Accettato: 17 Ottobre 2024 | Pubblicato 11 Dicembre 2024 | Lingua: en
Keywords Eliminativist error theories • Absence Causation
Copyright © 2024 Phillip Meadows. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Permalink http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2024/03/002
