The Dark Side of Being: on What There is Not
Editors: Filippo Costantini (Ca’ Foscari University), Filippo Casati (Lehigh University)
In contrast to Quine’s Parmenidean (meta-)ontology and his preference for desert landscapes, recent years have seen a renewed interest in the non-being: non-existent entities, mere possibilia, negative properties, negative facts, absences, nothingness, voids, holes, etc. Interest in the category of the non-being is not limited to ontology, but has found applications in the philosophy of mind, both with the role that intentionality plays in relation to non-entities (Crane 2013, Priest 2016) and with the problem of perception of absences, and also in the philosophy of art with the much discussed status of absence art, i.e., art that features absences as esthetic objects (Farinnikova 2019). This issue of JOLMA aims to critically examine the role of nonexistence in our theorizing. We aim to collect both sympathetic and critical studies on this topic.
The questioning of Quine’s orthodoxy began by first challenging the Parmenidean assumption that we cannot have reference to the non-being. Indeed, this view seems self-defeating (aren’t we speaking of the non-being right now, and thus referring to it?), and this has motivated philosophers to explore the realm of non-existence, especially with the revival of neo-Meinonghian (meta-)ontologies. Alternative approaches consist in exploring the possibility of empty reference, i.e., fully legitimate singular terms without any reference. But soon non-entities acquired an even more important role. Philosophers began to discuss that strange object which is nothingness, characterized as the absence of everything (Priest 2014, Casati & Fujikawa 2019, Costantini 2020); sometimes arguing that it grounds all of reality (Priest & Gabriel 2022); others have argued for causation by absences or omissions, claiming that absences can enter into causal explanations (Dowe 2001, Shaffer 2004). The idea that the non-being can play an explanatory role in various philosophical contexts seems to be gaining ground. At the same time, these ideas have also been heavily criticized, for example by Mumford (2021) and Della Rocca (2020); while the former defends a position called Soft Parmenidism, the latter argues for the far more extreme position that there are no distinctions in reality denying any positive role to the non-being.
If we admit reference to nonexistent objects, why should we not admit that there are circumstances in which we see what there is not? Psychologists are familiar with illusory contours such as the Eherenstein illusion or the Kanizsa triangle. But recently, there has been a growing body of literature arguing that we experience and/or perceive absences. For example, Farennikova (2013) argues that absence experiences are perceptual phenomena. Moreover, Farennikova (2019) even argues that absences can have esthetic properties, with the implication that absence art enjoys objective value. By contrast, others have claimed that while we can experience absences, we do not perceive them (Gow 2021a, 2021b).
In this issue of JoLMA, we would like to discuss the deeper reasons that may lead us to admit the non-being (in whatever form) in our theorizing in various fields. First, what kind of theoretical role can the non-being play? Can it have any explanatory power? Or even a causal power? Second, can we experience absences and omissions? And if so, is this experience a perceptual phenomenon, or should it be explained in other terms? Third, how can the more traditional ontological views (such as Quine’s) resist such an admission? Do we really need the non-being, or can we do without it? Possible topics might include (but are not limited to) the following:
Philosophy of language & metaphysics: (supposed) reference to non-existent entities; non-being & nothingness; empty terms/ and empty reference; mere possibilia; absences, omissions, voids, holes, empty space; absences and the number zero; negative properties and/or negative facts; negative truths (truthmakers for negative truths).
Philosophy of Mind: perception of absences and omissions; illusory counters; perceptual paradoxes; theories of intentionality.
Philosophy of art: absence art; depicting absences; figures of absence; figural voids.
References
Bernstein, S., & Goldschmidt, T. (Eds.). (2021). Non-Being: New Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Casati, F., & Fujikawa, N. (2019). "Nothingness, Meinongianism and Inconsistent Mereology." Synthese, 196, 3739-72.
Casati, R.; Varzi, A.C. (1994). Holes and other superficialities. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Costantini, F. (2020). "Extending Everything with Nothing". Philosophia, 48(4), 1413-36.
Crane, T. (2013). The Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Della Rocca, M. (2020). The Parmenidean Ascent. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dowe, P. (2001). "A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation' by Omission". Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79(2), 216-26.
Farennikova, A. (2013). "Seeing Absence". Philosophical Studies, 166, 429-54.
Farennikova, A. (2019). "Would You Buy Absence Art?". Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics, 255-78. London: Routledge.
Gow, L. (2021a). "Empty Space, Silence, and Absence". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(7), 496-507.
Gow, L. (2021b). "A New Theory of Absence Experience". European Journal of Philosophy, 29(1), 168-81.
Irimia, A. (2021). "Depicting Absence: Thematic and Stylistic Paradoxes of Representation in Visual and Literary Imagery". Zocco, G. (ed.), The Rhetoric of Topics and Forms, vol. 4. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 533-44.
