La destinazione della volontà. Duns Scoto critico di Tommaso d’Aquino nel Quodlibet, q. 16
Abstract
The text of Duns Scotus’ Quodlibet, q. 16 contains an extended criticism of Thomas Aquinas’ thesis on the natural necessity relating human will and good, both as in its universal consideration and as a Supreme Good. After a brief description of Aquinas’ thought on natural necessity and its compatibility with freedom of the will, the article deepens Duns Scotus’ arguments against Aquinas, and their relationship with a particular theory of natural appetite, considered as affection for advantageous (affectio commodi). In the last part, the article describes the way in which Scotus holds an alternative and peculiar kind of compatibility between necessity, freedom, and contingency, affecting human will.
Submitted: Sept. 10, 2024 | Accepted: Oct. 1, 2024 | Published March 13, 2025 | Language: it
Keywords Thomas Aquinas • Contingency • Duns Scotus • Natural Necessity • Free Will
Copyright © 2025 Gian Pietro Soliani. This is an open-access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction is permitted, provided that the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. The license allows for commercial use. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
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