Mumford, S. (2021). Absence and Nothing: The Philosophy of what There is Not. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Priest, G. (2014). "Much Ado About Nothing". The Australasian Journal of Logic, 11(2).
Priest, G. (2016). "Towards Non-Being". Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Priest, G.; Gabriel, M. (2022). Everything and Nothing. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Schaffer, J. (2004). "Causes need not be physically connected to their effects: The case for negative causation". Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, 197-216.
Invited contributors
- Friederike Moltmann, CNRS
- Graham Priest, CUNY
- Stephen Mumford, Durham University
Submission deadline: May 31th, 2024
Notification of acceptance: August 15th, 2024
Articles must be written in English and should not exceed 6,500 words (40,000 characters approx.). The instructions for authors can be consulted in the journal’s website: ‘Editorial Guidelines’.
Submissions must be suitable for blind review. Each submission should also include a brief abstract of no more than 650 words and five keywords for indexing purposes. Notification of intent to submit, including both a title and a brief summary of the content, will be greatly appreciated, as it will assist with the coordination and planning of the issue.
For any question, please use the following addresses: Filippo Costantini (filippo.costantini@unive.it) or the journal (jolma_editor@unive.it).
Please submit your proposals to the email jolma_editor@unive.it or using the section ‘Submit’ of the journal’s website.
Go to the upload area
https://ecfpeerflow.unive.it/abstracts/form/journal/18/304
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CALL FOR PAPERS (JOLMA 6 | 1 | 2025)
Together: non-representational accounts of social cognition
Editor: Carlos Vara Sánchez
For a long time, in philosophy of mind and psychology, the ‘theory-theory’ and the ‘simulation theory’ have been the predominant approaches in trying to explain how one understands and interrelates with other people. Proponents of the first set of theories argue that we use folk or common sense psychology to infer things about other people's mental states (Baron-Cohen 1995; Leslie 1991). On the other hand, those who endorse the second approach consider that we use our own mental activity to elaborate models of other people’s minds (Gordon 1986; Heal 1986). Despite relevant differences, both frameworks share some basic assumptions, such as the unobservability principle (Krueger 2012) —i.e., we need some extra-perceptual processes to gain knowledge from mental states— or the observational stance —i.e., we need to observe others to explain their behavior.
In the last decades, the situation has changed. The conversation has become more nuanced and complex. New frameworks have offered novel approaches to social cognition. Among the reasons for this change, we can mention the resurging of phenomenological (Merleau-Ponty 2012) and pragmatist theories of the mind (Dewey 1922), the consolidation of James Gibson’s ecological psychology (Gibson 1979), and the emergence of enactivism (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). All these circumstances have brought renewed ideas, concepts, and perspectives to the debate. Compared to the theory-theory and the simulation theory, a common aspect contributed by these approaches is an emphasis on non-representational explanations of social cognition. Instead of private events such as simulations and inferences, we now find dynamic and action-oriented notions that are deeply embodied and embedded in the sociomaterial environment. Mentions of habits, resonance, attunement, constraints, affordances, or coordination are often found when discussing social cognition from a non-representational perspective in the work of Shaun Gallagher (2020), Anthony Chemero (2009), Giovanna Colombetti (2014), Reuben M. Baron (1980), Dan Zahavi (2014), or Thomas Fuchs (2018). However, there is still much to discuss in this field.
This issue of JOLMA intends to contribute to the debate on non-representational approaches to social cognition and their viability. We aim to collect both sympathetic and critical papers on this topic coming from a variety of philosophical and psychological perspectives. Possible topics might include (but are not limited to) the following:
- Limitations and strengths of non-representational approaches to social cognition;
- Direct perception and social interaction;
- On the possibility of higher-order social cognitive processes without representations;
- Tensions between ecological psychology and enactivism in social cognition;
- Social interaction;
- Non-representational dynamics of social cognition;
- On habits and affordances;
- Affectivity and intersubjectivity.
Invited Contributors:
- Laura Candiotto, University of Pardubice
- Edward Baggs, University of Southern Denmark
- Miguel Segundo-Ortín, University of Murcia
Submission deadline: December 31st, 2024
Notification of acceptance: February 15th, 2025
Articles must be written in English and should not exceed 6,500 words (40,000 characters approx.). The instructions for authors can be consulted in the journal’s website: ‘Editorial Guidelines’.
Submissions must be suitable for blind review. Each submission should also include a brief abstract of no more than 650 words and five keywords for indexing purposes. Notification of intent to submit, including both a title and a brief summary of the content, will be greatly appreciated, as it will assist with the coordination and planning of the issue.
For any question, please use the following address: Carlos Vara Sánchez (carlosvarasanchez@gmail.com) or the journal (jolma_editor@unive.it).
Please submit your proposals to the email jolma_editor@unive.it or using the section ‘Submit’ of the journal’s website.
Go to the upload area
https://peerflow.edizionicafoscari.it/abstracts/form/journal/18/335
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